Yep, CG even damaged an Argentine Corvette!!Originally Posted by Ken White
A bit weighty!!! I carried the bl*ody the M2. 32lbs!! (The M3 is some 23lbs)
Plus my myself and the number 2, frequently hauled 4 rounds. Back when I was a Platoon Sergeant I watched a very stressed young soldier throw the CG into a drainage ditch, and seek to continue without it.
We had a quick discussion as the wisdom of his actions and then he then went in search of the missing item, which was successfully retrieved. - so yes, weight is an issue!!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Lighter is not always better.
The M3 has a tendency to break. The Rangers and the SEALS have had some problems with it.
The M2 is ultra reliable; with either version you have a lot of ammo choice which is a good thing, add the Simrad sight and you've got a better deal than most missiles for most purposes.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Distiller
I thought a little bit about it. Two developments I postulate: (i) the threshold for combined weapons ops is getting ever lower , (ii) new C3 technology enables a flat organization. Thus: If there is an echelon you could abandon it's the platoon. And you could organize the company - as the largest pure/non-combined unit - 100% flat along rifle-, GPMG-, MGL/mortar-, and guided missile teams. What you don't have at company level, you don't get. Non-combined-weapons units of battalion size and upwards (thinking about regiments here) will become rare I think, esp in small wars.
Err.... Want to give an example? How does C3 Technology alter the span of control? A Coy Commander Controls 12 Teams?
While there is precedent for a coy commander commanding up to 12 teams (w/ assistance from a few Lts as "stick leaders"), decentralized control and freedom of maneuver did not always flow along the same lines. Depending on the C2 platform utilized to control the contact, 4-man sticks of the Rhodesian Security Forces were often held on a tight leash to avoid geometry of fires issues and focus the efforts of multiple small elements.By giving the individual teams more freedom and responsibility, use technology to get away from micro-management (not the other way round, as it looks like now).
Even with robust and agile communications assets, I think we will still see a limit to the independent action that current planners and dreamers envision. There is so much we have to get right first, at least from the Marine Corps' perspective. First, the advanced training pipelines need to get squared away or we need to find a better way to deliver the same top-notch instruction that is available out of the schoolhouses. Second, we need a personnel stabilization system in place that addresses retention issues and truly puts the right pegs in the right holes. Lastly, the systems folks need to rdeuce the tinkering with gear and start settling on K.I.S.S. solutions that are robust enough to last a generation or accept modular upgrades without much fuss. Case in point, we went from ALICE to MOLLE to ILBE in less than ten years, and that damned MOLLE was only around long enough for some procurement officer and team to get a Navy-Commendation Medal and a round of performance bonuses (the pack subsequently proved itself to be junk).
This ballet has to happen together in order to make our larger DO plans fit, and I honestly do not see it headed in that direction. If we have well equipped teams/squads/platoons, but no one worth a damn to operate the gear and utilize proper minor tactics, the DO structure will devolve to some nastier incarnation of what we already have.
Excellent point. I think I commented as such elsewhere, but once you start taking troops out of their primary roles as shooters and make them the linguist handler, photographic documentor, tactical questioner, etc., there is a slight altering of the kinetic effects the previous 4-man teams can deliver. The business of strapping satcom to someone's back either means a commo sergeant (a'la SF) carries it, or we are going to continue to see specialists hump the set, yet that specialist will not be much of a snake-eater in other respects.I will point out though that some people, people with more experience than me, think independently operating squads are necessary for some of the fights we're facing in Iraq. I think independently operating squads really need to be big squads.
*On a totally unrelated subject, why is it that I can cursor through my cellphone's graphical user interface with ease and accomplish just about any task, but the screen face of the PRC-148, remote terminal screen of the PRC-150 and -117 kick my ass? When are the developers going to take a tip from the cellphone, game screen, and PDA?
Last edited by jcustis; 12-25-2007 at 10:45 PM.
-The problem with six man teams vs. three squads of two or three teams is simply an issue of control. Asking a PL to maneuver six elements without the benefit of squad leaders would be a nightmare. PLs depend on the squad leaders. The fireteam leader is engaged in the fight with his team. His job is to lead literally from the front. The squad leader is somewhat disengaged from the fight, remaining where he can best control his subordinate team leaders. From there he is able to maintain much better situational awareness then the team leader. As such he is capable of maneuvering his element on his own as well as coordinating with the other elements in the platoon and assisting the PL.
-Bottom up doctrine is a nonstarter. Individual squads, platoons and companies must have their own SOPs but these SOPs must adhere to a basic published doctrine. Without a solid frame work to build those SOPs individual units will end up doing things in very different ways. When those units do work together it tends to dissolve into chaos. I have to have a least an idea what the man to my left and right are going to do even if we have not worked together before.
-We cannot afford to ignore the effect of mechanization on infantry. As has been previously noted, few armored vehicles hold more than seven or eight dismounts. More importantly is the simple fact that mech infantry fights differently than light infantry. The presence of armor and the 25MM gun significantly changes things as well as adding more maneuver elements as well as more subordinate leaders.
-I do not understand the emphasis on the recce patrol and the LP/OP. Is this patrol based infantry supposed to be some sort of elite formation whose primary purpose is reconnaissance? It seems to me the author was advocating all infantry being organized this way.
SFC W
Not sure how to explain it better than I did in the article, but here goes.
1. This was written to make people think about the how and why of dismounted operations. The base of the idea comes from a fairly in depth study of MACV-SOG, Ground Studies Branch, and the UKs Royal Marines, based on extensive interviews, and presentation/written feed back to concepts and ideas. - but so what!
2. Essentially modern infantry are not optimised, either in training or equipment to fulfil core functions in terrain where dismounted operations are the primary enabler. - thus my statement that infantry should aim to fulfil the FIND function. - which is why there is the Recce and OP emphasis.
3. Infantry should operate in a combined arms/joint approach to operations. This impacts on the carried weight issue, and can be looked at in terms of an actual loss in capability the more weapons and protection you have men carry.
4. Once on foot, all infantry should fight the same way, but the reasons they do not is nothing to do with the role of infantry. It is to do with equipment and organisation issues. A friend of mine who commanded a Para Battle Group, put one of his companies in Warrior MICVs for one exercise and guess what. Nothing changed. They just jumped out and did what they did, and when they needed to go somewhere they jumped back in.
5. A UK Lt Col actually wrote to me about this article saying he liked it, but said it was impossible to make work, as raising the infantry bar made people who thought they were "special" or "Elite" less elite, and thus the objection to this concept comes from the people whom it supports!
...which goes a long way to informing my opinions about infantry doctrine, equipment and organisation being primarily the product of emotion and opinion, never held to rigour!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Agreed they must have their own SOPs but adhere to what published doctrine? This is exactly what I am saying. The soundest tactical SOPs come from the men who have to do them, and that should be a reflection of well written doctrine. Doctrine is WHY, not HOW. Bad SOPs can be error checked by doctrine, be that a VCP or searching a cave. - it's all been done before.
Look at the Battle Drill fiasco! Battle Drill was one of the most innovative and powerful infantry concepts of the 20th century. - and it was a made a total mess of by the so called "published doctrine," written by men who had no idea what it was - as most do not today, EG- the chap who wrote StormTrooper Tactics. - clearly understood nothing about battle drills - and the same mistake is made today by the US Army and their battle drills
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I disagree. it is not a control issue. Control is but one issue. Take 24 men and spilt them into 3 squads of 8. Put those squads under SLs, who can then sub-dived the squad as they see fit. - FG and RG or two fireteams - so they have to assign a Asst SL.
Alternatively, create 4 squads of six, all under SLs. For a 25% increase in span you have increased you basic maneuver options from 9 to 16, or 12-18 depending on method. - but because you have removed one level of command within the squads, you ability to control, as opposed to command should, and I submit is, increased in terms of effectiveness - and yes the SLs workload has increase by 1 man - and that is well within the accepted span of control.
Ultimately, losses and lack of combat participation makes the squad a non issue which is why I focus on the platoon as the basis for organisation, and in terms of principles, not mandated TOE.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Could you expand upon this a bit? You call Battle Drill a concept, so exactly how was a mess made by published doctrine?Look at the Battle Drill fiasco! Battle Drill was one of the most innovative and powerful infantry concepts of the 20th century. - and it was a made a total mess of by the so called "published doctrine," written by men who had no idea what it was - as most do not today, EG- the chap who wrote StormTrooper Tactics. - clearly understood nothing about battle drills - and the same mistake is made today by the US Army and their battle drills
I'm asking pointed questions to be certain I understand clearly where you side. After spending years dealing with the Marine Corps battle drill system, I'm wondering if I'm thinking what you're thinking, or exact opposites.
Battle Drill grew out of the UKs WW1 experience. It was revived in 1940 by two publications - I Corps Tactical Notes, and Wigram's Battlecraft.
Battle Drill essentially a tactical decision making process, so judgement was required. It relied on junior leaders clearly understanding what had to be done and how to it, so they could then do the next thing. - EG Locate the enemy, so they can then win the fire fight etc.
...but an essentially excellent idea then became corrupted, but poor teaching and that poor teaching then became the newer manuals etc. What I was taught battle drill in the 1980s it was a pale imitation of what it was meant to be, and relied on doing things in a very set stereotyped way - that became a method of stressing junior leaders in training rather than teaching them defeat the enemy.
In the mid 1950's US adopted General Fry's Assault Battle Drill, which is pretty poor stuff - I have a first edition - and it missed the point. Fry had the bones but IMO, he didn't know how to explain how it all fitted together.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Hmm. An early start tomorrow means I have to depart the pattern until the evening, but I'm curious now about this battle drill thing. I suppose I should have added it to the gear, manning, SOPs issues that I mentioned need to be resolved in synch. It was one of these threads here.
Perhaps a discussion of battle drill needs its own as well.
I am not sure why MACV-SOG is relevant. They performed a much different mission than modern infantry.Not sure how to explain it better than I did in the article, but here goes.
1. This was written to make people think about the how and why of dismounted operations. The base of the idea comes from a fairly in depth study of MACV-SOG, Ground Studies Branch, and the UKs Royal Marines, based on extensive interviews, and presentation/written feed back to concepts and ideas. - but so what!
Are you saying that modern infantry is not capable of performing combat missions other than find? Most infantrymen and commanders I have known might feel differently. Eight out of the ten divisions in the US Army are infantry divisions and the remaining two have huge infantry contingents. Infantry has performed the bulk of our fighting for years.
We do.
You're saying that this commander put his men in vehicles for which they had little or no training or experience and they didn't spontaneously change their SOPs to reflect the new vehicles over the course of a single exercise? I am not sure what that proves exactly.
5. A UK Lt Col actually wrote to me about this article saying he liked it, but said it was impossible to make work, as raising the infantry bar made people who thought they were "special" or "Elite" less elite, and thus the objection to this concept comes from the people whom it supports!
...which goes a long way to informing my opinions about infantry doctrine, equipment and organisation being primarily the product of emotion and opinion, never held to rigour!
Raising the bar is fine but you have to bear in mind that the higher you raise bar the more people you eliminate from the force. This is why there are only three Ranger battalions. We have eight infantry divisions and manning eight divisions requires finding a standard that is high enough to perform the mission but not so high as make manning difficult to maintain.
SFC W
@ Some of the mission may have been different, but the overall aims and means employed have wide utility today.
@ I am saying there needs to be more optimisation on the find function. - and I mean big time find function. Not just Recce. Anyone here learn how to do Vehicle Check points in Infantry Basic? House raids? Cordon and search? Road watching?
@ We do what? If Infantry are so well supported in the Joint environment, how come carried load is going up? - or has increased.
@ That is exactly what I am saying. What it suggests, rather than proves, is that there is not much difference between Mech and Light. The MICV is just an enabler like CAS or Arty.
@ Sensible and reasoned raising of the bar should get rid of people who should never have been there in the first place and ensure a useful degree of quality manpower.
U-boat, please note, I am writing this from a UK perspective. Not US. The original article was published in the British Army Doctrine and Training News. Infantry Magazine then wanted to publish it, so I'm not sure what its meaning to the US is.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Interesting...
We can disagree on that, the difference in mission was so significant in comparison to most infantry missions as to preclude any meaningful correlation.
I agree with your statement of need but would point out that your task list is mission and area specific and is highly subject to unit SOP; thus none of those really should be taught in Basic or OSUT.@ I am saying there needs to be more optimisation on the find function. - and I mean big time find function. Not just Recce. Anyone here learn how to do Vehicle Check points in Infantry Basic? House raids? Cordon and search? Road watching?
Because Armies are politically correct and slow to change and the troops are actually encouraged to carry more things than they need (like extra clothing and sleeping pads). There have been items added -- NVG for example -- so some weight gain was necessary. The biggest addition is in Armor...@ We do what? If Infantry are so well supported in the Joint environment, how come carried load is going up? - or has increased.
Yes and no. There isn't much difference but little things mean a lot. Three out of your nine have to stay with the vehicle; Driver, Gunner and a nominal dismount who doesn't dismount but has to stay aboard to pass up Ammo to the gunner...@ That is exactly what I am saying. What it suggests, rather than proves, is that there is not much difference between Mech and Light. The MICV is just an enabler like CAS or Arty.
So your nine man squad just became a six man squad. Then there's maintenance...
Add the fact that most MICV are more akin to a Light Tank than they are to a transport vehicle and tend to get employed like light tanks. Plus the reluctance of the Troops to move out of sight of their vehicle. People are so pesky about messing up good theories.
Can't argue with that one.@ Sensible and reasoned raising of the bar should get rid of people who should never have been there in the first place and ensure a useful degree of quality manpower.
@ Well we will disagree then. Hatchet Fore, Mike Force (ok Not SOG) and Exploitation Platoons were all basically light infantry, as were the heavier recon teams. Operation Tailwind and the blocking of Route 96, were basically conventional Air mobile operations.
@ Which is why a load carrying doctrine based on a combined arms approach is critical.
@ The Driver Gunner and Commander, should be NOT be from the Infantry. This is just a hangover of arm and cap badge politics and the old "but what can you do" attitude. Makes no sense, everyone knows it, yet we do it.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Well, we can disagree - but you're moving the old
goalposts. Yes, those you mention were essentially light infantry but the SOG specific elements you cite existed solely to support the RTs -- and the SOG mission was more than those RTs as well. Tailwind was a one-off (well, almost...) and several of the blocks were not an advertisement for anything except courage under fire. I'd also say Tailwind wasn't conventional in hardly any respect...
What is your proposal to reduce the load? Not just the buzz words, the realistic proposal.@ Which is why a load carrying doctrine based on a combined arms approach is critical.
Uh, actually, that's been tried -- and it didn't work too well. The initial ROCID (Infantry Division in the US Army circa 1956-1964) had a battalion of ~ 60 APCs with a commander / gunner and a driver. The theory was that the Infantry units needing transport would be provided it from that Bn. Didn't work at all well in practice for several reasons so it was abandoned. Not least was the problem of getting the senior Infantry type aboard and the Track Commander to agree on routes, vehicle placement, targets for the .50 cal and so forth. There was also the minor problem that the PC folks though their job was to be a taxi and that any danger was to be avoided -- the transported Infantry OTOH, expected to get shot at and had a sense of mission that the track crews sometimes lacked -- there's that pesky human dimension again...@ The Driver Gunner and Commander, should be NOT be from the Infantry. This is just a hangover of arm and cap badge politics and the old "but what can you do" attitude. Makes no sense, everyone knows it, yet we do it.
And maintenance. Everyone always likes to forget maintenance...
But it's a nice theory.
Well, we can disagree - but you're moving the old
goalposts. Yes, those you mention were essentially light infantry but the SOG specific elements you cite existed solely to support the RTs -- and the SOG mission was more than those RTs as well. Tailwind was a one-off (well, almost...) and several of the blocks were not an advertisement for anything except courage under fire. I'd also say Tailwind wasn't conventional in hardly any respect...
And yes, Mike Force elms were not SOG.
You probably also noted that the 'light infantry' "heavier recon teams" were those that had the most difficulty; the early guys like Dick Meadows who went out and snuck around didn't have nearly the problems (acknowledging that the NVA put more people out in later years as well). Strategic Recon will only succeed by stealth and wits, light infantry stuff (and thinking) will get you killed in that environment. Totally different job and focus.
What is your proposal to reduce the load? Not just the buzz words, the realistic proposal.@ Which is why a load carrying doctrine based on a combined arms approach is critical.
Uh, actually, that's been tried -- and it didn't work too well. The initial ROCID (Infantry Division in the US Army circa 1956-1964) had a battalion of ~ 60 APCs with a commander / gunner and a driver. The theory was that the Infantry units needing transport would be provided it from that Bn. Didn't work at all well in practice for several reasons so it was abandoned. Not least was the problem of getting the senior Infantry type aboard and the Track Commander to agree on routes, vehicle placement, targets for the .50 cal and so forth. There was also the minor problem that the PC folks though their job was to be a taxi and that any danger was to be avoided -- the transported Infantry OTOH, expected to get shot at and had a sense of mission that the track crews sometimes lacked -- there's that pesky human dimension again...@ The Driver Gunner and Commander, should be NOT be from the Infantry. This is just a hangover of arm and cap badge politics and the old "but what can you do" attitude. Makes no sense, everyone knows it, yet we do it.
And maintenance. Everyone always likes to forget maintenance...
But it's a nice theory.
I presented this at the RUSI about two years ago. There's a .ppt out there somewhere, but here goes the basics.
The need for infantry to carry excessive weight is based on the belief that they can subsist for X-days without re-supply. Why carry 3 days food and water when you have 20 mins of ammo?
Load is everything and trade offs have to be made. The idea that infantry must operate is isolation is major flaw, as is the idea that infantry should be able operate unsupported. Here some of the ideas I bounced around,
@ - Re-supply conducted by Attack Helicopters
@ - Low power wide area re-broadcast conducted by UAVs, to conserve battery life.
@ - Form groupings dedicated to load carrying support for dismounted infantry operations.
@ - Acceptance that supply limited operations are a "special condition" and not the norm.
@- rationalise equipment design, based on load and support. - Eg An effective sleeping bag can costs less than some mortar bombs or similar munitions, so why not make them disposable and supply-able, or "one night items" - make up 70kg (IIRC) "Platoon Overnight kits" to be dropped/pushed in as and when required
... and most of this came from looking at how SOG-RTs formulated their loads and conducted their re-supply.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Can you explain this idea in depth? I was watching something on TV the other day about robot/wagons that would carry the squads gear. Please explain this "load carrying group" and if you could, include a combat scenario on how it would work. Thank you sir
I suggest it was tried once and done badly. In the British Army, APCs were routinely crewed by RTC drivers in Malaya, Aden, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. The Kangaroo Carriers used in WW2 were not crewed by infantry and worked fine. No one says helicopters have to be flown by combat arms. No one ever says that MBTs working in close support of infantry have to be manned by infantry. So why MICVs?
besides all I am arguing is that even if organic to the OOB, the vehicles do not have to be crewed by Infantry. They can be crewed by dedicated armor operators, who come from an armor training stream.
The Royal Marines have a dedicated Armoured Support group, not dedicated to any Commando Battle Group and that works fine. OK crews are commando trained, but they just pick and lift anyone, including Army light infantry units - as being done in Helmand right now. Its all about leadership and professionalism.
Don't understand why maintenance is an issue. When I was in FV-432s we had a REME LAD at the Coy level for repairs and engine changes etc. The driver did all the "vehicle jobs" and he would get helped by one or two rifleman if needed. The rifleman had no technical training, but how hard is it to check track pins, oil levels etc? Lazy crews made a big deal out of it. Good crews just did it.
Formation Recce CVR-T crews seemed to do just fine on maintenance and they only had a crew of three. - and again, why did we take valuable infantry manpower and allocate them to mech recce tasks, when the vehicles and manpower could have come from dedicated units.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
If you were operating in jungle, - worst case- you would/could allocate assets, such as Helicopters, APCs, MRAP, C-130 para drop, to specifically support units or sub-units, on a continuous basis. - as was done for the Chindits. (A whole Air Force!) You would view re-supply as inherent as Arty or CAS. Your unit level S4 actually becomes a "Go-No Go" link in the chain. Not a "make this work regardless" factor.
...and for anyone who says, we do that, look at some of the planning assumptions for Operation Anaconda.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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