Pashtun / Pashtunwali / Pashtunistan (catch all)

[rborum]

I have heard this argument several times, mostly anecdotally. Matthew Hoh raised it in his letter of resignation.

The assertion is that most of the Pashtun insurgents are not fighting for the Taliban, but rather against foreign presence and a corrupt national government.

I have also heard some suggest - again, anecdotally - that the Taliban knows this and uses that rhetoric in their recruitment / propaganda efforts more than promoting Taliban ideals.

I completely understand that insurgent motivations can be complicated. You can't necessarily pin it on "one thing." But it led me to wonder about two things:

1. Beyond these anecdotes is there is any evidence - even polling or surveys or anything - that would support or refute the argument that at this juncture foreign presence and national government corruption drive the AFG insurgency more strongly than any pro-Taliban sentiment? (Maybe this even varies by region??)

2. Is there any merit - as part of a strategic assessment - to considering whether our mere presence (and possibly support for the local government) may make an insurgency worse, rather than better...independent of what we do when we're there? If so, how might a strategist (and I know there are a number of you out there) consider this is in his/her decisionmaking calculus?

[davidbfpo]

Randy,

I completely understand that insurgent motivations can be complicated. You can't necessarily pin it on "one thing." But it led me to wonder about two things:

1. Beyond these anecdotes is there is any evidence - even polling or surveys or anything - that would support or refute the argument that at this juncture foreign presence and national government corruption drive the AFG insurgency more strongly than any pro-Taliban sentiment? (Maybe this even varies by region??)

2. Is there any merit - as part of a strategic assessment - to considering whether our mere presence (and possibly support for the local government) may make an insurgency worse, rather than better...independent of what we do when we're there? If so, how might a strategist (and I know there are a number of you out there) consider this is in his/her decisionmaking calculus?

I am not sure about polling data for Q.1; which has been discussed here before. As for national government corruption, which is endemic, on the ANP thread(s) their corruption and illegal activities have featured several times. There was a recent story that newly arrived ANP were so bad the locals called for the Taliban's return IIRC.

In Q.2 then, the issue of external support for corrupt local government has appeared in Helmand Province, when the governor was removed due to alleged heroin trading (tons found in his residence) and on a SWC thread (possibly that on the UK role in Afghanistan). Drugs aside he was an effective governor, whose fighters then joined the Taliban!

Late in the day to say more.

[omarali50]

I know my opinion is not based on any direct knowledge of the afghan insurgency, but I am still doubtful about the very term "pashtun insurgency". I think some people are seeing what they are primed to think. I think the people doing the actual fighting are almost all motivated first and foremost by loyalty to the Taliban, not to some idea of Pashtun nationalism. The taliban may appeal to the pride of the Pakhtuns but they are primarily a religious movement. The idea of "Pashtun card" owes more to some Pakistani strategists thinking this is the best way to put forward a "secular" argument against the current Afghan regime. I could be wrong...

[tequila]

How much was the insurgency in South Vietnam driven by Vietnamese nationalism as opposed to Communist belief, a better land reform program, preference for the NLF government over the RVN government, the largest occupying force in the area at the time, etc. ? I don't think we're ever going to get a really solid answer to those questions, moreover because preferences and priorities change over time and vary from place to place.

[IntelTrooper]

The foreign presence thing is a drum beat by savvy Taliban recruiters and leaders. Foreign troops and other personnel frequently offend rural Afghans through ignorant actions more than just being viewed as "occupiers."

[rborum]

IntelTrooper - I love that you have a quote from wilf in your signature line. Great stuff.

What I gather from the comments so far is that (1) there is no systematic (at least open source) data available on the extent to which US presence trumps religious ideology as an insurgent motivator in AFG; (2) it would be near impossible to disaggregate those sentiments from other insurgent motivations anyway.

[j37]

There is some polling data that has been conducted by the BBC. I found it in an article on foreignpolicy.com The article ( http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...ight?page=full ) ran a few days ago. If you'd like to skip the commentary, here is a link to the bbc polling data http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/h..._poll_2009.pdf

I hope this information sheds some light on the subject.