Pashtun / Pashtunwali / Pashtunistan (catch all)

[jmm99]

My comment re: lesson learned in Vietnam applied to the tactical level - and a very basic level, that of the villages and their hamlets.

Your comment pertains to the strategic level, which is fine since that is what you do for a living. Your comment goes beyond one nation (Astan) and looks to the region (basically Indian Ocean littorals and continental land masses, from say Egypt to Indonesia to include most of the Muslim World).

Going back 40-50 years, we (US) were looking at containment of two Communist powers (SovComs and ChiComs) in the region of Southeast Asia. The result there was a "win" from our standpoint - Indochina became Communist; but the remainder remained non-Communist - though not a US proxy (ASEAN, etc.). The key was Indonesia which found its third way, not without a great deal of bloodshed.

Whether that "model" has any application to the Muslim World is another question. Your "friends" in the Kingdom certainly employ much of AQ's message - in truth, AQ has co-opted much of the Kingdom's message and added enhancements to it. Unless I've misunderstood much of what you have written, the Kingdom does not fall within your definition of "good governance".

What would this Muslim World "Third Way" message look like ? You know me, I like concrete examples.

Regards

Mike

[Yadernye]

Thanks for the welcome, folks.

To me, the interesting thing about Johnson's arguments is that he provides an explanation for the Pashtun insurgency that isn't focused on the Taliban/AQ relationship. He argues that the problem driving the insurgency is the breakdown of traditional tribal structures based on Pashtunwali self-government. This breakdown began with efforts in the 1970s by the Pakistani government to impose conservative Islam on the Pashtuns to quell any incipient nationalism. The Islamization of the Pashtuns accelerated during the Soviet occupation, which the Pakistanis exploited with their support for the Taliban in the 90s.

As McChrystal's ISAF evaluation points out, the Taliban are now only one of several Pashtun insurgent groups, loosely affiliated through their opposition to both the Afghan and Pakistani governments. Johnson argues that the way to quell this insurgency is to reconstruct the traditional balance between tribal elders, mullahs and central governments that existed before the early 1970s, and to restore the primacy of Pashtunwali-based Pashtun self-government.

If Johnson's argument is correct, than any COIN CONOP that involves pushing the authority of a central government upon Pashtun tribes who have never submitted to such an arrangement is akin to pouring gasoline on a fire. But...the focus of current U.S. strategy is to strengthen the Afghan government and security forces, thereby allowing U.S. military forces to depart.

[jcustis]

If Johnson's argument is correct, than any COIN CONOP that involves pushing the authority of a central government upon Pashtun tribes who have never submitted to such an arrangement is akin to pouring gasoline on a fire. But...the focus of current U.S. strategy is to strengthen the Afghan government and security forces, thereby allowing U.S. military forces to depart.

Since we are tied into that plan pretty deeply by now, and desire to have a government that can be relied on to live up to its part of the bargain (minimal corruption, more efficiency, etc., etc.), do we need to modify the approach and shape that government into a body that can be less a dose of gasoline and more like a pan lid that can quell the fire somewhat?

Put another way, can we ever facilitate central government power over Pashtun areas in a way that compliments their daily way of life, as opposed to being two pieces of sand paper rubbing against each other? If the honest answer is no, then we have some serious decisions within decisions that have to be made. Why we would have elements of a overall strategy that work at cross purposes is depressing at times.

In better news, there were 9 military servicemember deaths in Iraq last month, by CNN's tally. Only 2 of them were due to hostile action. The preceding few months are similar. Sectarianism aside, Iraqis at least had a tradition of a strong central base they had lived under, perhaps making it easier to return to central government control.

[jmm99]

Focus on the "the breakdown of traditional tribal structures based on Pashtunwali self-government" is nothing new. Kilcullen spends quite a bit of time on it in The Accidental Guerrilla. And, any thinking person knows that it is a combined Pstan and Astan problem because the Pashtuns are on both sides of the artificial border.

The question is how to solve the "Pashtun Problem". One solution is the top down approach of the Coalition in Astan to enhance the central Karzai government; which has its counterpart in the Pakistani efforts against the Taliban and associated groups in its own Pashtunistan.

Neither takes into account local governance in any real sense (compare the Taliban approach, which does provide governance down to the village level, no matter how flawed we think that "shadow governance" is).

Johnson-Mason would attempt to get back to the pre-SovCom Invasion structure of a weak central government and strong local tribal structures by moving reconstruction teams down to the district level. How this would differ from a top down (essentially a rule by law, nor rule of law) approach is not readily apparent to me.

From our (US and ISAF) standpoint, the lack of a non-Taliban center of gravity (or centers of gravity) among the Pashtuns is a real hurdle. Correct me if I am wrong, but I have not read of any large Pashtun group that could be co-opted, either as an ally of the Karzai government, or as a solid regional group that would be willing to take our side (even if not loving of Mr Karzai).

Another, and far more radical, approach is that suggested in Steve Pressfield's series of articles on reaching down to the tribes. There we can link to Jim Gant's One Tribe At A Time, which lays down in as much detail as he could provide the TTP for co-opting one small tribe via one ODA (e.g., p.28).

Bottom line: The GIRoA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) must find a way to incorporate the historical tribal structures into the national political system. It will not look like anything we can envision at this point, and may vary from province to province or even from tribe to tribe. But it can be done. Tribal Engagement Teams can help facilitate this.

A very good read, etc.

Again, MAJ Gant's approach is not new - it goes back to the initial stages of the CIA-SF operations in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. By very local work, the indigenous tribe is assisted to create its own security zone and, as an important incidence of that, its own local governance. As such, it creates a "rule of law" situation (a bubble up from the indigenous villagers), which is far removed from the "rule by law" situation imposed by many versions of population-centric counter-insurgency.

The problem with Jim Gant's solution is that it is in effect a form of revolutionary counter-insurgency. The indigenous villagers come to realize their own value and power, which reinforces their primary loyalty to their own institutions. To the extent they have secondary loyalty, it is to the US SF soldiers who assisted them (and who represent the US in their eyes). All of that is contrary to established US policy in Astan (as it was in Vietnam).

If we were starting this from scratch, I'd vote for MAJ Gant's solution. Given the policies in place, I'm quite certain that is not going to be the solution adopted by the "Powers That Be". I expect to see more of the same.

And, some form of conversation between ISAF officers similar to this between two French officers during the First Indochina War, after their unit (6th Spahis) had spent much of a week clearing a village and adjacent area of Viet Minh (well, not quite completely, as the dialogue suggests). It makes a point as the two officers discuss a five person civic action team, all Vietnamese, who had just joined them and who now had to "hold and build". The conversation is from Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy, pp.154-155):

MAJ Derrieu: Funny, they just never seem to succeed in striking the right note with the population. Either they come in and try to apologize for the mess we've just made with our planes and tanks; or they swagger and threaten the farmers as if they were enemy nationals which - let's face it - they are in many cases.

LT Dujardin: That may be so, but I wouldn't care to be in his shoes tonight when we pull out. He's going to stay right here in the house which the Commie commander still occupied yesterday, all by himself with the four other guys of his administrative team, with the nearest [military] post 300 metres away. Hell, I'll bet he won't even sleep here but sleep in the post anyway.

MAJ: He probably will, and he'll immediately lose face with the population and become useless.

LT: And if he doesn't, he'll probably be dead by tomorrow, and just as useless. In any case, there goes the whole psychological effect of the operation and we can start the whole thing all over again three months from now. What a hopeless mess.

And so it goes ....

Regards to all

Mike

[jmm99]

Glad you joined the discourse - and provided this astute observation:

Put another way, can we ever facilitate central government power over Pashtun areas in a way that compliments their daily way of life, as opposed to being two pieces of sand paper rubbing against each other? If the honest answer is no, then we have some serious decisions within decisions that have to be made. Why we would have elements of a overall strategy that work at cross purposes is depressing at times.

We are both depressed for the same reasons. The answer to your question is, of course, affirmative - if we were willing to spend the decades slowly building Jim Gant's small tribal infrastructures and melding them with a very accommodating central government (add honesty and integrity to the adjectives).

As it stands, our dialog will be that of the two French officers (you can stay the MAJ; I'll play the LT cuz I agree with his bottom line). So, the "decisions within decisions" is probably pre-ordained.

You hit Iraq right on the head. Iraq was ruled by a very centralized, authoritarian police state for decades. In such situations, a rather authoritarian population-centric "COIN" strategy will work because the people are used to it. Of course, it also involves quite a bit of local honey (just as Saddam did) as Mike Few and Niel Smith are waxing fine in another thread.

Best as always

Mike

[rborum]

I have heard this argument several times, mostly anecdotally. Matthew Hoh raised it in his letter of resignation.

The assertion is that most of the Pashtun insurgents are not fighting for the Taliban, but rather against foreign presence and a corrupt national government.

I have also heard some suggest - again, anecdotally - that the Taliban knows this and uses that rhetoric in their recruitment / propaganda efforts more than promoting Taliban ideals.

I completely understand that insurgent motivations can be complicated. You can't necessarily pin it on "one thing." But it led me to wonder about two things:

1. Beyond these anecdotes is there is any evidence - even polling or surveys or anything - that would support or refute the argument that at this juncture foreign presence and national government corruption drive the AFG insurgency more strongly than any pro-Taliban sentiment? (Maybe this even varies by region??)

2. Is there any merit - as part of a strategic assessment - to considering whether our mere presence (and possibly support for the local government) may make an insurgency worse, rather than better...independent of what we do when we're there? If so, how might a strategist (and I know there are a number of you out there) consider this is in his/her decisionmaking calculus?

[davidbfpo]

Randy,

I completely understand that insurgent motivations can be complicated. You can't necessarily pin it on "one thing." But it led me to wonder about two things:

1. Beyond these anecdotes is there is any evidence - even polling or surveys or anything - that would support or refute the argument that at this juncture foreign presence and national government corruption drive the AFG insurgency more strongly than any pro-Taliban sentiment? (Maybe this even varies by region??)

2. Is there any merit - as part of a strategic assessment - to considering whether our mere presence (and possibly support for the local government) may make an insurgency worse, rather than better...independent of what we do when we're there? If so, how might a strategist (and I know there are a number of you out there) consider this is in his/her decisionmaking calculus?

I am not sure about polling data for Q.1; which has been discussed here before. As for national government corruption, which is endemic, on the ANP thread(s) their corruption and illegal activities have featured several times. There was a recent story that newly arrived ANP were so bad the locals called for the Taliban's return IIRC.

In Q.2 then, the issue of external support for corrupt local government has appeared in Helmand Province, when the governor was removed due to alleged heroin trading (tons found in his residence) and on a SWC thread (possibly that on the UK role in Afghanistan). Drugs aside he was an effective governor, whose fighters then joined the Taliban!

Late in the day to say more.

[omarali50]

I know my opinion is not based on any direct knowledge of the afghan insurgency, but I am still doubtful about the very term "pashtun insurgency". I think some people are seeing what they are primed to think. I think the people doing the actual fighting are almost all motivated first and foremost by loyalty to the Taliban, not to some idea of Pashtun nationalism. The taliban may appeal to the pride of the Pakhtuns but they are primarily a religious movement. The idea of "Pashtun card" owes more to some Pakistani strategists thinking this is the best way to put forward a "secular" argument against the current Afghan regime. I could be wrong...

[tequila]

How much was the insurgency in South Vietnam driven by Vietnamese nationalism as opposed to Communist belief, a better land reform program, preference for the NLF government over the RVN government, the largest occupying force in the area at the time, etc. ? I don't think we're ever going to get a really solid answer to those questions, moreover because preferences and priorities change over time and vary from place to place.

[Schmedlap]

I checked up on Ghosts of Alexander today and saw that it has been declared dead (who knew that ghosts could die again?). D'oh.

But, I re-read a couple of his older posts, including Petraeus and McChrystal Drink Major Gant's Snake Oil and Gravediggers Disinter Tribal Militia Corpse. In doing so, I came across something that I had overlooked before. In his critique of the writings of the Jim Gants's of the world, he posted this piece from the Human Terrain System, published in September 2009.

My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun “Tribes” in Afghanistan

I read through it and found it to be a good explanation for why tribes may not be a good (or even less bad) conduit for us to work through or not a good / less bad unit to empower. That is, it's a good explanation if the observations are valid and the reasoning is sound. It made sense to me, but I'm not an anthropologist and I've never been to Afghanistan.

My question to the board: Is anyone aware of any informed critiques of this paper - positive or negative? Or, for those with relevant knowledge/experience, what are your thoughts on the paper?

[Entropy]

Schmedlap,

I read the paper a couple months ago and, like you, found it compelling. I haven't seen any critiques either.

There was a discussion over at Col. Pat Lang's blog on this topic and he's advocated an approach similar to what's proscribed by Maj. Gant. Col. Lang was also an adviser to the HTT program. I asked him his opinion on the apparent discrepancy between between the two papers regarding tribes. His reply (in the comments to that post linked above):

Some of the HTS crowd are perforce deeply committed to the social science method of looking at just about everything. That means, in this case, that one studies some phenomeneon at the smallest scale possible, with the greatest rigor, and little tolerance for intuition.

UW methods like those promoted by Major Gant work with any set of groups that have self identity in numbers small enough to be affected by you. Villagers, tribesmen, people working on collective farms, moshavniks. You can name any number of categories.

They have to have some leadership. If not then you can provide it yourself. They should have a perceived grievance. Movies are fun. I remember the Nuristani/Kaffiristani villagers in "The Man Who would be King." Their grievance was that the villagers up-stream were "pissing in the river."

That's about all I've seen besides the Ghost's of Alexander posts you linked to above.

[Infanteer]

Maj Gant's article and the debate it has spawned is very interesting and I'm currently trying to catch what I can.

The rebuttal on the "Alexander" blog was alright - the ad hominem attack in the form of "war crime" and "ethnic cleansing" was a silly piece of fluff, and nothing will alienate a significant target audience (and reduce the power of one's own argument) then attacking one of their own like that.

However, the attack on Maj Gant's focus on the tribes is worthy of consideration. Honing in on an area and finding success can be a double-edged sword as success is tied to the unique conditions that spawned it (and the problem). I consider it akin to the analogy of three blind men trying to describe an elephant. One is grabbing the trunk, another the tail and another the foot. When you say "elephant", you are going to get three different answers which all contain an element of the truth.

Maj Gant seems to put a lot of emphasis on "tribes". I have simply not seen this in my experience in Afghanistan, at least not to the level he seems to describe it. I've seen villages sharing the same tribal background badmouth eachother due to feuds that may or may not have anything to do with the insurgency. Even within villages, longstanding disagreements between villagers draw on outside sources to leverage themselves within their community. It is in this maelstrom that things like "Taliban", "ISAF", and "ANSF" find themselves in.

Maj Gant is rightfully receiving accolades for showing how engagements at the lowest - and what are most likely the most stable and legitimate - levels of Afghan society can provide success. However, every small platoon or company out there is going to be fighting a unique little war in its collection of villages, paths and fields and it has to be smart and make the proper assessment (and apply the proper protocol from above) before inserting itself into that conflict.

Anyways, my 2 cents.
Infanteer

[davidbfpo]

This BBC story fits here IMHO:

As the biggest offensive in Afghanistan since 2001 continues in southern Helmand province, the head of council for Helmand's tribal elders, Haji Abdurahman Sabir, tells BBC Pashto's Emal Pasarly about the frustrations of local residents.

More on this:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8522176.stm

[George L. Singleton]

I have "read over" Jedburg's recent posting of the link to KHYBER, THE VOICES OF PASHTUNS, JUNE, 2009.

Summary comments: Exact same cast of names and personalties who have been among the frequent posters on GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE a subdivision of KHYBER WATCH.

My abbreviated partial reviews now are critical in nature, there are some good points made by some of these writers:

1. M. Bilal Khan Yousafazai, article "Code of Pashtunwali", key point in his opening remarks is that this is an unwritten law and ideology, i.e., custom and practice open to widely differing interpretations. Conservative, oligarical...it in his view has developed into an "accepted constitution." It is under this unwritten constitution that Osama bin Laden is given protection under the guise of hospitality by those Pashtuns who are members of the Taliban. The Jirga system evolves from this "constitution" also. Jirgas are an old practice or custom, my remark (George)...the late King of Afghanistan in 2001-2002 returned briefly to Afghanistan to convene a Grand Jirga of the tribes of Afghanistan, most of whom are ethnic Pakhtuns numerically, to help the Allies restart a new government under Karzai.

2. Dr. Nbi Misdaq, who currently works for the US Department of State, Foreign Language Institute in Arlington, VA, leads off the listed articles advocating in a softly worded fashion an attempt to sell the secession of Pakhtuns from both Pakistan and Afghanistan to create a new nation-state of Pakhtuwana.

3. Mohammad Naeem, who is a young Canadian graduate student (told to me to be working on a Masters in Canada, but could as easily be a doctoral student there) is a regular posters on GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE and has on occasion been verbally violent on line, cursing, etc., which that website has consistently overlooked at allowed (HUJRA). Here again is an activist damning the government of Pakistan, no matter who or which party is in power, and adocating secession.

4. Jahznzel & Fatima Ahmed (she is a Masters degree student in Canada, where both reside) offer some more of the same general remarks.

5. Samin Jan Kekah, one of the Islamic religiously focused Pahtun writers on this new site, talks about the Islamic angel Shaytaan as being the biggest scholar and most educated among the angels, among the chose of God, sort of describing this angel as the, my wording, "Patron Saint" of Pashtun separatism and secession to be a new stand alone ethnically based (racial) nation created out of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This writer is from Quetta and is a university student at Balochistan University.

It needs to be understood that some of the Paskthun folks I am commenting on here represent a reverse racial superiority point of view, and have repeatedly told me in open forum of their disdain for "lesser" tribes and elites. Those who profess Islam are Sunnis, not Shiites, and they are not entirely friendly to Shiites as a matter of fact.

You find mixed messages and differeing opinions among these and other writers on the new and existing sites. This site, to me, is an attemt to create a direct forum with the world which supercedes their existing sites but builds on it and is in tandum with it.

You find here and there in these various writings mentioning of the Durand Line, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is a major object and purpose of their writing, to eventually undo the 100+ year old border separating Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Finally, the article about IDP (Internally displaced persons) by a free lance Pashtun journalist does provide some helpful statistical tables of where and how many IDPs are accommodated during the fighting.

Quraysh Khattak is a Pashtun Journalist who worked with many prestigious newspapers including The News. He is a freelance writer and works as a Program Manager in an Islamabad-based NGO. He writes in part:

Peshawar, Charsadda and Swabi.

The Ministry of Community Development (former Social Welfare Department) has conducted off camp registration in various areas. According to their record 77516 families of 462528 persons was living in rented houses or with their relatives in 11 districts of the province. But after the peace deal most of the IDPs went back to their home towns.

Quraysh Khattak is a Pashtun Journalist who worked with many prestigious newspapers including The News. He is a freelance writer and works as a Program Manager in an Islamabad-based NGO.

IDP’s updates on 8-5-2009
Aryana Insitute for Regional Research and Advocacy (AIRRA)
The ongoing militancy in Swat and the operation against the militants in the area has resulted in insurmountable hardships for a huge population of the area. The Islamic militants have imposed their own version of Islamic rules and regulations. They have occupied the houses, property and other places of the common public. The Army has come to rescue situation. But after the lapse of two long years, one of the strongest military in the Muslim world has yet to show the results. Frustration and disappointments compelled the population of the area to move to safer places in other parts of NWFP.

The controversial peace deal gave an opportunity to the militants to reorganize and regroup. They expanded their influence to District Buner,Shangla, Dir upper and Dir lower. They openly challenged the writ of the government and started militant activities in the areas. The liberals and opinion makers of the society welcomed the recent counter insurgency stance of the government, albeit with a caution. The people of the conflict zones are of the opinion that the supply lines, network and command and control structure of militants would need a ground assault on the part of the military but till now gun ship helicopters and jet aircrafts are used to target the militant hideouts.

The newly launched military operation resulted in huge migration of masses to down districts of the province and other parts of the country. Displacement of almost one million has taken place till now. Majority of the people have shifted to district Mardan, Nowshera, Peshawar, Charsadda and Swabi.

The Ministry of Community Development (former Social Welfare Department) has conducted off camp registration in various areas. According to their record 77516 families of 462528 persons was living in rented houses or with their relatives in 11 districts of the province. But after the peace deal most of the IDPs went back to their home towns. *George note: This refers to the on again, off again jirga and Government of Pakistan attempts to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban which we know then blew up and failed.

Experience tells us on SWJ that any displacement of a few million folks will have tons of problems, as was the case with the earth quakes in the Kashmir zone of Pakistan a few years ago. People gripe, sometimes genuinely, but massive logistics and resettlement and support is a horrendous job never suitable fixed to everyone's satisfaction, witness our Katrina on going repairs and resettlements here in the US.

End of "George's opinions" of the Pakhtuns, several of whom have dialogued with me since Nov. 2006 when I was invited to be a Member of KHYBER WATCH, sub set being GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE. I was separately invited to be a contributor, free will, up to me to contribute, on PAKHTUN WOMEN website, being told by the founder of that site that women in general were treated too rudely and hostilly on GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE and thus set up their own blog site, separately. Such negative cultural norms toward females is a part of the unwritten Pukhwatawana "constitution."

[wmthomson]

I am new to the SWJ forum but an avid reader. I am beginning the research for small writing project I have created for myself on Afghanistan and COIN ops I have found research easy except for information on Pashtun tribes, peoples and most importantly Pashtunwali any one have any suggestions?

[davidbfpo]

WMThomson,

Welcome to SWC.

I am new to the SWJ forum but an avid reader. I am beginning the research for small writing project I have created for myself on Afghanistan and COIN ops I have found research easy except for information on Pashtun tribes, peoples and most importantly Pashtunwali any one have any suggestions?

There are some first steps:

1. Use the Advanced Search option: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6813
2. A few lines of introduction always help others understand, with OPSEC and abonymity if req'd on 'Tell Us About You' thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=1441&page=51 . Now done (mins later: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=1441&page=51 Post 1018.

I know there are some maps of the tribes and links to the Pashtun honour code, for example for maps: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6643 Post 7 and Pashtunwali: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=4165

There's a starter and hopefully helpful.

davidbfpo

[Abu Suleyman]

I would start with Friedrik Barth, and work my way forward. I know that Barth is way outdated, and worked mostly in what is today Pakistan, and not afghanistan, but he had excellent insights into the lives, culture, and traditions of the Pashtuns (which he called by the old nomenclature of Pathans). More importantly, rather than just being an anthropologist, he was focused more on political and law questions, although they were almost all traditional.

If you have access to a database that does reference searches, you can rest assured that almost every academic study of Pashtunwali will cite him.

[Entropy]

Christian Bleuer's site is an excellent place to start.

[marct]

I would also recommend pretty much anything by Thomas Barfield. I had the chance to hear him talk and chat with him at NPS in March, and he has forgotten more about Afghanistan than most people have ever learned. Top notch scholar, and one of the few who has been working in the area for longer than 8 years .

[Granite_State]

Can anyone recommend a good short (30 pages max), readable article or chapter on Pashtunwali I could use to educate my junior Marines (LCpls and below)? Failing that, maybe something a little more in-depth for officers and NCOs?

I did a short search here prior to posting this, but if I missed a SWC thread on the specific subject please let me know.