The overlooked, underrated, and forgotten ...

[charter6]

The Hukbalahap war in the Philippines is a huge one. It should be one of the great examples of how to do COIN properly, but it's relegated to the margins because Malaya was roughly contemporaneous and made a bigger splash.

[davidbfpo]

Not in priority:

Indonesian Confrontation - campaign in Borneo (1960's)

Dhofar Province, Oman (1965-1975 note Oman, helped by Iran and UK)

Imperial campaigning along North West Frontier (till 1947)

Rhodesia / Zimbabwe War (1966-1979)

Post-1947 campaigns in India (little known and still current)

davidbfpo

[relative autonomy]

The Hukbalahap war in the Philippines is a huge one. It should be one of the great examples of how to do COIN properly, but it's relegated to the margins because Malaya was roughly contemporaneous and made a bigger splash.

That's were Edward Lansdale earned his status COIN expert and propelled him to Vietnam.

I just read Edward Lansdale's Cold War:Culture, Politics, and the Cold War by Jonathan Nashel. It's interesting becuase it talks a bit about all the ways Lansdale is remembered and all the ways his legacy is used by different communities.

Also what about King Philip's War? I believe that was the bloodiest conflict per capita ever fought on North America.

[relative autonomy]

Also the so-called "Indian Wars" of US history

Pequot War (1635-1637)
King William's War (1689–1697)
Queen Anne's War (1702–1713)
Chickamauga Wars (1776–1794)
NW Ordinance War (1787-1795)
Sullivan's Expedition (1779)
"Tecumseh's Wars"
a. First Creek War (1813-1814),
b.First Seminole War (1818-1819)
Black Hawk War of (1832
Second Creek War (1836)
Second Seminole War (1835–1842)
The Cherokee War (1838-1839)
Great Raid of 1840
Antelope Hills Expedition (1858)
Red River War (1874–1875)
Puget Sound War (1855–1856)
Dakota War of 1862 (1862)
Colorado War (1863–1865)
Red Cloud's War (1866–1868)
Comanche Campaign (1868–1874)
Black Hills War (1876–1877)
Nez Perce War (1877)
Pine Ridge Campaign (1890)

I think these wars are especially important for Americans to consider today. If the begining of the UK and France's COIN experience was in their colonial, then the American equivalent for Americans in, frankly, the conquest of the Native of American tribes. 26 of 30 US Generals who served in the Philippines between 1898 and 1902 served in the final "Indian Wars."

John Nagl, in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, talks about how the US fought some many for these wars but American generals, wanting to feel like equals to European Generals, still emphasized standard main force tactics and didn't really codify much in the way of any foundational and uniquely American COIN doctrines. Still the histories of these wars are interesting and overlooked.

[Steve Blair]

I think these wars are especially important for Americans to consider today. If the begining of the UK and France's COIN experience was in their colonial, then the American equivalent for Americans in, frankly, the conquest of the Native of American tribes. 26 of 30 US Generals who served in the Philippines between 1898 and 1902 served in the final "Indian Wars."

John Nagl, in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, talks about how the US fought some many for these wars but American generals, wanting to feel like equals to European Generals, still emphasized standard main force tactics and didn't really codify much in the way of any foundational and uniquely American COIN doctrines. Still the histories of these wars are interesting and overlooked.

I quite agree, in particular with respect to the postwar Indian campaigns. It's interesting to look at the differences between campaigns before and after the Civil War...especially in terms of how much needed to be relearned.

[Griz882]

Thank you realtive autonomy! I have long argued that the so-called "Indian Wars" offer excellent case studies to better understand what the US and her allies face today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

[Rex Brynen]

Thank you realtive autonomy! I have long argued that the so-called "Indian Wars" offer excellent case studies to better understand what the US and her allies face today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

...from the point of view of most aboriginal populations, the "Indian Wars" were all about brutal foreign (white) conquest, forced displacement, and even a little ethnic cleansing of the local population.

I don't doubt there are operational and strategic lessons to be learned, but lets be a little careful about understanding it as a COIN model

[Cannoneer No. 4]

...from the point of view of most aboriginal populations, the "Indian Wars" were all about brutal foreign (white) conquest, forced displacement, and even a little ethnic cleansing of the local population.

I doubt doubt there are operational and strategic lessons to be learned, but lets be a little careful about understanding it as a COIN model

Anybody remember this guy?

[tequila]

Steve Blair should be along in a few moments to deconstruct the Crook myth.

I'll tell you a major difference between the Pashtun and the Apache - there are millions of Pashtun and they are not just marginalized, uneducated tribal warriors in the FATA and the tribal areas.

[relative autonomy]

...from the point of view of most aboriginal populations, the "Indian Wars" were all about brutal foreign (white) conquest, forced displacement, and even a little ethnic cleansing of the local population.

I don't doubt there are operational and strategic lessons to be learned, but lets be a little careful about understanding it as a COIN model

i think its is important to note that many people view counterinsurgency warfare as a liberal gloss over the tactics of brutal colonialism colonial conquest and, historically, it isn't incorrect. taking Vietnam as an example, you can trace the development of counterinsurgency doctrines used to pacify the country from the "collective punishment" of colonial France to "the oils spot doctrine" of the first Indochina war to the increasing scientifically managed COIN doctrines of anti-colonial liberal Americans whether it be Kennedy and Lansdale or Johnson and Robert Komer. The genesis of counterinsurgency warfare lies in battles to secure colonial domination and there is really no way of getting around that. i think the most interesting question, then, becomes can COIN transcend that or destined to reproduce so colonial logic?

also, interesting debate on civil war....

[davidbfpo]

In 2007 Rex Brynen commented:

How has Mozambique sustained democracy since 1992, despite having experienced bitter anti-colonial (1962-75) and civil (1975-92) war that left left almost a million people dead through its direct and indirect consequences?

Six years later this question has become pertinent sadly:

Suspected Renamo guerrillas killed seven Mozambican soldiers in an ambush on Thursday near the former rebel group's remote mountain hideout, local media said, the latest flare-up in a simmering insurgency.....Analysts say this year's attacks are a reaction to it being pushed into political and economic obscurity by Frelimo, which is expected to dominate municipal elections due next month and nationwide elections in just over a year.

Link:http://mobile.reuters.com/article/id...31017?irpc=932

Mozambique rarely gets attention from the MSM.

[goesh]

Yes, I should have mentioned Louis Riel, every bit the equal of Sitting Bull in his oratory skills and ability to cross cultural barriers with a message - he remains a hero to the Metis, at least up in N Dak that I'm aware of anyway and no doubt many First Nation folks up there hold him in high esteem as well

[Old Eagle]

One of the things that's been troubling me in many of the analyses of various COIN ops is "desired endstate".

Many of the TTP proffered by various COIN experts of the past are applicable when the endstate is permanent (or relative permanent) administration, but not when you're trying to establish an independent entity capable of governing itself and not bothering its neighbors.

Indian Wars TTP quite often worked because the future of the various tribes was irrelanent to the endstate. Eventually, "real 'merkins" were going to dominate all of the natives and totally subjugate them permanently. For colonial powers, the endstate was similar, even if not so extreme -- UK, France, NL intended to administer colonial areas indefinitely, so their relationship to the indigenous populations and their development of enduring institutions was different than it was in, say, Malaya, where the intent to grant independence was declared relatively early on.

This is also one of the critiques I have for LTC Campbell's excellent paper on Making Riflemen from Mud. What works in situations where you want to leave may be different from those situations where you want to stay.

Sorry for the ramble.

Hope this makes sense.

[marct]

Hi Old Eagle,

One of the things that's been troubling me in many of the analyses of various COIN ops is "desired endstate".

Many of the TTP proffered by various COIN experts of the past are applicable when the endstate is permanent (or relative permanent) administration, but not when you're trying to establish an independent entity capable of governing itself and not bothering its neighbors.

I think you have hit upon a really cogent point, and one that has been bothering me for some time. The only analogs I have been able to come up with either failed (e.g. the Spanish Civil War, the Russian Civil War) or were cases of propping up or creating "puppet states" (e.g. various Roman campaigns, various British East India company campaigns). About the only other examples I can think of that might be analogs involved the replacement of a current regime with a legitimate, but displaced, local regime (e.g. Spain during the Napoleonic Wars).

[Rank amateur]

Hi Old Eagle,



I think you have hit upon a really cogent point, and one that has been bothering me for some time.

Me too, but when I hear "Officers who wish to remain anonymous are suggesting that democracy may not work in Iraq," I suspect that the COIN experts have figured out there's a reason why it hasn't been done before.

[marct]

Hi RA,

Me too, but when I hear "Officers who wish to remain anonymous are suggesting that democracy may not work in Iraq," I suspect that the COIN experts have figured out there's a reason why it hasn't been done before.

"Democracy is a wonderful thing or will be once we have someone in power who will tell us how to make it work" (paraphrase - anonymous Russian taxi driver to Robert Heinlein).

I really think it is important to separate out the process from the form since the deal with related, but different, cultural factors. Insisting on a "democracy", and a particular form of it at that, was, IMO, one of the greatest blunders in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In my mind, a lot of it comes down to concepts of "legitimacy", which is a slippery cultural perception.

[Rank amateur]

One of the things that's been troubling me in many of the analyses of various COIN ops is "desired endstate".

Many of the TTP proffered by various COIN experts of the past are applicable when the endstate is permanent (or relative permanent) administration, but not when you're trying to establish an independent entity capable of governing itself and not bothering its neighbors.

Indian Wars TTP quite often worked because the future of the various tribes was irrelanent to the endstate. Eventually, "real 'merkins" were going to dominate all of the natives and totally subjugate them permanently. For colonial powers, the endstate was similar, even if not so extreme -- UK, France, NL intended to administer colonial areas indefinitely, so their relationship to the indigenous populations and their development of enduring institutions was different than it was in, say, Malaya, where the intent to grant independence was declared relatively early on.

This is also one of the critiques I have for LTC Campbell's excellent paper on Making Riflemen from Mud. What works in situations where you want to leave may be different from those situations where you want to stay.

Sorry for the ramble.

Hope this makes sense.

U.S. Scales Back Political Goals for Iraqi Unity

WASHINGTON, Nov. 24 — With American military successes outpacing political gains in Iraq, the Bush administration has lowered its expectation of quickly achieving major steps toward unifying the country, including passage of a long-stymied plan to share oil revenues and holding regional elections.

Like I said, I believe that the end goals are being changed to something that is achievable according to COIN doctrine.