Hizbullah / Hezbollah (just the group)

[wm]

The idea that a bunch guerillas with some nice kit, can fight a competent modern military force to a stand still is ludicrously simplistic, inaccurate and misunderstands the nature of tactical operations.

But it does allow someone to argue to the otherwise militarily naive holders of the purse strings that the services need a lot more money to buy a lot more sophisticated materiel to be able to keep those guerrillas from succeeding in a stand up conventional fight.

[William F. Owen]

But it does allow someone to argue to the otherwise militarily naive holders of the purse strings that the services need a lot more money to buy a lot more sophisticated materiel to be able to keep those guerrillas from succeeding in a stand up conventional fight.

"...when proper training and the sensible employment of existing equipment will suffice?"

I concur.

[TROUFION]

What is missing in the analysis is a study of the nature of the fight, meaning defensive. The Hizbullah forces built a defensive position, a defense in depth if you will, that was attacked by the IDF. They used their suit of weaponry, some very good weapons-IED, Kornet etc to good effect in a defensive campaign. What would make Hizbullah truly dangerous would be if they could develop these tatics into an offensive capability.

As a historical reference the development of stormtroop tactics in WWI moved along the same lines. They started as defensive-local counter attacks and advanced to large scale offensive capable units, capitalizing upon new technology in arms. If the Hizbullah created an offensive capacity-one that could penetrate IDF defenses and enter Israel itself then they would have done something truly evolutionary. (note I said evolutionary not revolutionary as this is a natural progression of weapons-tactics-and technology).

A sizable armed force organized in small groups capable of infiltration and penetration, armed with mobile anti-tank weapons, shoulder launched anti-aircraft weapons, and preceded by a wave of suicide bombers (vehicle and foot) could make a serious impact. Ultimate success however would be questionable as the sustainability would be in question. Holding the ground gained and resupply would be difficult.

The actions of the VC and NVA in Tet could be looked at as a reference for the offensive capability of well armed infiltration forces.

I bring this up because like many of you I don't see any real radical change here. I certaintly dont like the Gen Scales response from the USA today article: more US infantry riding to battle in vehicles that can withstand roadside bombs... While these vehicles are important the focus should be on the training of the individual soldiers and Marines and developing tactics to defeat the hunter killer teams without blundering along roads waiting to be blown up. We can do better than that form of movement to contact.

[Norfolk]

TROUFION, you've been reading some of our minds here, haven't you? Advance/Movement to Contact, as it is usually practiced, amounts to little more than a slaughter waiting to happen. While I share Wilf's skepticism regarding some of the claims regarding Hizbullah's tactical competence (especially given the tactical problems that the IDF had in its own forces), perhaps some of the tactical accomplishments, or at least concepts, that are attributed to Hizbullah in the summer of 2006 may be usefully taken into consideration as our tactics are (hopefully) reformed into something much more effective, and less costly in lives.

It really says something about our present tactical concepts and doctrine when we have to look all the way back to WWI German Stormtroopers for cutting-edge ideas about how to change out tactics for the better. Kind of twisted.

[William F. Owen]

I bring this up because like many of you I don't see any real radical change here. I certaintly dont like the Gen Scales response from the USA today article: more US infantry riding to battle in vehicles that can withstand roadside bombs... While these vehicles are important the focus should be on the training of the individual soldiers and Marines and developing tactics to defeat the hunter killer teams without blundering along roads waiting to be blown up. We can do better than that form of movement to contact.

You are right that there is no change. What Hezbollah tried to do would have been comprehensible to any WW1 officer.
Where the WW1 officer would have problems is not using 10,000 guns per 50km to flatten every village the enemy occupied.

The vast majority of Hezbollah's tactical concepts are founded on working from within a civilian population. Not something we would ever do.

Stormtroopers could only really ever work on the Western front, once vast amounts of artillery could provide suppression and fog could mask their movement. Huge numbers of Stormtroopers died during Operation Michael when they tried to operate without supporting fires and in daylight or good weather.

Combined Arms still rules supreme, against any opponent.

[Global Scout]

The IDF failed in their recent fiasco into Lebanon, so all the chest thumping about how the IDF can defeat Hezbollah in combat is somewhat comical. I guess the caveat was if the IDF had a better plan they would have won, because they can fight better.

By most accounts the IDF's active duty forces did superbly, but several of their reservists didn't fare so well in tough urban combat. That is probably true for most nations, you have the A-Team and then a distant C-Team that normally requires a fair amount of time to knock the dust off of it after they mobilize to be combat ready.

The fact remains that irregulars achieved their goal, and just as in Vietnam it doesn't necessarily matter who actually wins the individual battles. This conventional mindset still blinds our military to the reality that in irregular warfare the fight is to shape the perceptions of the population (and other target audiences), not destroy the opposing military forces, because they know they can't.

We need to evaluate how the Hezbollah utilized tactical operations to defeat Israel in the last campaign, not how they used tactical operations to defeat the IDF, because they didn't, but then once again that wasn't the point.

We have this habit of saying we kicked their butt based on metrics that simply are not important, when we're actually getting our butt handed to us if you look at the metrics that count.

[Surferbeetle]

We have this habit of saying we kicked their butt based on metrics that simply are not important, when we're actually getting our butt handed to us if you look at the metrics that count.

Global Scout,

I am working on and thinking about metrics these days and would appreciate your insights (and the rest of this august company for that matter) as to 'the metrics that count'.

My general impression of of Hezbollah is that of Iranian trained and backed units that live and marry into local Lebanese community and who are, as result, able to tie in using geographically calibrated (ie local) CA, PSYOP, and SF capabilities as required. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah

I have been thinking about the November-December 07 Special Warfare article on "Can Militias be Used Effectively" (along with the associated footnotes) and trying to overlay this with the Iran-Hezbollah relationship metrics-wise. http://www.rand.org/publications/ran...03/burden.html
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/200509...n-in-iraq.html

Some of my musings are about Hezbollah force ratios and strategy as related to the civilian population and if we can/should use some of their successful tactics in Iraq.

Steve L.

[Rank amateur]

And a war were Ken served.


But the AP found in researching declassified Army documents that U.S. commanders also issued standing orders to shoot civilians along the warfront to guard against North Korean soldiers disguised in the white clothes of Korean peasants.


Were the North Koreans moral or immoral: justified or unjustified?

if we can/should use some of their successful tactics in Iraq.

Which specific tactics are you thinking about?

[TROUFION]

The fact remains that irregulars achieved their goal, and just as in Vietnam it doesn't necessarily matter who actually wins the individual battles. This conventional mindset still blinds our military to the reality that in irregular warfare the fight is to shape the perceptions of the population (and other target audiences), not destroy the opposing military forces, because they know they can't.

We need to evaluate how the Hezbollah utilized tactical operations to defeat Israel in the last campaign, not how they used tactical operations to defeat the IDF, because they didn't, but then once again that wasn't the point.

We have this habit of saying we kicked their butt based on metrics that simply are not important, when we're actually getting our butt handed to us if you look at the metrics that count.

I added the bold because I think the statement needs to be evaluated. Defeat is an interesting word, true defeat for Israel means no more Israel, but Global Scout states defeat in the campaign, a much more microcosmic defeat. One that could sow the seeds of true defeat if Israel isn't careful.

Irregular forces have throughout history demonstrated an ability to quickly achieve a salient, to make a break through and to defend thick forest or urban areas. They have also proven that they generally lack the sustainment power to press salients-meaning continue attacks into foriegn terrain. On the defense side however they are highly effective and with the local population in support they have long legs and are capable of sustaining their defense against heavy attacks.

What I was getting at (with the reference to the stormtroops) was exactly that defensively they (irregulars) can conduct local counter attacks and prolong a defensive stand so long as a local population can render support. In the offense however they run into serious logistic problems, they are lacking in sustainanbility when attacking into unsupportive terrritory, their ability to live off the land diminishes. The stormtroops of WWI required massive supply and this is one of the reasons they faltered (there are too many reasons to discuss here maybe on a seperate thread).

Why I bring this up is because it comes back to the intent of the operation. The intent of Hezbollahs operation was what? I will give it a simplified answer: to provoke the IDF to attack into thier territory and to give the IDF a black eye, thereby gaining experience fighting the IDF and gaining a lot of support via a strong IO campaign. It hurt Israel, but they recover. It hurt Hezbollah but they too recover. The Arab World still hates Israel, no real substantive change there and Israel still exists again no change.

My question is has something changed? Can an irregular force bring about the defeat of a first rate power, and i mean true defeat, on its own? I do not believe it could not even if they had the perfect IO campaign along with it.

Could an assault by Hezbollah irregulars take down (or initiate the demise) of Israel proper? Possibly yes, If they made serious headway into Israel (like the NVA/VC in Tet) seizing multiple towns in the north and set in like the VC/NVA at Hue City. AND if the bordering Arab states (smelling blood) rushed in to provide them support. AND IF the Palestinians rose up to join the Hezbollah. Then Hezbollah fighters could take out Israel.

BUT the Hezbollah irregulars could not do it on their own. Once they entered Israel the population would be against them and their supply lines would be exposed. If they tried it on their own and no one rushed to thier aid with resupply then they would falter, become isolated, then be hunted and trapped or forced to withdraw. Again they can hurt Israel but on their own they cannot take Israel out.

[Surferbeetle]

My question is has something changed? Can an irregular force bring about the defeat of a first rate power, and i mean true defeat, on its own? I do not believe it could not even if they had the perfect IO campaign along with it.

The French, The Soviet, and the US experience in Algeria, Afghanistan, and Afghanistan & Iraq (respectively) are something to reflect upon depending upon how one defines 'true defeat' (failure to achieve strategic objectives).

A Savage War of Peace (ISBN-13 978-1-59017-218-6)
Soldiers of God (ISBN 1-4000-3025-0)
Tactics of the Crescent Moon (ISBN 0-9638695-7-4)

[William F. Owen]

The IDF failed in their recent fiasco into Lebanon, so all the chest thumping about how the IDF can defeat Hezbollah in combat is somewhat comical. I guess the caveat was if the IDF had a better plan they would have won, because they can fight better.

No chest thumping from here. A few too many new names carved on the wall recently for anyone to feel good about what happened.

However, your caveat is correct. Not just a better plan, but ANY plan. Some of the screw ups were unbelievable, and defy comprehension.

I see no problem with defeating the type of defence Hezbollah used. It's pretty simple, and, contrary to popular belief, not that sophisticated. I have a very clear picture of what went wrong, as do a lot of the folks concerned with the operation. The IDFs tactical competence is not an area requiring attention per se, though there are improvements to be made. - and this being said by a man who considers UK tactical doctrine to be stuck in the stone age!

[Rank amateur]

working from within a civilian population. Not something we would ever do.

Depends upon who you mean by we and whether disguising soldiers as civilians counts as "working from within a civilian population."

The team attacking the target was mostly based on Sayeret Matkal commandos, led by then unit-commander Ehud Barak. (Barak later became Prime Minister). The team approached the buildings disguised as civilians and couples (Barak was disguised as a brunette).

From the Jewish virtual library: "When they approached their target they got out of the cars and began walking like lovers, as they had planned."

[Mike Innes]

Depends upon who you mean by we and whether disguising soldiers as civilians counts as "working from within a civilian population."

I was wondering when the discussion would get around to this. Some of you might be interested, if not surprised, to know that legal research has been working on those sticky gray operational areas where recce, SF, and intelligence takes on shapes and forms that are difficult to distinguish, at least in appearance, from guerrilla/insurgent/terrorist tactics. Issues of network embeddedness and the legitimacy thresholds they imply (one man's terrorist, etc.), are being revisited and deliberated with a view to better understanding how the Laws of Armed Conflict, designed for the linear battlespaces of old, can be reconciled with non-linear conflict environments like those inhabited by Hizbullah, AQ, etc.

For starters, take a look at the New Battlefields, Old Laws (NBOL) project. It's a joint research initiative of the Institute for National Security and Counter-Terrorism (INSCT) at Syracuse University, and the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the Interdisciplinary Centre Herzliya in Israel. Workshops have included discussion of scenarios just like the one cited in the last post, except they happened a bit more recently. More interestingly, scenario writers were very young Israeli Masters students who'd been faced with those very situations during their 2006 summer break, spent fighting in Lebanon.

[Ken White]

Military deception is as old as warfare. Inadvertently placing civilians in danger due to combat exigencies is also an unhappy circumstance of long standing. So too is deliberate use of civilians as shields an ancient practice -- but they are three very different things.

Lawyers and wordsmiths may parse the three to their hearts content to get accord -- because that's what lawyers and wordsmiths do. Fortunately, most of us can safely ignore both.

I know of no western nation or armed force that allows, much less espouses the use of civilians as shields. If anyone here knows of one that does, I'd like to hear about it -- and I am NOT talking about aberrations where some Commander locally gets or got stupid.

Anyone who conflates the three very different things to make a political point simply isn't thinking well.