Pashtun / Pashtunwali / Pashtunistan (catch all)

[jmm99]

The Accidental Guerrilla is worth cracking - not the Bible, but worth the read; especially as to the destruction of the traditional systems of local tribal governance in Astan and elsewhere. Another one addressing some of the same issues is Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, which I'm just finishing. Neither gives any pat solutions to the "hopeless mess".

I found MAJ Gant's little piece fascinating. Since there are some 40,000 villages in Astan, the picture of 40K ODAs (or their equivalent) is not what I expect to see. However, it could be the answer if we (US) wanted to get a firm hold on a key strategic piece of geography. Let us say, a base for conducting direct actions against AQ. In that situation, it wouldn't matter if that region had loyalty to the central government - so long as its inhabitants had primary loyalty to themselves and a secondary loyalty to us. E.g., the Montagnards in Vietnam.

In a sense, we would be engaging in the Management of Savagery (Chaos) and taking what seems to be a situation of local instability and turning it to our advantage. Naji thinks that AQ can manage savagery; I think we could do even better if we kept in mind the enlightened self-interests of ourselves and the local indigenous people - adapt, improvise and overcome. In such limited cases, the timeframe might well be acceptable.

And, oui, M. Legrange, I am stealing a bit from your thoughts as I have been digesting them. Colonialement.

Regards

Mike

[jcustis]

so long as its inhabitants had primary loyalty to themselves and a secondary loyalty to us.

And from this I wonder if we can gain, from some serious "living among them" effort, a sense of loyalty derived from the Pashtunwali code. If that code could be exploited through IO, engagement, development, etc., in order to allow support for our efforts, and that support was in harmony with faith in Allah, we'd probably be headed along the right track (let's term it the "Gant Path").

The beautiful thing about Gant's proposal is that we don't have to do it in all 40,000 villages in the country. That's why we orient on key terrain at times...all 40K villages are not key, but the need to determine the ones that are is paramount.

I wonder how we'd fair if we could all just grow beards as a first best practice.

[William F. Owen]

..hang on a second. Seems here that some things are getting mixed up.

a.) Can you defeat "the insurgency." Yes. It's just a matter of time, resources, and political will. The argument "oh but the Soviets lost" is hokum, because they might have won, if they had been prepared to invade all the safe-havens, and the Mujahadeen were in pretty dire straights till they got US funding.

....NATO has neither of those problems. Pakistan is an ally, are they not.

b.) Is there a strategic goal worth the time, blood, money and effort? - Dunno.

Just my take.

[tequila]

The argument "oh but the Soviets lost" is hokum, because they might have won, if they had been prepared to invade all the safe-havens, and the Mujahadeen were in pretty dire straights till they got US funding.

This implies that the Soviet Union would have had to invade Pakistan in order to win the war, which means they had no chance to win at all. Somehow I doubt invading FATA and Baluchistan would have ended the insurgency --- instead it would have simply continued in even more intensified fashion from Punjab and Sindh, with all of Pakistan drawn in as opposed to just the ISI. The whole of Pakistan would likely have been radicalized as a result.

Never mind the diplomatic and Cold War implications of another Soviet invasion of a sovereign country after Afghanistan. The Kremlin chose wisely to avoid this.

[William F. Owen]

This implies that the Soviet Union would have had to invade Pakistan in order to win the war, which means they had no chance to win at all. Somehow I doubt invading FATA and Baluchistan would have ended the insurgency --- instead it would have simply continued in even more intensified fashion from Punjab and Sindh, with all of Pakistan drawn in as opposed to just the ISI. The whole of Pakistan would likely have been radicalized as a result.

Maybe. I'm not playing "what if" history here. What I am trying to point out is that the argument that the "Afghan Guerilla" is some how un-beatable, is simply not true. He only manages to survive because of the political context of Afghanistan being a basically worthless cross-roads in the middle of nowhere, which no one wants to risk their future over.

They can be beaten, but basically unless their is a valid strategic goal, there is no point in making the investment. Like the US and NATO, the Soviets wanted a friendly regime in Kabul. OK, assuming that is somehow a good idea, what do you want to pay politically and diplomatically?

[tequila]

What I am trying to point out is that the argument that the "Afghan Guerilla" is some how un-beatable, is simply not true. He only manages to survive because of the political context of Afghanistan being a basically worthless cross-roads in the middle of nowhere, which no one wants to risk their future over.

Yes. But I don't think anyone here buys any of that orientalist crap. Problem is, of course, that strategic conundrum exists for us as well, which means that we of course could lose in the same way as the Soviets and the British did.

[Cavguy]

Yes. But I don't think anyone here buys any of that orientalist crap. Problem is, of course, that strategic conundrum exists for us as well, which means that we of course could lose in the same way as the Soviets and the British did.

The issue isn't whether it is possible to subdue the insurgency in Afghanstan. Given enough resources and time it's possible. The question is whether it is worth it in the strategic calculus. I think that's the crux of the President's decision and why it is taking so long - I don't think he's deciding between 20,000 and 40,000 troops, but whether to do it at all, given all the other constraints on the nation, and whether such an effort would benefit national security in proportion to the lives and treasure invested to make it work.

[William F. Owen]

Yes. But I don't think anyone here buys any of that orientalist crap. Problem is, of course, that strategic conundrum exists for us as well, which means that we of course could lose in the same way as the Soviets and the British did.

Precisely my point. So what is the political objective in Afghanistan again? Why are NATO and US there?

a.) Is it important?
b.) How much will it cost?

The idea that military force cannot defeat the insurgency is rubbish. It's just in this case it's politically pointless, because the cost cannot match the benefit.