The basic reason why larger squads/sections seem to be favoured here, is to provide greater flexibility and ability to sustain battle losses in order to make F&M at that level work.Originally Posted by Norfolk
Edit: I pressed the wrong button: that's why this ended up being its own post, rather than just being an edit of the previous post. And I certainly did not intend to quote myself!
Last edited by Norfolk; 12-14-2007 at 04:28 PM.
Random query from an amateur observer: What about psychosocial issues in terms of span of control?
From my life experience, limited as that is, I've found that once you get much beyond 10 people (self included), you begin to need to split things up in order to be able to know the people involved (and coordinate their actions) to any substantive level. I can only imagine that gets worse in the environment faced by combat forces.
Is my perspective horribly broken? Is there something I'm onto here?
No Penta, you're asking very valid questions. Some of that is covered in the monographs that Rifleman has posted links to on this thread already. But unless we're going to dig up Granicus and other Span-of-Control Theory writers, the monographs are probably good enough. That, and especially the personal experience of the Infantrymen on this thread. Offhand, the US Army Infantry School's own studies indicate a ratio of leader to led of 1 to 5 is the max before things takle a slide; Granicus 40 or 50 years ago figured 3-6, with 4-5 as optimum. Penta, we're struggling with some of the same questions you are here.
I was around when the first Police SWAT teams were being formed in the late 70's and the model which still largeley exist today is a 5 man fire team. if it is a large incident and more teams are involved they are used in a similar manner as Wilf has described, and I just recognized the similarities at least if I understand him correctly. Some federal SWAT teams operate as larger units but we stayed away from them because it ended up turning in a cluster f...
Heh. Yep
Personalities and span of control can do you a job...
The British Platoon of 1918-1936 was comprised of 4 x 7 man sections/teams. 2 sections were rifleman, and the other 2 each had a Lewis gun and carried a lot of ammunition. The HQ was 3-4 men. Sergeants commanded most platoons. When the BREN was procured in 1936, the idea was to give each section a Bren gun, but to save money they reduced the sections to 3, and made them 8 men instead of 7. The 3 men now spare manned the new 2-inch mortar.
In 1943/44 Lt Col Lionel Wigram suggested, and may have practiced, what I call the Wigram grouping concept. Taking an under strength platoon of 24 men, 7 men under the platoon Sergeant manned the three Bren Guns, 3-4 men manned the 2-inch Mortar, and the rest under the platoon commander, formed 2 rifle sections. The Rifle sections main task was to get the Bren Guns as close to the enemy as possible, to kill the enemy. So the rifle teams found postions for the Bren group. Once the Brens were in place and firing the rifle teams went off to find or gain a closer or better position.
The Australians are experimenting with Platoon 1/39, which is 40 men organised into 6 x 4 man fire teams, and 3 x 4 man fire support teams. This can be configured anyway the platoon commander sees fit. Either as 3 x 8 man sections with a 12 man FS group or as 2 x 12 man sections of 2 fire teams and 1 support weapons team. David Kilcullen, whom I have met and discussed this at length with, was instrumental in this concept.
The IDF infantry have 36 man platoons (Machlaka) comprised of 3 x 12 man section (Klass) of 3 x 4 man teams (Huliyah). There is no platoon HQ. The Platoon commander leads one of the Klass. He is free to alter the exact number in each team or number of teams in each section, as best suits the mission.
All in all team based modularity aimed at making the Platoon the minimum manoeuvre unit does seem to be catching on, in sharp contrast to the current US and UK approach.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
When I was in 72-75 the rule was to fight 3 to 1 if you had a choice. In other words a platoon would attack a squad. We did have an annual squad ORTT (operational readiness training test) which was done squad vs squad. But the platoon was the main unit, squads would do recon patrols or ambushes but it was always done as part of a platoon operation. Our platoons and squads were pretty small. When I first went in they were still drafting people and I think it was about 90 days later the draft ended. This put us at an extreme personnel shortage for awhile. In my company 1st platoon was 15 men for almost a year and a half, 2nd platoon was a little better and 3rd platoon my platoon was the largest at about 40 men. Which was broken down into 3-11 man squads and the rest was a Hq section to include PLt. Leadr,Sgt. and RTO's.
Looks a bit like the old German system again, or a light version of the weapons platoon, or a mini-company. 24 men rifle pool, GPMG teams, 60mm mortar teams, AT4 teams. 45 men.
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