Human Terrain & Anthropology (merged thread)

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

To kick or not kick is not really the problem. That comes down to good behaviour, and common sense.

Both of which are rare and, also, culturally defined .

... but HTTs are working for the military. That means that have to have some military utility. They must be useful. The military has a defined mission and that is what the HTTs have to support. The military is not there to enable the HTTs to gather information of Ethnographic interest.
Surely their job is to furnish information in support of the mission? Isn't that an S2 function?

Is it a civil affairs function?

I think you, and a lot of people, are caught up in a terminology (and perception) problem here. The first part deals with the concept of "mission". First off, all missions are nested under and, in theory, subservient to a policy "mission". What may be the most immediately effective way to achieve a specific mission may actually lead to an increased likeliness of a higher order mission failing. This seems to be the niche in which the HTS was originally conceived of to fill - figuring out when the "normal" actions on a mission would increase the likelihood of failure for a higher order mission. That isn't really either an S2 or CA function.

Second, the "military utility" of an HTT is, in theory, both preventative as well as supportive in nature. Again, in theory, it should cover the spectrum from really low level missions (e.g. door kicking) to the highest order they can influence (e.g. which local power structures to work with). This just doesn't fit in nicely with the standard definitions of who does what, when and how, and it has certainly led to confusion about the role of the HTTs and the HTS.

[120mm]

I think it is probably a good time to point out, that as currently configured, HTS teams' primary mission is to provide overlap of ethnographic information between rotations.

Originally, HTS was supposed to be a computer system, but it failed, miserably. The teams were conceived as an analog way to pass ethnographic information from one rotation to another.

Apparently, the system has grown bigger than that, but it's conception was a reaction to the Army's inability to properly do a battle handoff with the inhabitants of their "battle space".

[marct]

You know, it's a totally weird evolution. If you go back to the earliest discussions, the original concept, apparently, was to provide some base level cultural training to deployed troops with an ethnographic library "back-up".

I wonder what a generation is in terms of its mission?

[Ken White]

I get the dumbass regular army thing; however, I only get info from SF guys over beer, once they realize that you're "okay". That is a two-edged blade.

You missed the point. Dumbasses on both sides are the problem. I've seen SF teams get wrapped up in a green blanket and mystique and get really dumb as well as RA Cdrs tell the Teams to get a haircut. It is a two edged blade; both sides are at fault and it is abysmally stupid.

I'm also irrelevant. I see a trend with an inverse relationship between compliancy and relevancy. But that is just basic large group dynamics, the more I think about it.

No question but there are more non-compliant folks in the sense you meant than compliant ones, I believe...

That is the rub, isn't it?

Not to me, I wouldn't put a politician in charge of anything.

[ODB]

a dumbass. There is a time and a place to act in the ways so many complain about. When an Army BCT is targeting an ODA based on SIGINT and said ODA sends up a picture of one of it's members to the BCT S2, then said member goes into the TOC to brief the S2, the S2 realizes it's his target, makes for a funny story. Unfortunately in reality it is not funny. Or how about the time a conventional GO decided no one would leave a FOB in civilian clothes and vehicles. Intel dried up immediately because those he was complaining about stopped doing their job to comply. Same GO within a week came back begging for them to get back to work. Or the time an ODA thought they didn't need battle space approval for missions, then get into a skirmish and have no QRF support because no one knows they were even out conducting operations. I can go on and on, as we all can about the dumbasses on both sides, but the bottom line is it comes down to individuals. There is a common ground we all should be working towards to complete, unfortunately when individual agendas get in the way we end up with things like those stated above. No one side is more guilty than the other it just depends on the individuals involved. I have said before that I believe now than any other time in history are many of these issues going away and that the relationship between SOF and CF have never been better. Finally is everyone starting to understand what it is each other does, the big problem is when others want to do the jobs of each other and not their own job. There are many who "get it", unfortunately after 7 years there are still too many who do not. Too many have the I'm "special" attitude, why are they "special", because they are "Special Forces" who work for "Special Operations Command". That's two "specials", too bad they forget about the 3rd one, the individual!

As far as information sharing, there is a bigger picture out there that we all have our piece to paint. Whether we like it or not, all of us in the Army are compartmentalized for various reasons. There are different authorities that allow each of us to do different things, not everyone needs to know everything. I have heartburn when a BCT tells me they have their list of 300locals that I cannot talk to, what? That lasted all of 1/2 a day, when did they get into my business?

Additionally ethnography (had to look it up), but when I did I found it to be one word that sums up what I do. When one looks at techniques:

Direct, first-hand observation of daily behavior. This can include participant observation.

Conversation with different levels of formality. This can involve small talk to long interviews.

The genealogical method. This is a set of procedures by which ethnographers discover and record connections of kinship, descent and marriage using diagrams and symbols.

Detailed work with key consultants about particular areas of community life.

In-depth interviewing.

Discovery of local beliefs and perceptions.

Problem-oriented research.

Longitudinal research. This is continuous long-term study of an area or site.

Team research.

Case studies.

Sounds like what SF teams do daily.....

[marct]

Hi ODB,

Additionally ethnography (had to look it up),

LOL - from the Greek (like a lot of big academic words) ethnos - "people" and "graphos" - writing. Literally writing about a "People".

but when I did I found it to be one word that sums up what I do. When one looks at techniques:

Sounds like what SF teams do daily.....

Yup. Never said you folks didn't do it, and I'd love to buy you a few rounds sometime and chat with you about how you do do it. Maybe write an ethnography of SF ethnographers .

[ODB]

That is the million dollar question. We all know things are being done, but where those reports end up is the question. Additionally when they are passed around it's up to individuals whether they continue to distribute or file away. IMO the information is out there, but individuals with their own agendas hold it up or decide that because of the source they don't need it and develop (recreate the wheel) their own products. This is what we need to get over! I'm just one individual but it starts with individuals and if others start to come on board then we can make things happen the way they are suppose to. The whole networking thing, who knows maybe someday I'll be in some distant land with one of the very people on here and we'll both think back to these discussions and do things they way they should be done.

I'm always up for a few good rounds and some meeting of the minds. Best way to learn IMO, next to experiences.

[marct]

I'm always up for a few good rounds and some meeting of the minds. Best way to learn IMO, next to experiences.

Works for me .

You're right about the information compartmentalization, and it's not only in the military - we (Anthropologists) do it as well.

[William F. Owen]

Hi Wilf,
Both of which are rare and, also, culturally defined .

Agreed, but that doesn't change anything!

First off, all missions are nested under and, in theory, subservient to a policy "mission". What may be the most immediately effective way to achieve a specific mission may actually lead to an increased likeliness of a higher order mission failing.

Well I think I am pretty well versed in the difference between, task, mission, plan, and even strategy. I see all as being different things, but we do not have a universal set of definitions here.

That isn't really either an S2 or CA function.

- Then it needs to be challenged and held to greater rigour than I had previously suggested. Seems like HTTs should work for the State Department then

This just doesn't fit in nicely with the standard definitions of who does what, when and how, and it has certainly led to confusion about the role of the HTTs and the HTS.

Again, this would seem to indicate a lack of rigour.

The role of HTTs reminds me of that of Wellington's cavalry - who thought their job was to "add tone to what would otherwise be a vulgar brawl."

[jcustis]

I would have to offer, that at least in my personal experience right at this moment, ODAs can at times have very specific agendas, like the mentoring and development of CT or "I-SWAT" teams that puts that effort at odds with the larger business of doing those things you mentioned ODB. Again, it is my current observation here in N. Iraq; results elsewhere may vary.

What I will also offer is the rant that I think it is totally presumtuous for a HTT to draft a report on the goings-on in my TF's AO, without ever setting one foot on the ground, talking with one single local national (to say nothing about taling with sheikhs, muktars, and men-on-the-stree), or perusing the conditions at any local market. So then how can that HTT presume to write a report about tribal and ethnic tensions on an electoral process, when we already know what their executive summary says? This same report smells exactly as if they simply read intentions reports and intelligence summaries and then slapped their own shade of lipstick on the baboon's ass. It remains a baboon's ass, however.

The problem lies in the fact that the folks who are tasked with employing aspects of HTT support just don't frigging know how to do it, and at time don't want to be bothered...Right as I got into country, the non-kinetic effects manager of our higher headquarters was concerned about the pending arrival of a human terrain team to his command, and he frankly did not know what to do with them, in part because he did not have the exposure, training, or both. I pointed him in the direction of this Council and the data repository of the Journal, in the hope that he would get enough read-in information to avoid getting steam-rolled by any agenda. Heck, he already had a huge wall chart of reconstruction project information that was in various states of disarray. He "got it" but he had neither the staff or time to manage the volume of the effort as effectively as he probably could have. And then a HTT gets tossed into the mix?

I was a huge fan of the PRT concept when I first read about much of it here within this very board. In pratical terms, there is anecdotal information that many battalion commanders find the PRT and embedded PRT efforts as a distraction, waste of time, and often very counter to their understanding of the commander's intent that was received from their higher headquarters. You know what they say about there not being any "I" in team, and I have already dealt with two PRT guys who have impressed me as being almost egocentric to the point that they could not possibly hear and understand what we were saying in response to their ideas and commentary. Couple that with this looming sense of zero movement on about anything that really needs to get done, and it is downright frustrating.

To cite just one example, we had a supporting PRT lead show up and try to pitch his development ideas to my boss, but he continued to harp on the red-tape he had to go through (some 17 steps with DoS) to get a project implemented via his channels. He wanted, however, to support our Task Force's efforts by assisting us with employing our funds to spin up the same sort of project. To all this, my boss told him basically thanks, but no thanks. Why should he utilize his money for something that should be a matter led by State in the first place?...and if it was hard because of the 17 steps, then maybe it just wan't meant to be performed by his TF either.

In just this past year or so, I have begun to rage against the degree with which we are outsourcing so much capability, and the PRTs and HTTs are starting to frustrate me, right along with the Law ENforcement Professional program, which at least for my TF, has turned out to be a bust and is about three years too late.

[120mm]

Agreed, but that doesn't change anything!

- Then it needs to be challenged and held to greater rigour than I had previously suggested. Seems like HTTs should work for the State Department then

I would suggest that the Army should work for DoS, at least in COIN.

IWhat I will also offer is the rant that I think it is totally presumtuous for a HTT to draft a report on the goings-on in my TF's AO, without ever setting one foot on the ground, talking with one single local national (to say nothing about taling with sheikhs, muktars, and men-on-the-stree), or perusing the conditions at any local market. So then how can that HTT presume to write a report about tribal and ethnic tensions on an electoral process, when we already know what their executive summary says? This same report smells exactly as if they simply read intentions reports and intelligence summaries and then slapped their own shade of lipstick on the baboon's ass. It remains a baboon's ass, however.

I cannot imagine how an HTT can continue to collect their prodigious salaries and never leave the wire. Did the commander not let them out of the gate, or did the HTT not leave based on their own judgement?

The problem lies in the fact that the folks who are tasked with employing aspects of HTT support just don't frigging know how to do it, and at time don't want to be bothered...Right as I got into country, the non-kinetic effects manager of our higher headquarters was concerned about the pending arrival of a human terrain team to his command, and he frankly did not know what to do with them, in part because he did not have the exposure, training, or both. I pointed him in the direction of this Council and the data repository of the Journal, in the hope that he would get enough read-in information to avoid getting steam-rolled by any agenda. Heck, he already had a huge wall chart of reconstruction project information that was in various states of disarray. He "got it" but he had neither the staff or time to manage the volume of the effort as effectively as he probably could have. And then a HTT gets tossed into the mix?

I wonder why he couldn't form a council of the various actors to cause them to coordinate and self-direct. He sounds like a micro-managing type who got what he deserved, frankly. Way too many folks in the military who manage/direct assets without knowing how to lead or to just let others do their jobs.

To me, a staff officer or commander would be well-served to look at product, first, and then share that vision with the actors, who can then be convinced/coerced/massaged into getting the commander's product.

BTW - the staff officer or commander have to expect that the actor gets his/hers, too, in the process of helping each other out.

[Stan]

I cannot imagine how an HTT can continue to collect their prodigious salaries and never leave the wire. Did the commander not let them out of the gate, or did the HTT not leave based on their own judgment?

That issue is no longer an "issue". They will be promoted to the prestigious grade of GS-12 and promptly dumped outside the wire (assuming they stay on board)

HTS Program Managers Spared, Laugh On Way to Bank

By John Stanton

Filed under > Commentary

(The Intelligence Daily) -- “I will bet that there is more to this than SOFA issue! It would be interesting to know the true reason this has happened. I can imagine that there are some unhappy campers in the program now.”

On February 9, 2009, Human Terrain System (HTS) program manager Steve Fondacaro informed HTS employees that they were being converted to Term Government Employees. The catalyst for the drastic change was, according to Fondacaro, the new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Iraqi Government. Yet, sources believe there is something fishy about the SOFA cover, particularly since their treatment by HTS program management (Steve Fondacaro, Steve Rotkoff—Deputy Program Manager, and Montgomery McFate-Sapone-Senior Social Scientist) over the past year has been anything but stellar. Further, BAE SYSTEMS was not notified by HTS program management but, according to sources, by HTS employees who had gotten word of the changes afoot through the HTS grapevine.

[marct]

That issue is no longer an "issue". They will be promoted to the prestigious grade of GS-12 and promptly dumped outside the wire (assuming they stay on board)

Too true, Stan! Take a look at John's latest report. This part in particular caught my eye:

"As of 8:00AM Monday morning, 9 February, the US federal government made a move to make all Human Terrain Team jobs federal positions. BAE was never notified in advance and received notification at about the same time as employees. This is a major pay cut [for us] and you would not believe how much. I was making six figures (USD) with the opportunity to make much more when I got to Iraq. Now I drop to five figures and with my cap as a government employee I will not make much more. But a social scientist with absolutely no experience will still be making the six figure amount! We will now all be labeled as Intelligence Analysts and that includes analysts, research managers, social scientists and team leaders. Many of us can't afford to quit because of financial obligations. Social Scientists in the program are torn now because they can't take a position that says Intelligence Analyst as a job description."

That last sentence, if true, will be a real problem. One other thing is that this quote seems to imply that there will be different pay grades for social scientists and other team members. If THAT is true, it is a kiss of death as far as team building is concerned .

[Stan]

Hey Marc !
The things one can google these days I ran across Implications of Space and Time (nice job BTW) and the US. Army's Professional Writing Collection.

You may have very well provided the first complete set of definitions for AO that, to this day, I never spent much time thinking about.

Then the Army comes (came) up with The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s)

Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) have recently been employed in Afghanistan at the brigade level to support a focus on the information environment in planning with very positive initial success. ... The education pipeline, however, is not overflowing with trained information experts and most brigades will likely never see a social scientist assigned to their staff.

Not quite sure why I think this para means absolutely nothing, but yet, says it it all.

[Ken White]

ways to rid themselves of a program that is drawing flak while never admitting any mistakes on their part.

The Armed forces of the US are masters of the various techniques...

[marct]

The things one can google these days I ran across Implications of Space and Time (nice job BTW) and the US. Army's Professional Writing Collection.

You may have very well provided the first complete set of definitions for AO that, to this day, I never spent much time thinking about.

Hey Stan,

Thanks - I enjoyed writing it (if any masochists want to read it, it's here). I've got to admit that the assumptions they operate on are really bad blinders .

The education pipeline, however, is not overflowing with trained information experts and most brigades will likely never see a social scientist assigned to their staff.

You know, that might not be a bad thing . Seriously, though, I would rather see social scientists interacting with planners, trainers and simulators (oh yeah, and the policy folks too!), than foisting us off on an unsuspecting BCT. Okay, I'll admit, I'd love to do fieldwork with one, but that gets us back to the question about foisting social scientists off on military personnel in a war zone...

[Ron Humphrey]

Hey Stan,

Thanks - I enjoyed writing it (if any masochists want to read it, it's here). I've got to admit that the assumptions they operate on are really bad blinders .

Read earlier after Stan posted about it and it didn't hurt as much as I thought it might

Think your on to something though with exactly how and or where integration takes place. If someone specializes in things which happen over long periods of time then aside from the fact they might recognize something not exactly sure how well they'll ever not be somewhat of a difficulty for those who have deal with the "here and now, right now" day to day action.

[marct]

Hi Ron,

Read earlier after Stan posted about it and it didn't hurt as much as I thought it might

Drat, I'm going to have to maqke those posts more academic or my rep will be RUINED!!!!!!

Think your on to something though with exactly how and or where integration takes place. If someone specializes in things which happen over long periods of time then aside from the fact they might recognize something not exactly sure how well they'll ever not be somewhat of a difficulty for those who have deal with the "here and now, right now" day to day action.

It is tricky. I tend to think in centuries / millenia, and that gets really tricky for my students to understand. On the whole, I know it is possible - I've been able to do it - but it is tricky.

[120mm]

I am looking more and more like a freaking genius for taking my current gig.

BTW, things are just rockin' in Kabul, so far...

[Stan]

I am looking more and more like a freaking genius for taking my current gig.

BTW, things are just rockin' in Kabul, so far...

Hey Drew !
Say, you're not hangin' out with Anthropologists at the local bars, are you ?

Stay safe and keep your powder dry !

Regards, Stan