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Thread: Insurgent Adaptation to Surge

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    Council Member Beelzebubalicious's Avatar
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    Default Insurgent Adaptation to Surge

    Haven't seen direct discussion or analysis of how the insurgents are adapting to the change in USG tactics/strategy (the surge/COIN) in Iraq. In an environment of constant adaptation, are insurgents changing their tactics and strategy as a result? If so, how?

  2. #2
    Council Member Wildcat's Avatar
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    Someone should correct me if I'm wrong, but I feel like what happened is that, when we focused the surge on Baghdad, we drew the insurgents to Baghdad like moths to a flame. That city has been extremely violent for the past several months, while meanwhile people have been pointing to the relatively placid state that Anbar is in at the moment. Is this because the Anbar fighters are taking a little break, licking their wounds and such, while the bulk of Coalition attention is elsewhere? Maybe. Or is it because the insurgents who WERE in Anbar decided to move the fight to Baghdad, where there were more Americans to kill? Maybe as well, but that seems to run opposite to what traditional guerrilla strategy dictates, which is to avoid the bulk (or front) of the occupier's forces and to harass the occupier on his flanks and then run away, encouraging said occupier to pursue and drawing him into more battles, stretching out his logistical apparatus and so forth. But, then again, this isn't a traditional insurgency, is it? I guess the problem we face is trying to determine who exactly we've been fighting in Baghdad, whether it's AQI, Shi'a militias, or whether it's Sunni imports from Anbar.

    Michael Yon (www.michaelyon-online.com) seems to think that the changes in US strategy, coupled with the rising prominence of AQI, have convinced the Sunnis in Anbar to team up with the Coalition, and Yon points to the growing number of patrols that Coalition and IA forces are conducting ALONGSIDE these Sunni militias that were, in all likelihood, planting IEDs on the roads one year ago. The "Sunni Awakenening," as it's called. We should hope that this is the case, and that we've managed to convince them that the Coalition is there for their benefit. The situation now is not necessarily desirable, but we sure as hell don't want it to go back to the way it was before.

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