Hizbullah / Hezbollah (just the group)

[TROUFION]

The fact remains that irregulars achieved their goal, and just as in Vietnam it doesn't necessarily matter who actually wins the individual battles. This conventional mindset still blinds our military to the reality that in irregular warfare the fight is to shape the perceptions of the population (and other target audiences), not destroy the opposing military forces, because they know they can't.

We need to evaluate how the Hezbollah utilized tactical operations to defeat Israel in the last campaign, not how they used tactical operations to defeat the IDF, because they didn't, but then once again that wasn't the point.

We have this habit of saying we kicked their butt based on metrics that simply are not important, when we're actually getting our butt handed to us if you look at the metrics that count.

I added the bold because I think the statement needs to be evaluated. Defeat is an interesting word, true defeat for Israel means no more Israel, but Global Scout states defeat in the campaign, a much more microcosmic defeat. One that could sow the seeds of true defeat if Israel isn't careful.

Irregular forces have throughout history demonstrated an ability to quickly achieve a salient, to make a break through and to defend thick forest or urban areas. They have also proven that they generally lack the sustainment power to press salients-meaning continue attacks into foriegn terrain. On the defense side however they are highly effective and with the local population in support they have long legs and are capable of sustaining their defense against heavy attacks.

What I was getting at (with the reference to the stormtroops) was exactly that defensively they (irregulars) can conduct local counter attacks and prolong a defensive stand so long as a local population can render support. In the offense however they run into serious logistic problems, they are lacking in sustainanbility when attacking into unsupportive terrritory, their ability to live off the land diminishes. The stormtroops of WWI required massive supply and this is one of the reasons they faltered (there are too many reasons to discuss here maybe on a seperate thread).

Why I bring this up is because it comes back to the intent of the operation. The intent of Hezbollahs operation was what? I will give it a simplified answer: to provoke the IDF to attack into thier territory and to give the IDF a black eye, thereby gaining experience fighting the IDF and gaining a lot of support via a strong IO campaign. It hurt Israel, but they recover. It hurt Hezbollah but they too recover. The Arab World still hates Israel, no real substantive change there and Israel still exists again no change.

My question is has something changed? Can an irregular force bring about the defeat of a first rate power, and i mean true defeat, on its own? I do not believe it could not even if they had the perfect IO campaign along with it.

Could an assault by Hezbollah irregulars take down (or initiate the demise) of Israel proper? Possibly yes, If they made serious headway into Israel (like the NVA/VC in Tet) seizing multiple towns in the north and set in like the VC/NVA at Hue City. AND if the bordering Arab states (smelling blood) rushed in to provide them support. AND IF the Palestinians rose up to join the Hezbollah. Then Hezbollah fighters could take out Israel.

BUT the Hezbollah irregulars could not do it on their own. Once they entered Israel the population would be against them and their supply lines would be exposed. If they tried it on their own and no one rushed to thier aid with resupply then they would falter, become isolated, then be hunted and trapped or forced to withdraw. Again they can hurt Israel but on their own they cannot take Israel out.

[Surferbeetle]

My question is has something changed? Can an irregular force bring about the defeat of a first rate power, and i mean true defeat, on its own? I do not believe it could not even if they had the perfect IO campaign along with it.

The French, The Soviet, and the US experience in Algeria, Afghanistan, and Afghanistan & Iraq (respectively) are something to reflect upon depending upon how one defines 'true defeat' (failure to achieve strategic objectives).

A Savage War of Peace (ISBN-13 978-1-59017-218-6)
Soldiers of God (ISBN 1-4000-3025-0)
Tactics of the Crescent Moon (ISBN 0-9638695-7-4)

[TROUFION]

your nation state no longer exists in the manner it once did, having a new government imposed upon it; or ceases to exist in entirety. Byzantium, Rome, Germany/Japan (WWII), South Vietnam, Nationalist China.

Bottom line the wars you listed are what I define as this: they are Small Wars (this is my own view of what small wars are)--any war where the Nation State, its government and soveriegnty are not at direct risk. Example The US in Iraq. The converse Saddam Hussien's Iraq faced a Big War, a total war, one that ended with the Nation State radically changed against its will and a new Government impossed upon it.

[Surferbeetle]

your nation state no longer exists in the manner it once did, having a new government imposed upon it; or ceases to exist in entirety. Byzantium, Rome, Germany/Japan (WWII), South Vietnam, Nationalist China.

The Roman and Ottoman Empires seemed to be more of a death by thousand cuts than what Germany & Japan experienced in WWII. None-the-less I do not believe that militias such as Hezbollah or insurgencies such as the Iraqi/Afghani can directly take down a great power according to your definition of "...your nation state no longer exists..."

The Ottoman Centuries (ISBN 0-688-08093-6) Still chipping away at this one...
Rubicon (ISBN 1-4000-7897-0)

[Ken White]

Mike said:

"Ken, use of civilian shields is only part of the picture when it comes to concealment warfare. What the legal research is attempting is important in this regard, I think, precisely because of some of the political points that have been made, and because many of the issues they have engendered have been poorly understood, poorly defined, and poorly operationalized."

All true -- but does not negate my point that there are three disparate things being discussed.

"The reason any of these, which have ample historical precedent, are being revisited now is precisely because: 1) politics has kicked crap out of what's meant by law in/of war; and 2) the shape and conduct of war today is entirely different from what it was when the LOAC were originally designed."

Even more true -- and, again, no contradiction to what I said. The first effect you mention in that quote is very much true and the driver of this sub thread. I realize 'politics' are an ever changing game and the trend is to leftist elements and I further understand that all politics are the art of the possible. The intent of many and of much of that ditzy maeuvering is to eventually outlaw war. I could approve of that with no qualms -- I can also doubt it will happen in any of your lifetimes. In the interim, if war is outlawed, only outlaws will start wars but not only outlaws will be involved in them.

I believe that comment merits some deep thought on the part of the anti-war types...

R.A. said:

"And a war were Ken served.

""But the AP found in researching declassified Army documents that U.S. commanders also issued standing orders to shoot civilians along the warfront to guard against North Korean soldiers disguised in the white clothes of Korean peasants.""

Were the North Koreans moral or immoral: justified or unjustified?"

All war is immoral; period, end of sentence. Everything everyone does in war is thus immoral and anyone who thinks otherwise is deluding themselves.

While they're all immoral, some are necessary. The degree of validity or necessity can vary depending upon viewpoint. Korea was obviously deemed necessary by most of the players at one time or another for one reason or another.

Neither you nor I are in any position to make judgments on the North Korean decision -- we aren't Koreans and our mores are quite different. I've been there four times over a 25 year period and I cannot judge them; the culture is too different.

I will, however, note that I said ""I know of no western nation or armed force that allows, much less espouses the use of civilians as shields. If anyone here knows of one that does, I'd like to hear about it -- and I am NOT talking about aberrations where some Commander locally gets or got stupid.""(emphasis added /kw) Having fired into crowds of refugees wherein there were NK troops in 1950 (didn't occur later in the war), I was well aware of that -- and they are far from alone in doing things like that, the Chinese and others have as well. That's why I asked if anyone could identify any western nation who had done that sort of thing -- so your attempt at diversion or obfuscation sorta falls flat...

Good try, though

[Surferbeetle]

Mike said:
All war is immoral; period, end of sentence. Everything everyone does in war is thus immoral and anyone who thinks otherwise is deluding themselves.

While they're all immoral, some are necessary. The degree of validity or necessity can vary depending upon viewpoint.

Ken,

I go back and forth on this; I have seen some good and some bad but I can say that in general things are more complex than they appear and you do the best that you can do at the time knowing what you know. I suspect I will need a few more years to think about it in order to have a more nuanced understanding.

What were the metric's de jour in Korea and are there any that apply to our situation today looking at things from the COIN viewpoint? What lessons learned can we cull from Hezbollah tactics? What's worth reading on this?

Steve

[Global Scout]

I added the bold because I think the statement needs to be evaluated. Defeat is an interesting word, true defeat for Israel means no more Israel, but Global Scout states defeat in the campaign, a much more microcosmic defeat. One that could sow the seeds of true defeat if Israel isn't careful.

Again I will argue those who are blinded by the conventional doctrines of war, where victory/defeat is focused almost totally on red and blue forces, instead of the larger strategic picture. One does not need to destroy a nation's armed forces then occupy to defeat it. If an irregular force can coerce/manipulate another nation to behave a way to its liking, then the irregular force wins.

One could argue that irregular forces defeated Spain because the Madrid bombings resulted in a change of government and Spain withdrawing from Iraq. The same is happening Poland now, due to irregular attacks against Polish forces and their Ambassador in Iraq, and soon they will depart.

S. Vietnam could be argued for days, but I think most of us will agree that the focus of the Viet Cong and NVA was not defeating our military, but rather conveying to the U.S. population that they couldn't be defeated, among other things.

Lenin overthrew the Russian government with irregulars? How? He moblized the population, just as Mao did some 20 plus years later.

It is great that our western militaries can't be defeated by irregulars, but the fact remains is despite our might, the irregulars can still manipulate the superpowers.

Here are some questions in regard to Israel's escapade into Lebanon:

1. Do the people in Lebanon support the Hezbollah more or less after the conflict? The fact is it was the Hezbollah who are seen as the heros of the conflict, and even those who didn't support the Hezbollah previously tended to favor them after Israel started destroying Beirut's infrastruture.

2. Who became more isolated in the international community, Hezbollah or Israel? While most the international community will never support Hezbollah, they effectively provoked Israel to take actions that further isolated them internationally, which limits their ability to undertake similiar actions in the future.

Irregular warfare is not about defeating your adversary's military force, that is checkers. It is an attempt to asymmetrically corner him and force him to change his behavior, this is called chess.

Winning and losing can be defined many ways. Ultimately there are forces that would like to see Israel go away, that would be probably be a total victory for them, and I agree I don't think that is feasible in one fatal swoop, but over time Israel can be degraded by these activities, and so can we, Europe and other nations. The answer is not to simply send our military forces in to crush them unless we're willing to break international law and wage total war on a population.

The answer remains elusive, if it was simple we would have implemented it already.

[TROUFION]

One could argue that irregular forces defeated Spain because the Madrid bombings resulted in a change of government and Spain withdrawing from Iraq. The same is happening Poland now, due to irregular attacks against Polish forces and their Ambassador in Iraq, and soon they will depart.

You can give the irregular force a battlefield victory here if they achieved a strategic aim BUT this is not a true defeat, LOOSING AN ELECTION is not the same as forced regime change, loss of statehood and subjugation. Loosing an election is democracy in action. It is what is done in Nation States. Stable nations hold elections and change politics all the time. The simplest example would be the US loosing a war and having the Constitution and the Government of the US thrown out, replaced with a system and personel of the Victors choosing or of a complete collpase of government.

Now I have never said an irregular force cannot issue a true defeat to a western power just that they would be hard pressed to do it alone. Hence the tie to Hezbollah, they can try to defeat Israel but without outside support they would be unable to do it alone.

As for Byzantium I was speaking more to the final battle of 1452. The completeness of it. Emperor dead capital city taken. Byzantium in any form ceases to exist.

Good debate & good points thanks.

[Ron Humphrey]

Again I will argue those who are blinded by the conventional doctrines of war, where victory/defeat is focused almost totally on red and blue forces, instead of the larger strategic picture. One does not need to destroy a nation's armed forces then occupy to defeat it. If an irregular force can coerce/manipulate another nation to behave a way to its liking, then the irregular force wins.


The answer remains elusive, if it was simple we would have implemented it already.

It seems to be the hardest lesson for western societies to learn that our perception of win/lose/ or draw really doesn't matter in the larger scheme of things to those countries where we become involved. It is in large part their perceptions and subsequent actions/reactions which truly determine the end outcome.

It is notable that many of the successes throughout history can probably be traced to changes in the metrics which those forces looked to for what success looked like. This is a lesson which we can scarcely afford to miss.

The largest part of understanding the enemy is understanding ourselves and how they (the enemy) / the populace of our prospective countries / and ourselves as fighting forces differ in our approaches / perceptions / and overall intents.

It would seem to me that if I am a commander of irregular forces and that which I sought to achieve gets accomplished I would consider that a successful battle. Winning the war or bringing about the kind of overall change you seek that would involve much more than simply who manages to get in a good punch.

The funny thing about Hezbollah is how little they had to accomplish in order to gain such notoriety among military analysts. You would think the actions of the irregulars who accomplished much larger things such as the ousting of soviet forces would be better brain building material. Especially if you consider that pretty much any time this happened there was major help behind the scenes. Taken in context with current operational environments who is behind the scenes in each area and what are they helping with.

Not in any way trying to say that 2006 wasn't an eye opener but rather that it really shouldn't have been such a surprise considering what we did and do know about third party venders.

[Ken White]

Ken,

I go back and forth on this; I have seen some good and some bad but I can say that in general things are more complex than they appear and you do the best that you can do at the time knowing what you know. I suspect I will need a few more years to think about it in order to have a more nuanced understanding.

Things are and one does. Every war is different and we all change as we age and society changes also -- thus I'm not sure anyone will ever get it all sorted out even in their own mind, much less for the variety that is mankind. Nor am I sure that one needs to. For most of us, our instincts work pretty well.

What were the metric's de jour in Korea and are there any that apply to our situation today looking at things from the COIN viewpoint?...

We were exceedingly fortunate in Korea as the war occurred before the DoD invention of 'metrics.' Thank the gods. The only numbers that counted were tonnages of munitions and chow delivered. The WIA and KIA were acknowledged as a cost of doing business and while they were mourned, briefly, there were no Memorial Services and no particular angst. Life went on, such as it was. New replacements came in every month so there was always a lot of training going on when not actually committed. Everyone was present for duty all day every day and there were no breaks though one did get two three day R&Rs in the Rear (if lucky) and one seven day to Japan (most everyone). Nice, peaceful, fun, little war.

The only significant COIN activity was that conducted against remnants of North Korean Divisions left in the south after Inchon. There were thought to be somewhere between 10 and 20 thousand (an overestimate -- or a lot of 'em went civilian and blended in locally). When 1st Mar Div got back south from the Reservoir, they and the 5th RCT were put to work cleaning them out.

That was done in a little over a month with TTP that probably would not be used today. Basically half the Division put out ambushes at night to enforce the dusk to dawn curfew and anything that moved got killed, the other half went on sweeps during the day and corralled most of them and not too gently. Intel was beyond rudimentary. No real lessons there IMO.

What lessons learned can we cull from Hezbollah tactics?

That frontal attacks against defended positions are very costly? Don't attack fortified positions with tanks and too few infantry? Don't rely on air power to win anything against a determined enemy on their own ground? Don't attack an enemy that has attained social dominance in an area unless you can defeat him, he'll only emerge stronger? That the West will lose the info battle in the ME because we are not trusted there and will not be for many years if ever? That just as Saddam sucked us in, Hezbollah sucked the Israelis in? That nothing in the ME is as it seems?

Not being snide or snarky, everyone of those is a very serious point.

What's worth reading on this?

Sorry, I'm unsure what "this" is? Korea? Hezbollah? Morality of war?

[Surferbeetle]

Things are and one does. Every war is different and we all change as we age and society changes also -- thus I'm not sure anyone will ever get it all sorted out even in their own mind, much less for the variety that is mankind. Nor am I sure that one needs to. For most of us, our instincts work pretty well.We were exceedingly fortunate in Korea as the war occurred before the DoD invention of 'metrics.' Thank the gods.

Ken,

I appreciate your insights.

As a young Lieutenant stationed in Vicenza I would occasionally wander the old WWI Battlefield of Asiago. It was above treeline so my breathing was a bit labored but no matter how much ground I covered the plethora of splintered bones, sharp shrapnel, live ordnance, and shattered rock always helped me to think about the true nature of war. Fortunately for me it was also located in a beautiful northern Italian setting so it was always an enjoyable hike.

Books-wise I was looking for some recommendations on Hezbollah and Korea. With regards to Korea, 'Task Force Smith' vignettes for cadets and Hackworth's thoughts about it in his book 'About Face' are pretty much the extent of my reading. I have no Arabic reading skills, but I am very interested in Hezbollah/Hizbullah tactics, in particular their CA stuff...and suspect that some of their tactics are worth understanding and applying to our current situation.

This month's foreign affairs has a painful but interesting article to read about the ME

"Summary: The Bush administration wants to contain Iran by rallying the support of Sunni Arab states and now sees Iran's containment as the heart of its Middle East policy: a way to stabilize Iraq, declaw Hezbollah, and restart the Arab-Israeli peace process. But the strategy is unsound and impractical, and it will probably further destabilize an already volatile region.

Vali Nasr, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Adjunct Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future." Ray Takeyh is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic."

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/200801...ning-iran.html

Regards,

Steve

[Mike Innes]

In the interim, if war is outlawed, only outlaws will start wars but not only outlaws will be involved in them.

Too true. Very nicely summarized. But it's not as simple a differentiation as you suggest when you write

does not negate my point that there are three disparate things being discussed.

While I'd agree that as categories of activity they can and should be distinguished, in practice, they quite literally bleed from one into the other - the exigencies of war. That said, this is where distinctions between intent and effect are critical, the former being what distinguishes us from criminals.

On western nations and deliberate use of civilian shields - I may have miscommunicated. I wasn't really looking to engage with the subject, since I don't fundamentally disagree or have anything intelligent to offer on it.

[Ken White]

Too true. Very nicely summarized. But it's not as simple a differentiation as you suggest when you write

are ever simple -- other than plans which should be so.

While I'd agree that as categories of activity they can and should be distinguished, in practice, they quite literally bleed from one into the other - the exigencies of war. That said, this is where distinctions between intent and effect are critical, the former being what distinguishes us from criminals.

The intent does not so bleed in most cases, the effects may in some. Keeps the philosophers and the lawyers employed.

Everyone engaged in a war is criminal to some extent -- and I say that as one who has engaged and would cheerfully do so again. As I noted earlier, all war's immoral, some are necessary...