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Thread: Abandon squad/section levels of organization?

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    Council Member Uboat509's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    The need for infantry to carry excessive weight is based on the belief that they can subsist for X-days without re-supply. Why carry 3 days food and water when you have 20 mins of ammo
    It is hardly uncommon to go three days and not have 20 minutes of contact. I met guys on my last trip who were on their second tour and had only been in their second fire fight. My own experience during my tour was that I was IED'd a number of times but only got into one firefight that lasted all of two minutes.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Load is everything and trade offs have to be made. The idea that infantry must operate is isolation is major flaw, as is the idea that infantry should be able operate unsupported. Here some of the ideas I bounced around,
    With eight infantry divisions out of a total of ten it is hardly out of the realm of possibility that individual infantry formations will have to operate for extended periods of time with minimal support.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    @ - Re-supply conducted by Attack Helicopters
    How? US attack helicopters are incapable of carrying any meaningful load.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    @ - Low power wide area re-broadcast conducted by UAVs, to conserve battery life.
    I will take your word on this one. I don't have any experience with the actual operation of UAVs.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    @ - Form groupings dedicated to load carrying support for dismounted infantry operations.
    We already have logistics units and even light infantry has some vehicles for logistical support down to company level.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    @ - Acceptance that supply limited operations are a "special condition" and not the norm.
    That depends entirely on the enemy and the specific fight that we are in.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    @- rationalize equipment design, based on load and support. - Eg An effective sleeping bag can costs less than some mortar bombs or similar munitions, so why not make them disposable and supply-able, or "one night items" - make up 70kg (IIRC) "Platoon Overnight kits" to be dropped/pushed in as and when required .
    No argument here. Our procurement system sucks and my experience is that decisions are often made based on a single variable rather than all the possible variables. Body armor is a prime example. Prior to OIF no one wore body armor except in very specific circumstances. Now you can't leave the gate with out full body armor with all the bells and whistles. In Iraq that is not such a problem where foot patrols are largely only in urban areas and last no more than a few hours after which the soldier will usually go back to a safe area where he can refit. I have not been to Afghanistan but friends of mine are telling me that foot patrols can be significantly longer in the mountains and forty pounds of body armor in addition to weapons, ammo and equipment plus whatever sustainment load there is seriously degrades a unit's ability to operate in that environment. Unfortunately the Army often does not look at things in that light. To many commanders, body armor stops bullets and shrapnel so we will wear it any time we are out of the wire and that is all there is to it. At what point does the body armor become more of a hindrance than it is worth?

    SFC W

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Uboat509 View Post

    How? US attack helicopters are incapable of carrying any meaningful load.
    With great ease. You just trade one or more pylon loads for a re-supply pod. I am told the design exists, and I have it on some good authority that it would be easy to adapt the ferry fuel tanks for than role.

    Each pylon can take about 500kg IIRC. I crunched some numbers a while back and that indicated that 1 x AH-64 could easily deliver most of the small arms ammo, rations and water needed for a dismounted company of 3 platoons. Volume seems more of an issue than weight.

    SOCOM folks tell me that this was widely discussed for SF, but it went away as no AH-64s were on the SOCOM OOB at the time. - eg MH-60 would be the preferred method.

    ...and of course AH pilots don't want to haul ammo and rations!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    Council Member Ratzel's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Uboat509 View Post
    Body armor is a prime example. Prior to OIF no one wore body armor except in very specific circumstances. Now you can't leave the gate with out full body armor with all the bells and whistles. In Iraq that is not such a problem where foot patrols are largely only in urban areas and last no more than a few hours after which the soldier will usually go back to a safe area where he can refit. I have not been to Afghanistan but friends of mine are telling me that foot patrols can be significantly longer in the mountains and forty pounds of body armor in addition to weapons, ammo and equipment plus whatever sustainment load there is seriously degrades a unit's ability to operate in that environment. Unfortunately the Army often does not look at things in that light. To many commanders, body armor stops bullets and shrapnel so we will wear it any time we are out of the wire and that is all there is to it. At what point does the body armor become more of a hindrance than it is worth?
    SFC W
    What I wonder is, if we were fighting the Vietnam war, would we be wearing body armour? Can you imagine a 2 or 3 day foot patrol with an interceptor vest? Iraq would seem to be a proper place for it, but what about other areas, especially hot and humid areas? The jungle would be pure misery with the interceptor. What about the Kevlar helmet?

    This is why I would hope, that high on the priority list, is an effort to constantly improve the gear that is most useful to the ground fighter.

    Lighter more comfortable boots, Better small arms, Lighter more protective body armour, lighter and better night-vision, better BDU's, lighter squad radios, etc,etc.

    Besides these improvements, what I wonder, is if there's a group of NCO's and Junior Officers who discuss issues like this and get paid for it? Is there a "Think Tank" for NCO's and Junior Officers? It would seem, that the type of discussion we're having right here should be undertaken and financed by DoD. Discussing issues of load carrying weight, or conditions for body armour, could be discussed in this "Think Tank." This "Think Tank" would do what all Think Tanks do, in which they would conduct studies, have discussions, and write literature away from politics of the Pentagon and especially congress. If its decided that more money is needed in these ground fighter areas, and away from a congressman's pet defense contractor, this Think Tank should be shielded from those pressures.

    Does one exist?

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ratzel View Post
    What I wonder is, if we were fighting the Vietnam war, would we be wearing body armour? Can you imagine a 2 or 3 day foot patrol with an interceptor vest?
    So take it off. You have the option to wear a plate carrier, if you believe you need one, or only use plates for specific operations.

    Body armour and helmets should not be mandated. It's like anything. Use when required. Do not use when not useful.

    That's why you pay leaders to lead. They have to make decisions as to when to trade security for activity.

    The two things that have the greatest potential to lighten a soldiers load is better training and leadership - at all levels!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ratzel View Post
    What I wonder is, if we were fighting the Vietnam war, would we be wearing body armour? Can you imagine a 2 or 3 day foot patrol with an interceptor vest? Iraq would seem to be a proper place for it, but what about other areas, especially hot and humid areas? The jungle would be pure misery with the interceptor. What about the Kevlar helmet?
    Some units did. If memory serves, most Marine units around the DMZ were required to wear body armor, but it was more a question of unit policy during that war. In some units only the point man wore a vest, while in others no one did and just down the road you'd find a company where everyone wore the flak jacket and helmet anytime they left the wire.

    The Marine examples were from '67-'68 or '69, and they did foot patrols.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
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    Council Member Uboat509's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    So take it off. You have the option to wear a plate carrier, if you believe you need one, or only use plates for specific operations.

    Body armour and helmets should not be mandated. It's like anything. Use when required. Do not use when not useful.

    That's why you pay leaders to lead. They have to make decisions as to when to trade security for activity.

    The two things that have the greatest potential to lighten a soldiers load is better training and leadership - at all levels!
    It would be nice to have this option but it they do not now. I was reading an article recently about a unit in Afghanistan that was doing patrols in the mountains. They could not patrol more than a day nor could they go too high because of the mandated body-armor. I do not know at what level the authority to use or not use body armor rests but I suspect that it is at least at division level. I can remember leaving FOBs in Iraq and there would be a guy at the gate whose only job was to make sure that everyone leaving the FOB had body armor and a helmet on. I suspect that few commanders would let their men operate without body armor anyway. If one of his men did get killed or wounded there would likely be a shrapnel sh*tstorm.

    SFC W

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    Council Member Uboat509's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    With great ease. You just trade one or more pylon loads for a re-supply pod. I am told the design exists, and I have it on some good authority that it would be easy to adapt the ferry fuel tanks for than role.

    Each pylon can take about 500kg IIRC. I crunched some numbers a while back and that indicated that 1 x AH-64 could easily deliver most of the small arms ammo, rations and water needed for a dismounted company of 3 platoons. Volume seems more of an issue than weight.

    SOCOM folks tell me that this was widely discussed for SF, but it went away as no AH-64s were on the SOCOM OOB at the time. - eg MH-60 would be the preferred method.

    ...and of course AH pilots don't want to haul ammo and rations!

    Can you provide a link to some info on this? I have not heard of it. 500 KG seems a bit high honestly, that would be over a ton with both pylons loaded, but I have never really been around them.

    I am not really sure how many Ah-64s there are in the inventory. I don't remember seeing any on my last trip although I did see a lot of Kiowas. I doubt that the would allow any to be used for logistics rolls. I doubt there are any in theater that are not already committed to combat patrols. In any case there are a lot more utility helicopters than attack helicopters in the inventory and they already do logistic resupply. Why would we need to use attack helicopters for this roll? It strikes me as being like using an Abrams tank to carry logistics instead of a cargo truck.

    SFC W

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    Council Member Uboat509's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ratzel View Post
    This is why I would hope, that high on the priority list, is an effort to constantly improve the gear that is most useful to the ground fighter.


    Lighter more comfortable boots, Better small arms, Lighter more protective body armour, lighter and better night-vision, better BDU's, lighter squad radios, etc,etc.
    Like the ACU? My experience is that as equipment gets lighter, they issue more of it. I had a team sergeant that used to joke about carrying a hundred pounds of lightweight equipment.

    Quote Originally Posted by Ratzel View Post
    Besides these improvements, what I wonder, is if there's a group of NCO's and Junior Officers who discuss issues like this and get paid for it? Is there a "Think Tank" for NCO's and Junior Officers? It would seem, that the type of discussion we're having right here should be undertaken and financed by DoD. Discussing issues of load carrying weight, or conditions for body armour, could be discussed in this "Think Tank." This "Think Tank" would do what all Think Tanks do, in which they would conduct studies, have discussions, and write literature away from politics of the Pentagon and especially congress. If its decided that more money is needed in these ground fighter areas, and away from a congressman's pet defense contractor, this Think Tank should be shielded from those pressures.

    Does one exist?
    The closest I have seen to this personally is when I was OPFOR at JRTC. NATIC would periodically give us equipment to test in the field and then would would fill out a report about it. I don't think that I have ever been actually issued any of the equipment that I tested, even the good stuff.

    SFC W

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Uboat509 View Post
    Can you provide a link to some info on this? I have not heard of it. 500 KG seems a bit high honestly, that would be over a ton with both pylons loaded, but I have never really been around them.

    SFC W
    I crunched these numbers a while back. IIRC this is based on the an AH-64 using a 230 US gallon external tank. That's 871 litres. IIRC to calculate JP-4 weight you x0.8 so 871 litres = 696kg per tank.

    Even if those are 771 litre tanks they'll weigh 616kg approx

    I know Apache pylons can take over 200kg because they can load 4 x AGM-114 plus the launcher on one pylon.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by Uboat509 View Post
    Like the ACU?
    Come on now! The ACU blends great in western rangeland environments; the best stuff for sagebrush I've ever seen. So if we ever have to fight a war in Wyoming, we're ready.
    "Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    With great ease. You just trade one or more pylon loads for a re-supply pod. I am told the design exists, and I have it on some good authority that it would be easy to adapt the ferry fuel tanks for than role.
    Each pylon can take about 500kg IIRC. I crunched some numbers a while back and that indicated that 1 x AH-64 could easily deliver most of the small arms ammo, rations and water needed for a dismounted company of 3 platoons. Volume seems more of an issue than weight.

    ...when I first read this comment, oh a while ago now, it bugged me that I was sure I had seen something like this depicted somewhere. It kept bugging me (typical duyslexic trait that, to keep fixating on an item of information, among many such items, until you find it) until yesterday evening. I was clearing out my room (a rare enough occurance that) and found a load of old books I bought as a teen. Flicking through one of them, I found this!
    Attached Images Attached Images

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    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
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    I miss these threads...it's what brought me to the SWJ.

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    Council Member gute's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Infanteer View Post
    I miss these threads...it's what brought me to the SWJ.
    You mean you did not come to the SWJ for the threads about the NBA finals - I'm shocked

    Seriously, I'm with you. I miss the discussions regarding squad, platoon, ad company organizations; squad, platoon weapons; use of fires, etc. I would like to see some of these discussions re-energized with what has been learned during the last 10 years+ and the inclusion of anticipated new weapons.

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Infantry squad organisation and equipment is very, very sexy to many people. It's not very important, though.

    Infantry action is more important at the platoon level, and in the modern Western model of warfare even the infantry platoon is only a tiny component of the whole, as quite often the difference between tactical success or not is predetermined irrespective of the platoon's quality, TO&E and equipment.

    Speaking of TO&E; it's not even relevant for training. Most training is done in understrength, and the understrength issue becomes even more severe if an army deploys many formations simultaneously (thus being unable to cannibalise some to fill up the deployed ones). The de facto TO&E after the first few contacts will bear very little resemblance to the TO&Es in field manuals which are the subject of so much discussion.


    Infantry quality is about intangibles and improvisation much more than about the sexy items and charts discussed so repeatedly and vividly.


    The one question regarding infantry small unit design that I'm still interested in is whether one should focus on burst or sustained capabilities. I lean towards burst, as competent hostiles could have so much fire support on call that breaking contact after at most two minutes should be a habit.

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    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
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    TO&Es are accountants tools. How many people and equipment should I give to this organization?

    By D+1, you ain't fighting by a TO&E.

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    Council Member gute's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Infantry squad organisation and equipment is very, very sexy to many people. It's not very important, though.

    Infantry action is more important at the platoon level, and in the modern Western model of warfare even the infantry platoon is only a tiny component of the whole, as quite often the difference between tactical success or not is predetermined irrespective of the platoon's quality, TO&E and equipment.

    Speaking of TO&E; it's not even relevant for training. Most training is done in understrength, and the understrength issue becomes even more severe if an army deploys many formations simultaneously (thus being unable to cannibalise some to fill up the deployed ones). The de facto TO&E after the first few contacts will bear very little resemblance to the TO&Es in field manuals which are the subject of so much discussion.


    Infantry quality is about intangibles and improvisation much more than about the sexy items and charts discussed so repeatedly and vividly.


    The one question regarding infantry small unit design that I'm still interested in is whether one should focus on burst or sustained capabilities. I lean towards burst, as competent hostiles could have so much fire support on call that breaking contact after at most two minutes should be a habit.
    IMO flexibility of the small unit of action is key. Allowing the small unit leaders to have a free hand to organize their unit (platoon, company, battalion) to meet their assigned objectives.

    A few months ago there was an interesting article about that buzzword "transformation" and the next transformation would be battalion combat teams. The author argued in his article that battalion task forces or battle groups are the logical next step and would allow the U.S. to more easily serve alongside our European allies. He also argued the small unit of action would no longer be the squad, but a section of 18-20.

    Word association and mindset IMO go hand in hand. Maybe we need new words for small unit organizations. New words which emphasize flexibility. The swarming model discussed here at SWJ had such words such as pods and clusters. I don't like either - can you imagine being assigned to "cluster F"

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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Infantry action is more important at the platoon level, and in the modern Western model of warfare even the infantry platoon is only a tiny component of the whole, as quite often the difference between tactical success or not is predetermined irrespective of the platoon's quality, TO&E and equipment.
    Funny you should say that. I was reading Royal Marines and some things really caught my eye. From 1943 to about the early 1960s (maybe a bit later for some units) the RM Cdo was organised into five troops with a HQ and Weapons troop (2 x mortar 2 x MMG). Each troop (a large platoon sized org) had 63 all ranks. Organised as either four ten man sections, a 10 man spt section and a 13man HQ (1943) or two 26 man sections (two 11 man sub-sections and a fure support sub-section) c. 1950s. There simply was no Sqn (Coy) HQ. From I have read the Company organisation was introduced for better interoperability with Army units when rotating especially during the whole East of Suez drawdown. Given the mission of the RM I suppose it made sense to have large Troops. Would love to know how well the system worked (i.e., without a Coy HQ/layer of command) though in practice given it lasted over 20 years and was tested by WWII combat conditions.

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    Council Member gute's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii View Post
    Funny you should say that. I was reading Royal Marines and some things really caught my eye. From 1943 to about the early 1960s (maybe a bit later for some units) the RM Cdo was organised into five troops with a HQ and Weapons troop (2 x mortar 2 x MMG). Each troop (a large platoon sized org) had 63 all ranks. Organised as either four ten man sections, a 10 man spt section and a 13man HQ (1943) or two 26 man sections (two 11 man sub-sections and a fure support sub-section) c. 1950s. There simply was no Sqn (Coy) HQ. From I have read the Company organisation was introduced for better interoperability with Army units when rotating especially during the whole East of Suez drawdown. Given the mission of the RM I suppose it made sense to have large Troops. Would love to know how well the system worked (i.e., without a Coy HQ/layer of command) though in practice given it lasted over 20 years and was tested by WWII combat conditions.
    The U.S. Army Rangers organized the same way. If you go to Bayonet Strength you can look at the MTOE for British Commando, etc.

    http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/...l/site_map.htm

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    Council Member gute's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Infantry action is more important at the platoon level, and in the modern Western model of warfare even the infantry platoon is only a tiny component of the whole, as quite often the difference between tactical success or not is predetermined irrespective of the platoon's quality, TO&E and equipment.
    So tactical success or failure is determined by leadership?

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by gute View Post
    So tactical success or failure is determined by leadership?
    At times.
    But most often, logistics, peacetime training, heavy weapons, fire support, "do and don't" orders, sensors, terrain, the enemy's nature, missions and at times even *gulp* planning limit the range of possible outcomes so much that individual platoons are really just a small part of the whole.

    I suppose very few infantry platoons (if any) had a substantial impact during the invasion of Iraq 2003.

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