Gentlemen,

I just returned from my last tour as a troop commander in Diyala Province. Currently, I'm studying at the Naval Postgraduate School. I'm To my knowledge, my squadron (5-73 CAV) employed the most ordinance of any unit last year in Iraq. We operated primarily in insurgent (mostly AQIZ) safehavens tasked with reclearing areas previously unpatrolled by CF/ISF. The areas (Turki Village and Diyala River Valley) were literally owned by the Islamic State of Iraq. They established their own government, judicial system, essential services, recruiting grounds, and training camps. Both areas were severely restricted by the terrain.

As in Ramadi, we used the increased kinetic activity as a means to establish a foothold. Prior to our deliberate attacks, we employed heavy reconnaissance efforts to identify our target sets (training areas, enemy caches, C2 nodes). Once positively identified, we executed violently.

Once cleared, we established patrol bases and transitioned to securing the populace. In the DRV, half the populace had been displaced b/c of sect or tribe. Within a 100m of my patrol base, AQI conducted public beheadings three months prior to my arrival.

Through an aggressive security plan, CT effort, and reconstruction, we were able to control the area by repatriating the displaced shias, establishing a police force, working through tribal peace negotiations, and mentoring our IA counterparts.

The effort proved highly successful. The point is, we used the airstrikes as a means of establishing the foothold. Yes, we were violent, but the situation on the ground called for it. I will probably conduct a critical evaluation of our efforts as part of my thesis, but I believe that we effectively employed COIN theory given the environment that we operated in.

With that, I will stand by for your thoughts/critiques.

Mike