Abandon squad/section levels of organization?

[Rifleman]

We've cussed and discussed just about every conceivable rifle squad design on another thread. And I, for one, have really enjoyed everyone's input.

So moving on to a different take on the same issue: should light infantry organizations organize into permanent squads at all?

I'll start the ball rolling with two links to articles by British author William Owen. Owen advocates a small platoon divided into several big fire teams. The platoon leader could control all the teams himself or mix and match the teams into ad hoc squads for operations as he saw fit. So, using that theory, at different times you could have light squads, heavy squads, mixed squads, two team squads, three team squads, and various combinations.

Here are the links:

A small amount of study will reveal that the vast majority of the world’s infantry units are organised along roughly the same lines. This is often interpreted as being indicative of certain well-founded principles. Close examination shows this to be less than certain.

Complete article here: http://www.geocities.com/drakonok/Or..._Infantry.html

The purpose of this article is to describe an alternate tactical doctrine, training, and organization for light infantry units and subunits. The intended purpose of presenting an alternative is not to criticize current or existing concepts, but to aid thought and understanding by showing an alternative that may have some positive merit, if correctly understood and applied.

Complete article here:http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m...n16346580/pg_1

It seems to me that Owen's proposals would require the addition of one or two more platoons in a company to keep the end numbers roughly the same.

The firing line is ready. Commence firing!

[Ken White]

First the positive.

He argues that more flexible infantry can be had through superior training, that most infantry units are capable of doing a far higher level of qwork than doctrine currently suggests. I totally agree.

He then discusses a training regimen that has merit.

He advocates as I have for many years a great deal more care in the selection of entry personnel for the infantry and better training for NCOs.

He objects to the process of placing trained infantrymen in support jobs. Good!

Second, the caution.

He essentially espouses elimination of blanket doctrine for local developed TTPs. While I personally have little problem with that, I believe both the Lawyers and the Legislators will have significant problems with the concept. Both of those tribes have great influence and neither is going away.

Lastly, the objections to his organizational proposal

The flaw in his organizational argument is exposed early on in your first link:

"This leads to a debate between soldier and accountant, where the soldier states that a section must be eight men, and the accountant then asks “can 6 men with the right equipment, do the same job as 8?”"

My counterpoint to that is to ask the Accountant if he can operate with two fewer Analysts and could better combine his auditing section with his compliance section. I suggest that excessive interference by accountants has already done enough damage to the force structure, no further involvement is needed. Owen then follows that inanity with another:

"Few have yet asked, “how do I best organise infantry to perform operations?”..."

That's been asked for at least one hundred years by a number of people -- who not only asked but have rigorously tested some answers. In the second link, he offers this near his summary:

" The first is that the majority of Soldiers are too stupid to understand what some believe to be a complex idea, and the second is that any entertaining of such an alternative doctrine would fatally undermine current concepts."

While I acknowledge there are those who would take one or both approaches, I do not believe the majority of professional soldiers would do so. They would look at what he offered, most with at least some acceptance that the Troops are capable of doing far more than we ask of them, we just generally do not train them as well as we should so if the Troops are not operating at full capability, the fault is with the senior leaders, not with the Troops. There will always be those who are reluctant to change -- again, they're a minority. Thus I suggest his postulation is flawed.

He then says:

"First, the idea is probably not complex. It is fundamentally simple and logical, as is 90 percent of real world infantry work once broken down into its component parts. It is only the layers of process that we insist on adding that make it appear complex. Stripped of its comic book mystique, sniping is a fundamentally simple skill; however arcane its exponents wish it to appear. It can also be taught and applied simply, and thorough practice and experience will almost always lead to a useful degree of skill. Someone unable to master its most basic knowledge and application probably has no place in an infantry unit. The absolute enemy of PBI is process, as expressed in the proliferation of procedure and drill. The aim of process and drill is to reduce judgement because judgement allows for error. The aim of PB is to require simple and rapid decisions at the lowest level."

Aside from a minor disagreement on sniping -- no mystique to it, it is simply not a job everyone can do and to say any Infantryman can do it is fatuous -- I agree with the rest of that paragraph. Unfortunately, it does not support his prescription, quite the opposite -- it negates it.

Simple and rapid decisions at the lowest level are made by Team Leaders on a daily basis and by Squad Leaders constantly. ant marginally competent Squad Leader -- much less Platoon Leader -- is capable of and often does set up a specific task structure at odds with the TOE.

A five man team is organizationally weak, one absence hurts, two make it inoperative and will lead to a combing teams. Even a nine man squad (inadequate but the Army appears stuck with it for a while) has some staying power, a five man team doesn't. Three days of full bore war would simply destroy the Team.

More importantly, he's missing the educational and training process of being a team Leader and then a Squad Leader and of learning to lead an ever increasing number of people in ever increasingly complex tasks.

Even worse, he's breaking the tight bond at squad level to place people in an amorphous Platoon -- and that's why it's a bad idea

[wm]

Even worse, he's breaking the tight bond at squad level to place people in an amorphous Platoon -- and that's why it's a bad idea

Ken has hit on the the bottom line regarding the failing of the proposal.

Small units need to be small in order to prpoduce the bonds and interoperabality that makes actions on contact become second nature and instinctive. Even in sports, teams with more than 5 or 6 players on the field subdivide into smaller "teams": Football--5 linemen, 6 backs; baseball--infielders and outfielders; rugby--8 forwards, 7 backs; soccer--3-6 offensive players, 3-6 defenders. Even with these various sub-arrangements, I think they usually further sub-divide into even smaller "teams" that are in the 3-5 person range. As some one noted elsewhere on a thread, three's company.

I suspect a better answer at platoon level would be to keep the squads (although I want 10-man squads--2 5-man teams,one led by the SL and the other by his A/), add a large weapons squad with 3 3-4 man MG teams (gunner, a/gunner, 1-2 ammo bearers at least one of whom could also be a grenadier) that can be tasked out to the squads or held back as a GS base of fire for the Platoon as a whole.
At the company level along with the 3 line platoons include a robust weapons platoon that has both 2-3 MG squads of 3 guns each and 1 or 2 mortar sections with at least three tubes in each, which again can be attached to platoons or used in a DS, GS, R, or GSR role as mission, enemy, and situatiuon dictate/warrant. (Irwin Rommel considers MGs indirect fire weapons in his discussions of small unit tactics at company level and below in Infantry Attacks. I agree with that perception.)
I would probably also add a section equiped with a small UAS (like the Raven) to the Company HQs section.

[Norfolk]

Very much agreed Ken.

This does not make for either a cohesive, let alone sustainable, fighting element. Using a four man brick to patrol the streets of Belfast in an Aid to the Civil Power operation is one thing; clearing such a city in an actual war is quite another. Use a 4-man brick to clear houses, and one of the times it goes into one, it will never come back out. That's a squad's/section's job; not a fire team job, not a platoon job. Same thing with clearing an enemy trench position. Sure, a fire team (led in turn by a buddy-team, one man covering, the other grenading/shooting/rolling-in/bayoneting/changing-mag/giving-thumbs-up for rest to move in, etc.) makes the break-in, and then the rest of the assaulting squad moves in; one fire team clears ahead, another guards the break-in point, and if you're USMC, you can rotate the fire teams doing the clearing with hardly skipping a beat - not giving the enemy any let-up. Meanwhile, the rest of the platoon watches your back and suppresses the enemy until they're sent in covered by the rest of the company.

To do the same thing with Owen's organization, the whole 30-man platoon would be required to do what a 13-man Marine squad can do all on its own, and half of that 30-man platoon would be better used elsewhere. One 5-man assault team makes the break-in, covered by the rest of the platoon, fine. Then another 5-man assault team has to follow to either cover the break-in, or to take over the lead during clearing. The rest of the platoon continues to cover. But there's a problem with this.

The 5-man assault team has only 2 riflemen to clear with. You don't clear unless you have to with an LMG, there's often not space, and it's too heavy to bring to bear before someone with a rifle or carbine beats you to the draw. Dead gunner. An LSW is even worse, being longer and almost as heavy - and having to be reloaded as often as a rifle. Dead LSW gunner. The Grenadier is also handling an unwieldy weapon, and if he's the team leader, dying early on would be rather bad form. And so, just because there's 5 men in the trench, doesn't mean you've got 5 guys to clear with. There's only 2, the others amounting almost to dead weight in close-quarters. So, a third 5-man team has to come in to rotate with the lead 5-man team clearing. That leaves a fourth 5-man assault team and a 5-man fire support team and a 5-man Plt HQ team (some Sherry while you wait, Sir?) more or less idle and taking up space, as the other platoons should be covering the assaulting platoon. But there's not enough strength left in the assaulting platoon for even another squad-level clearing. Wasteful.

And if you want to clear houses, you'll have to reorganize the entire platoon before doing so.

So, anything from an 8-9 man Section/Squad or a 13-man Marine Squad, and 3 of each per platoon = 24/27/39 infantry (not including Plt HQ), plus varying heavy weapons. Compare this to 30 per platoon (including 5 at Plt HQ and another 5 are with Heavy Weapons - leaving 20 for digging out and killing the enemy. And this is just at the beginning of a war (and assuming everyone's authorized TOE is full to start with - hehe).

In practice, cohesion matters aside (Ken took care of this once and for all), the 30-man platoon is going to die real fast. The 5-man assault teams will be down to 2 (at most) within a couple days of heavy, sustained battle, whereas the Commonwealth/US Army 8-9 man sections/squad will be down to about 4 men at most - a fire team. The USMC 13-man squad will still muster at least 6-men much of the time. So much for Owen's 5-man "Assault Team" in real-war conditions. Not to mention, with an LMG and an LSW, plus a grenadier, the 5-man "assault team" is left with only 2 riflemen best suited for the actual assault. The LMG is necessary, and so is the Grenadier, and so are the riflemen - but not the LSW.

If you want a dedicated rifleman to take out enemy crew-served weapons and other long-range targets, put a few riflemen with AR's with bipod and telescopic sight (like the LSW) at platoon HQ to do that; attach a said-equipped AR man to squad from platoon if tactically necessary - but don't task the assault team with both the close- and long-range firefights. At section/squad, they may be too preoccupied with suppressing the enemy immediately to their front to be able to deal with enemies further back.

And if the GPMG crews in the fire support team each need 2 guys to carry 2 belts of ammo, they better send their unfit carcasses to the rear and bring the physically fit forward. I carried the GPMG (my pet name for it was the "G-Pig") and not less than two belts of ammo on my person (only about twice did I carry more - one time was out of newbie stupidity [4 belts], the other time was against my will). A couple other guys were to carry three belts each (and this was as a Platoon-level weapon). At Section level, 2 belts of ammo carried by each individual GPMG gunner (so long as they are not assigned SF tasks as well, just the Light Role) is enough to start.

If you are using GPMGs as heavy weapons, and especially in the SF role, you need at least 4 men per gun, preferably 6. Each GPMG gunner (at platoon or company level in commonwealth Armies) is issued with 8 boxes of ammo (1,760 rounds); an SF Kit with Tripod (weighs more than the GPMG), spare barrel, two Tritium aiming lamps, aiming stakes, mortar dial-sight, tool and cleaning kit, spare parts, etc.; spade; plus his own and the team's personal weapons and kit. In addition, the Gun Commander has binoculars, range-finder, and a 1:50,000 scale map. And I'm not even adding a Gun Controller here to coordinate the fires of the guns.

Even without the Gun Controller, the 5-man fire support team is seriously undermanned (and I suspect rather under-equipped and under-supplied) to effectively crew 2 guns - and before battle losses. There are good reasons the USMC holds GPMGs at Company level, and only detaches them out to platoons when tactically appropriate; Commonwealth Armies typically either hold a single GPMG at each Company and Platoon HQ (the Brits briefly experimented with 2 GPMGs at Platoon, and scrapped it), or hold them all in a MG Platoon at Battalion. I have doubts about the US Army practice of 2 GPMGs at Platoon level.

What these articles don't seem to grasp is that the 8-man Commonwealth Section was too small for the jobs it had to do; it used to be 10 in practice and up to 11 in theory. Likewise for the 9-man US Army Squad; Army testing determined that a 13-man Squad was best, but an 11-man squad was cheaper and could still do the job - but for a shorter time than the 13-man squad, and once that squad reached 8, it could no longer function effectively as a squad. Turning around and saying that 5 men can do an 8-9man job is dubious; it is downright erroneous (attributable it seems to ignorance - Owen gives no indication that he is aware of what the size of the Commonwealth Section/US Army Squad was in fact intended to be in order to carry out its tasks) to say that 5 men can do the job of what has been found to require 11-13 men. Both the Commonwealth Armies and the US Army determined that not less than 11 men were required for the Section/Squad - not 10, not 9, not 8, and certainly not 5.

What Owen is describing is a reinforced Section, but calling it a Platoon.

Finally, Infantry NCOs should receive formal, thorough training at all levels. Owen is alright here. In the Commonwealth, each private infantryman should have six months of good solid basic infantry training, and in his first year in his Battalion, have received an additional 3-6 weeks advanced infantry training in either reconnaissance, machine-guns, mortars, AT, or assault pioneering. After about 3-4 years in the Infantry, he should go on his NCO course. In the Commonwealth, this may be either an Infantry Section Commander Course of about 14 weeks (qualifying the new NCO for command right through platoon sergeant), or separate Junior and Senior Leadership/Command Courses, taken a few years apart; either way, an NCO's basic NCO training should amount to 3 months of good, thorough training. And before anyone thinks that this is excessive, the Wehrmacht used to make its sergeants undergo as little as 3 and up to 6 months of NCO training.

I apologize for this long post, it's a fault of mine.

[jcustis]

I'll offer these two points, as you guys are demonstrating a grasp of minor infantry tactics that is making my head swim right now.

First it seems that Owen wants a number of absolutes; with more sub-units a coy commander can constitute a full reserve. While I can see he point, a reserve need not be a complete platoon.

Take the movement to contact scenario, for example. Depending on the likelihood of enemy contact, a company commander could assign the flank security task to a platoon and pull a full squad from it and make it the reserve. I've established a small, but capable, reserve in the past. Committed properly, it can seize the day without the need for the entire 40+ man platoon to lumber into the attack.

I'm glad that the business of task-organizing is so ingrained into Marine infantry that we don't need neat structures to facilitate it.

Secondly, we'd have to bring in a former member of the RLI to confirm for me, but IIRC, the Rhodesian equivalent of a platoon in modern sense (for organization purposes) was a "troop" of 16 men organized into four 4-man sticks. These folks were definitely PBI, and for almost no other reason than COIN naturally drives the skill sets to focus on recce patrolling and observation.

The business of organizing in such a fashion could have come as much from the means of mobility as it did the abilities of the troop leaders. We must note that the Alouette could only carry 4 men, and the DC-3 Dakotas (carrying paratroopers for the follow-up sweeps) carried up to 16 men. We are no doubt re-organizing our infantry forces in Iraq due to their mobility. It makes sense to do so because it definitely makes no sense to have Jones from 2nd team in a vehicle manned by 3d team, but reporting to the 2nd team leader.

I think Owen is on point with the training aspect. I think any leader worth his rank has complained about those things limitng his ability to traing, whether it be ammo, batteries, equipment, or "area beautification" details. It hasn't changed much, although I must admit that the current goings-on have openend peoples' eyes and reduced the bull#### to a manageable level.

Permanent squads make the business of assigning subordinate tasks a bit easier because you are dealing with the rule of 3s. I can attest that the more maneuver elements you have, the more friction you inherit. While a looser organization may have some merit, I can only imagine certain tactiacl scenarios where we'd benefit from a more distributed structure.

[Rifleman]

I remember reading in James McDonough's excellent book Platoon Leader that his first platoon in the 173rd Airborne Brigade consisted of three six man "squads." I've read elsewhere that many Vietnam era rifle squads were in reality big fire teams of 5-7 men. There was no squad fire and maneuver, only fire and movement forward or back. Enveloping attacks didn't begin until platoon level.

Since companies seem to arrive at small platoons divided into what amounts to large fire teams I thought it was worth considering having it as doctrine, as long as the company's total strength was the same. It would be the same number of troops, just broken down differently.

Look at it this way: a nine man rifle squad has to organize into a single fire team at about six men, or after about 33% casualties; a six man fire team has to combine with another fire team at about three men, or 50% casualties. I thought there might be some advantage to that.

All things considered, I like traditional squads best - at least when they're big squads. The only reason I thought Owen's proposals should be discussed is because the Army rifle platoon often arrives at something similar after sustained combat.

[Rifleman]

Since companies seem to arrive at small platoons divided into what amounts to large fire teams I thought it was worth considering having it as doctrine, as long as the company's total strength was the same. It would be the same number of troops, just broken down differently.

You know, I read what I wrote again and realized that I didn't even believe it myself.

COIN, LIC, OOTW, etc., seems to be more of a platoon and squad fight, so it probably won't matter if the company end numbers are the same. Platoons, squads, and fire teams need to be where the robustness and sustainability is.

Here's to Owen's big five man fire teams.....grouped into big platoons and squads.

[Norfolk]

You know, I read what I wrote again and realized that I didn't even believe it myself.

COIN, LIC, OOTW, etc., seems to be more of a platoon and squad fight, so it probably won't matter if the company end numbers are the same. Platoons, squads, and fire teams need to be where the robustness and sustainability is.

Here's to Owen's big five man fire teams.....grouped into big platoons and squads.

Especially in BIG Squads and Platoons.

Here, Here!

[David I Evans]

And if the GPMG crews in the fire support team each need 2 guys to carry 2 belts of ammo, they better send their unfit carcasses to the rear and bring the physically fit forward. I carried the GPMG (my pet name for it was the "G-Pig") and not less than two belts of ammo on my person (only about twice did I carry more - one time was out of newbie stupidity [4 belts], the other time was against my will). A couple other guys were to carry three belts each (and this was as a Platoon-level weapon). At Section level, 2 belts of ammo carried by each individual GPMG gunner (so long as they are not assigned SF tasks as well, just the Light Role) is enough to start.

If you are using GPMGs as heavy weapons, and especially in the SF role, you need at least 4 men per gun, preferably 6. Each GPMG gunner (at platoon or company level in commonwealth Armies) is issued with 8 boxes of ammo (1,760 rounds); an SF Kit with Tripod (weighs more than the GPMG), spare barrel, two Tritium aiming lamps, aiming stakes, mortar dial-sight, tool and cleaning kit, spare parts, etc.; spade; plus his own and the team's personal weapons and kit. In addition, the Gun Commander has binoculars, range-finder, and a 1:50,000 scale map. And I'm not even adding a Gun Controller here to coordinate the fires of the guns.

GPMG in the light role is normally scaled for between 600 to 800 rds per man in the pair, that's about 24 to 32 minutes fire at the normal rate of fire, half that at rapid. Weight between 32 to 43kg for 1200 to 1600 rounds. You'd normally drop 400 round per gun and break them into belts of 100 and dump them onto the platoon for them to carry.

The ammo scale for GPMG(SF) is 5,000 rounds per gun with 3 guns per section. That's 135kgs of belt per gun, 405kgs per section. That's 50 minutes at the normal rate of fire, half that at rapid.

WFE gave you a 3 man gun team, of gunner, controller and ammo bearer.

You just can not carry 405kgs between 11 bods for a WFE gun section with 3 guns so once upon a time a section would have 3 LR with trailers or the CSM of the Company you're attached gets a big pile of ammo or the OC gets told by the Guns Section Commander "My rate of advance is about 2km a hour"

In the SF role you'd be looking for a flank position to give the maximum beaten zone area over enemy positions so that the bulk of targets are between 800 to 1100m from your gun line.

I've carried 1,000 rounds of link and it's slow movement time, I think my heaviest load on the GPMG (SF) section Commanders course was about 54kgs and took us about 2 hours to cover 5km cross country as a Guns platoon.

The GPMG is heading back into Support Company holdings post Herrick and post FSG but it would be interesting to see what happens next.

BTW. The beaten zone of the GPMG is, in part, created by the nature of the kinetic energy upon the weight of the gun. A relativity tight beaten zone where a 20 round burst will impact in an area with a maximum length of 100m and a maximum width of 9m. Repeated bursts will keep landing in the same area, if the gunner keeps his point of aim consistent. Make the gun too light and the trade off is that the beaten zone for a burst will grow in size for less effect.

[carl]

I have a question out of curiosity.

For those of you who have fired a MAG-58 type gun and a Bren gun, which do think is better suited for use as a squad level weapon?

[flagg]

I have a question out of curiosity.

For those of you who have fired a MAG-58 type gun and a Bren gun, which do think is better suited for use as a squad level weapon?

My experience is based on C9(5.56 Minimi SAW) with the AR magazine well withdrawn from service(now 7.62 Minimi) and the MAG58/GPMG.

Talking to folks who were around when a modified Steyr AUG was considered as a complement to the Steyr rifle, one expression used to describe it's deficiencies(which includes the Bren) is the "built in stoppage".

Which seems to be an issue here....but if the Marines are happy working around the "built in stoppage" with their M27 IAR, then maybe it's not as big an issue as many seem to think.

Since we are growing closer again with the US(particularly the USMC), maybe this will be re-evaluated in the future.

I'm a fan of the new 7.62 Minimi. It's a great tool. It has the firepower of the MAG58/GPMG at reduced weight...while brand new it's quite a good system, I can't help but wonder about longevity much like the C9(5.56 Minimi SAW) near it's end of life the accuracy/grouping capacity was becoming shockingly bad.

We've only recently introduced the 7.62 Minimi and not long before that the LMT DM rifle. An announcement was just made that we will be replacing the Steyr rifle in the next 2 years.

I wonder if there is a possibility of not just seeing an AR platform purchased here for individual issue, but also evaluating the USMC's recent M27 IAR choice and role in the section/platoon.

Time will tell.

[Compost]

I have a question out of curiosity.

For those of you who have fired a MAG-58 type gun and a Bren gun, which do think is better suited for use as a squad level weapon?

My experience of MGs was mainly as a reservist and did not involve combat operations.

The top-mounted magazine made the Bren LMG fast to reload and easy to carry and use particularly when prone. Also its downward ejection was low observable except when in a dustbowl. For a right-handed firer the sight was unobscured, less applicable to left-handed. Weapon was overlong but well-balanced and very reliable and accurate. During 1970s, AusArmy reintroduced the Bren especially for patrolling to complement the troublesome M-60 GPMG.

With regard to built-in stoppages, a manageable sized belt of say 30 to 100 rounds used up without extension makes for a much slower one-man reload than does a box magazine.

As a MAG-58 type GPMG, the M-60 was usefully compact and well balanced for carriage and ready fire. But it had many dysfunctional aspects. In fact so many problem areas that during the 1970s AusArmy reintroduced the Bren especially for patrolling.

Have handled but not trialed and fired the MAG-58. Found it overlong and poorly balanced with the belt-feed too far forward of the trigger grip. But durability/functioning and robustness/ruggedness count for a lot everywhere. In general the MAG-58 is thoroughly proven as suitable – though not ideal – for squad/section, and better as a GPMG/MMG for use above that level.

Currently there are two well-credentialled LMGs contending for squad/section level use. The Mark48 and Negev 7 are each compact and seem well balanced with belt-feed near the trigger grip. The Mark-48 has great lineage. But so does the NG7. Assuming similar durability/maintainability and robustness/ruggedness my vote goes to the NG7 for its single shot capability and alternate use of bottom-mounted box magazine.

Of course would prefer to see both modified to provide downward ejection alongside - or via a chute in - the belt container. Also as a lesser priority belt-feed from left and right sides. Plus immediate alternate use preferably in either belt-feed slot of say a 30-round box mag. ..... etc

[JMA]

I have a question out of curiosity.

For those of you who have fired a MAG-58 type gun and a Bren gun, which do think is better suited for use as a squad level weapon?

Horses for courses. Only did training on the Bren which were converted from 303 to 7.62. No wow or Gee-whizz with that baby.

As you will be aware the RLI contacts on Fire Force (Rhodesia) were close range 10m or less. If they were running into you, you waited till you couldn't miss. Under those conditions you wanted fire power right up front - and so FN MAGs were carried on a scale of one per 4-man stick with 500 rounds in 50 belts and no spare barrel. Was used as a personal weapon with no number 2 crewman to assist. Controlled bursts only of 2-3 rounds. Can't think of what more you can possibly need to lay down immediate - devastating - fire power to win the fire fight. All you need are lads strong enough to carry and handle the weapon - firing mainly standing from the hip or from the squat - on a ratio of 1:4 among your troops.