Hizbullah / Hezbollah (just the group)

[Tom Odom]

Only twice in the United Nations' six decades has it authorized the use of substantial force -- in 1950 regarding Korea and in 1990 regarding Kuwait. It still has not authorized force in Lebanon. What is being called a "cease-fire" resolution calls for Israel to stop all "offensive" operations. Israel, however, reasonably says that its entire effort is defensive. The resolution calls for Hezbollah to stop "all attacks." The United Nations, however, has twice resolved that Hezbollah should be disarmed, yet has not willed the means to that end. Regarding force now, the U.N. merely "expresses its intention to consider in a later resolution further enhancements" of the U.N. force that for 28 years has been loitering without serious intent in south Lebanon.

George Will is off here. The UN Force in the Congo used force including fighter bombers in the sparring surrounding the Katangan secession in the early 1960s. The UN force there was the largest "pure" UN force deployed and most folks have forgotten it altogether. When it used force against the Belgian-sponsored secession of mineral rich Kataganga, that set off a hot political war inside the UN and inside the US government (between JFK's Administration and those who were willing to see the Congo dismembered).

And as usual Will and a host of others treat UNIFIL and its problems as if the UN had deliberately placed an inept force in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL's deployment in south Lebanon was never allowed to go as planned; the primary obstacle was Israel, intent on keeping the Litani River corridor open. UNIFIL soldiers died each month I was in Lebanon and the casualties came from both sides. It will be very interesting to see if the French do put a force on the ground with the requisite means to defend itself, especialy one with real AT and indirect fire capabilities.

Best
Tom

[Jedburgh]

Wow, that Canergie Endowment for International Peace "piece" was written by Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, "an assistant professor at the Lebanese American University in Beirut. She writes regularly on Lebanese politics and is the author of Hizbullah: Politics and Religion." Just call me a sucker for propaganda.

Have you read the book? Well written and insightful, it is one of the better books on Hezballah; it is certainly not "propaganda". The two short pieces she wrote for CEIP provide a good perspective from Lebanon; although gloomy in their analysis, they are not exactly written in a pro-Hezballah slant. If you want to read real pro-Hizballah propaganda, take a look at Hizbullah: The Story from Within, by Naim Qassim, one of the top tier of Hezballah's leadership. The book is still worth a read for the perspective, but you have to recognize it for what it is.

Now, all this talk about Hizbollah rebuilding southern Lebanon is sort of moot with all those Israeli soldiers sleeping in what were once Hizbollah foxholes. What a bunch of crap.

Hezballah has a long history of rebuilding homes and more after major Israeli attacks. Operation Grapes of Wrath has been discussed as an example in another thread. They certainly won't be able to do it in the areas still under IDF control, but you can bet the funds are already flowing and plans are being drawn up.

That also makes things a little difficult for Reuters to stage photographs and pundits to now come up with more lies about how great Hizbollah is for being dumb enough to start this battle to begin with getting Lebanon wrecked. Not only did Hizbollah not win this short engagement they also lost it.

Can you reference any major media organization stating "how great Hizbollah is" for starting this conflict? Thus far, there seems to be unusual unanimity that Hezballah made a huge mistake in their calculations about the kidnapping that initiated this mess. However, Israel also made a tremendous strategic error in this case, as well as numerous operational mistakes, and they damn sure didn't "win" anything. But neither did Hezballah "lose". There is also unusual unanimity regarding the significant boost in stature that Hezballah has gained by simply standing their ground - despite their losses. To disregard the tremendous effect that is rippling throughout the region because of this is unwise.

Also, I don't think the world would miss the current Lebanese government if it was to crumble under the weight of its own hypocrisy. You can't have your cake and eat it too as as the old saying goes.

Blaming the victim. The Lebanese government was weak before this ball started rolling. The US and the West had a great opportunity to positively engage Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution when Syria was forced to withdraw in disgrace. It would have been perfect timing for a massive infusion of economic aid and military assistance specifically aimed at weakening Hezballah at a moment of vulnerability. But we were too focused on other targets, despite the administration's vaunted vision for the region, and only proffered token aid amid loud statements of success. Prior to this fiasco, Lebanon was in the middle of great economic growth and political opening that could have been greatly facilitated for a tremendous positive effect in the Levant. That moment is gone forever, and now Hezballah is in a position of strength. To achieve the same goals now will take a much greater effort, and the Lebanese government is going to be far less cooperative.

It took over 25 rockets to kill one Israeli citizen. It took one Israeli forward observer or one Israeli air strike to kill an entire platoon of the world's greatest guerrilla force. The bad guys get together a three man team and run out and kill a tank. Suddenly, Israel is losing? How many tanks and crews has Israel lost since 1948? Three? Four?

You are making the common errors of using body counts to make judgments of effect and mirror imaging ideas of conventional warfare onto a completely different type of conflict. The effect of Hizballah's rockets is purely psychological and has nothing to do with numbers of Israelis killed or wounded. Go back over the past decade's reporting in the Israeli media of rocket attacks in northern Israel and you'll see what I mean. The same thing goes when a Merkava is destroyed - a single tank destroyed by Hezballah has a far greater psychological impact upon the IDF and the people at home than did a dozen tanks destroyed in the Sinai in '73. Israel did not lose this fracas militarily; it lost it at the strategic geo-political level.

Some people seem to think we're up against the same type of endlessly funded insurgencies and guerrillas from the late great Soviet Union era. In case anyone hasn't noticed but the Soviet Union is gone. All their little victories during the Cold War are dying on the vine. That would include Syria and Iran.

No one with any sense mirror images today's conflicts with the brush fires of the Cold War. Although, to reverse that, there is a risk in summarily dismissing that era, because there are still significant lessons gained from those brush fires that we disregard at our peril. As you point out, however, funding is an issue that has changed tremendously. But today's terror and insurgent threats seem to have no problem in arming and equipping themselves. Rather than go into sources in detail here, I will simply recommend another RAND product: Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements

By the way, Iran was not a Soviet victory. The Shah was a proxy of the U.S., and the Islamic Revolution was nearly as virulently anti-Soviet as it was anti-U.S. (they lumped us together as imperialists, and even burned our flags together).

[Merv Benson]

As a terror weapon the Hezballah rocket attacks were much less effective than human bomb attacks, both in body counts and terror in general, not to mention cost. The rockets did cause a lot of grass fires and forest fires. Perhaps their largest effect was in the disruption of the northern Israeli economy.

Hezballah remains a parasitic organization that relies on the charity of Iran and Syria plus its own organized crime methods of fund raising, so any rebuilding it does with be at the expense of flow of funds from those sources. One of its advantages is that it basically will bear no consequence for the destruction of Lebanon's infrastructure, therefore Hezballah will have little incentive to avoid future conflicts. The contribution of Saudi and other Gulf states to the rebuilding of the Infrastructure appears to have no strings that would force the Lebanese goverment to restrain Hezballah. The ability to make war without consequence or responsibility seems to be Hezballah's greatest asset.

Finding away to deal with that problem is the best hope of avoiding future conflicts with this group.

[Culpeper]

No, I have not read the book but I have put it in my queue. Right now I’m reading the RAND “On ‘Other War’”. If the current situation remains as planned then Hizbollah has lost the ability to rebuild what they help get destroyed. Oh, they will try but it is going to be difficult under the eyes of the entire world this time. It would be up to the UN to manage the rebuilding as such. Also, CNN is a good example of pro Hizbollah media coverage…

“During earlier coverage on Sunday, CNN chose the word ‘resistance’ to describe Hizbullah's actions in Lebanon – a term used by Hizbullah - as well as Hamas - to describe their own attacks - implicitly presuming that armed jihad organizations are 'resisting' and defending against aggression, rather than initiating it.”

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7...291328,00.html


I don’t consider the Lebanese government a victim. I consider them a codependent of Hizbollah and blaming the current U.S. administration for allowing Lebanon to take their own medicine is not a mistake in the long term. I see no sense in the U.S. enabling the government of Lebanon into taking half measures as being good enough. Thus, the U.S. focusing on other problems rather than enabling Lebanon was not a mistake.

I understand the difference between conventional and the needed unconventional tactics in regard to fighting outfits like Hizbollah. Nevertheless, it is the U.S. that takes the loss of a single tank as a psychological defeat and not the IDF or the people of Israel. Israeli history didn’t start in 1948. I was just using that as a reference point because of the current State of Israel. Also, you stated that Israel didn’t win anything and then later claimed Israel won militarily. Since it is too soon to tell how big of an unconventional victory they may have achieved I will remain undecided until the current plan succeeds or fails before deciding whether or not Israel made mistakes to the point of defeat as is currently being spread throughout the Islam world no different than the Egyptian government falsely telling the Jordan government and the rest of the Muslim countries that they were once pounding the Israelis in Jerusalem and thus causing Jordan to end up losing territory. I also understand not to ignore past insurgency conflicts backed by the Soviet Union but I also recognize that today these insurgencies don’t have that sort of backing any longer. Gone are the days when Syria would be able to replace tanks with a constant flow of new ones coming in via the Soviet Union. I stand corrected on Iran.

As for Hizbollah’s valor and fighting tenacity? Towards the end of the current fighting after the cease-fire was imminent they were actually abandoning positions and weapons. Weapons provided by Iran and Syria no doubt. These guys are not the Japanese in the Pacific Theater. They do have options. One being to live another day and to do stupid things like abandoning weapons so the civilized world can prove where they actually came from. They're really not that smart.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.../15/wmid15.xml

[Jones_RE]

Hezbollah initiated a course of violence for two reasons: 1) it wanted something and 2) it thought it could accomplish something violence. They wouldn't launch an attack for no reason. They also wouldn't launch an attack that would be doomed to complete failure.

Marc MacYoung, from No Nonsense Self Defense, describes the concept of a "Secondary Victory." He was speaking of the sort of "victory" achieved by a violent criminal or an inmate in a correctional setting. The perpetrator doesn't beat the police officers in the sense that he "wins" or gets away. But by making cops sweat and work for it he gains esteem among his peers - other criminals or inmates. If you think about it, this makes a lot of sense. There's no way that a prison inmate will ever beat up all the guards - they have him outnumbered and have better weapons. But if it takes six men with pepper spray, clubs and stun guns to drag him out of his cell think about how tough that guy is!

Hezbollah has scored the same sort of "victory" here. They haven't achieved a true victory: IDF troops stopped of their own accord. They were not bloodily repulsed or routed in a conventional sense - all engaged IDF units remain combat effective and are ready to resume operations at any time.

However, it's undeniable that Hezbollah has achieved a secondary victory. Their power and prestige on the Arab Street, among Arab governments, in Lebannon, in Europe, in the UN and in Syria and Iran couldn't be higher right now. That makes them immensely difficult to deal with.

If you want to prevent a group like Hezbollah from getting violent, you have to set things up so that they cannot get what they want through violence, cannot achieve a secondary victory, and offer them something that they do want through another means (namely, compliance with your demands).

Israel is only moderately successful at the first part. Hezbollah has a very difficult time achieving much in the way of violence against Israel proper. Rockets and mortars usually miss. Raids and sniping are hard work (and dangerous!). The border is pretty well guarded. A true success would be a heavily patrolled border, backed up by human intelligence work in Lebannon. The IDF should have stopped Hezbollah's raid before it even started by being alert, well trained and fully prepared for battle. Hezbollah wouldn't have dared launch it if they'd known it would fail.

Israel has NOT been successful at the second part. By reacting with a lot of force in a big, conventional operation they already show some weakness. But having that operation fail is utterly unacceptable. Israel has to go a long way towards developing the kind of human intelligence contacts and surveillance operations that would have enabled it to defeat Hezbollah quickly and clearly. A willingness on the part of the IDF/the Isreali government/Israeli society to accept higher military casualties would be a good start - it opens up rougher operations.

Israel has not even attempted to offer Hezbollah another way out. Right now there is no negotiation. There are no contacts. If violence is the only means Hezbollah has then they'll use violence, regardless of the cost or the odds.

A proper strategy of deterrance has to hit all three key points: deny the antagonist the ability to achieve victory, make sure the antagonist knows that there's nothing to be had from defeat either (i.e. no secondary victory) and finally offer the antagonist another way to recover something from a bad situation.

Israel needs to seriously step up its intelligence work and enter into negotiations with Hezbollah. Not so much to argue about details, but to offer the leadership of Hezbollah a plausible alternative to fighting. In their place, I'd be more than willing to trade Hezbollah prisoners in whatever numbers for Israeli citizens/soldiers. The IDF can always get more of them, after all. Shebaa farms is another matter. Israel can also offer reparations for damage to civilian infrastructure or offer humanitarian aid. Disarming Hezbollah will probably not happen. Israel is too weak to negotiate that much of a concession. Once Israel establishes its ability to achieve all three steps of deterrance, then they can demand compliance from Hezbollah on rockets or possibly full disarmament.

Note that a beefed up UNIFIL and forward deployed Lebanese army would make it more difficult for Hezbollah to achieve even a secondary victory - too much chance that their initial operation would fail in a humiliating fashion.

[Jedburgh]

If the current situation remains as planned then Hizbollah has lost the ability to rebuild what they help get destroyed. Oh, they will try but it is going to be difficult under the eyes of the entire world this time. It would be up to the UN to manage the rebuilding as such.

Current plans are simply to disarm Hezballah; to eliminate them as a armed militia independent of the Lebanese government. "Under the eyes of the world" only matters in that context. The organization retains its representation in the Lebanese parliament, and they will also retain all of their social welfare infrastructure. The only obstacle to their engaging in reconstruction is the continued IDF presence in certain areas. In all other areas there is nothing to stop them from moving forward with rebuilding.

As regards disarmament, I - along with countless others, I'm sure - am waiting to see how the process is going to turn out. An Israeli general has already spoken out against integrating former Hezballah fighters in the Lebanese Army. Some other form of actionable DDR program has to be put into place for disarmament to be effective.

I don't consider the Lebanese government a victim. I consider them a co-dependent of Hizbollah and blaming the current U.S. administration for allowing Lebanon to take their own medicine is not a mistake in the long term. I see no sense in the U.S. enabling the government of Lebanon into taking half measures as being good enough. Thus, the U.S. focusing on other problems rather than enabling Lebanon was not a mistake.

This is a nation that was just recovering from roughly 15 years of civil war followed by years of foreign domination. While Israel occupied a southern "security zone", the Lebanese central government was not only weak, but effectively under Syrian dominance, if not outright control. After the Israelis finally withdrew from south Lebanon six years ago, most Lebanese wanted to see Hezballah disarmed. However, with Hezballah being a client of Syria, the Lebanese had no choice but to accept their armed presence and provocations on the border with Israel. The Cedar Revolution provided an opportunity, but the Lebanese government and security forces were still too weak, and Hezballah and the Shi'a too unwilling, to disarm and integrate the organization without descent into a new civil war. There was a moment when the U.S. and the West could have stepped in and achieved a strategic victory - without force of arms. It passed.

...you stated that Israel didn't win anything and then later claimed Israel won militarily.

I never "claimed" that Israel won militarily. I simply said that "Israel did not lose this fracas militarily". The mere fact of not losing does not automatically translate into a win. There was no clear military victor in this campaign. The IDF certainly has the lead by measure of pure destruction, but Hezballah continued to inflict casualties and fire rockets up until the cease-fire. There were not many head-to-head engagements in the campaign. When that did occur, the IDF hammered Hezballah. But Hezballah, like any other irregular force, prefers hit-and-run engagements. These resulted in casualties on the IDF side, and sometimes resulted in the deaths of the Hezballah ambush teams. Did they hurt the IDF militarily? No. But the Israeli public is extremely casualty-conscious (far more so than the U.S. public), so Hezballah achieved a little IO victory with each IDF WIA/KIA. Did the IDF hurt Hezballah militarily? Yes. But not to the point of crippling the organization to a degree from which it can't recover in the near-to-mid term.

As stated above, the key to how this all turns out in the near term lies in how the mandate for the new "peacekeeping" force is structured - but in the long-term the Lebanese government and security forces need to be strengthened in order to ensure stability. And they have been crippled by this campaign to a greater degree than has Hezballah.

[Culpeper]

Could you expand on the moment the U.S. could have helped the Lebanese government? You keep referring to it and I don't see the light yet. In my current frame of mind, even though their government was more democratic than before, it still immediately resulted with Hizbollah pulling the strings. Similar to Hamas in the Gaza Strip and so forth. Even now, the Lebanese government is reluctant to cross the river as directed under the current cease-fire. I'm having a difficult time separating the government from Hizbollah. I always have.

[Strickland]

It is impossible to separate Hizbollah from the Lebanese Government, due to the fact that Hizbollah has popularly elected officials in positions of influence within the Lebanese administration. This would be akin to trying to separate the Republican or Democratic Party from our government?

Yes, Hizbollah - the Movement has a militia, but so does the ruling party of Iraq, and we havent put it on the Foreign Terrorist Organization List yet.

Here's a thought - is our refusal to deal with Hizbollah on a political basis over their remarks concerning the illegitimacy of Israel in any way similiar to our dealing with the Japanese, yet not asking them to publicly admit to killing and raping millions of Chinese during WWII? In the end, are we not picking and choosing which statements or lack of statements offend our general political and moral sensibilities?

I think we all forget that Hizbollah and Hasan Nasrallah publicly denounced the 9/11 terrorist attacks.