Abandon squad/section levels of organization?

[William F. Owen]

Adam L,

1. I think we're looking for a basic and generic rifle squad to build upon.

2. I might be wrong, but it seems that a rough consensus is emerging in favour of larger squads.

Why? What is so important about squads/sections. How is 30 men organised as 2 x 15 man squads different from 3 x 10 man squads? These squads are not normally acting in isolation of each other, so where do we see clear blue water between the Squads and 30 men (or whatever number you choose) as being 6 x 5 man teams able to form 15 man or 10 man sections or teams?

The 1936-1983 UK Section was a 8-10 man formed into two Fireteams - except they were called the Rifle group (5-6 men) and the Gun Group (3-4men). Occaisonally, when operating in Jungle, the 10 man sections composed three groups - usually a Gun group x 4 men, and two 3 man scout groups.

I hope I'm making sense.

[Distiller]

Why? What is so important about squads/sections. How is 30 men organised as 2 x 15 man squads different from 3 x 10 man squads? These squads are not normally acting in isolation of each other, so where do we see clear blue water between the Squads and 30 men (or whatever number you choose) as being 6 x 5 man teams able to form 15 man or 10 man sections or teams?

The 1936-1983 UK Section was a 8-10 man formed into two Fireteams - except they were called the Rifle group (5-6 men) and the Gun Group (3-4men). Occaisonally, when operating in Jungle, the 10 man sections composed three groups - usually a Gun group x 4 men, and two 3 man scout groups.

I hope I'm making sense.

How do you see the question of keeping the squad small enough to fit "as one piece" into APCs (provided you procure/design one that can take 9+crew) and UH-60-type air assault helicopters?
You might be able to pack 14 men (another nice number for a 3 team squad) into a helicopter, but never into an APC.

[William F. Owen]

How do you see the question of keeping the squad small enough to fit "as one piece" into APCs (provided you procure/design one that can take 9+crew) and UH-60-type air assault helicopters?
You might be able to pack 14 men (another nice number for a 3 team squad) into a helicopter, but never into an APC.

I believe Platoons should be optimised for their dismounted role. Mounting them in a vehicle or APC is just getting them from A-B. (MICVs are a whole different box of frogs!)

You do have to make a choice about total number of men versus available vehicles, so that does have an effect. "If" your platoons are 30 men, and your vehicle only carries 6 men, you'll need 5 APCs versus the 4 you'd need if they carried 8 - so the budget might not be their, and there might be logistic penalties as well. 3 APCs or MRAPs that can carry 10 men would life the whole platoon, but you'd have no spare seats.

[Norfolk]

I believe Platoons should be optimised for their dismounted role. Mounting them in a vehicle or APC is just getting them from A-B. (MICVs are a whole different box of frogs!)

You do have to make a choice about total number of men versus available vehicles, so that does have an effect. "If" your platoons are 30 men, and your vehicle only carries 6 men, you'll need 5 APCs versus the 4 you'd need if they carried 8 - so the budget might not be their, and there might be logistic penalties as well. 3 APCs or MRAPs that can carry 10 men would life the whole platoon, but you'd have no spare seats.

Wilf, completely agreed on the point that all Infantry Platoons need to be optimized for thee dismounted role. Closing with and destroying the enemy is their raison d'etre.

I think our concern with Section/Squad size has to do with their ability or inability to perform Fire-and-Manoeuvre. It's the old, does the Section/Squad do one or the other (the "Old" way) or does it do both (the "New" way)? The "Old" way, when the Section/Squad either Fired or Manoeuvered within the context of the Platoon Attack made it possible to have maybe 10 men between the Gun Group and the Rifle Group, and Bob was your uncle. Now, the "New" way of course has two Fire Teams/Assault Groups alternating Fire-and-Movement all the way in during the Platoon Attack, as if the rest of the Platoon isn't even there.

That's wrong, and with only 8 men in the Section or 9 men in the Squad and no more or less stable base of fire to support them (like the old Gun Group did), they take a lot of looses on the way to the objective. In The RCR, we were told that an 8-man Section would take 60% losses in the first 24 hours of offensive operations (this was presumably against an entrenched Soviet Motor-Rifle Troops, with dug-in Tanks, IFVs, the lot).

If you have the time, sometime, these two pieces by my Regimental Adjutant
may provide an idea of where we're coming from:

http://regimentalrogue.com/papers/sect_atk.htm

http://regimentalrogue.com/papers/sect_atk_part2.htm

[William F. Owen]

I think our concern with Section/Squad size has to do with their ability or inability to perform Fire-and-Manoeuvre. :

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I posted this in the platoon weapons thread. I think it is relevant here:

I see there as being two things that the platoon needs to do as concerns weapons. First you need Teams (3-5 men?) to conduct reconnaissance so that weapons teams – again 3-5 men – can get weapons into places where they can do the most damage to the enemy. This is as old as the hills and has been around for years. Wigram detailed this in his 1941 “Battlecraft” pamphlet, and then added to it in his post Sicily battle notes.

The “Recce” Teams should be lightly loaded so as they can best do their task. The weapons teams would then be optimised to support the weapons they are equipped with.

As a straw man and in the absence of any other ideas, I’d have 3-5 “Recce” teams under the platoon commander, and 2-4 weapons teams under the Platoon Sergeant.

...so why not emphasise F&M at the Platoon level instead of at the Squad/Section?

Yes, read the Regimental Rogue stuff some years ago.

[Norfolk]

...so why not emphasise F&M at the Platoon level instead of at the Squad/Section?

Agreed, and we'd like to, but unfortunately "Peacetime Doctrine" has this fixation upon organic fire and movement within the Section - admittedly, that's a mindset that has to be fixed at higher echelons - the ones who write the doctrine - but it does spawn a "pepperpot straight into the enemy's guns" tactical mindset at Section and Platoon levels. In practice, Platoon and Section commanders are often discouraged or at least not encouraged to develop and use their own tactical judgement, and so just settle for a rote prescription.

[Norfolk]

Agreed, and we'd like to, but unfortunately "Peacetime Doctrine" has this fixation upon organic fire and movement within the Section - admittedly, that's a mindset that has to be fixed at higher echelons - the ones who write the doctrine - but it does spawn a "pepperpot straight into the enemy's guns" tactical mindset at Section and Platoon levels. In practice, Platoon and Section commanders are often discouraged or at least not encouraged to develop and use their own tactical judgement, and so just settle for a rote prescription.

The basic reason why larger squads/sections seem to be favoured here, is to provide greater flexibility and ability to sustain battle losses in order to make F&M at that level work.

Edit: I pressed the wrong button: that's why this ended up being its own post, rather than just being an edit of the previous post. And I certainly did not intend to quote myself!

[Rifleman]

I posted this in the platoon weapons thread. I think it is relevant here:

I see there as being two things that the platoon needs to do as concerns weapons. First you need Teams (3-5 men?) to conduct reconnaissance so that weapons teams – again 3-5 men – can get weapons into places where they can do the most damage to the enemy. This is as old as the hills and has been around for years. Wigram detailed this in his 1941 “Battlecraft” pamphlet, and then added to it in his post Sicily battle notes.

The USMC squad seems to have been doing this well since 1945. Their squad design allows you to use one team as a scouting fire team.

The “Recce” Teams should be lightly loaded so as they can best do their task. The weapons teams would then be optimised to support the weapons they are equipped with.

The USMC teams have always been balanced - at least on paper - instead of light and heavy, but that's not carved in stone. Ken White wrote of a USMC squad leader in Korea who would sometimes consolidate his BARs into one team.

As a straw man and in the absence of any other ideas, I’d have 3-5 “Recce” teams under the platoon commander, and 2-4 weapons teams under the Platoon Sergeant.

I'll have to think about that.

...so why not emphasise F&M at the Platoon level instead of at the Squad/Section?

I'm not in a position, or experienced enough, to say that the platoon should or shouldn't be the focal point for fire and maneuver. In fact, I think with the U.S. Army it really has to be that way, since their squads are not really big enough to fire and maneuver.

Fire and maneuver usually became a platoon function for the Army in Vietnam anyway. Their squads - two fire team squads on paper, of course - always ended up as a machine gunner, grenadier, and a handfull of riflemen. More or less the German Gruppe. You can see this portrayed in the film Hamburger Hill and the novel The 13th Valley.

I will point out though that some people, people with more experience than me, think independently operating squads are necessary for some of the fights we're facing in Iraq. I think independently operating squads really need to be big squads.

Wilf, keep writing please. I'm not always in agreement but it's always a pleasure to read.....so far.

Oh, how do you like my avatar and signature?

[Ken White]

I've stated my preference for the 13 man USMC squad, it is totally flexible and provides adequate power for almost every conceivable mission. The USMC organization also puts the crew served stuff at Co level where, as Norfolk says, it is best trained and controlled. It doesn't need a lot of tinkering.

Army squads can and do use fire and maneuver (as most understand that term) and are capable of independent operations -- and squads DO get (and should get) independent missions. The only time they don't is when a lack of leadership capability above their level gets on a "force protection" kick and is lacking in the testicular fortitude to trust 'em and let them do their jobs. Admittedly, that happens entirely too often nowadays...

Even with the smaller Army unit size, you effectively get six four man recon (or whatever) teams and while I'd rather see the MG and Javelins * at Co level, the Weapons squad concept does work and does have the advantage of forcing the PSG and PL to think of weapons and support on a constant as opposed to an as required basis.

( * The Javelin is a good if heavy weapon; its predecessor, the Dragon, was an unmitigated -- and unsalvageable -- disaster and didn't die soon enough.)

Still, having been in both in conventional and COIN ops for real as well as in peacetime, stateside training -- the Marines have it right. The Army model will work and I have no doubt a competent Pl and PSG in either can do anything I've seen suggested in this and the related threads.

Either model can be reorganized internally and for specific missions as the Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant decide; at least in my experience, they don't have to ask anybody. That said with the caveat that at the beginning of a war, some senior NCOs and Officers can be unduly hidebound -- but that is their problem and those types aren't likely to get to close to the booms, bees and snap of combat and can generally be politely and discretely ignored.

At the rifle Company level, bigger is better. There are a lot of force multipliers out there but at the level of the Infantry company, most are not terribly helpful; adequate strength to deal with human frailty, combat losses and other attritional factors is imperative. The Marines understand that; they also understand the "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" rule...

The factor many miss at that level when they start with the reorganizing what-ifs is the training value of Teams and Squads. Many theorists operate on the fallacy that every one in the Platoon (or any other level) is well or at least adequately trained in his job. They aren't and never will be; humans fail, need leave, dozens of factors -- there are ALWAYS new people coming in and, particularly in war time, they will never be fully trained and competent -- particularly at combat troop leading. That's why the civilian penchant for "flattening the pyramid" does not work for combat organizations (not to mention that it doesn't work all that well in civilian industry, either ). Being a Team leader is the elementary school, Squad leader is Middle School and the PSG is the High School -- none of them need a degree, much less an advanced degree but..

Don't go to war without them.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,

@The very experienced Special Forces NCOs leading Nungs and Montangnards in SOG made flexibility work to their advantage.

@It's also worth noting that some other SF projects like Popular Forces, Mobile Strike Forces, and Mobile Guerrilla Forces pretty much stuck to a traditional infantry organization.

@ did you happen to interview retired Command Sergeant Major Samuel Hernandez? He was a one-zero at CCN and made the first HALO jump in Vietnam with RT Florida.

@ Yep, but the Yards were pretty basic (every brave) folks. What works for them could well work elsewhere.

@ I had long talks with Ken Bowra who trained FANK Battalions in RVN. He even gave me copies of all their training programs. This was primarily to do with scaling equipment and inter-operability with conventional US Forces.

@Never met him. Doug Miller had agreed to talk to me and then fell ill and died. All the other guys I talked to are listed in the book. I have talked to many more since.

@ Fire and maneuver usually became a platoon function for the Army in Vietnam anyway. Their squads - two fire team squads on paper, of course - always ended up as a machine gunner, grenadier, and a handfull of riflemen.

@I will point out though that some people, people with more experience than me, think independently operating squads are necessary for some of the fights we're facing in Iraq. I think independently operating squads really need to be big squads.

@ Oh, how do you like my avatar and signature?

@ In WW1 it certainly was and became so in WW2, for the UK. I have written extensively on the fact that the whole concept of section/squad F&M was a mistake caused by badly written manuals.

@ In Northern Ireland they just grouped 2 x 8 man sections together and formed "multiples," which were 3-4 x 4 man teams. Generally the platoon was split into 2 halves, one lead by the Platoon Commander and one by the Platoon Sergeant. This works. We have 25 years of continuous proof! In 1995 the UK did documented field trials which showed the same basic principles worked well for the Platoon attack as well.

@ Ah yes, the Avatar. Are you by any chance, an American?

...and when Washington gives back all the plantations the rebels stole from my family, I'll be a lot happier!

[Rifleman]

Why? What is so important about squads/sections. How is 30 men organised as 2 x 15 man squads different from 3 x 10 man squads? These squads are not normally acting in isolation of each other, so where do we see clear blue water between the Squads and 30 men (or whatever number you choose) as being 6 x 5 man teams able to form 15 man or 10 man sections or teams?

The 1936-1983 UK Section was a 8-10 man formed into two Fireteams - except they were called the Rifle group (5-6 men) and the Gun Group (3-4men). Occaisonally, when operating in Jungle, the 10 man sections composed three groups - usually a Gun group x 4 men, and two 3 man scout groups.

I hope I'm making sense.

Wilf,

You're articulating your position very well, so yes, you are making sense.

It's just that if I was a green 2d Lieutenant and you gave me six fire teams, some heavy and some light, I would be tempted to habitually group the same teams together into defacto squads of two or three teams each, instead of mixing and matching differently for each contact.

I don't think I'd be alone in doing that either, so now we're back to where we started from.