Irregular Warfare: After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers

[mmx1]

Cover article in the Economist this week:
Brains, not Bullets; how to fight future wars.

http://www.economist.com/research/ar...ry_id=10015844
http://www.economist.com/opinion/dis...ry_id=10024437

Brains, not bullets
Oct 25th 2007
From The Economist print edition


Western armies are good at destroying things. Can they be made better at building them?


ANOTHER debate to do with Iraq and Afghanistan is building in America, one that could have important consequences for the West. This debate is being conducted in the Pentagon—and it has to do with the future shape of America's armed forces. With its far-flung alliances and commitments, the superpower rightly wants a “full spectrum” of military capabilities to deal with everything from an all-out war to a small policing action. But precisely what the mix should be is increasingly contentious—and could prove expensive.

If the biggest threat comes from rising powers, such as a belligerent Russia or a pushy China, America and its allies will need to invest in aircraft, ships and advanced weapons to cope. If the greatest challenge is the fight against militants and insurgents around the world—seen by some as a new and different “fourth generation” of warfare (see article)—then they will need more boots on the ground and, crucially, different sorts of soldiers wearing them. Sadly for taxpayers everywhere, the emerging answer from America is that a modern power needs to prepare for both challenges. But there has been a clear swing towards manpower from technology....

[SWJED]

Irregular Warfare: After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers - The Economist, 25 October.

... Can America and its Western allies avoid similar humiliation in Iraq and Afghanistan? Martin van Creveld, an Israeli military historian, argues that insurgencies have been almost impossible to defeat ever since Nazi Germany failed to suppress Josip Broz Tito's partisans in Yugoslavia. Winning such wars requires one of two tactics: extreme restraint and patience, as shown by the British over nearly 38 years in Northern Ireland; or extreme brutality, as shown by Syria in 1982 when the army destroyed much of Hama, a stronghold of Islamist rebels, killing at least 10,000 people. Any other method, says Mr van Creveld, risks being too harsh to win the support of the population but not harsh enough to cow it into submission.

This rule is too stark. Experts point to successes such as the end of the insurgency in El Salvador, the collapse of the Shining Path rebels in Peru, the end of the civil wars in Mozambique and Angola, the demise of the Red Brigades in Italy and of the Red Army Faction in Germany. Much of this debate revolves around the meaning of victory and defeat, as well as the definition of counter-insurgency, civil war, counter-terrorism and so on. One school of thought holds that America's forces had largely defeated the Vietcong in Vietnam when its politicians lost the will to stop North Vietnam's conventional army from overrunning the south. That is to miss the point: in counter-insurgency one side can win every battle, yet lose the war...

[max161]

This paragraph sounds a lot like what Special Forces is supposed to do:

“To be fair, the Pentagon talks about building “partner capacity”, but it may need more radical steps—in particular creating new specialist units to train allies, embed Western soldiers in local forces to improve their performance and be able to call in airstrikes, and help organise civil reconstruction.”

Dave

[Ken White]

elsewhere could be as well but my spies tell me they're busy on, er, um, other tasks...

At the risk of minor heresy, my mind boggles at what just one SF Company could do in the 'Stan with an OpCon (I'd even go OpCom) light Infantry battalion and an Engineer Company plus a few other folks as far as training the ANA -- or even the cops...

Hmm. That may be major heresy. Absolute apostasy even.

Instead, we have to take ARNG Armor Battalions (Dismounted) and 'train' them to train others...

[Adam L]

Ken, I think you've gotta a point there.

[Adam L]

The Economist has been going down hill for a while. I don't quite get what he was going for with this article.

[/quote]Even if America cannot imagine fighting another Iraq or Afghanistan, extremists round the world have seen mighty America's vulnerability to the rocket-propelled grenade, the AK-47 and the suicide-bomber. [/quote]

1. We had already shown this in Lebanon and Somalia.
2. What has really changed is not that our enemies have shown that we are vulnerable to their attacks, but that our public cannot withstand casualties and that they can.
3. What has changed EVERYTHING is technology. Whether it is cell phones or the internet, insurgents see immediate results to their actions and are not only able to use it for propaganda, but are capable of seeing its effect on their enemy (specifically the American civilians.) Unfortunately, knocking out satellite phone, cellular phone and internet service in Iraq doesn't seem to be an option. Everything is immediate today.

Also, the British had a much easier time with the geography of Malaya. They didn’t' have to deal with Laos and Cambodia. On top of this, the SAS was in its formative years and for this reason was most capable of adapting to the situation in every way. He also ignores the fight between the military and politicians. Politicians change often in Western governments and force the military to constantly appease their desires. This impact can best be seen in Northern Ireland. All of this effects small wars.

Note: I know I seem to always be critical in my posts, but that is only because I am a critic. LOL. . I just don't like mid-length articles. Their purpose is unclear. They are not a summary of the issues, they fail to explore issues in their entirety and most often fail to site anything to help the reader fill in the gaps. This unfortunately has become the trend/standard.

Adam

P.S. Sorry about that rant.

[Ken White]

I really agree the Economist has lost it to a significant degree.

The "vulnerability" to the RPG, AK-47 and the suicide bomber is hyperbolic to say the least. It is also of no strategic, very little operational and not great tactical significance.

I'm not sure I agree that "our public" cannot withstand casualties. Certainly some object quite strongly to casualties for any war and possibly more to casualties for this war but I still firmly believe the largest majority of those disaffected by this war are less concerned with casualties than they are with performance. The bulk of the public, I think simply wants it finished and finished acceptably.

There is to my mind little question that they are trouncing us in the info war -- we have turned the corner tactically if not operationally but in the information domain we are getting zapped.

The Brits get a lot of praise over Malaya. Your point is well taken. They did okay but contrary to popular opinion, it wasn't a "win" -- it, like most other COIN ops, achieved simply an acceptable outcome. Folks also forget the massive advantage they had there -- they were the government. In Viet Nam, in Afghanistan and in Iraq, we had or have to get along with independent governments who were and are emphatically willing to operate on their own agendas and who did or do not care about US public opinion. Huge difference.

[Adam L]

I'm not sure I agree that "our public" cannot withstand casualties. Certainly some object quite strongly to casualties for any war and possibly more to casualties for this war but I still firmly believe the largest majority of those disaffected by this war are less concerned with casualties than they are with performance. The bulk of the public, I think simply wants it finished and finished acceptably.

I agree with you for the most part. I should have been more exact about the segment of society I was refering too. I agree most people in opposition to the continuance of this war, hold this due to our performance rather than our casualties. I do have to point out that when most people evaluate performance, casualties have a big effect. I guess I am just sick of dealing with the rather large minority that is so far out on the left, that they make Phil Ochs look like a moderate. I have had to deal with a lot of University types these days, and unfortunately it would be an understatement to say that they are leaning to the left. On top of this, too many people feel this war is something new when it is not. I myself am a great critic of this war, but that doesn't mean I am for pulling out or was agianst it I the first place. I have known enough to put it in context. When I have not now known enough I have eduacated myself. (I am of the opinion that the public libarary system, the internet and a good grasp of the English language is all that is needed for a good education. I must admit the libraries are not what they used to be. Carnegie would be disgusted.) Too many people look at this war and don't know what they are looking at. Unfortunately, this is something we see no matter the area in American politics (probably everyone else's too.) Here I am ranting again, and off topic. Sorry.

There is to my mind little question that they are trouncing us in the info war -- we have turned the corner tactically if not operationally but in the information domain we are getting zapped.

We need to establish a DoJ program where we give hackers more lenient sentence and perhaps a special prison if they are willing to spend thier time attacking terrorists online mainframe. This may seem a little silly, but with the amount of hackers we spend a fortune prosecuting every year, it would be easier to plea most of them out into a program like this. This would save millions and give us a more foot (or more accurately "finger") soldiers.

I guess this should go in a file at the back of the cabinet with my other silly ideas:
1. Instead of hireing Disney to make a movie that will improve our perceptions worldwide, hire the guys who marketed PokeMON. They can market anything! LOL!
2. An Arabic version of Jefferson Starship's "White Rabbit" or better yet "MacArthur's Park." I think this would be a lot more effective than deathmetal and Led Zeplin. LOL!
3. Scaring Muslim terrorists with aggressive congressional "pork." LOL!

Sorry, I just had to share those with someone.

The Brits get a lot of praise over Malaya. Your point is well taken. They did okay but contrary to popular opinion, it wasn't a "win" -- it, like most other COIN ops, achieved simply an acceptable outcome. Folks also forget the massive advantage they had there -- they were the government. In Viet Nam, in Afghanistan and in Iraq, we had or have to get along with independent governments who were and are emphatically willing to operate on their own agendas and who did or do not care about US public opinion. Huge difference.

True, Malaya wasn't a "win" and most often there are not "wins." Also, you are right with your distinction between the governemnt/political situation in Malaya and the other mentioned conflicts. We forget history. This is why I want "History" classes in schools not "social studies." (Yes, I know what Social Studies is and that it includes History. I just think it is B.S., and I don't mean bachelor of science.)


Adam

[mmx1]

I was not expecting this crowd to glean anything new out of the Economist piece. However, we're not the target audience, and I'm interested in it mainly for its effects in educating the Western mainstream about small wars and the consequences it has for the organization of our militaries. This piece and the accompanying article on restructuring Western militaries for small wars made the cover of this week's edition. In particular, the irregular warfare piece can be better understood as a piece of supporting background information for the cover article on military transformation.
http://www.economist.com/opinion/dis...ry_ID=10024437

I believe the statement about ak-47's, RPG's, and suicide bombers is meant to be hyperbolic - they are universally understood symbols of the guerilla.

[Ken White]

I was not expecting this crowd to glean anything new out of the Economist piece. However, we're not the target audience, and I'm interested in it mainly for its effects in educating the Western mainstream about small wars and the consequences it has for the organization of our militaries. This piece and the accompanying article on restructuring Western militaries for small wars made the cover of this week's edition. In particular, the irregular warfare piece can be better understood as a piece of supporting background information for the cover article on military transformation.
http://www.economist.com/opinion/dis...ry_ID=10024437

I believe the statement about ak-47's, RPG's, and suicide bombers is meant to be hyperbolic - they are universally understood symbols of the guerilla.

Almost certainly on the intent of the RPG, etc. inclusion as well -- my concern is that many readers of the Economist won't recognize the hyperbole...

[Watcher In The Middle]

Originally posted by Adam L:

We need to establish a DoJ program where we give hackers more lenient sentence and perhaps a special prison if they are willing to spend their time attacking terrorists online mainframe. This may seem a little silly, but with the amount of hackers we spend a fortune prosecuting every year, it would be easier to plea most of them out into a program like this. This would save millions and give us a more foot (or more accurately "finger") soldiers.

Give them a special "prison" (actually, a walled off apartment complex would work just fine), with a few bundled T12s (or really get serious and get them an even bigger pipe), all high speed wireless, 24 hour food service, and an open account at newegg (well, ok, a $100k limit) - hell, you'd never get them to leave. Oh, and btw, the guiding principle is "The Only Rules Is There Ain't No Rules" - and then stand back & watch.

Give this team 9 to 12 months to take on the jihadists - IT'S OVER!! The jihadists won't have a chance up against this bunch.

And guess what - it will be a whole lot cheaper than throwing them in federal prison. In fact, you might actually have a really hard time getting them to leave once their sentence was completed.

[walrus]

At the risk of raising blood pressures and getting myself banned, I have to say that the Economist has done an excellent job and the derogatory comments about the article and the British demonstrate exactly why we are in the trouble we are in in Iraq and to a lesser extent Afghanistan.

To put it another way, some of you just don't get it, and you don't know that you don't get it - which is why you don't like the Economists take on things.

Lets start with some neurolinguistics again "Framing" - if you frame Iraq as a "war" and then tag it as something that is either a "win" or a "lose" you are setting yourself up for disappointment, because these concepts don't compute in an insurgency.

Take Malaya for example, the British didn't call it a "war" it was officially described as "The Malayan Emergency", the campaign in Northern Ireland against the IRA hasn't been called a "war" either.. The "enemy" (for want of a better word) weren't regarded as "soldiers" fighting a "War" they were regarded as criminals performing criminal acts and if caught they were dealt with by the civil justice system.

Names DO matter because with each name there comes a whole host of connotations; War - enemy - defeat - victory - soldier - winning - losing - battle.

The end state we eventually reach in Iraq is not going to be defined as a "win" or a "loss", that much is obvious already. Instead we will ultimately settle for some sort of political compromise that will have good parts and perhaps bad parts from our point of view. The Economist implicitly understands this.

What the Economist also implicitly understands is the total weakness of Foreign Army of occupation (any foreign army) against a well organised domestic insurgency movement that has a measure of popular domestic support. Look no further than the American War of Independence if you want an example.

The simplest example I can give of this asymmetry is from my own past: I was once given that most delightful role you can have in a war game - playing the enemy, in this case the VC. We had a ball, and every night we went to sleep with the alarm clock set for 0200 or thereabouts when we would get up and carefully creep towards a perimeter, throw a few grenade simulators and make some noise, then we'de go back to bed in the knowledge that the poor guys in the base were going to be stood to for the rest of the evening. - Thats asymmetry - liittle effort by us - big effort by you.

Gen. Schwartzkopf, the greatest commander America has produced since WWII in my opinion summed it up brilliantly at a press conference I heard before Gulf War One. A journalist asked him about precautions being taken against the possibility of Iraqi minefields and how many mines there might be?

Schwartzkopf simply replied "Son, all it takes is one mine." Same again - little effort by minelayer - big effort by us.

There is a video on You Tube of a radar controlled Gatling gun destroying incoming mortar bombs at Balad. Great demonstration of technology and a great video, but I couldn't help from thinking about how much it was costing in ammo to destroy each of these old $5.00 81 (or 82)mm mortar rounds. Same thing - little effort by insurgents - big effort by us. Thats asymmetry

I also fail to understand the comment that:

The "vulnerability" to the RPG, AK-47 and the suicide bomber is hyperbolic to say the least. It is also of no strategic, very little operational and not great tactical significance.

No significance? How many billions have been spent on hardening vehicles? How many billions are spent on road blocks, checkpoints and god knows what other security measures to deal with these threats in Iraq??? Not significant???? Of course they are significant because they have constrained the way we must operate every day, all day!

"Winning" in counterinsurgency, as it was taught to me, involves getting people, including the insurgents, into a state where they think that its going to be better for them in future to either stop fighting or stop supporting those doing the fighting, and as we have sadly seen "Shock and Awe" just doesn't cut it as a motivator. The Economist seems to understand this.

Sorry for the rambling post, it saddens me deeply that some people just don't get this.

[Ken White]

...
To put it another way, some of you just don't get it, and you don't know that you don't get it - which is why you don't like the Economists take on things.

Most of us here have been saying the same thing the Economist said for some time. I went on a rant longer than yours just about the stupidity of the words 'victory,' 'war' and 'win.'

I suggest there's a difference in deciding something is superficial as opposed to not "liking the Economists take on things" in the sense that anyone disagreed with it.

The end state we eventually reach in Iraq is not going to be defined as a "win" or a "loss", that much is obvious already. Instead we will ultimately settle for some sort of political compromise that will have good parts and perhaps bad parts from our point of view. The Economist implicitly understands this.

Neither you or the Economist have a patent on understanding that problem. Again, a numberl of us have made that point

What the Economist also implicitly understands is the total weakness of Foreign Army of occupation (any foreign army) against a well organised domestic insurgency movement that has a measure of popular domestic support. Look no further than the American War of Independence if you want an example.

Or that point. The recurring thread not only on this board but from most of the folks in the US DoD for some time is that we can screw it up, only the Iraqis and the Afghans can fix it. I guess you missed all that as well...

I'll also note that most of us are more than aware of the screwups, plural and by many actors, that got us to this point and have had no problems stating that.

The simplest example I can give of this asymmetry is from my own past: I was once given that most delightful role you can have in a war game - playing the enemy, in this case the VC. We had a ball, and every night we went to sleep with the alarm clock set for 0200 or thereabouts when we would get up and carefully creep towards a perimeter, throw a few grenade simulators and make some noise, then we'de go back to bed in the knowledge that the poor guys in the base were going to be stood to for the rest of the evening. - Thats asymmetry - liittle effort by us - big effort by you.

That is a simple example. Having spent a couple of years in Viet Namese rice paddies against the real thing, they were a little more painstaking than you were -- they would almost never attack a fixed position without at least two painstaking reconnaissance peeks. They also had RPGs and AKs -- didn't do the suicide bit though, just got a lot of their own folks killed by getting caught before they got to the wire.

Gen. Schwartzkopf, the greatest commander America has produced since WWII in my opinion summed it up brilliantly at a press conference I heard before Gulf War One....

We can differ on that...

There is a video on You Tube of a radar controlled Gatling gun destroying incoming mortar bombs at Balad. Great demonstration of technology and a great video, but I couldn't help from thinking about how much it was costing in ammo to destroy each of these old $5.00 81 (or 82)mm mortar rounds. Same thing - little effort by insurgents - big effort by us. Thats asymmetry

Yes it is. It's also not smart on a couple of other levels but we have a bad habit of relying on technology rather than training and trying to insure troop comfort to almost the same extent we go to in protecting troop safety. Penalty of living in a democracy with a dim, panicky legislative body and collectively more money than good sense. *

I also fail to understand the comment that:
""The "vulnerability" to the RPG, AK-47 and the suicide bomber is hyperbolic to say the least. It is also of no strategic, very little operational and not great tactical significance.""

No significance? How many billions have been spent on hardening vehicles? How many billions are spent on road blocks, checkpoints and god knows what other security measures to deal with these threats in Iraq??? Not significant???? Of course they are significant because they have constrained the way we must operate every day, all day!

The items have no significance -- the people using those things are quite significant. They are doing the things you state, so I guess you and the Economist missed that one. It's not the hardware, it's people and their mind and dedication...

Oh -- and those vehicles? Comment * above applies.

"Winning" in counterinsurgency, as it was taught to me, involves getting people, including the insurgents, into a state where they think that its going to be better for them in future to either stop fighting or stop supporting those doing the fighting, and as we have sadly seen "Shock and Awe" just doesn't cut it as a motivator. The Economist seems to understand this.

Sorry for the rambling post, it saddens me deeply that some people just don't get this.

I think most everyone here gets that and has for some time. One could even say that's why this board exists (note the Title and headers). The Economist is apparently not a reader or contributor, others who stop by only sporadically may also miss some commentary. Nothing wrong with that. Except perhaps those real VC with their painstaking recon before attacking might have been able to show one something about taking the effort to know what one is attacking instead of assuming things...

[Adam L]

I am going to have too agree with Ken almost 100% here.

We are more dissapointed in the Economist, which has for many years a periodical of fine caliber, that unfortunately has been deteriorating. Our (I believe I am not talking for just myself. Correct me if I'm wrong. ) objection to the article is that it is a summary of issues which have been, and are being debated and discussed which is myopic and selective in its view of this situation and it historical parallels.

What the Economist also implicitly understands is the total weakness of Foreign Army of occupation (any foreign army) against a well organised domestic insurgency movement that has a measure of popular domestic support. Look no further than the American War of Independence if you want an example.

I think anyone who has been following this site is aware of that.

Gen. Schwartzkopf, the greatest commander America has produced since WWII in my opinion summed it up brilliantly at a press conference I heard before Gulf War One....

Perhaps the greates persona ( the past 30 years), but don THE GREATEST personality or general. Desert Storm was impressive, but far from perfect. He put far too much confidence in technology and air power finding targets (specifically SCUDS) on the ground. Whether or not he was misguided in his confidence is an issue for debate. His record on this and other issues precludes him from holding the title of "the greatest commander America has produced since WWII." I do greatley admire the man, but that goes too far. I would however give him and award for, "gallantry in the face of Press." He certainly new how to deal with them.

For everything else I want to say, see Ken.

Adam

[goesh]

MO says when confroting religious autocrats at the regional and national level whose ideology is grounded in Quranic Socialism, there is going to have to be a bit more destroying than building. The new ideology and tactics may be producing more temporary accomodation on the part of indigenous peoples/host forces that fundamental change. Rigid paternalism, rigid monothesim and rigid tribalism have been around alot longer than than empowerment, cultural sensitivity and warm hugs. If you ain't marrying their women and praying some to their God, you ain't going to leave much of a footprint behind when you go home.

[Steve Blair]

Gotta agree with Ken - lots of agreeing to disagree with the piece (which is little more IMO than a rehashing of the obvious with a lot of hot air tossed in for good measure) and some other comments (Schwartzkoph's 'greatness' comes to mind immediately, but there are others as well).

[Rank amateur]

What's obvious to you, isn't obvious to everyone. I thought it was a decent summary of key concepts written in a way that amateurs could understand.

As point of reference, I'm sure most Iraqis would laugh their ass off at our Iraqi culture discussion because they are full of gross simplification and the obvious. It doesn't mean that they're not helpful to someone.

Also, I need to disagree with Ken's earlier point. The fact that 150,000 - give or take - US soldiers are tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan by people with PRGs and AKs greatly increases the likelihood of Iran getting the bomb and that obviously has major strategic geopolitical implications.

[Ken White]

. . .

Also, I need to disagree with Ken's earlier point. The fact that 150,000 - give or take - US soldiers are tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan by people with PRGs and AKs greatly increases the likelihood of Iran getting the bomb and that obviously has major strategic geopolitical implications.

You do note that you and I say it's the people -- which was my point -- and not the tools? We can agree on that much.

I disagree that US Soldiers being occupied (as opposed to "tied down") in Afghanistan and Iraq is likely to greatly increase the likelihood of Iraq getting "the bomb." If it has any effect at all, it is more likely to deter them. Give it some thought.

Nor, for that matter, do I think that even if Iran had a nuclear capability that the strategic implications would be major -- acknowledging that you and I would probably differ on what constitutes 'major.'

[walrus]

When I read comments and hear military commentators expressing frustration about counterinsurgency and "Hearts and Minds" activities, etc., I am reminded of an old saying: "When your only tool is a hammer, every problem is a nail."

My perception of the American military (biased of course because I'm Australian) is that it has been designed for the precision application of overwhelming firepower - which is something it does very very well, as was demonstrated in Gulf War One ( by my hero - Gen. Schwartzkopf).

The problem with a counterinsurgency environment is that firepower is not the issue, as we have sadly seen, the AK47, RPG, a few dud 155 rounds and a garage opener is quite sufficient to produce mayhem. The problem is not about having sufficient weaponry to apply to targets, its about finding the targets in the first place and then deciding what to do with them. Under such circumstances, as the Economist has pointed out, it's the brains of your troops and their training and experience that are your critical, limiting, asset.

I do not know enough about American training to be able to comment, but Australian infantry training, always emphasized the absolutely critical importance of junior leaders (Cpl, Lance Cpl) and section operations (about ten men). A very very high premium was placed on initiative, problem solving and independence, (almost to the point of insubordination).

I am speculating of course, but I wonder if this is where the gap is that The Economist is trying to delicately point out?


As for being sensitive about culture, anthropology, etc. etc. it's not about being namby pamby and group hugs at all. It's about getting inside the enemy's skull so that the message you are sending is coherent and understood, bearing in mind that to succeed against an insurgency, you have to convince the population that there are better things to do in life than become a suicide bomber.

I'll know that the message has gotten through when I see troops taking off their sunglasses before they talk to Iraqis.

[skiguy]

I'll know that the message has gotten through when I see troops taking off their sunglasses before they talk to Iraqis.

You mean like this?(taken from the MNF-Iraq website)