Hamas is learning too. Article form JDW
http://www.webfilehost.com/?mode=viewupload&id=4539274
Hamas is learning too. Article form JDW
http://www.webfilehost.com/?mode=viewupload&id=4539274
Good link, Kaur.Originally Posted by kaur
From the conclusion:
I don't believe we need to be "worried". Threat migration is an issue that we are very cognizant of, and (despite assertions to the contrary by some critics) there are a few very capable professionals out there monitoring various insurgent and terrorist TTPs in conflicts around the world. The TTPs of the conflict in question are certainly being broken down and digested for their potential at the tactical and operational level. However, the context of the Israeli-Hizballah conflict is unique, and I do not see it being replicated for a future US conflict....Hizballah’s display on the battlefield should worry U.S. policymakers and military planners as well. Enemies of the United States will likely seek to emulate Hizballah’s perceived successes in southern Lebanon, and the lessons learned by the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan may or may not apply to such a fight. As the IDF learned in the occupied territories and Lebanon, the fight you have today might be completely different from the one you have tomorrow...
It also needs to be said that those Americans in uniform who have spent time in Iraq and Afghanistan already are starkly aware of the truism that the fight you have today might be completely different from the one you have tomorrow. Threat TTPs, particularly in Iraq, are very often highly adaptive and evolutionary. In my opinion, we do a very good job of collecting lessons learned and breaking down threat tactics - although we do have blockages to effective dissemination and training implementation.
This oft-beaten dead horse - effective information sharing - is still a serious problem. As stated, we have capable professionals collecting and analyzing virtually all relevant lessons to be learned from conflicts world-wide. The problem is that it doesn't all go where it can do the most good - down to the small unit leaders that can best digest and implement the material.
Of course, much of the "analysis" I'm speaking of isn't put together into a soldier-friendly format...although these tactical lessons are picked up, they are not broken down and put back into a format useable at the tactical level by our guys.
And, although we do monitor and analyze TTPs in a wide variety of conflicts, there is no intelligence element that ultimately ties it all together and spits it back out - linking key aspects of separated TTPs from around the world together, like an explosives analyst looks at signatures in widely scattered bombing incidents, a profiler looks for tiny similarities in multiple murders across a wide area, or a crime analyst looks for similar incidents in other regions as he works to figure out a new crime trend in his jurisdiction...
Take a look at pages 18-19
http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/mh/dti0906/
Seems to be a reverification, though from a pro-Israeli source, of Israeli Armor performance in Lebanon.
As an aside, that NXT-book format is horrible. Who thought that would be a good idea?
WINEP, 21 Aug 07: Hizballah's 'Big Surprise' and the Litani Line
....At the moment, the group seems to think that despite Israel's heavy reliance on airpower in the last war -- with ground forces deployed in only a limited fashion -- the next war would begin with a much larger Israeli ground assault. Any attempt to defend the area south of the Litani would therefore be suicidal. Moreover, the deployment of 12,000 UN peacekeepers and several thousand Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) personnel has made the construction of static defensive lines in southern Lebanon much more difficult than it was before summer 2006. Accordingly, even as Hizballah continues to train village units south of the Litani in the hope that they could slow an Israeli ground invasion, the group has constructed its main defensive positions to the north, where the terrain favors the defender and where Hizballah could deny Israeli armor columns easy access to the Bekaa Valley....
ATGM vs Merkavas
One notable thing that I take from this (if true) is that Hizbullah AT units matched ATGM attributes to Merkava subtypes, and systematically targeted to probe for AFV design weaknesses.
If true, its shows a strikingly high degree of training and fire discipline, when the tendency for most irregular (and many regular) forces would be to fire at the nearest or most threatening vehicle.
Yes, and since they were trained by Iranians, there are huge implications if we get into a ground war with Iran. There are also huge implications if the Iranians provide similar weapons and training to the Palestinians or the Iraqi Shia.
Iran/Palestinians/Iraq
Iran doesn't have much capacity to smuggle substantial ATGM capacity to Hamas in Gaza, and almost no capacity to get anything into the West Bank. The most you find is a few RPGs (usually with regular, non-tandem warheads) and IEDs/mines, and in Gaza only. Given how casualty-averse the IDF is, however, that's a substantial deterrent.
Regarding Iraq, its almost inevitable that Iran will, in the long term, be providing some security assistance to Iraq--indeed, Ahmadinejad has made the offer. Indeed, some (now senior) Supreme Council military cadres held IRGC commissions during their exile in Iran in the 1980s.
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