NATO in Afghanistan till 2015 (merged thread)

[Jedburgh]

Very detailed report from HRW:

Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan

Brutal attacks by armed opposition groups on Afghan teachers, students, and their schools have occurred throughout much of Afghanistan in recent months, particularly in the south. These attacks, and the inability of the government and its international backers to stop them, demonstrate the deteriorating security conditions under which many Afghans are now living. While ultimate responsibility lies with the perpetrators, much about the response of the international community and the Afghan government can and must be improved if Afghanistan is to move forward. The situation is not hopeless, yet....

Pages 109 to 114 of the pdf file are an analysis of the effect, or lack thereof, of military nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. A fairly close look is taken at the PRT concept and results.


Note: I know there are those who disdain any reporting from "Human Rights" organizations. However, I have a great deal of respect for the professionalism and balance of HRW, buttressed by personal observations of some of their personnel in action in Northern Iraq when they were still carrying out investigations into Saddam's Anfal operation against the Kurds.

Admittedly, there are times when their black-and-white views don't mesh well with the multiple shades of gray in the world we operate in, but I have found HRW to be very careful and precise in its findings and judgements. This is in great contrast to AI, which tends to be far more strident, and often exemplifies the reasons why many in the military look down upon "Human Rights" sources.

[Tom Odom]

Very detailed report from HRW:

Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan


Pages 109 to 114 of the pdf file are an analysis of the effect, or lack thereof, of military nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. A fairly close look is taken at the PRT concept and results.


Note: I know there are those who disdain any reporting from "Human Rights" organizations. However, I have a great deal of respect for the professionalism and balance of HRW, buttressed by personal observations of some of their personnel in action in Northern Iraq when they were still carrying out investigations into Saddam's Anfal operation against the Kurds.

Admittedly, there are times when their black-and-white views don't mesh well with the multiple shades of gray in the world we operate in, but I have found HRW to be very careful and precise in its findings and judgements. This is in great contrast to AI, which tends to be far more strident, and often exemplifies the reasons why many in the military look down upon "Human Rights" sources.

Jed,

I generally like HRW. Their work in Rwanda was excellent; that said, they operate from their core belief that all violence and all war is a violation of human rights. In particular, HRW "reporting" of organized killings by the new GOR in late summer/early fall was suspect in my view then and remains so today.

Other organizations like AI are highly suspect; they draw funding by making dramatic claims, many of which are effectively proved to be overstated or even false. Then again there is MSF; if I talk about the MSF in Rwanda we will have to move this post to the "rant" column. Then again MSF in Goma was one of the few NGOs willing to speak out against what was happening in the camps and act on it.

I did a quick scan read of this one; looks good and well judged in its assessments.

Best
Tom

[marct]

On of the comments following the ISN piece was

The lynchpin to watch is Canada. Since moving into the south of the country this summer, its troops there have borne some of the heaviest fighting. At the same time its political investment in the success of the Afghan adventure is more in line with European members than with America or even the UK. The fear that a Canadian withdrawal will prompt a strategic re-evaluation in European capitals is a very real one.

Coming on top of that, CBC.ca just posted an interesting story

Military considers longer tours of duty in Afghanistan
Last Updated: Sunday, October 22, 2006 | 11:32 AM ET
CBC News

The Canadian military wants to increase the time served by its troops in Afghanistan to nine months, up from six, a general told soldiers gathered in Edmonton on Saturday.

Brig.-Gen Mark Skidmore spoke after a change of command ceremony that put him in charge of army forces in Western Canada.

The career soldier from London, Ont., took over the job from Brig.-Gen. Tim Grant, who will become commander of Task Force Afghanistan for six months.

"If you're a member of the Canadian military, particularly a soldier with a skill set that's required in Afghanistan, and you haven't been yet, I think chances are very good that the opportunity is going to be there to serve," Skidmore told the assembled troops at the Jefferson Armouries.

On Wednesday, Gen. Rick Hillier, chief of defence staff, said the Armed Forces will be looking outside combat units to find troops.

"We will re-role people that are in the training system right now but who are designed to be something else," he told the Commons defence committee.

... more

There are some very odd maneuvers going on politically here

Marc

[SWJED]

31 October London Times - Troops Turn Away From 'Ink Spots' For Control by Anthony Loyd.

... “If you listen to all the rumours then you would never go out or do anything,” said Colonel Ian Huntley, the Royal Marine commander in the capital of the restive Helmand province of Afghanistan. “It was always expected that there would be a period of asymmetric war, suicide bombings, et cetera. Generally, though, the place is relatively benign. I’m sure there are many worse places in the world to work.”

The colonel’s phlegmatic approach typifies the attitude of 3 Commando Brigade, which arrived in Helmand a month ago. Its mission — to support the Afghan Government with the necessary security measures to allow civil development — had been slanted more to war fighting than reconstruction after the outgoing 16 Air Assault Brigade spent the summer engaged in heated battles with insurgents.

Development was all but non-existent in Helmand by the time the Marines arrived, its concept still pinned on the failed idea of “ink spots”, whereby isolated northern towns, including Musa Qala and Sangin, were supposed to be the seeds of an expanding stability rather than the scenes of fierce fighting and rancour.

In the absence of officials from the Department for International Development, who rarely venture out of Kabul, the development of Helmand — the key to making progress in southern Afghanistan — has fallen largely on the military’s shoulders. The “ink spot” idea has been killed off, replaced by the concept of the “ADZ”, the Afghan Development Zone, a lozenge-shaped area, approximately 40 km (25 miles) long by 20 km wide, stretching along the Helmand river valley from the town of Gereshk to the city of Lashkar Gah.

Despite the threat of the suicide attacks, British patrols are deploying daily from their base in Lashkar Gah, home to about 350 soldiers and Marines, and assessing the potential of redevelopment sites within the ADZ.

The speed of progress might be slow, but the mission is up and running. And unlike in Iraq, where British officers and men have expressed doubts openly about the advantage of their continued presence in the country, in Helmand hope in the mission still remains high...

[SWJED]

7 November Los Angeles Times editorial - Make a Drug Deal with Afghanistan.

... The Afghan people are rebelling because the U.S. government is currently committed to destroying 60% of their economy. In the name of the "war on drugs," a U.S. corporation, Dyncorp, is being paid to barge into the fields of some of the poorest people in the world and systematically destroy their only livelihood.

These Afghans are growing poppies — from which heroin is derived — out of need, not greed. A quarter of all Afghan babies die before their fifth birthday. The Senlis Council warns that if Western governments continue this program of economic destruction — and the negative propaganda bonanza it creates — the Taliban may be sufficiently rejuvenated to march on Kabul, depose President Hamid Karzai and pin up a "Welcome home, Mr. Bin Laden" banner.

There is an alternative to this disastrous spiral. The world is suffering from a shortage of legal opiates. The World Health Organization describes it as "an unprecedented global pain crisis." About 80% of the world's population has almost no access to these painkillers at all. Even in developed countries, for cancer care alone there is an unmet annual need for 550 metric tons more opium to make morphine.

Afghan farmers continue to produce the stuff, only to be made into criminals because of it. Meanwhile, in a Kabul hospital, half the patients who need opiates are thrashing about in agony because they can't get them, while in fields only a few miles away opium crops are being hacked to pieces.

The solution is simple. Instead of destroying Afghanistan's most valuable resource, Western governments should buy it outright and resell it to producers of legal opiate-based painkillers on the global market. Instead of confronting Afghan farmers about their crop, our representatives should be approaching them with hard cash...

[marct]

The solution is simple. Instead of destroying Afghanistan's most valuable resource, Western governments should buy it outright and resell it to producers of legal opiate-based painkillers on the global market. Instead of confronting Afghan farmers about their crop, our representatives should be approaching them with hard cash...

Actually, this is one that the Western governments really shouldn't do - the UN or private companies operating under UN and national government oversight should. There are just too many resonances with the Opium War if national governments by themselves are doing it.

Marc

[Jedburgh]

The Economist, 13 Nov 06: Afghanistan after the Taliban: Five Years On

...Some worry that this will prove to be the high point of progress in Afghanistan. Analysts discuss the risk of successes of the past five years now draining away. There have been real achievements, if unevenly distributed. Afghanistan has an elected and popular president, Hamid Karzai, and a parliament that, despite some doubtful members, has proved itself generally responsible. Some 4.5m refugees have come home and 6.5m children are back in school. A national army of 35,000 men has been built from scratch, along with a police force of 55,000, although the latter is woefully corrupt and needs reforming. A UN disarmament campaign has processed 63,000 members of illegal armed groups and impounded 10,000 tanks and other heavy weapons. Some 4,000 health posts and 10,000km of roads have been built or rebuilt, although it unclear how these will be maintained in the long term...

...The prospects for long-term recovery depend, ultimately, on getting stability and flattening the Taliban. NATO commanders admit that they would like more troops to do that, but Western public opinion may not tolerate a long and bloody campaign. The Taliban, by contrast, appear happy to plan for the long term. As one Taliban commander recently boasted: “You have the clocks but we have the time.”...

[Ray]

One cannot wipe out the Taliban with the way it is being approached.

Unless one "seals" the border (though that is well nigh impossible), the Taliban terrorists will keep coming in and going into the areas cleared.

Therefore, two types of force is required.

One, those that seal the border.

Two, rear areas security force i.e. those that clear the area and then ensure that whatever trickles in is removed forthwith.

[marct]

One cannot wipe out the Taliban with the way it is being approached.

Unless one "seals" the border (though that is well nigh impossible), the Taliban terrorists will keep coming in and going into the areas cleared.

Therefore, two types of force is required.

One, those that seal the border.

Two, rear areas security force i.e. those that clear the area and then ensure that whatever trickles in is removed forthwith.

Good points but, unfortunately, there is no way it can be done as things now stand. If you look at the case in the south-east, the border into North and South Waziristan is wide open and the Pakistani Government has no hope of being able to seal their side. One totally radical suggestion, that I know the Pakistanis won't accept, is to return Waziristan to Afghanistan (they used to be Afghan provinces and are dominated by the Pashtun tribe). The key to "winning" in Afghanistan, IMHO, lies to a large degree in recognizing that the current borders are illusions and operating on that recognition.

We lost the best chance for "winning" when the Loya Jirga met in 2003 and the king was shuffled aside - Karzai doesn't have the same personal authority, either moral or organizational. And, while I do respect him for a lot of the work he has done, he is not going to be able to unify the country as long as he is viewed as a puppet for the West. A victory in Afghanistan must be a victory by Afghans along the lines of the 2nd Afghan war (1878-1881).

Marc