I believe the standard SOG spike team was a seven-man element as well. Three Americans and four or so indigs (either 'Yards or Nungs) was common, although there were some larger teams and other elements on occasion (CCC tended to make heavy use of Hatchet Force companies if memory serves, although all three Command & Control elements had them).
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Ah...I see. Steve, how was the SOG team kitted out? My understanding was that they were typically organized for/as Recon (with some exceptions perhaps), so usually "light" on the heavier weapons (typcially no LMGs/GPMGs, etc.)Originally Posted by Steve Blair
As I recall, the SEAL squad organization was more akin to a conventional fire-and-movement infantry squad (albeit smaller to fit entirely into assault boats): a squad leader (a junior officer), and two 3-man fire teams, each with an LMG, a grenadier, and a rifleman. Two such squads made up a SEAL platoon (the senior squad leader commanding the paltoon, the junior squad leader as 2i/c). Of course that was a few years ago now, and things may have changed.
Last edited by Norfolk; 10-26-2007 at 12:51 PM.
SOG teams tended to travel fairly light (so you're correct there)...basic weapon was the AK or CAR-15/XM-177E2. The Hatchet Force was obviously heavier and did carry LMGs. SOG did have tons of air ordnance on call, so that to a degree offset their light organic weaponry (note that it's to a degree, but their basic mission was recon/targeting).
During Vietnam the SEALs tended to operate in teams ranging from 3-7 men, if memory serves. They had heavier weapons, in part due to their use of the Stoner system that allowed for a fairly light LMG-type weapon. SEALs didn't tend to do tons of long range patrolling, so they could go heavy on weapons and light on other stuff. Platoons tended to break into two sections for operational purposes...one "on" and one "off" if memory serves (although I could be suffering from CRS, so any corrections are appreciated).
On a related note there was a fascinating article that came out a couple of years ago (don't remember the journal title, but I do have a copy of it in the files) that involved a conference of old SOG 1-0s (team leaders) meeting with current SF personnel at Bragg. Some very interesting "compare and contrast" stuff in there, including the SOG guys feeling that they had much more control over mission planning than units do today.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Hmmm...Steve, that last is rather intriguing...if you had time, some time, to dig it up and either post it or PM/E-Mail it, I would be most grateful.
OH PLEASE, PRETTY PLEASE, WITH SUGAR AND A CHERRY ON TOP!
I'll dig it up. They didn't go into tons of detail because it was an unclassified forum, but there was some sweet stuff in there.Hmmm...Steve, that last is rather intriguing...if you had time, some time, to dig it up and either post it or PM/E-Mail it, I would be most grateful.
OH PLEASE, PRETTY PLEASE, WITH SUGAR AND A CHERRY ON TOP!
The sad part is that no one had bothered to do this until only a few years ago. Some of the 1-0s indicated that no one had EVER talked to them in an attempt to gather some lessons. And these are guys who were running the Trail at the height of the Vietnam War....
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Thanks Steve!I'll dig it up.
The sad part is that no one had bothered to do this until only a few years ago. Some of the 1-0s indicated that no one had EVER talked to them in an attempt to gather some lessons. And these are guys who were running the Trail at the height of the Vietnam War....
It's in the Summer 2000 issue of Special Warfare. The title is "One Zero Conference." I've got a pdf version if needed.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I wonder if CSM (Ret.) Samuel Hernandez was one of them. CSM Hernandez was with both B-52 Project Delta and MACVSOG CCN. I know he was on RT Florida for the first HALO jump. I don't know what other teams he went "over the fence" with.
I'm just asking out of curiosity, since he was my battalion CSM from '84-'88, both at Ft. Bragg and Vicenza.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
I'm actually not sure. The article didn't go into much detail, and didn't discuss the 1-0 participants in terms of names. It's certainly worth a read, though. Some very good stuff.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I’ve been following this thread and the “Rifle squad composition“ and I just have to point out/ask a few things.
Now, please tell me whats wrong with this.
- What type of operation is the best “squad” being created for, or is it a “one size fits all.” Can one size fit all? Is there a better fit depending on service or section there of.
- I have been seeing a big range in size of platoons, squads, etc. and I am wondering if it is even reasonable to compare and 8, 13, 17 man squad. Are they even the in the same ball park?
- Should the concept be better trained fireteams 3-7 men (for the sake of argument 4) with the capability to be combined into squads of different sizes and capabilities based on the demands of the operation. What I am really asking is should there be “sub” parts to squads and platoons to enhance flexibility. Should a 16 man squad be able to break down into 2 x8 man squads, or take 2 x 16 man squads and break it into 2 x 12 man squads + and 8 man squad. My point and question is should there be more of a move away from doctrine that will never meet every requirement and towards a more flexible system?
I would like any squad to be capable of accomplishing the various roles found in MCWP 3-11.2, The Marine Rifle Squad. I forgot to reference that pub as a little evidence that the Corps has applied a lot of thought to the business of fighting the squad.What type of operation is the best “squad” being created for, or is it a “one size fits all.” Can one size fit all? Is there a better fit depending on service or section there of.
Last edited by jcustis; 10-28-2007 at 02:35 PM. Reason: Norfolk caught the error. It's 3-11.2, not 3-11.3 (Scouting and Patrolling)
Adam L, I think we're looking for a basic and generic rifle squad to build upon. I might be wrong, but it seems that a rough consensus is emerging in favour of larger squads. Tom, Ken, jcustis, and I like 13-14 men in a squad, and Rifleman likes it too, but would settle for the old 11-man if he could get it. And the reason for that preference seems to comes down to three major things.I’ve been following this thread and the “Rifle squad composition“ and I just have to point out/ask a few things.
Now, please tell me whats wrong with this.
- What type of operation is the best “squad” being created for, or is it a “one size fits all.” Can one size fit all? Is there a better fit depending on service or section there of.
- I have been seeing a big range in size of platoons, squads, etc. and I am wondering if it is even reasonable to compare and 8, 13, 17 man squad. Are they even the in the same ball park?
- Should the concept be better trained fireteams 3-7 men (for the sake of argument 4) with the capability to be combined into squads of different sizes and capabilities based on the demands of the operation. What I am really asking is should there be “sub” parts to squads and platoons to enhance flexibility. Should a 16 man squad be able to break down into 2 x8 man squads, or take 2 x 16 man squads and break it into 2 x 12 man squads + and 8 man squad. My point and question is should there be more of a move away from doctrine that will never meet every requirement and towards a more flexible system?
The first is a preference for "1 Up, 2 or 3 Back" formations, especially in the attack, in order to maximize suppression of the enemy and minimize friendly losses. Of course you can get away with just two fire teams in a squad in a company or a platoon attack, but it's harder to do in an independent squad attack, since you don't have that third team to perform the assult while the other two suppress.
The second is the size of the rifle squad after sustained battle attrition. Cleary, an 8 or 9 man squad doesn't have to lose very many people before it becomes just a fire team, whereas a 13 or 14 man squad may still muster two small fire teams after suffering very heavy losses.
The third is that the 3-fire-team squad seems to naturally lend itself to adaptation, either by detaching fire teams out, or receiving attachments from elsewhere; the 3-team squad's triangular structure is shared more or less all the way up the hierarchy of echelons, where all sorts of task-organizations and cross-attachments occurr as a matter of course. And with this concept of the 3-team Squad in mind, it only seems natural that the Squad can likewise be task-organized when tactically appropriate. So, it can be expanded by adding fire teams or heavy weapons teams, or it can reduce or split up as needed (patrols, OPs/LPs, guard duties, etc.) But the 3-team structure always acts as the base, a basis for change. The 2-team squad seems a little more rigid in some ways, not least because if it detaches just one of its teams, it's reduced to a single team itself.
As for your "mix'n'match" proposal Adam, there's nothing particularly wrong with that.
And in those situations where major reorganization is required to meet less conventional (unconventional?) tactical situations, this organization provides a good, solid base upon which to make necessary changes. I think that a smaller squad, and a smaller platoon might be much more hard-pressed to make such changes out of hide, not least because it's starting out with less, and with only 2 rather than 3 teams per squad, it has less flexibility to begin with.
Last edited by Norfolk; 10-28-2007 at 02:56 PM. Reason: Spelin' n' syntx
Aside from the fact that SWC took too long to
talks to those guys, the even more devastating item is your comment that I highlighted below. The trend is, apparently in the direction of OVER control -- when it should be just the opposite.
Sad.
(emphasis added / kw)
SOG Teams, as concerns OPS-35 Ground Studies Branch, were entirely task organised, and there was no standard configuration. I interviewed 12 SOG patrol leaders for my novel (Blackfoot is Missing), and I discussed this particular issue with them at some length, as it was dear to my heart. Smallest "recon" team I know of was 4 men, (done only once) and the largest recon team I heard of was 12-13.
Dirty little secret - SOG OPS-35 Ground Studies Branch was the model for my Patrol Based Infantry concept - so while I understand all the reservations folks have posted, getting up to speed on SOG operations between 1965 and 71 may give some clues as to where I am coming from. - should anyone really care and I am amazed that some of you do!!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf,
Point taken; however, I'm still not convinced that it's the way to go for standard infantry. Both flexibility and modularity have advantages, of course, but so does habitual association. Where to strike the balance?
The very experienced Special Forces NCOs leading Nungs and Montangnards in SOG made flexibility work to their advantage. But then again they finished the conflict with more Medals of Honor, per capita, than any other unit in Vietnam. That's a tremendous testimony to their ability. Do we think that most green 2d Lieutenants could or would be capable of operating that way?
It's also worth noting that some other SF projects like Popular Forces, Mobile Strike Forces, and Mobile Guerrilla Forces pretty much stuck to a traditional infantry organization.
I'll have to order a copy of Blackfoot is Missing. By the way, did you happen to interview retired Command Sergeant Major Samuel Hernandez? He was a one-zero at CCN and made the first HALO jump in Vietnam with RT Florida. John Plaster's book SOG mentions him. He was also my Battalion Command Sergeant Major from 1984-1988.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
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