Do We Hate America? The Arab Response

[SteveMetz]

I agree with your point 3, but can we really change that? And I'd be inclined to guess that if that group didn't exist, it would be made up and people would believe it existed anyhow. I'd also argue that the Arab reaction to that small minority is what is driving your point 1. So now we have the cycle going. Can it be fixed? I'm honestly not sure. With so few moderate Moslem leaders speaking out (or, more importantly, being reported as speaking out), it's easy for the religious right to launch their spin. And their spin feeds the radical Islam spin. There's always a great deal of talk about how moderate thinkers fear the radical elements within Islam, and it's not that far of a leap for the normal person to decide that if their own co-religionists are afraid of them, maybe they should be, too.

It doesn't help the "average" American, who's accustomed to a fixed church leadership heirarchy, that Islam appears to lack the sort of leadership structure they're accustomed to. For someone who's conditioned by their upbringing to see a pastor as the 'leader' of their church, a pronouncement by an Islamic cleric who most likely doesn't have the same standing is going to be given weight that it might not deserve.

I'm to a degree thinking out loud here, but to my way of thinking the problem is more complex than pressure groups (and I tend to believe that those do more harm than good in the long run, at least from the perspective of the "average" American). Americans have been conditioned by their consumer and quota society to expect neat labels for things and groups. Things like sports play into it, too (scorecard, teams, etc.). How do you help them understand that this stuff can't be cleanly labeled? You also have decades of pro-Israel images to overcome in the process (now there's a pressure group for you...), as well as all the talking head babble about the "Arab street"...which I expect conjures up images of mob rule and the like for many people.

I guess it all boils down to "Yeah...there's that problem. Now how the hell do we fix it? And can we fix it without help from outside?"

I agree with you and, no, I don't think it can be fixed because its foundation is the "dream palace" of the Arabs. I'm the first to admit I've never lived in an Arab culture for an extended period but I have been strongly influenced over the past couple of years by a personal relationsip with an Arab. I've been amazed at the extent to which once this person arrives at a "narrative," no amount of event empirical evidence can shake them from this. I don't by any stretch intend this to be a racist position but I also don't think that because of political correctness, we can deny the fact that different cultures understand the world differently.

This is a theme I've been building in my book: the United States tends to be successful operating intra-culture (e.g. Atlanticism). We encounter problems when we operate cross-culturally (Vietnam, Iraq). And the rub is that the current global security system puts us in a position of frequently operating cross culturally. And I don't think increased "cultural sensitivity" is going to fix that.

That's why I take issue with the well meaning Americans who argue that if we just had a better organization for "strategic communications," the problem would be solved. While our organization is sub-optimal, I don't think it's the root of the problem.

[tequila]

I agree with you and, no, I don't think it can be fixed because its foundation is the "dream palace" of the Arabs. I'm the first to admit I've never lived in an Arab culture for an extended period but I have been strongly influenced over the past couple of years by a personal relationsip with an Arab. I've been amazed at the extent to which once this person arrives at a "narrative," no amount of event empirical evidence can shake them from this. I don't by any stretch intend this to be a racist position but I also don't think that because of political correctness, we can deny the fact that different cultures understand the world differently.

I think we all have our own "narratives" which we tend to sink into comfortably, and often overestimate just how often we question ourselves on them. I've run into amazingly similar issues in my own relationships alternately with (1) a white Southerner completely unable to comprehend that slavery had anything to do with the Civil War (2) a Maronite Lebanese who insists that she has absolutely no Arab blood, and is indeed a pureblooded descendant of the Phoenician builders of Tyre (3) an African-American woman utterly convinced that black sub-Saharan Africans built the Pyramids of Giza, inspired the Greek alphabet, and invented basic principles of mathematics.

Due to my own narrative, I find myself chronically unable to believe that the Marine Corps did not win the Pacific War or storm Fallujah by themselves.

This is a theme I've been building in my book: the United States tends to be successful operating intra-culture (e.g. Atlanticism). We encounter problems when we operate cross-culturally (Vietnam, Iraq). And the rub is that the current global security system puts us in a position of frequently operating cross culturally. And I don't think increased "cultural sensitivity" is going to fix that.

That's why I take issue with the well meaning Americans who argue that if we just had a better organization for "strategic communications," the problem would be solved. While our organization is sub-optimal, I don't think it's the root of the problem.

Agree with much of this argument. Unfortunately, I think even our "Atlanticist" operations are much overrated, at least anytime we penetrate east of the English Channel. As far as the vapidity of "strategic communications" go, I agree that this is accorded far too much importance. However, I think that often the issue is not necessarily so much a clash of cultures being unable to understand one another as a genuine divergence of interests. We Americans have our own cultural blinders --- one of them is a failure to recognize that what is best for the United States and our own interests is often not what is best for those in other places with other interests.

[SteveMetz]

Due to my own narrative, I find myself chronically unable to believe that the Marine Corps did not win the Pacific War or storm Fallujah by themselves.

I hear that they MIGHT have had they not run out of jars.

[goesh]

I guess I don't have to worry quite as much about globalizing myself any more.

[Van]

I think we're ignoring a key point; althought this is a problem for the U.S., one of the big sources is Arab nations using anti-U.S. sentiments to distract attention away from their own corruption. It gives frustrated young men an outlet that is not perceived as a threat to the internal status quo, and helps the governments avoid detaining/killing/torturing these young men en masse (as they scream for the death of Zionism, crusaders etc, rather than for the death of their own prime minister, president, etc), which would only make internal tensions worse.

The countermove is fairly obvious, but wouldn't fly well in the media; diplomatic sanctions and loss of economic support to nations that spout anti-U.S./West venom from state-run media, and distribute free radios pretuned to the regional VOA and BBC freqs. And the carrot; diplomatic and economic considerations for nations that have free media or even-handed state run media. The real key to the carrot and the stick is making them rapidly adaptable, so changes in a nations actions (good or bad) don't go unrecognized.

Of course, the mainstream media would scream that this is interfering in freedom of press, a propaganda program, yada yada.

[tequila]

I think we're ignoring a key point; althought this is a problem for the U.S., one of the big sources is Arab nations using anti-U.S. sentiments to distract attention away from their own corruption. It gives frustrated young men an outlet that is not perceived as a threat to the internal status quo, and helps the governments avoid detaining/killing/torturing these young men en masse (as they scream for the death of Zionism, crusaders etc, rather than for the death of their own prime minister, president, etc), which would only make internal tensions worse.

The countermove is fairly obvious, but wouldn't fly well in the media; diplomatic sanctions and loss of economic support to nations that spout anti-U.S./West venom from state-run media, and distribute free radios pretuned to the regional VOA and BBC freqs. And the carrot; diplomatic and economic considerations for nations that have free media or even-handed state run media. The real key to the carrot and the stick is making them rapidly adaptable, so changes in a nations actions (good or bad) don't go unrecognized.

Of course, the mainstream media would scream that this is interfering in freedom of press, a propaganda program, yada yada.

I think you're falling into a number of traps here that fail to address some of the genuine differences that need to be addressed honestly.

1) I think you are overestimating the impact of state-run media on Arab perceptions of both Arab regimes and the West, especially given the rise of semi-independent and privately run media in the past 15 years, al-Jazeera leading the way.

2) You are seriously overestimating the potential positive impact of saturating the Arab world with Western media outlets. Again, the "if we could only get our strategic communications right, everything would be okay!" trap. You assume that our message is selling something that the Arabs want to buy.

The United States has spent billions in the past six years spreading its Arabic-language message through outlets like al-Hurra and Radio Sawa. Yet negative perceptions of the United States have skyrocketed in the past six years. Has it occurred to you that no matter how well packaged, the invasion and occupation of Iraq is just not going to be popular with Arabs, and thus negatively affect how they perceive the United States?

Promoting a free media in the Arab world is a worthy U.S. goal. However, a truly "free" media will also be one that is "free" of U.S. messaging control. The best example of this is, of course, al-Jazeera, which is accused by most Western governments and militaries as being militantly anti-Western, despite the fact that it is the only Arab sat channel which routinely covers American and Israeli politics and which grants airtime to Israeli government spokesmen.

[SteveMetz]

y U.S. goal. However, a truly "free" media will also be one that is "free" of U.S. messaging control. The best example of this is, of course, al-Jazeera, which is accused by most Western governments and militaries as being militantly anti-Western, despite the fact that it is the only Arab sat channel which routinely covers American and Israeli politics and which grants airtime to Israeli government spokesmen.

Agree completely. I think we Americans have this deeply naively belief that the only reason people would fear and dislike us is because they misunderstand us. We have this belief in the benevolence of the free press and democracy, then are aghast when al Jazeera criticizes us or Hamas wins and election.

I believe we have two and only options in the Islamic world: 1) get used to being hated (and hence invent a different counterterrorism strategy that is NOT based on winning hearts and minds); or 2) abandon Israel and support to dictators like Mubarak, the Sauds, and Musharraf.

[Rex Brynen]

I think we're ignoring a key point; althought this is a problem for the U.S., one of the big sources is Arab nations using anti-U.S. sentiments to distract attention away from their own corruption. It gives frustrated young men an outlet that is not perceived as a threat to the internal status quo, and helps the governments avoid detaining/killing/torturing these young men en masse (as they scream for the death of Zionism, crusaders etc, rather than for the death of their own prime minister, president, etc), which would only make internal tensions worse.

I'm not sure which Arab countries you're thinking of. In most of them, there is almost no officially-promoted anti-Americanism... indeed, regimes tend to play down strong, open, official criticism of Washington (even when they differ sharply on policy issues) because they are well aware of the difficulties of being allied to the US at a time when their populations are overwhelmingly critical of US policies. There are exceptions--Syria, for example--but these are regimes that are at loggerheads with the US, and over which Washington has little leverage.

There is strong criticism of the US from the opposition press--both Islamist (of all varieties) and liberal-democratic. There is also considerable criticism in the free (satellite) TV channels, notably al-Jazeera--generally reflecting, rather than leading, popular attitudes.

Some of this hostility is rooted in misperception, sterotypes, etc. US public diplomacy has often been very weak.

However, a great deal is rooted in US policies too--and there's only so much you can do to sell an unpopular toothpaste by just changing the packaging...

[Schmedlap]

This is a theme I've been building in my book: the United States tends to be successful operating intra-culture (e.g. Atlanticism). We encounter problems when we operate cross-culturally (Vietnam, Iraq). And the rub is that the current global security system puts us in a position of frequently operating cross culturally. And I don't think increased "cultural sensitivity" is going to fix that.

That's why I take issue with the well meaning Americans who argue that if we just had a better organization for "strategic communications," the problem would be solved. While our organization is sub-optimal, I don't think it's the root of the problem.

Do you think that we were capable of operating cross-culturally in the first half of the 20th century, such as the Phillipines (1899-1902) and Japan (1945)? If so, would it be reasonable to assert that we changed as a nation sometime in between the late 40's and early 60's (with Korea being a toss-up in the 1950s), leading to the poor performance that you mentioned in Vietnam (1960s) and Iraq (1991 - present)?

[Schmedlap]

Several people in this thread who are likely older, wiser, and have done more research than I, made several comments and/or assumptions that strike me as being way off the mark...

- Arabs will never like us, therefore a strategy of winning hearts and minds is misguided
- Arabs believe the typical or modal American is one who is anti-Muslim and/or anti-Arab
- There is a growing number of Americans who confuse Muslim and terrorist or just simply dislike Muslims

In regard to the first one, I presume we all agree that "hearts and minds" does not equate to "they love us."

In regard to Arab perceptions of us, I suppose that this is not much of a rebuttal since it is purely anecdotal, but I've expended nearly 3 years of my life in Iraq. Recognizing that most Arabs are masters at telling you what you want to hear and there is much lost in translation, I nonetheless find it difficult to believe that even a significant minority of them (aside from armed jihadists and JAM SG) strongly dislike us or hold a view of the typical American as one who is anti-Muslim or anti-Arab. My impression is that they simply view us as bumbling fools who are too quick to drop bombs, though this impression improves when they interact with us directly.

Again, not much of a rebuttal, but I simply do not see the growing sentiment of Americans who are becoming more ignorant and more distrustful of Muslims in general. I am as cynical about the intellect and education of the average schmoe as anyone else, but I think that Americans are becoming more aware that most Arabs - most notably the Iraqi people - are more concerned with living their lives in their way, in their land, than in coming here to attack us. The greatest catalyst to this education is our current effort in Iraq. I think that people are increasingly beginning to realize that we are risking our lives in Iraq, working side-by-side with Iraq Security Forces, reconciling with former insurgents, and helping the Iraqi people because they are worth working with and worth helping - that they are not a bunch of crazed jihadists. Most Americans respect Soldiers and are slowly beginning to realize that if we think the Iraqis are worth helping, then maybe the Iraqis - and other Arabs - are not the inherently anti-American suicidal nutjobs that many perhaps once assumed.

[skiguy]

I'm not saying there's a growing sentiment of racism, I'm only saying it's there and been there and I don't see much change since 9-11. I get perplexed at those who say they support OIF, yet in the next sentence, say Islam is evil. My "rebuttal" to them is "You are aware a majority of the Iraqis are Muslims, right?" I don't only see this attitude with the Christians, I see it with anyone who mostly listens to (and believes) Glen Beck or right-wing radio/TV. And let's not forget, Beck and FOX said an Islamic terorist started the fires in California. WTF?!?

The average American (myself included) does not know or understand the different sects of Islam and that, IMO, is the biggest problem.
Maybe I'm just being naive or have false hope in the fact that people actually learn from history, but the argument that Muslims have been fighting each other since they began and won't/can't change doesn't fly with me. Never been there, but from what I hear and read from good sources, that's just not true.

[SteveMetz]

Several people in this thread who are likely older, wiser, and have done more research than I, made several comments and/or assumptions that strike me as being way off the mark...

- Arabs will never like us, therefore a strategy of winning hearts and minds is misguided
- Arabs believe the typical or modal American is one who is anti-Muslim and/or anti-Arab
- There is a growing number of Americans who confuse Muslim and terrorist or just simply dislike Muslims

In regard to the first one, I presume we all agree that "hearts and minds" does not equate to "they love us."

In regard to Arab perceptions of us, I suppose that this is not much of a rebuttal since it is purely anecdotal, but I've expended nearly 3 years of my life in Iraq. Recognizing that most Arabs are masters at telling you what you want to hear and there is much lost in translation, I nonetheless find it difficult to believe that even a significant minority of them (aside from armed jihadists and JAM SG) strongly dislike us or hold a view of the typical American as one who is anti-Muslim or anti-Arab. My impression is that they simply view us as bumbling fools who are too quick to drop bombs, though this impression improves when they interact with us directly.

Again, not much of a rebuttal, but I simply do not see the growing sentiment of Americans who are becoming more ignorant and more distrustful of Muslims in general. I am as cynical about the intellect and education of the average schmoe as anyone else, but I think that Americans are becoming more aware that most Arabs - most notably the Iraqi people - are more concerned with living their lives in their way, in their land, than in coming here to attack us. The greatest catalyst to this education is our current effort in Iraq. I think that people are increasingly beginning to realize that we are risking our lives in Iraq, working side-by-side with Iraq Security Forces, reconciling with former insurgents, and helping the Iraqi people because they are worth working with and worth helping - that they are not a bunch of crazed jihadists. Most Americans respect Soldiers and are slowly beginning to realize that if we think the Iraqis are worth helping, then maybe the Iraqis - and other Arabs - are not the inherently anti-American suicidal nutjobs that many perhaps once assumed.

Great observations but one thing bothers me. Your descriptions is almost word for word the same as things I've heard from my buddies who were in Vietnam. While on a one to one basis, most Vietnamese just wanted to get on with their lives and were pretty decent folks, in the aggregate they had a culture and a system which generated and--more importalty--tolerated organized violence. Seems that the important point is not whether the average Iraqi is an OK fellow when you're sitting sipping tea, but how he responds to violence against Americans or against other Iraqis.

I'm not sure if this means anything or not. Perhaps it's just a brain fart.

[tequila]

Great observations but one thing bothers me. Your descriptions is almost word for word the same as things I've heard from my buddies who were in Vietnam. While on a one to one basis, most Vietnamese just wanted to get on with their lives and were pretty decent folks, in the aggregate they had a culture and a system which generated and--more importalty--tolerated organized violence. Seems that the important point is not whether the average Iraqi is an OK fellow when you're sitting sipping tea, but how he responds to violence against Americans or against other Iraqis.

I'm not sure if this means anything or not. Perhaps it's just a brain fart.

All cultures and systems that I am aware of tolerate and generate organized violence, our own not least among them. Perhaps you mean tolerate and organize violence in opposition to American political goals?

[Ken White]

Great observations but one thing bothers me. Your descriptions is almost word for word the same as things I've heard from my buddies who were in Vietnam. While on a one to one basis, most Vietnamese just wanted to get on with their lives and were pretty decent folks, in the aggregate they had a culture and a system which generated and--more importalty--tolerated organized violence. Seems that the important point is not whether the average Iraqi is an OK fellow when you're sitting sipping tea, but how he responds to violence against Americans or against other Iraqis.

I'm not sure if this means anything or not. Perhaps it's just a brain fart.

(emphasis added / kw)

I'm not sure the sentence I emphasized makes a great deal of difference. In Korea, Viet Nam, the Mid East and elsewhere it's been my observation that, as a nation (opposed to as individuals) we are politely tolerated and little more. We annoy people in other nations on many levels. If there's a war going on, we tend to annoy them even more (for several reasons...).

Point being, the average person is not stirred to action due to that, only those who object violently become problematic and they are a fairly small percentage. We are never going to win many hearts -- and most minds, fortunately, eschew violence. The key is thus not the average local national but the unhappily disposed, a fairly small percentage. Almost by default you can woo in one way or another about half of those; the other half aren't going to play nice under most any circumstances. All you need to do with the average local is avoid hacking him or her off to the maximum extent possible.

We don't do that too well, mostly due to this

"We have adopted a model of counterinsurgency -- essentially the British one -- which is predicated on cultural acuity. But we do not have it. That, I think, is a large part of our problem.

For whatever reason, a lot of Brits do this fairly well; few Americans do.

[Steve Blair]

Actually, I don't know if it's a matter of the Brits "doing cultural acuity well" (in fact, I'd say given some of their recent problems with imigrant assimilation I'd say they may have some issues here). To me it's more a matter of them being able to pick out their local surrogates with a high degree of precision and effectiveness. That and it was typically an issue of "using" the local nation for economic purposes...they didn't tend to come in with the same level of missionary/moral baggage that we cart around. Behind the "white man's burden" rehtoric the British always seemed to have an acute sense of the bottom line and got out when the cost started to exceed the benefit. Most other colonial powers didn't follow this example, and we went into it with an excess of spirits left over from the abolition movement (IMO). Once the crusading New England types freed the black man, they moved on to the red man and then the yellow/green/purple/whatever man. So there was always an unspoken (or spoken) sense of moral purpose often disconnected with either the national interest or any sort of bottom line.

But, as always, YMMV with this. And I'm speaking in generalities, of course. We've had our successes, just as the British have had their failures.

[tequila]

My own feeling is that "cultural acuity", while certainly useful, is definitely not a cure-all or even a genuine prerequisite. While absolutely critical for achieving a clear-eyed analytical picture, it does not help at all if shackled to a politically unrealistic target.

Rory Stewart's analysis of Gertrude Bell seems to be relevant here. It's hard to imagine any Westerner with more genuine field experience and "cultural acuity" than Dame Bell and her contemporaries. Yet they still failed utterly to construct a British-allied, stable Iraq.

...

Some suggest today that the US failure in Iraq is due simply to lack of planning; to specific policy errors— debaathification, looting, the abolition of the army, and lack of troops; and to the absence of a trained cadre of Arabists and professional nation-builders. They should consider Bell and her colleagues, such as Colonel Leachman or Bertram Thomas, a political officer on the Euphrates. All three were fluent and highly experienced Arabists, won medals from the Royal Geographical Society for their Arabian journeys, and were greatly admired for their political work. Thomas was driven from his office in Shatra by a tribal mob. Colonel Leachman, who was famed for being able to kill a tribesman dead in his own tent without a hand lifted against him, was shot in the back in Fallujah. Bell's defeat was slower but more comprehensive. Of the kingdom she created, with its Sunni monarch and Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish subjects, there is today no king, no Sunni government, and something close to civil war. Perhaps soon there will be no country.

Bell is thus both the model of a policymaker and an example of the inescapable frailty and ineptitude on the part of Western powers in the face of all that is chaotic and uncertain in the fashion for "nation-building." Despite the prejudices of her culture and the contortions of her bureaucratic environment, she was highly intelligent, articulate, and courageous. Her colleagues were talented, creative, well informed, and determined to succeed. They had an imperial confidence. They were not unduly constrained by the press or by their own bureaucracies. They were dealing with a simpler Iraq: a smaller, more rural population at a time when Arab national-ism and political Islam were yet to develop their modern strength and appeal.

But their task was still impossible. Iraqis refused to permit foreign political officers to play at founding their new nation. T.E. Lawrence was right to demand the withdrawal of every British soldier and no stronger link between Britain and Iraq than existed between Britain and Canada. For the same reason, more language training and contact with the tribes, more troops and better counterinsurgency tactics—in short a more considered imperial approach—are equally unlikely to allow the US today to build a state in Iraq, in southern Afghanistan, or Iran. If Bell is a heroine, it is not as a visionary but as a witness to the absurdity and horror of building nations for peoples with other loyalties, models, and priorities.

[Norfolk]

[QUOTE=Ken White;29411For whatever reason, a lot of Brits do this fairly well; few Americans do.[/QUOTE]

Different culture, socially and militarily (people-, not things-oriented).

That said, there is also the issue of pride (not to mention other similar matters), and I suspect that this often tends to be rather worse with certain cultures. I would tentatively submit that while we may have our share of arrogance and ignorance (Western cultures inclusive), Pride, per se, is perhaps rather less of a problem in many ways (at least relating to the conduct of war, diplomacy, etc.) than in other cultures.

I remember in "The General's War" by Gordon and Trainor, that when the Coalition Forces were preparing to breach the Iraqi defensive lines in 1991, a senior Arab general refused the offer of mine-breaching equipment (his Army had none), and preferred his men to make the breach the old-fashioned way. As the American general who made the offer was told, the reason for this was "Pride". And Pride, as well as related emotions and the like, plays no small role in how people feel, and act, particularly in cultures like many of those in the Near East.

[tequila]

That example reminds me more than anything else of Omar Bradley's rejection of Pete Corlett's advice on the value of naval gunnery in the amphibious assault during Operation Overlord, all because Corlett had learned his trade against the Japanese. Bradley had no intention of listening to someone from a "bush league theater." The troops at Omaha got 20 minutes of prep fire from one battleship and suffered three times as many casualties as at Tarawa, which was fought six months earlier. If not for the sheer guts and determination of the American infantryman, the battle might have been lost.

"Pride" is not an exclusively Arab term.

[tequila]

Do you think that we were capable of operating cross-culturally in the first half of the 20th century, such as the Phillipines (1899-1902) and Japan (1945)? If so, would it be reasonable to assert that we changed as a nation sometime in between the late 40's and early 60's (with Korea being a toss-up in the 1950s), leading to the poor performance that you mentioned in Vietnam (1960s) and Iraq (1991 - present)?

The ability to work cross-culturally is not the sole determinant of success in insurgencies. The Filipino insurgents were divided, lacked modern weaponry, and had no means of foreign support or refuge --- factors that were critical to the success of the Vietnamese. The occupation also benefited from officers like MacArthur and Otis who operated very much in the model of the Progressive movement back home with the "policy of attraction", which proved key in coopting Filipino support --- though this was not necessarily "cross-cultural" in nature. In Japan we benefited from a preexisting and largely intact bureaucratic structure combined with a massive occupation army and uncontested legitimacy due to the Emperor's unconditional surrender. South Korea under Hodge was a near-run disaster, however, that had much in common with postwar Iraq 2003-2004. Thankfully the Korean Communists overplayed their hand in 1946 and 1948, and geography prevented sufficient infiltration of arms and reinforcements to create a truly dangerous insurgency.

I don't only see this attitude with the Christians, I see it with anyone who mostly listens to (and believes) Glen Beck or right-wing radio/TV. And let's not forget, Beck and FOX said an Islamic terorist started the fires in California. WTF?!?

Remember, however, that Beck is one of the lowest rated TV show hosts out there, and even FOX News (1-2m viewers), while highly rated for a cable network, still commands a small audience compared to the major network news (upwards of 25m viewers).

[SteveMetz]

Do you think that we were capable of operating cross-culturally in the first half of the 20th century, such as the Phillipines (1899-1902) and Japan (1945)? If so, would it be reasonable to assert that we changed as a nation sometime in between the late 40's and early 60's (with Korea being a toss-up in the 1950s), leading to the poor performance that you mentioned in Vietnam (1960s) and Iraq (1991 - present)?

Interesting point but I'm not sure either of those cases disprove what I'm trying to suggest. When using the "mailed fist" or "defeat and occupy" approaches, cultural acuity is less significant. We have adopted a model of counterinsurgency--essentially the British one--which is predicated on cultural acuity. But we do not have it. That, I think, is a large part of our problem.