NATO in Afghanistan till 2015 (merged thread)

[marct]

On of the comments following the ISN piece was

The lynchpin to watch is Canada. Since moving into the south of the country this summer, its troops there have borne some of the heaviest fighting. At the same time its political investment in the success of the Afghan adventure is more in line with European members than with America or even the UK. The fear that a Canadian withdrawal will prompt a strategic re-evaluation in European capitals is a very real one.

Coming on top of that, CBC.ca just posted an interesting story

Military considers longer tours of duty in Afghanistan
Last Updated: Sunday, October 22, 2006 | 11:32 AM ET
CBC News

The Canadian military wants to increase the time served by its troops in Afghanistan to nine months, up from six, a general told soldiers gathered in Edmonton on Saturday.

Brig.-Gen Mark Skidmore spoke after a change of command ceremony that put him in charge of army forces in Western Canada.

The career soldier from London, Ont., took over the job from Brig.-Gen. Tim Grant, who will become commander of Task Force Afghanistan for six months.

"If you're a member of the Canadian military, particularly a soldier with a skill set that's required in Afghanistan, and you haven't been yet, I think chances are very good that the opportunity is going to be there to serve," Skidmore told the assembled troops at the Jefferson Armouries.

On Wednesday, Gen. Rick Hillier, chief of defence staff, said the Armed Forces will be looking outside combat units to find troops.

"We will re-role people that are in the training system right now but who are designed to be something else," he told the Commons defence committee.

... more

There are some very odd maneuvers going on politically here

Marc

[SWJED]

31 October London Times - Troops Turn Away From 'Ink Spots' For Control by Anthony Loyd.

... “If you listen to all the rumours then you would never go out or do anything,” said Colonel Ian Huntley, the Royal Marine commander in the capital of the restive Helmand province of Afghanistan. “It was always expected that there would be a period of asymmetric war, suicide bombings, et cetera. Generally, though, the place is relatively benign. I’m sure there are many worse places in the world to work.”

The colonel’s phlegmatic approach typifies the attitude of 3 Commando Brigade, which arrived in Helmand a month ago. Its mission — to support the Afghan Government with the necessary security measures to allow civil development — had been slanted more to war fighting than reconstruction after the outgoing 16 Air Assault Brigade spent the summer engaged in heated battles with insurgents.

Development was all but non-existent in Helmand by the time the Marines arrived, its concept still pinned on the failed idea of “ink spots”, whereby isolated northern towns, including Musa Qala and Sangin, were supposed to be the seeds of an expanding stability rather than the scenes of fierce fighting and rancour.

In the absence of officials from the Department for International Development, who rarely venture out of Kabul, the development of Helmand — the key to making progress in southern Afghanistan — has fallen largely on the military’s shoulders. The “ink spot” idea has been killed off, replaced by the concept of the “ADZ”, the Afghan Development Zone, a lozenge-shaped area, approximately 40 km (25 miles) long by 20 km wide, stretching along the Helmand river valley from the town of Gereshk to the city of Lashkar Gah.

Despite the threat of the suicide attacks, British patrols are deploying daily from their base in Lashkar Gah, home to about 350 soldiers and Marines, and assessing the potential of redevelopment sites within the ADZ.

The speed of progress might be slow, but the mission is up and running. And unlike in Iraq, where British officers and men have expressed doubts openly about the advantage of their continued presence in the country, in Helmand hope in the mission still remains high...

[SWJED]

7 November Los Angeles Times editorial - Make a Drug Deal with Afghanistan.

... The Afghan people are rebelling because the U.S. government is currently committed to destroying 60% of their economy. In the name of the "war on drugs," a U.S. corporation, Dyncorp, is being paid to barge into the fields of some of the poorest people in the world and systematically destroy their only livelihood.

These Afghans are growing poppies — from which heroin is derived — out of need, not greed. A quarter of all Afghan babies die before their fifth birthday. The Senlis Council warns that if Western governments continue this program of economic destruction — and the negative propaganda bonanza it creates — the Taliban may be sufficiently rejuvenated to march on Kabul, depose President Hamid Karzai and pin up a "Welcome home, Mr. Bin Laden" banner.

There is an alternative to this disastrous spiral. The world is suffering from a shortage of legal opiates. The World Health Organization describes it as "an unprecedented global pain crisis." About 80% of the world's population has almost no access to these painkillers at all. Even in developed countries, for cancer care alone there is an unmet annual need for 550 metric tons more opium to make morphine.

Afghan farmers continue to produce the stuff, only to be made into criminals because of it. Meanwhile, in a Kabul hospital, half the patients who need opiates are thrashing about in agony because they can't get them, while in fields only a few miles away opium crops are being hacked to pieces.

The solution is simple. Instead of destroying Afghanistan's most valuable resource, Western governments should buy it outright and resell it to producers of legal opiate-based painkillers on the global market. Instead of confronting Afghan farmers about their crop, our representatives should be approaching them with hard cash...

[marct]

The solution is simple. Instead of destroying Afghanistan's most valuable resource, Western governments should buy it outright and resell it to producers of legal opiate-based painkillers on the global market. Instead of confronting Afghan farmers about their crop, our representatives should be approaching them with hard cash...

Actually, this is one that the Western governments really shouldn't do - the UN or private companies operating under UN and national government oversight should. There are just too many resonances with the Opium War if national governments by themselves are doing it.

Marc

[Jedburgh]

The Economist, 13 Nov 06: Afghanistan after the Taliban: Five Years On

...Some worry that this will prove to be the high point of progress in Afghanistan. Analysts discuss the risk of successes of the past five years now draining away. There have been real achievements, if unevenly distributed. Afghanistan has an elected and popular president, Hamid Karzai, and a parliament that, despite some doubtful members, has proved itself generally responsible. Some 4.5m refugees have come home and 6.5m children are back in school. A national army of 35,000 men has been built from scratch, along with a police force of 55,000, although the latter is woefully corrupt and needs reforming. A UN disarmament campaign has processed 63,000 members of illegal armed groups and impounded 10,000 tanks and other heavy weapons. Some 4,000 health posts and 10,000km of roads have been built or rebuilt, although it unclear how these will be maintained in the long term...

...The prospects for long-term recovery depend, ultimately, on getting stability and flattening the Taliban. NATO commanders admit that they would like more troops to do that, but Western public opinion may not tolerate a long and bloody campaign. The Taliban, by contrast, appear happy to plan for the long term. As one Taliban commander recently boasted: “You have the clocks but we have the time.”...

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 15 Nov 06:

Transforming NATO (...again): A Primer for the Summit in Riga 2006

The portion of the report dealing with Afghanistan and its potential effects upon the Riga summit and NATO's future is on page 48 of the pdf document.

...The NATO operation in Afghanistan is in itself a remarkable achievement. Given the distance from Brussels, complexity, and operational environment, ISAF would have been an unimaginable mission just ten years ago.

Many observers believe the ISAF mission marks the birth of a “global NATO” that is willing and able to face 21st century threats. Others, however, are increasingly skeptical about the operation’s long-term sustainability. SACEUR General James Jones called for an additional 2,000 troops in September 2006. The deafening silence that followed raised questions about whether NATO had the political will and adequate capabilities to succeed....

[Jedburgh]

CSIS Briefing, 12 Dec 06:

Winning in Afghanistan: How to Face the Rising Threat

Key Trends
- Development of effective government and economy will take at least 5-10 years; no instant success is possible.
- Current Afghan government, and US and NATO aid and activity levels are inadequate.
- Reconstituted enemy is more lethal and shows increased capacity for effective asymmetric warfare, including effective information operations
- Pakistan sanctuary is an enemy advantage
- Major rise in violence in West and South
- Rising threat in other areas
- Violence likely to be at least equal next year and may well be higher.
- Afghan forces developing but require major increases in aid and years of support.
- NATO effort has insufficient forces and only US, Canadian, British, Danes, Estonians,and Dutch forces are in the fight. Romanians have been in limited action but are largely road bound due to wrong APCs.
- Increased Narco-trafficking/crime
- Threat exploits limited transportation infrastructure.
- Image-risk of US defeat in Iraq strong morale builder for Taliban-Al Qa’ida

(Much more detail in the 71 slide pdf presentation)

Edit to add: Press Briefing Transcript