Human Terrain & Anthropology (merged thread)

[marct]

half a dozen of the other, Ken .

And lest you think I wasn't including Canadian politicians...

[Ken White]

great indicator of why World Government should be diligently avoided. At least a large number of gaggles of politicians will do less damage than one big gaggle...

[marct]

At least a large number of gaggles of politicians will do less damage than one big gaggle...

Oh, I don't know... If they were all in the same place at the same time, there are some great possibilities .

[Norfolk]

great indicator of why World Government should be diligently avoided. At least a large number of gaggles of politicians will do less damage than one big gaggle...

Ken, I believe that you and marc are describing Distributed Operations, using politicans instead of infantry. I'm certain the enemy in the GWOT would just tremble at the sight of such a mighty show of force and demonstration of resolve...

I find myself rather disinclined towards the HTT concept. While I am not entirely averse to a small research presence in-theatre, I'm not certain that HTT's would result in benefits that would outweigh the risks of putting anthropologists and other researchers in situations where the natives, so to speak, might get a little restless. And even if the HTT's had military escorts, even some of the time, this might just aggravate certain sensibilities, on both sides.

Officers should develop a practical grasp of local life, culture, and conditions; that many may not, never mind the Other Ranks, is a problem that can only be addressed at home, in the education system, which seems to serve admirably to atrophy and close the minds of the young. If anything, I would recommend that a few of the better minds on the HTT's tour around Military Units providing a little practical guidance on ethnography to the officers and men. It's not much, but maybe a little more useful and a little safer, than going out to survey a society still at war.

And a good time was had by all! Well, most.

[John T. Fishel]

Personally, I have no problem with HTTs, anthropologists and other social scientists at the operational level so long as their efforts are focused on trying to reduce casualties among the innocent. (Boy what an oversimplification but you get my drift.) On the strategic level, each individual must decide whether he sees the war as just or not - if, not then resign or don't join up. (I realize that a soldier is somewhat more limited regarding thos kinds of choices but not completely.)

In the 80s, I ran into a card carrying anthropologist who was a CIA employee working psychological ops for El Salvador. He was the author of the anti-landmine theme that was expressed in the most effective propaganda poster I ever saw - a beautiful little girl dressed in a white formal dress on crutches because her lower leg had been blown off by a mine. The caption read, "And her human rights?" ("Y sus derechos humanos?") He was certainly on the side of the angels, in my book and his postercontributed indirectly to the success of the anti-landmine treaty - an unintended consequence, perhaps.

[marct]

Personally, I have no problem with HTTs, anthropologists and other social scientists at the operational level so long as their efforts are focused on trying to reduce casualties among the innocent. (Boy what an oversimplification but you get my drift.) On the strategic level, each individual must decide whether he sees the war as just or not - if, not then resign or don't join up. (I realize that a soldier is somewhat more limited regarding thos kinds of choices but not completely.)

Yeah, I do get your drift. And, on the whole, I agree with the way you have framed it. I have some, hmmm, tactical/operational level problems with the original HTT proposal - it was those databases with real names that got to me). I have no problems with them trying to reduce casualties by identifying specific "at risk" groups in terms of poverty, demographics, etc. I would also have no problem going armed if I was over there . Then again, unlike a lot of my confreres, I actually do know how to shoot and use a blade.

In addition to the strategic level moral decision, I think there is also a pragmatic moral crux. In the case of the Iraq war, I, personally, believe it to be an unjust war. At the same time, there are many things happening in the world that I believe to be unjust, and that doesn't stop me from playing Don Quixote to them . We don't live in a perfect world, and that means that we have to clean up the excrement politicians leave lying around at times before more people die. I would have volunteered for the HTTs already (if they'd take me ), but it looks like they only want red-blooded US Type Americans - prejudice I tell you .

Marc

[John T. Fishel]

Isn't that enough?

I agree with you on the databases with real names. Pragmatically, over the long haul it doesn't help the war effort to maintain that kind of database. different story for intel types but theirs are more selective anyway (or should be).

Ceaning up after politicos seems to be an occupational hazard on these pages: Malcom Nance (aka Abu Buckwheat), Stu Harrington, John Nagl, Dave Kilcullen, and all the gang in the Small Wars Council. But without some good politicians all our cleanup efforts would be in vain.

Cheers

JohnT

[marct]

in the ongoing culture war...

A CounterPunch Special Investigation
Pilfered Scholarship Devastates General Petraeus's Counterinsurgency Manual

* Core Chapter a Morass of "Borrowed" Quotes
* University of Chicago Press Badly Compromised
* Counterinsurgency Anthropologist Montgomery McFate's Role Under Attack

By DAVID PRICE


Editors' note: This expose of the stolen scholarship in the Army's new manual on counterinsurgency to which General David Petraeus has attached his name also runs in our current newsletter sent by US mail or as a pdf to our newsletter subscribers. Normally material in our newsletter does not run on the CounterPunch website. In the belief that David Price's story merits the widest and swiftest circulation, not only as regards the "borrowings" from unacknowledged sources but also the prostitution of anthropology in evil military enterprises we re making an exception in this case. AC / JSC

Full article here.

[Steve Blair]

Sad to say I didn't see much of an expose here...more just a collection of innuendo and invictive. Ah, well.....all in a day's unbiased research, I guess....

[marct]

Hi Steve,

Sad to say I didn't see much of an expose here...more just a collection of innuendo and invictive. Ah, well.....all in a day's unbiased research, I guess....

Well, if you check ut the very end, you will see the case for plagiarism in detail. I do have some problems with it, mainly the old "common knowledge" rule seems to have been forgotten. I think what truly bugs me is that the references didn't have to be taken out - they could easily have been left in, especially for the Chicago edition!

[Steve Blair]

Hi Steve,



Well, if you check ut the very end, you will see the case for plagiarism in detail. I do have some problems with it, mainly the old "common knowledge" rule seems to have been forgotten. I think what truly bugs me is that the references didn't have to be taken out - they could easily have been left in, especially for the Chicago edition!

I agree about the Chicago edition...and did find the lack of notes odd (especially when compared to the Marine Corps' Warfighting books that contain good notes). They certainly could have done a better job there. Not sure if I'd hang the bones for that one on sloppy editing on the part of the military (some GO didn't like the look of endnotes or footnotes) or a style guide suited for standard FMs and not up to the task of this one. Or just someone(s) being stupid....

But it just gets my hackles up when attacks like this come out against a military publication while the same 'academic sources' remain silent regarding cases within their own ranks (Ward Churchill springs immediately to mind, but there are others...Ambrose for another). Been a long Tuesday already, and that just spiked the ol' blood pressure and triggered the "need beer" sensor....

[marct]

Hi Steve,

But it just gets my hackles up when attacks like this come out against a military publication while the same 'academic sources' remain silent regarding cases within their own ranks (Ward Churchill springs immediately to mind, but there are others...Ambrose for another). Been a long Tuesday already, and that just spiked the ol' blood pressure and triggered the "need beer" sensor....

I'm finding "warning: beer low" lights flashing inside my own head right now . Yeah, I also have problems with the rhetoric being used. Anyway, 'nuff said for now.

[Beelzebubalicious]

It’s probably pointless to critique Price since his arguments will be supported by those who hold his viewpoint and dismissed by those who don’t. But, I think it’s worthwhile critiquing his critique.

The authors of the manual made a mistake by not noting references to published works. The point is made. We all know how this is an issue in the academic world. Plagiarism is probably the worse thing an academic can do - perhaps even worse than sleeping with one’s student. By the way, in my opinion, academia can be its own petri dish of intellectual incest – everything is derivative.

However, as McFate points out, this isn’t an academic work nor was it meant for an academic audience. The bigger picture is that it is laying out a strategy for use in the field. Being academic would be entirely useless in this regard. I may be wrong, but I don’t think that the Manual aims to be “…an object of academic respectability” as Price claims. His entire point rests on tearing this down as an academic work.

Of course, Price doesn’t just make his point and move on; he uses the point to make a lot of other arguments. I find a lot of his connections and assumptions irresponsible. For example, he quotes “Human Terrain research gathers data that help inform what Assistant Undersecretary of Defense John Wilcox recently described as the military's ‘need to map Human Terrain across the Kill Chain’”. Yes, the army needs to do this. But where is the specific link, other than the use of the term “human terrain” to the HTT project and the use of Anthropologists. If there was a statement or reference from a HTT authority or publication stating that this was the goal, that would be one thing, but if it’s just a weak connection to a line from a PPT presentation that discusses weapons technology, then that’s another.

Price goes on to attack McFate, of course. One of his lamest arguments is that “The military and intelligence community loves McFate and her programs not because her thinking is innovative -- but because…[she] tell them what they already know.” First of all, he misses the point. Helping the military to understand culture is the point, starting at the beginning. It doesn’t have to be innovative, but it should be simple, easy to understand and applicable/useful. Most academic work is not. Second, Price falls into the trap that many Anthropologists do which is assuming the role of critic and defender of the defenseless. It starts with taking a pre-determined position on a situation, say “the military is evil” and then seeking to attack it from that viewpoint. What if you’re an Anthropologist and you happen to believe the military is not evil and you support their goals and objectives?

His last statement is, “Considering the Manual's importance for Iraq, perhaps it is only fitting that American strategists are now trying to win a war based on lies with the stolen words and thoughts of others.” I know words are important and words sometimes get us into big messes, but this isn’t a war of words.

[Rob Thornton]

I do not think Price understands there is a difference between the effort of writing something down and the effort (and stones) required to put it into practice. This is where I appreciate McFate most, she walks the walk. Hats off to her and those willing to serve and give us a hand.

Price can sit back and huck stones till his arms gets tired - if he wants traction here - he's got some sacrificing to do before he can carry the water to those anthropologists going out on the HTTs. I used to tell my soldiers who decided to leave the Army after one tour - that in my eyes, their service put them head and shoulders above those who would not serve - they were among the best part of America - reading Price reminded why I said that to them. Folks like Price are not worth the time - they'll never get past the printed page.

[marct]

Hi Beelzebubalicious,

It’s probably pointless to critique Price since his arguments will be supported by those who hold his viewpoint and dismissed by those who don’t. But, I think it’s worthwhile critiquing his critique.

I agree.

The authors of the manual made a mistake by not noting references to published works. The point is made. We all know how this is an issue in the academic world.

I am not sure if it was the authors - my understanding is that the references, and quotation marks, were in the original drafts of the document, probably in (MLA or APA) footnote format. Is it "plagiarism" when citations were included in the draft and sticken by the editors? I don't think so.

However, as McFate points out, this isn’t an academic work nor was it meant for an academic audience. The bigger picture is that it is laying out a strategy for use in the field. Being academic would be entirely useless in this regard. I may be wrong, but I don’t think that the Manual aims to be “…an object of academic respectability” as Price claims. His entire point rests on tearing this down as an academic work.

This is somewhat tricky. Yes, the field manual was not meant as an academic work originally, but David does have a point about how it has been taken up after U of C published it. I can understand why they reproduced the pdf version, but I am surprised, and bothered, that they didn't offer a proper, academic version as well. I doubt that it was portrayed by the authors as “…an object of academic respectability”, but by virtue of being published by U of C it has been constructed as such by pop culture. As such it is, IMO, an obvious IO failure on someones part to think through the possible ramifications of publishing it in that venue.

Of course, Price doesn’t just make his point and move on; he uses the point to make a lot of other arguments. I find a lot of his connections and assumptions irresponsible. For example, he quotes “Human Terrain research gathers data that help inform what Assistant Undersecretary of Defense John Wilcox recently described as the military's ‘need to map Human Terrain across the Kill Chain’”. Yes, the army needs to do this. But where is the specific link, other than the use of the term “human terrain” to the HTT project and the use of Anthropologists. If there was a statement or reference from a HTT authority or publication stating that this was the goal, that would be one thing, but if it’s just a weak connection to a line from a PPT presentation that discusses weapons technology, then that’s another.

Yup; he is using what JG Fraser (The Golden Bough, 1906-15; yeah, I have the 12 volumn version on my shelf ) called the Law of Contagion - this is polluted therefore everything it touches is polluted; surprisingly sophisticated magical thinking for someone claiming to be "objective" .

Probably the worst effect of his "critique" is that by making it in this format, he has created a hostile environment for any positive critique of FM 3-24. For example, the definition of "symbol"

Counterinsurgency Manual, section 3-51: Cultural Forms

"Symbolscan beobjects, activities, words, relationships, events, or gestures."

Unacknowledged Source:

"The symbols I observed in the field were, empirically, objects, activities, relationships, events, gestures, and spatial units in a ritual situation" (Turner, Victor. The Forest of Symbols. Cornell University Press, 1967. P.19.)

is, in my opinion, poor simply because of the exclusion of the word "empirical". I've used a lot of Turner's work myself in my comments on IO and PSYOPS here at SWC and his models have some excellent applicability. Price's critique, however, means that it will now be a "harder sell" for me to get that more sophisticated understanding of symbols into operations simply because such an attempt is more likely to be viewed as an attack rather than a critique and expansion. In this, at least, he has probably succeeded in his obviously ideologically driven agenda of spearating Anthropology and the military.

Price goes on to attack McFate, of course. One of his lamest arguments is that “The military and intelligence community loves McFate and her programs not because her thinking is innovative -- but because…[she] tell them what they already know.” First of all, he misses the point. Helping the military to understand culture is the point, starting at the beginning. It doesn’t have to be innovative, but it should be simple, easy to understand and applicable/useful. Most academic work is not.

Of course most academic work isn't simple - if it were, then anyone could do it and you wouldn't "need" academics . On a (slightly) more sophisticated note, all specialized groups create specialized language and models to define their professional spheres and maintain their social control over specific task areas (cf Andrew Abbott, The System of the Professions, University of Chicago Press, 1988). A corollary of this is that professions attempt to destroy those who would open their knowledge bases to the "laity". In this particular case, the "witch hunting" process (in the post malleus maleficarum sense of witchcraft as heresy rather than witchcraft as delusion [cf the canoni episcopi]) is compounded by the "moral" valuation of the military by many within Anthropoogy.

Second, Price falls into the trap that many Anthropologists do which is assuming the role of critic and defender of the defenseless. It starts with taking a pre-determined position on a situation, say “the military is evil” and then seeking to attack it from that viewpoint. What if you’re an Anthropologist and you happen to believe the military is not evil and you support their goals and objectives?

Don't be so Manichean about it ! What if you are an Anthropologist who supports only some of the goals and objectives? What if <shudder> you are actually trying to be objective about the entire thing?!?

His last statement is, “Considering the Manual's importance for Iraq, perhaps it is only fitting that American strategists are now trying to win a war based on lies with the stolen words and thoughts of others.” I know words are important and words sometimes get us into big messes, but this isn’t a war of words.

Back to the Law of Contagion again. Yes, words are important as are the perceptions and connotations they imply. You are right that this isn't a war of words, and yet, at the same time, it is a war of words and thoughts and actions.

Marc

[Brian Hanley]

is it "plagiarism" when citations were included in the draft and sticken by the editors? I don't think so.

It is very bad editing to open a book to charges of plagiarism. The criticism of the book as a politically rushed document stands, and I suspect that particular editing decision was made to improve its "look". It may also be that McFate is dissembling a wee bit, but I don't know that. Ensconced now in graduate-student land my view of PhDs has become highly cynical. Quite a few liars and operators in academia, and they learn an ethos that is the inverse of "Semper Fidelis".

Those I have worked with have not touched a line of what I have written except for excisions and making requests to me for revision. Once they held up final press at some expense to fix 3 slightly wrong citations. So not all military related books are edited this way.

Aside from that this matter of anthropologists participating in warfare is sticky for a pretty simple reason. It makes those studying anyone anywhere open to question as a functional spy. In quite a few regions of the world that anthropologists study indigenous peoples that can get them killed. Thus, it is a practical matter for the profession. However, anthropologists fairly frequently find themselves "involved" in the struggles of indigenous peoples. So it is somewhat disingenuous for the profession to act as if its hands are entirely clean.

A very dear friend of mine got involved in the revolutionary movement in Bolivia while studying the tin miners as a field anthropologist. In the end, after springing a couple of revoluionairies out of prisons they were being tortured in, she had a hit squad assigned to kill her from both the leftists and the rightists. She was saved by two old Bolivian men who had served together in the same unit during Bolivia's war of independence. They had shifted to opposite sides but still maintained their friendship and decided they should save her life. The execution order still stands today should she return.

Personally, I read anthropology. It is highly educational, and some of it very readable.

[SWJED]

“Desperate People with Limited Skills” by LTC John Nagl at the SWJ Blog.

Writing and Employing the Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual

In the current issue of “Counterpunch”, anthropologist Dr. David Price continues his assault on social scientists assisting national efforts to succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan. This time he impugns the work of anthropologists who helped write Field Manual 3-24, the Counterinsurgency Field Manual that was published by the Army and Marine Corps in December 2006 and republished by the University of Chicago Press in July 2007.

Price’s essay is extensive, but the argument and the tone of the whole can be extrapolated from this paragraph on the first page:

Most academics know that bad things can happen when marginally skilled writers must produce ambitious amounts of writing in short time periods; sometimes the only resulting calamities are grammatical abominations, but in other instances the pressures to perform lead to shoddy academic practices. Neither of these outcomes is especially surprising among desperate people with limited skills-- but Petraeus and others leading the charge apparently did not worry about such trivialities: they had to crank out a new strategy to calm growing domestic anger at military failures in Iraq.

I will attempt to explain the motivation for the project that led to the writing of the Field Manual as I observed it, provide a few words explaining the process of writing doctrine, and then discuss the effects of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual in the field and on the American military. This is not an official response to Price’s essay, and I do not speak on behalf of the Army, General Petraeus, or any of the other members of the team that produced the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, but only for myself...

Much more at the link...

[Rank amateur]

Looks like Mr. Nagl can stand up for himself. I thought the charge of "cultural relativism" was devastating and potentially fatal.

[SWJED]

Army Response to Counterpunch

In response to a SWJ e-mail concerning Dr. David Price’s recent Counterpunch article U.S. Army spokesman Major Tom McCuin:

As Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl stated:

Military Field Manuals have their own grammar and their own logic. They are not doctoral dissertations, designed to be read by few and judged largely for the quality of their sourcing; instead, they are intended for applied use by Soldiers. Thus authors are not named, and those whose scholarship informs the manual are only credited if they are quoted extensively.
The essential point to be made is that the messages contained in the manual are valid, regardless of any discussion of academic standards. Any argument over missing citations should in no way diminish the manual's utility in the current counterinsurgency fight. The emphasis on cultural understanding and increased reliance on non-lethal forms of engagement to achieve military goals represents a giant leap forward in U.S. military doctrine.

Unfortunately, Dr. Price has chosen to focus his disagreement with current American foreign policy on the Human Terrain System. Rather than accept the Army's several offers to enter in a reasoned dialogue on the merits – or lack of merits - of the role anthropologists can play in helping to reduce the use of lethal force to achieve military and political objectives, Dr. Price has chosen to wage a public and increasingly personal media campaign to discredit HTS and the dedicated social scientists associated with it.

The Human Terrain System is recognition of the fact that academic study and applied social science has practical uses, and those who have chosen to devote their time and efforts to exploring non-lethal alternatives to combat are making a vital contribution to the nation's efforts to secure a peaceful, stable and secure future for the people of Iraq and Afghanistan.

The long term by-product of their heroic efforts will be better informed military decisions that minimize casualties and suffering, and ultimately, optimized policy decision making within government that is harmonized with the ethical principles social science values the most.

[SteveMetz]

Army Response to Counterpunch

In response to a SWJ e-mail concerning Dr. David Price’s recent Counterpunch article U.S. Army spokesman Major Tom McCuin:

I've vowed to stop paying attention to this whole thing. Dr. Price is an obscure and rather clueless academic at a third tier university who, unfortunately, has found a theme to address the fact that his normal work is largely ignored. I'm no longer going to play along.