Abandon squad/section levels of organization?

[Ken White]

I've stated my preference for the 13 man USMC squad, it is totally flexible and provides adequate power for almost every conceivable mission. The USMC organization also puts the crew served stuff at Co level where, as Norfolk says, it is best trained and controlled. It doesn't need a lot of tinkering.

Army squads can and do use fire and maneuver (as most understand that term) and are capable of independent operations -- and squads DO get (and should get) independent missions. The only time they don't is when a lack of leadership capability above their level gets on a "force protection" kick and is lacking in the testicular fortitude to trust 'em and let them do their jobs. Admittedly, that happens entirely too often nowadays...

Even with the smaller Army unit size, you effectively get six four man recon (or whatever) teams and while I'd rather see the MG and Javelins * at Co level, the Weapons squad concept does work and does have the advantage of forcing the PSG and PL to think of weapons and support on a constant as opposed to an as required basis.

( * The Javelin is a good if heavy weapon; its predecessor, the Dragon, was an unmitigated -- and unsalvageable -- disaster and didn't die soon enough.)

Still, having been in both in conventional and COIN ops for real as well as in peacetime, stateside training -- the Marines have it right. The Army model will work and I have no doubt a competent Pl and PSG in either can do anything I've seen suggested in this and the related threads.

Either model can be reorganized internally and for specific missions as the Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant decide; at least in my experience, they don't have to ask anybody. That said with the caveat that at the beginning of a war, some senior NCOs and Officers can be unduly hidebound -- but that is their problem and those types aren't likely to get to close to the booms, bees and snap of combat and can generally be politely and discretely ignored.

At the rifle Company level, bigger is better. There are a lot of force multipliers out there but at the level of the Infantry company, most are not terribly helpful; adequate strength to deal with human frailty, combat losses and other attritional factors is imperative. The Marines understand that; they also understand the "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" rule...

The factor many miss at that level when they start with the reorganizing what-ifs is the training value of Teams and Squads. Many theorists operate on the fallacy that every one in the Platoon (or any other level) is well or at least adequately trained in his job. They aren't and never will be; humans fail, need leave, dozens of factors -- there are ALWAYS new people coming in and, particularly in war time, they will never be fully trained and competent -- particularly at combat troop leading. That's why the civilian penchant for "flattening the pyramid" does not work for combat organizations (not to mention that it doesn't work all that well in civilian industry, either ). Being a Team leader is the elementary school, Squad leader is Middle School and the PSG is the High School -- none of them need a degree, much less an advanced degree but..

Don't go to war without them.

[Rifleman]

( * The Javelin is a good if heavy weapon; its predecessor, the Dragon, was an unmitigated -- and unsalvageable -- disaster and didn't die soon enough.)

Oh boy, I gotta tell you a story. It has nothing to do with this thread, but I gotta tell you a story.

March of 1988: 3rd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment - that great unit of units - has finished an FTX in Grafenwohr, Germany and is flying back to Vicenza, Italy. That great Alpha fire team leader extroidinaire (that would be your's truly, folks) who is due to ETS in one month has been selected by his platoon sergeant for the distinguished honor of jumping back into Italy with an item known as.....a Dragon Missile Jump Pack.

Why not, huh? We've got a squad full of cherries and the Bravo fire team leader is about 5'5". The cherries don't have enough jumps to be trusted with the thing and the Bravo fire team leader can barely get out the door without dragging his rucksack on the floor anyway. Your's truly is 5'11", had forty-something static line exits at that point, and used to jump the M60 regularly. So it falls to me. Who can fault the platoon sergeant's logic?

With a DMJP I should have been the lead jumper in the starboard side stick but I got bumped back to #3 somehow. IIRC, the jumper who took my door position was wearing gold oak leaves and was an "S" something or other but I might not be remembering that correctly. I believe #2 was the assistant "S" something or other.

We started in-flight rigging at two hours and twenty minutes out. Unlike the others I didn't do a complete rig, just main and reserve. At the twenty minute warning I stood up and the starboard side safety helped me hook up my ruck and the DMJP. I sat back down to watch a cherry across the isle blow chunks into a barf bag for a few more minutes of nap of the earth till the ten minute warning.

Oh boy, this is my last jump and I'm going to make it my best ever.

Red light, jump commands, doors open, fresh air, jumpmaster door check, green light!

Like a cherry that I wasn't supposed to be I brushed the DMJP on the leading edge of the starboard side troop door and staggered off the step in one of the sloppiest body positions I ever had. I more or less just fell into the prop blast.

Twists! Twists! Twists! Past the risers and halfway up the suspension lines.

Bicycle, bicycle, bicycle, bicycle!

When I cleared the twists I lowered my ruck and just got that *x#@* DMJP lowered when I heard my ruck hit the ground. The DMJP didn't make it all the way down my 15' lowering line.

I did get my feet and knees together but I didn't get much of a slip pulled.

Balls of the feet, buttocks (what happened to calf and thigh?) pushup muscle, and back of the head (added that one for good measure). Hey, at least I managed not to smack an elbow.

Ah, memories. Some days I miss it and some days I don't. Today.....I miss it!

[Ken White]

We all get one like that sooner or later. I hit a tree one day and swung into it, smacking my canteen in to my kidney; cussed the AF, the tree and the canteen, finally climbed down my reserve and dropped ten feet to the ground, started to the Assembly point which meant crossing a corner of the DZ --and after I saw all the barbed wire fences and people with cuts was ready to go back and kiss the tree...

Lemme dispel a Jump School myth; body position has nothing to do with twists, it's the Static Line. If, in the process of unhooking it, tossing it over your shoulder and then eventually hooking up, you keep it perfectly straight, you won't have any twists; let it get twists in it before you hook up then exit the bird and that flat doubled over nylon strap will straighten itself out by twisting your deployment bag after the suspension lines are out and before the chute fully deploys. I convinced the 82d Jump School of that, they took it to Benning, Benning didn't want to hear it so they're still teaching it wrong. The Glory (and rep) of the School transcends mere reality...

Having said that, don't change your story, it's great...

[Norfolk]

Airborne!

[William F. Owen]

( * The Javelin is a good if heavy weapon; its predecessor, the Dragon, was an unmitigated -- and unsalvageable -- disaster and didn't die soon enough.)

I don't doubt the weapon sucked, but don't fixate on that. It's the idea. Look at the AT-7/13. Guided weapons in the Platoon is IMO, a very good idea, but Javelin is just too expensive for most armies, and maybe even the UK. We have now faired our entire war load of Javelins in Helmand!!

[Ken White]

The idea is not which missile (I'd even go with a Carl Gustaf), it's just to avoid one that does not work and is unlikely to be made to do so.

Your ancestors went in the wrong direction. My Tory Great, Great, Great, Great Grandfather headed west to Kentucky and did rather well for himself... So did my equal number of greats Rebel Grandfather. Alas, their Great, Great, Great Grandchildren married and squandered it all leaving me like unto a Churchmouse...

[Norfolk]

On my mother's side (specifically through her mother's side), my ancestors were tarred and feathered and driven out of New England, Tories they were. As United Empire Loyalists, they made their way to Ontario. Once again, on my mother's side, a hundred years or so after the Great Tax Revolt Across the Great Lakes, more of my ancestors (specifically through her father's side) ran away from home in the logging camps of Michigan and came to Ontario. And my father's side were British soldiers, and English Bluebloods at that, for which they received Imperial landgrants for their service in the Boer War; my paternal grandmother (she was a US citizen) always complained that "The side of the family that stayed in England got the Lordship, and the side that came to Canada got the work."

And I have always viewed Rifleman's signature with much amusement; and a lot of those Hessians settled around the area where I live in the years after the Tax Revolt by Those People Down There and again after the War of 1812.

Ken, I respectfully object to the Eryx: after the Government bought them, the Infantry Battalions promptly put them into storage and kept using the Carl G's because the Eryx wasn't as good and the Gunner had to track the missile all the way to the target. At ranges of 600 m and less, that was not considered conducive to the survival of the Missile crew in the seconds after launch. The Carl G's of course could be fired and then you just got out of there macht schnell.

After a few years, DND got curious as to why they hadn't heard anything about the Eryx being used, and when they found out that the Battalions had simply locked them up and tossed the key away, DND got pretty unhappy and ordered the Carl G withdrawn from service and stored and the Eryx to be used by the Battalions. That, and a few other bright ideas like deleting the Assault Pioneer (since restored after battle experience in A-Stan) and Mortar Platoons (still waiting to hear if they will be restored) from the Infantry Battalions made DND even more popular with the Troops than they already were.

[William F. Owen]

Ken, I respectfully object to the Eryx:

Eryx is a frigging joke, and yes Carl Gustav M3 with 1,000m HEDP, and the Simrad sight is a winner in comparison.

[Ken White]

...
Ken, I respectfully object to the Eryx: after the Government bought them, the Infantry Battalions promptly put them into storage and kept using the Carl G's because the Eryx wasn't as good and the Gunner had to track the missile all the way to the target. At ranges of 600 m and less, that was not considered conducive to the survival of the Missile crew in the seconds after launch. The Carl G's of course could be fired and then you just got out of there macht schnell.

After a few years, DND got curious as to why they hadn't heard anything about the Eryx being used, and when they found out that the Battalions had simply locked them up and tossed the key away, DND got pretty unhappy and ordered the Carl G withdrawn from service and stored and the Eryx to be used by the Battalions. That, and a few other bright ideas like deleting the Assault Pioneer (since restored after battle experience in A-Stan) and Mortar Platoons (still waiting to hear if they will be restored) from the Infantry Battalions made DND even more popular with the Troops than they already were.

I just grabbed a name -- as I said, the issue was not to select a particular missile or system but to not select one particular missile.

As for the CG, not a great tank stopper but great for a lot of other things, if a bit weighty.

Re: the troops and DND -- world wide story...

I hope the Troops win.

[William F. Owen]

As for the CG, not a great tank stopper but great for a lot of other things, if a bit weighty.

Yep, CG even damaged an Argentine Corvette!!

A bit weighty!!! I carried the bl*ody the M2. 32lbs!! (The M3 is some 23lbs)

Plus my myself and the number 2, frequently hauled 4 rounds. Back when I was a Platoon Sergeant I watched a very stressed young soldier throw the CG into a drainage ditch, and seek to continue without it.

We had a quick discussion as the wisdom of his actions and then he then went in search of the missing item, which was successfully retrieved. - so yes, weight is an issue!!

[Ken White]

. . .
A bit weighty!!! I carried the bl*ody the M2. 32lbs!! (The M3 is some 23lbs).
. . .

The M3 has a tendency to break. The Rangers and the SEALS have had some problems with it.

The M2 is ultra reliable; with either version you have a lot of ammo choice which is a good thing, add the Simrad sight and you've got a better deal than most missiles for most purposes.

[jcustis]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Distiller
I thought a little bit about it. Two developments I postulate: (i) the threshold for combined weapons ops is getting ever lower , (ii) new C3 technology enables a flat organization. Thus: If there is an echelon you could abandon it's the platoon. And you could organize the company - as the largest pure/non-combined unit - 100% flat along rifle-, GPMG-, MGL/mortar-, and guided missile teams. What you don't have at company level, you don't get. Non-combined-weapons units of battalion size and upwards (thinking about regiments here) will become rare I think, esp in small wars.

Err.... Want to give an example? How does C3 Technology alter the span of control? A Coy Commander Controls 12 Teams?

By giving the individual teams more freedom and responsibility, use technology to get away from micro-management (not the other way round, as it looks like now).

While there is precedent for a coy commander commanding up to 12 teams (w/ assistance from a few Lts as "stick leaders"), decentralized control and freedom of maneuver did not always flow along the same lines. Depending on the C2 platform utilized to control the contact, 4-man sticks of the Rhodesian Security Forces were often held on a tight leash to avoid geometry of fires issues and focus the efforts of multiple small elements.

Even with robust and agile communications assets, I think we will still see a limit to the independent action that current planners and dreamers envision. There is so much we have to get right first, at least from the Marine Corps' perspective. First, the advanced training pipelines need to get squared away or we need to find a better way to deliver the same top-notch instruction that is available out of the schoolhouses. Second, we need a personnel stabilization system in place that addresses retention issues and truly puts the right pegs in the right holes. Lastly, the systems folks need to rdeuce the tinkering with gear and start settling on K.I.S.S. solutions that are robust enough to last a generation or accept modular upgrades without much fuss. Case in point, we went from ALICE to MOLLE to ILBE in less than ten years, and that damned MOLLE was only around long enough for some procurement officer and team to get a Navy-Commendation Medal and a round of performance bonuses (the pack subsequently proved itself to be junk).

This ballet has to happen together in order to make our larger DO plans fit, and I honestly do not see it headed in that direction. If we have well equipped teams/squads/platoons, but no one worth a damn to operate the gear and utilize proper minor tactics, the DO structure will devolve to some nastier incarnation of what we already have.

I will point out though that some people, people with more experience than me, think independently operating squads are necessary for some of the fights we're facing in Iraq. I think independently operating squads really need to be big squads.

Excellent point. I think I commented as such elsewhere, but once you start taking troops out of their primary roles as shooters and make them the linguist handler, photographic documentor, tactical questioner, etc., there is a slight altering of the kinetic effects the previous 4-man teams can deliver. The business of strapping satcom to someone's back either means a commo sergeant (a'la SF) carries it, or we are going to continue to see specialists hump the set, yet that specialist will not be much of a snake-eater in other respects.

*On a totally unrelated subject, why is it that I can cursor through my cellphone's graphical user interface with ease and accomplish just about any task, but the screen face of the PRC-148, remote terminal screen of the PRC-150 and -117 kick my ass? When are the developers going to take a tip from the cellphone, game screen, and PDA?

[Uboat509]

-The problem with six man teams vs. three squads of two or three teams is simply an issue of control. Asking a PL to maneuver six elements without the benefit of squad leaders would be a nightmare. PLs depend on the squad leaders. The fireteam leader is engaged in the fight with his team. His job is to lead literally from the front. The squad leader is somewhat disengaged from the fight, remaining where he can best control his subordinate team leaders. From there he is able to maintain much better situational awareness then the team leader. As such he is capable of maneuvering his element on his own as well as coordinating with the other elements in the platoon and assisting the PL.

-Bottom up doctrine is a nonstarter. Individual squads, platoons and companies must have their own SOPs but these SOPs must adhere to a basic published doctrine. Without a solid frame work to build those SOPs individual units will end up doing things in very different ways. When those units do work together it tends to dissolve into chaos. I have to have a least an idea what the man to my left and right are going to do even if we have not worked together before.

-We cannot afford to ignore the effect of mechanization on infantry. As has been previously noted, few armored vehicles hold more than seven or eight dismounts. More importantly is the simple fact that mech infantry fights differently than light infantry. The presence of armor and the 25MM gun significantly changes things as well as adding more maneuver elements as well as more subordinate leaders.

-I do not understand the emphasis on the recce patrol and the LP/OP. Is this patrol based infantry supposed to be some sort of elite formation whose primary purpose is reconnaissance? It seems to me the author was advocating all infantry being organized this way.

SFC W