Infanteer:
I miss these threads...it's what brought me to the SWJ.
Same.

Fuchs:
Infantry squad organisation and equipment is very, very sexy to many people.
Guilty.


Fuchs:
It's not very important, though.
Oh, shut up.


Fuchs:
Infantry quality is about intangibles and improvisation much more than about the sexy items and charts discussed so repeatedly and vividly.
Oh, alright then…


Fuchs:
The one question regarding infantry small unit design that I'm still interested in is whether one should focus on burst or sustained capabilities. I lean towards burst, as competent hostiles could have so much fire support on call that breaking contact after at most two minutes should be a habit.
Interesting. But would that not be very much situation dependent? The Taliban have learnt to do this because they can melt into the populace and become invisible. But in WWIII, will a coy breaking contact be able to hide from the enemy’s sensors and outrun his fire support?


Infanteer:
TO&Es are accountants tools. How many people and equipment should I give to this organization?

By D+1, you ain't fighting by a TO&E.
Often even by D. Think about how landing craft for Overlord were occupied, in a deliberate bid to ‘scramble’ the TO&E.


Gute:
IMO flexibility of the small unit of action is key. Allowing the small unit leaders to have a free hand to organize their unit (platoon, company, battalion) to meet their assigned objectives.
But they can only (re)organise their units from a given starting point. Which gets us back to some form of TO&E.


Fuchs:
But most often, logistics, peacetime training, heavy weapons, fire support, "do and don't" orders, sensors, terrain, the enemy's nature, missions and at times even ual platoons are really just a small part of the whole.

I suppose very few infantry platoons (if any) had a substantial impact during the invasion of Iraq 2003.*gulp* planning limit the range of possible outcomes so much that individual platoons are really just a small part of the whole.
Indeed, I wonder if the overall course and outcomes of the adventures over the last ten years would have been any different if coalition forces would have been armed with SMLEs, STENs and BRENs. But that does not mean that nothing can be gained from improving the quality of an M4, or decreasing the weight, or rate of issue, of a GPMG.

In these threads we tend to perhaps over-emphasise the importance of micro. But that said, a focus on macro should not come at the detriment of micro. If ‘I’ have a slightly better chance of getting home alive, or even just a better chance of doing my job well (what ever that means), with an M4 over an SMLE, than I want that M4. If you want to focus on micro to the point that discussing the diameter of an M4 firing-pin is important or just interesting (as I think it is, in the right context), than a forum like lightfighters is the place to be. At SWC we tent to hover from minutia-micro to macro philosophy, and back again. That makes it harder to satisfy the agendas of all players and to define a context within which to focus a conversation. However, these trigger puller threads are more micro orientated – the pointy end of the spear (or firing-pin).


After all that, I really just wanted to post this link.
It highlights the importance of some of the other variables that Fuchs point out. Like here:

The Germans found, however, that to be acquainted with Russian tactics and organization was useful but by no means decisive in achieving victory in battle. Far more important was the proper understanding of the Russian soldier's psyche, a process involving the analysis of his natural impulses and reactions in different situations. Only thus were the Germans able to anticipate Russian behavior in a given situation and draw the necessary conclusions for their own course of action. Any analysis of the outstanding characteristics of the Russian soldier must begin with his innate qualities.