Do We Hate America? The Arab Response

[Norfolk]

My own feeling is that "cultural acuity", while certainly useful, is definitely not a cure-all or even a genuine prerequisite. While absolutely critical for achieving a clear-eyed analytical picture, it does not help at all if shackled to a politically unrealistic target.

Rory Stewart's analysis of Gertrude Bell seems to be relevant here. It's hard to imagine any Westerner with more genuine field experience and "cultural acuity" than Dame Bell and her contemporaries. Yet they still failed utterly to construct a British-allied, stable Iraq.

I would also submit that the indigenous rulers of what is now Iraq have typically had mixed success at best, and at their worst, did far worse than either the British or the US. Sargon the Great may have been the first historically-recognized conqueror of the Fertile Crescent (now to a great extent the "Shia Crescent"), but he spent a good deal of his time re-conquering those whom he had already conquered. This pattern has remained largely the same for whoever has followed over the last 5,000 years (with few exceptions) as rulers over what is now Iraq.

As is, if the locals, who have far greater understanding of the prevailing conditions than we, cannot sort this out themsleves, then we shouldn't be beating ourselves up too much over our inadequacies in the same areas. This does not relieve Western Armies (and Western policy-makers, et al) of their responsibility to understand and adapt as best they can to said circumstances, but it puts our situation in a clearer perspective.

[tequila]

I believe that leads into the last part of Stewart's article:

If Bell is a heroine, it is not as a visionary but as a witness to the absurdity and horror of building nations for peoples with other loyalties, models, and priorities.

The beating up should perhaps commence at the very idea of attempting to impose an externally directed model.

No, it's not, but "Pride" does not usually assume at the tactical and operational level in present-day Western Armies the same place that it still does in many Near-Eastern Armies (or insurgent groups). Our troops are rather less inclined to jump out in the middle of a street, spray wildly and ineffectually for the benefit of the locals watching from the sidewalk, and then beat a hasty retreat before the other side responds in kind.

Actually, their side has been more likely to plant roadside bombs and trigger from safety than indulge in the sort of behavior you are referring to.

The example at the operational level that I cited from "The General's War" stands.

As does my rather more costly example from Operation Overlord.

[Norfolk]

Actually, their side has been more likely to plant roadside bombs and trigger from safety than indulge in the sort of behavior you are referring to.

As does my rather more costly example from Operation Overlord.

As to the first:

Does not change the fact that the Iraqi insurgents still engage in such "tactical" behaviour openly, and with some regularlity, whilst the Western troops there are typically loathe to do so themselves.

As to the second:

The point with the last example is that the senior US commander actually judged that it was tactically and operationally inapplicable, however erroneously that judgement was made; in the case of the Arab general, he knew that the mineclearing equipment was tactically necessary and chose to reject it anyway because it would have demonstrated Arab reliance upon Western military expertise; the two examples are not comparable.

[tequila]

Does not change the fact that the Iraqi insurgents still engage in such "tactical" behaviour openly, and with some regularlity, whilst the Western troops there are typically loathe to do so themselves.

How much of this is due to a cultural reliance on "pride" vs lack of training + watching too many Hollywood films which portray this as effective? For example, does the Egyptian Army do this? The Iranians? How about Hizbullah in 2006 or Fatah al-Islam in Nahr el-Bahred?

The point with the last example is that the senior US commander actually judged that it was tactically and operationally inapplicable, however erroneously that judgement was made; in the case of the Arab general, he knew that the mineclearing equipment was tactically necessary and chose to reject it anyway because it would have demonstrated Arab reliance upon Western military expertise; the two examples are not comparable.

Bradley disregarded Corlett's advice because he believed he had nothing to learn from someone who had only fought the Japanese, despite the fact that Corlett had commanded two major amphibious assaults in the face of opposition and Bradley none. This in addition to Corlett being specifically detached to provide advice on amphibious landings by GEN George Marshall. You don't think an irrational pride had anything to do with that?

[Norfolk]

How much of this is due to a cultural reliance on "pride" vs lack of training + watching too many Hollywood films which portray this as effective? For example, does the Egyptian Army do this? The Iranians? How about Hizbullah in 2006 or Fatah al-Islam in Nahr el-think an irrational pride had anything to do with that?

Remember the Zarqawi video with the Minimi? It's not just restricted to the insurgency. The Iraqi Army has a bit of a problem in that regard as well - and I'll leave aside the Saudis at Khafji in 1991:

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200512/iraq-army/4

For Arab Pride try "Arab pride, US prejudice" by Abdel-Moneim Said:

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/640/op111.htm

Corlett was indeed ignored, as were British offers of specialist armoured assault engineers (from Hobart's 79th Div) that made the British/Canadian landing that much easier, but this was in the belief that such were not tactically necessary given the different conditions of North-West Europe as opposed to those in the Pacific, not merely out of pride. In this case, there was no clear recognition that the tactical situation deed indeed require such proffered assistance. Ther senior US general beleived that he already had the means at hand to make the breech successfully, not that he saw that he did not have such means and wilfully went ahead anyway.

On the other hand, with Saudis preparing to make a breach during Desert Storm, this was a case of a clear recognition by the Arab general that mine-clearing equipment was tactically necessary, and he refused to countenance said equipment and training anyway, openly admitting that it was out of quote, "Pride", unquote. The two cases are not directly comparable.

[tequila]

Remember the Zarqawi video with the Minimi?

Zarqawi was a convict and former street thug whose formal weapons handling training approximated zero. The better comparison would be between Zarqawi and your average mid-level Crip leader rather than Zarqawi and an American soldier.

Compare vs. Arab forces which are actually motivated and trained as Western forces are --- i.e. Hizbullah and Amal, both trained by Iranians. Even their village militias showed excellent fire discipline in 2006.

If you want to believe that Omar Bradley made a perfectly reasonable decision based totally on his own military judgment in 1944, I suppose I won't be convincing you otherwise. Corlett himself thought that Bradley was snubbing him out of prideful disdain rather than reasonable disagreement, however. According to Corlett:

"I was pretty well squelched for my question [regarding why Army troops would attack using LCVPs and LCAs instead of LVTs]. I soon got the feeling that American generals in England considered anything that had happened in the Pacific strictly 'Bush League stuff' which didn't merit any consideration. I felt like an expert according to the Naval definition, 'A son-of-a-bitch from out of town.'"