Hizbullah / Hezbollah (just the group)

[Jedburgh]

20 Jun 07 testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe: Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terror List.

Michael Jacobson, Senior Fellow, Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence & Policy, WINEP

Alexander Ritzmann, Senior Fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy

James Phillips, Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation

Dr. Matthew Levitt, Director of the Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence and Policy, WINEP

[SteveMetz]

In a recent interview, Hezbollah spokesman Hussein Rahhal discussed how Israel's summer 2006 war against Hezbollah changed both the West's vision of Arabs and the Arabs' vision of themselves (al-Quds al-Arabi, July 13). Rahhal claims that the Arabs now see themselves as "capable of action," and no longer as a people "who cannot do anything in the face of an advanced Western machine [the Israeli military] that is supported with a lifeline from the West." He argued that the West now sees the Arab as one with the "will of steadfastness, confrontation and dedication, as well as the capability of fighting…who can be a match for the Israeli, who has 60 years of technical and financial support from the West…We have forced the West to look at us as equals." Rahhal also analyzed the changed perception that Israelis have of themselves in the wake of the war. "There is a feeling of disappointment and failure [among Israelis]," he said. "This is because he has reached a conviction that if the Arabs had a will to fight, they cannot win. They are reassessing the situation with regard to all Arab armies. This is extremely important, and it is a strategic change that involves the Arab and Israeli individuals."

Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus, July 17, 2007 - Volume IV, Issue 23

This reminds me of all the time Saddam Hussein spent explaining why 1991 was actually a win for him. These guys must be magna cum laude graduates of the Karl Rove Academy of Positive Spin

[Jedburgh]

Infantry Mar-Apr 08 (AKO Log-In Required): The Arab Perspective of the 2006 Israeli War with Hezbollah - The Egyptian Strategic Research Central Al-Ahram Annual Strategic Report

....The Arab report states that 1,500 Hezbollah fighters shattered and eroded the invincibility and deterrence factors of the IDF. Israeli forces could not advance at will towards Beirut as they did in 1982, and this is already being touted as Hezbollah offering a major deterrence factor to Israeli military movement towards the Lebanese capital. Arab articles and books on the war refer to this conflict as the Sixth Arab-Israeli conflict, which is indicative of the timeline by which the mass media in the region view its long-term wearing down of Israel....

[Rex Brynen]

Retired IDF general: Deterrence is our best option against Hezbollah

Giora Eiland says another war between Israel and Hezbollah 'will be a war between Israel and the State of Lebanon and will wreak destruction on the State of Lebanon.'

Haaretz 16 December 2010 /Reuters

Mass devastation in Lebanon is Israel's best deterrence against the powerful Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, former Israel Defense Forces general and national security adviser Giora Eiland said Thursday, warning that Israel's home front would suffer greatly in any confrontation between the two sides.

"Our only way of preventing the next war, and of winning if it happens anyway, is for it to be clear to everyone ... that another war between us and Hezbollah will be a war between Israel and the State of Lebanon and will wreak destruction on the State of Lebanon," Eiland told Israel Radio. "And as no one - including Hezbollah, the Syrians or the Iranians - is interested in this, this is the best way of creating effective deterrence."


Eiland also cautioned that guerrilla group, which has an arsenal of thousands of rockets, would inflict heavy damage on the Israeli home front if war broke out.

Israel last sent its troops into southern Lebanon in 2006, after Hezbollah abducted and killed two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border attack. Tensions between Israel and Hezbollah's Iranian and Syrian backers have stoked expectations of renewed violence in Lebanon.

"Israel does not know how to beat Hezbollah," said Eiland, who served as national security adviser to former prime ministers Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert.

"Therefore a war waged only as Israel-versus-Hezbollah might yield better damage on Hezbollah, but Hezbollah would inflict far worse damage on the Israeli home-front than it did 4-1/2 years ago," he said.

...

[bismark17]

At the Domestic L.E. level, I would be worried about their Force Projection via Hezbollah cells throughout the world. People forget they attacked a Jewish Center in Argentina back in 1994 and don't forget the cell that was rolled up in North Carolina thanks in part to the vigilance of an off duty officer working in a convienance store in the mid 90s. http://www.rd.com/content/a-hezbolla...-charlotte-nc/

[Jedburgh]

At the Domestic L.E. level, I would be worried about their Force Projection via Hezbollah cells throughout the world. People forget they attacked a Jewish Center in Argentina back in 1994 and don't forget the cell that was rolled up in North Carolina thanks in part to the vigilance of an off duty officer working in a convienance store in the mid 90s.

The degree to which Iran is able to use Hezbollah as a proxy is greatly exaggerated. They are definitely not a terror "force projection" force to be used at the whim of the Iranian government. Each has its own core interests and objectives, separate from the other, although they definitely share others.

When Hezbollah collaborated with Iran in carrying out the attacks in South America, they also had their own interests at heart - revenge (even if indirect) for the Israeli abduction of Mustafa Dirrani, one of their senior leaders.

And the NC cell, which is definitely over-used as a domestic operational example, was a fund-raising support cell with no other operational mission. No intel collection, no direct action, nada. Pure support, in an attempt to protect the lucrative fund-raising activity. Even then they ended up compromised.

Yes, Iran and Hezbollah are both threats, each potentially serious in their own context. But lets assess them in realistic manner.

[bismark17]

My understanding is that Hezbollah is just a proxy of the Revolutionary Guards. Even if not, they share many of the same goals and objectives. Its not in their interest to see Iran's government destroyed. I don't think Hezbollah would sit on the fence during a large scale engagement between the U.S. and Iran.

As for the cells it doesn't take much to change direction from simple fund raising to a more active posture. At least several of the members had combat training in Lebanon. It makes sense to think if they had the foresight to infiltrate fund raising cells that they would also have other sleeper cells acting more covertly.

[Rex Brynen]

My understanding is that Hezbollah is just a proxy of the Revolutionary Guards. Even if not, they share many of the same goals and objectives. Its not in their interest to see Iran's government destroyed. I don't think Hezbollah would sit on the fence during a large scale engagement between the U.S. and Iran.

Hizbullah has a close and intimate ideological and material relationship with the IRGC and the Iranian regime. However, it is not a "proxy," and its electoral success and political influence in Lebanon requires that it also keep touch with its Lebanese Shi'ite base there (most of whom have no such attachment to Iran).

Incidentally, there no chance that any US strike will "destroy the Iranian government," and Hizbullah knows that. While it would degrade Tehran's military and economic capabilities, it might actually enhance the regime's hold on power.

I do think that, in the event of a prolonged US assault on Iran, there would be intense pressure on Hizbullah to "do something," and that there is a non-zero chance it might do so. However, in general I'm with Ted when he says that Hizb's ability to mount major, short-notice external operations has likely been exaggerated.

[Jedburgh]

...As for the cells it doesn't take much to change direction from simple fund raising to a more active posture. At least several of the members had combat training in Lebanon. It makes sense to think if they had the foresight to infiltrate fund raising cells that they would also have other sleeper cells acting more covertly.

First off, the fund raising was an active support op - it was not conducted by a "sleeper" cell. And foresight had nothing to do with it. It was simply opportunism.

Just to be clear - A sleeper cell is composed of individuals who do absolutely nothing to compromise their identity until they are activated. They are part of the community. Once a cell "acts" it is no longer a sleeper.

Now, active cell members also need to blend into the community; the key difference is that active cell members attempt to conduct their ops in such a manner as to prevent compromise - compartmentation, clandestine communications, etc. Sleeper cell members do absolutely nothing even covertly or tangentially related to the organization until they are activated.

The "sleeper cell" threat is definitely overblown. The problem with true sleepers is that it is very difficult to maintain loyalty, let alone operational control - unless its a situation like in Telefon. In my opinion, every cell that actually exists in this country is active, to one degree or another. The problem is in identification. Professionally compartmented support cells, using relatively sophisticated clandestine comms, may conduct discreet fund-raising or low-level intel collection with little danger of being rolled up - or of creating enough evidence to enable successful prosecution.

When fund raising is linked with overt criminal activity - as with the cigarette smuggling example - it creates a significant risk of operational compromise. That brings us to the next point. It is not as easy as you think for a cell to transition effectively from financial support to intel collection or offensive action. As stated, the members engaged in the criminal activity are constantly at risk of compromise. Effective compartmentation means that they better have no knowledge or links with any important element of the organization - the money gets passed on through a cut-out, or even better, a series of cut-outs. The cigarette smugglers know nothing, other than they are helping the cause. Much like most of those who raised money for the IRA in the US.

Cells engaged in intel collection require training, tight compartmentation and a detailed understanding of clandestine comms in order to even remotely be effective - they ain't gonna waste those guys by getting them engaged in a high risk action.

As regards offensive action, one of the methods the guys smuggling cigs may get involved is if they look exploitable for a suicide op. If the dumbass will risk going to jail for smuggling cigs to send a few thousand home to Lebanon, he may be malleable and dedicated enough to get him to blow himself up. However, I see that as an unlikely course of action for Hezbollah in the US. Even if we do attack Iran. But for al-Qa'ida, an affiliate or a wannabe, that is a very scary possibility that keeps LE - Fed, state and local - on edge across the country. Yet that has nothing to do with the Iran issue. In any case, a handler is necessary for the wannabe martyr - and the handler, in most instances, is going to be a smart guy and well trained along the lines of what I mentioned for the intel cell. If he's done his job right, he won't be directly connected to the suicide bomber by anything that is readily picked up post-blast.

The other side of the offensive action coin is the threat of a sophisticated attack - non-suicide IED, VBIED, WMD, high-profile hostage incident, etc. ad nauseum. This ain't gonna be carried out by a bunch of cigarette smugglers who have fired off a few rounds in the Bekaa. Similar to the example of the intel cell, this type of op will be executed by guys who have been trained, not only in the skills necessary to carry out the attack, but in organizing and conducting themselves in a clandestine manner that mitigates against operational compromise until the moment of attack.

Now, for a high-payoff offensive op, there is the possibility of the organization dropping the compartmentation at the last moment, and bringing in the dumbasses to be gun-cover for the real actors in the drama. They'll be expendable, and they'll be given only what they need prior to the op. Of course, in this worst-case scenario, if everyone is called in for a terror TF of this nature, the assumption is that the final denouement will be so ugly that it just won't matter who is compromised afterwards. No state-supported terror organization would go to this extreme in an attack on the US. The non-state bad guys would if they could.

[BR]

Of course Hezbollah is an iranian proxy. In fact the organization was founded by dispatched units of the Pasdara(Irani Revolutionary Guard) in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon in the beginning of the eighties.

[Rex Brynen]

I suppose it depends on what one means by "proxy."

Hizbullah is an extremely close ally of Iran, and heavily funded and equipped by it. It is, at the same time, a very Lebanese organization, whose core constituency supports it because of its Lebanese goals (resistance to Israeli occupation, defending the political interests of the Shi'ite community) and not because of its Iranian connection.

Does Hizbullah slavishly follow orders from Tehran? No. Does it usually agree with Tehran? Yes--and, equally, Tehran usually defers to it on issues of Lebanese policy (although some differences seem to have been apparent during the recent presidential crisis).

[Rex Brynen]

How about Hizbullah in 2006

Excellent example, Tequila--Hizbullah's tactical performance was often outstanding, as was their ability to operate in very small manoeuver units (which also exhibited innovation and leadership by NCOs). There was very little "spray and pray," and a great deal of coordinated ambushing involving multiple weapons systems, interlocking fields of fire, etc (for example, simultaneous ATGM, RPG, and deep-dug IED attacks, followed by LMG and mortar cover fire while AT units relocated or went to ground).

Moreover, Hizbullah regular force combatants typically show levels of OPSEC well beyond what your average NATO infantry are ever asked to manage--far from "prideful" boasting, their own immediate families are often unaware of their status, training, etc.

By contrast, Amal--a militia made up of the same "cultural" group, Lebanese Shi'ites—displayed very poor tactics and discipline in the war in 2006.

This isn't to say that culture doesn't matter--it clearly does. It is to suggest that whatever the original cultural "cloth," however, the right combinations of training, doctrine, and ideological motivation can clear still produce effective military forces.

[tequila]

By contrast, Amal--a militia made up of the same "cultural" group, Lebanese Shi'ites—displayed very poor tactics and discipline in the war in 2006.

Rex, I thought much of the first line of village militia which slowed the IDF was Amal?

[Rex Brynen]

Rex, I thought much of the first line of village militia which slowed the IDF was Amal?

Most of it was Hizb, which also has local militia reserves--and, frankly, much more local support. Amal was active, but judging from the relative casualties they only played a minor role (and their forces are known for poor discipline and training).

[Norfolk]

Zarqawi was a convict and former street thug whose formal weapons handling training approximated zero. The better comparison would be between Zarqawi and your average mid-level Crip leader rather than Zarqawi and an American soldier.

Compare vs. Arab forces which are actually motivated and trained as Western forces are --- i.e. Hizbullah and Amal, both trained by Iranians. Even their village militias showed excellent fire discipline in 2006.

If you want to believe that Omar Bradley made a perfectly reasonable decision based totally on his own military judgment in 1944, I suppose I won't be convincing you otherwise. Corlett himself thought that Bradley was snubbing him out of prideful disdain rather than reasonable disagreement, however. According to Corlett:

"I was pretty well squelched for my question [regarding why Army troops would attack using LCVPs and LCAs instead of LVTs]. I soon got the feeling that American generals in England considered anything that had happened in the Pacific strictly 'Bush League stuff' which didn't merit any consideration.'"

If you read one of the articles posted, you would have seen that the same remark was made about the performance of some Iraqi troops being trained by the US.

I do not believe that Bradley had a completely objective military basis for the judgement he made, but he did have one, however flawed that was, given the resources at his disposal and his professional appreciation of what he was facing. That personal feelings affected this does not change the fact that he still had a military basis upon which to render the judgement he did, however faulty that judgement was (and it most certainly was flawed) and the role of emotions in colouring that judgement. The Saudi general in his own admission, did not, and consciously and deliberately rejected any and all outside help even as he knew that his own troops had neither training nor equipent at hand for the breech. Bradley may have deceived himself, believing that all the firepower and engineer resources he had at hand would certainly be sufficient to do the job; the Saudi was not deceived, and went ahead anyway.

Hezbollah is in no way representative of the armies of the Arab world in general, and even the latter suffered tactical defeat by the end of last year's Israeli invasion (a pyrrhic victory to be sure). As you observed, intensive Iranian training has had its effect - but unlike many other Arab armed forces, these two have been engage in more-or less constant wars for survival, which may have softened their resistance to outside training - even to help from the "Persians" - albeit fellow Shi'a. Amal has not been a major factor for some years, and its fighting prowess dubious.

And Hezbollah, for all the striking political success it scored, has suffered the loss of the majority of its best fighting men. It is now a shell of what it used to be, and has kept fairly quiet, militarily, ever since. Not to mention thst the Israelis, by their own admission, were even maintaining their own fighting standards, having not only let them slip in order to concentrate on intrnal security operations, but in fact had cancelled the annual training of Reservists - which has since ben restored.

There are points in the two articles that I posted the links to that have not been addressed. Here is a more direct handling of the matter by a USMC trainer of the Iraqi Army posted on our own site: "partnering with the Iraqi Security Forces" by Lt.Col. P.C. Skuta, CO 2/7th Marines:


http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/skuta.htm

About a quarter of the way down the page he makes the observation that US trainers should:

Start off slow. Lawrence says, “Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for, and the Arabs form their judgments on externals that we ignore.” How true. It was beneficial for the battalion to take a ‘crawl, walk, run” approach to training and operating with the ISF. Especially if there is a lack of trust, and underdeveloped personal relationships, the Iraqis would be hesitant to adopt U.S. processes. This was not because the Iraqis had a negative view of U.S. military techniques, quiet the contrary; it was because they maintained Arab and Iraqi pride. (boldface added)

[Rex Brynen]

And Hezbollah, for all the striking political success it scored, has suffered the loss of the majority of its best fighting men. It is now a shell of what it used to be, and has kept fairly quiet, militarily, ever since.

I don't think Hizbullah lost the majority of its best fighting men, and its losses were compensated by both stepped-up recruitment and greater combat experience. In my view it is at least as powerful now as it was in 2006.

Hizbullah's relative quiet in the south derives from a combination of its desire to have time to continue its rearmament, fortification and training programme; its current primary focus on Lebanese domestic politics; and the domestic costs of being seen to spark another confrontation with Israel at this time.

Perhaps the most interesting contrast, btw, is between Hizb performance in 2006, and PLO performance in 1982. The PLO was, by the standards of the day, at least as well as equipped as Hizbullah. It had larger field forces, deployed in battalion and larger formations. It was fighting for its political life, and consisted of personnel (largely Palestinian refugees) who had strong ideological motivations to fight Israel.

Its battlefield performance, however, was much worse. In fairness, it faced a much larger IDF force. However, the variation had much more to do (I think) with differences in leadership, command and control, training, and political-organizational (rather than religious-ethnic) cultures.

(Actually, we have a PhD student doing a thesis on this very comparison.. wait a few years and you may be able to buy the book!)

Again, I'm not suggesting that culture is irrelevant--I think its quite important. I do think that the right mix of other factors, however, can have dramatic effects on combat effectiveness.

Umm, what was the original thread? *lol*

[Norfolk]

I don't think Hizbullah lost the majority of its best fighting men, and its losses were compensated by both stepped-up recruitment and greater combat experience. In my view it is at least as powerful now as it was in 2006.

Hizbullah's relative quiet in the south derives from a combination of its desire to have time to continue its rearmament, fortification and training programme; its current primary focus on Lebanese domestic politics; and the domestic costs of being seen to spark another confrontation with Israel at this time.

Perhaps the most interesting contrast, btw, is between Hizb performance in 2006, and PLO performance in 1982. The PLO was, by the standards of the day, at least as well as equipped as Hizbullah. It had larger field forces, deployed in battalion and larger formations. It was fighting for its political life, and consisted of personnel (largely Palestinian refugees) who had strong ideological motivations to fight Israel.

Its battlefield performance, however, was much worse. In fairness, it faced a much larger IDF force. However, the variation had much more to do (I think) with differences in leadership, command and control, training, and political-organizational (rather than religious-ethnic) cultures.

(Actually, we have a PhD student doing a thesis on this very comparison.. wait a few years and you may be able to buy the book!)

Again, I'm not suggesting that culture is irrelevant--I think its quite important. I do think that the right mix of other factors, however, can have dramatic effects on combat effectiveness.

Umm, what was the original thread? *lol*

Yes, I largely agree with you, Rex. The Hezbollah performance was certainly in stark contrast to that of the PLO in 1982. Indeed, the IDF managed to snatch (military) victory from the jaws of defeat last year in large part to sheer weight of men, machines, and firepower. And reported Hezbollah tactics are being studied, re-studied, and studied some more to extract their lessons.

I was under the impression from an Israeli paper (so far as I know, it was not one of the rabid right-wing ones either, so I was inclined to believe it, or at least not to seripously doubt it), that Hezbollah had suffered heavy losses in its best men, especially from a particular elite battalion. I may well be wrong in that regard, then.

I'm intrigued by the mention of your student's work, Rex (my inner political philosopher is naturally attracted to these sorts of things).

Yes, it would appear that we have deviated just a little from this thread's focus.

[Abujnoub]

A few points.

Hizbullah's field units fought well against the IDF during the July war. The Israeli claim of 600-1,000 dead Hizbullah is an exagerration. The figure is closer to 200-300. Mind you, there were others fighting in south Lebanon - Amal, SSNP, Communists etc - who could have made up the numbers. For eg. only nine Hizbullah died in Aitta Shaab village which saw some of the fiercest and most prolonged fighting of the war. The IDF was unable to seize any border villages or towns until the final stages of the war when it entered Lebanon in force. Aitta Shaab, located less than 1km from the border and also close to the scene of the July 12 kidnapping which triggered the war, remained in the hands of Hizbullah until the end. The fighters defending the village for the most part were not even full-time regulars, but part-timers, albeit with extensive battlefield experience from the 1980s and 1990s. The IDF evenually abandoned attempting to seize the villages and simply skirted them. At the end of the war, it was possible to drive behind the IDF's front line (almost matching the configuration of the old Security Zone from the 1990s) going from village to village without seeing a single IDF soldier. In general, the villages were defended by village guard units with the regulars deployed in the bunker networks in surrounding wadis. Hizbullah employed small unit hit-and-run tactics. Hizb SecGen Nasrallah said during the war “We are fighting a guerrilla war... Our policy is not to hang onto geography ... It is beneficial for us to allow them to advance to the entrances of villages. This is our goal. Our goal is to inflict maximum casualties and damage to the capabilities of the enemy, and we are succeeding.”

The reason the IDF fared so badly in my view was down to unrealistic political expectations (the Israelis should have learned by 2006 that bombing Lebanese infrastructure does not turn the population against Hizbullah, it turns them against Israel. The Israelis tried this tactic in 1993, 1996 and 1999. It didn't work then and it won't work if they try it again in the future), woeful intelligence shortcomings on what they were dealing with (Hizbullah of 2006 was not the Hizbullah of 2000. It still amazes me that the IDF had no idea of the extent of the bunker network constructed by Hizbullah in those six years, despite near daily overflights with jets, UAVs and whatever assets they may have had on the ground), and hubris on behalf of the IDF General Staff. Hizbullah didn't win the war, Israel lost it.

How can you defeat Hizbullah? You can't militarily in my view. You can temporarily weaken but you cannot destroy. A senior IDF general told me recently that the IDF should have staged a full-scale invasion from the get go, punching up to the Litani in a couple of days before fanning back and wiping out Hizbullah pockets. However, first, the IDF would have taken much larger casualties, second, what about Hizbullah positions north of the Litani and in the Bekaa? The speculation is that come round 2, the IDF will move into the Bekaa and take out Hizbullah's logistical centers there. But then what? As has already been stated, Hizbullah will simply rebuild once the IDF has gone home.

BTW, Being Arabic, the word Hizbullah can be spelt in numerous different ways. There is no correct or incorrect spelling in English.

[Rex Brynen]

Welcome to the discussion, Abujnoub. Should we read anything into you being being an Abujnoub and not an Ibnjnoub?

I would agree with your assessment, although I think Hizballah's casualties were higher than they have claimed (although not as high as IDF claims). Amal's casualties might have been significant, but the SSNP and LCP were at best very marginal contributors to both the fighting and the battle deaths.

Actually, I think there were (and are) very few in the IDF who thought or think that it possible to defeat Hizballah militarily. This in many ways makes the design of the 2006 campaign even more puzzling--and especially the almost complete absence of any plan on how best (from a political point-of-view) to terminate the fighting. The flip-flop on UNIFIL+ was a perfect example of this.

[Abujnoub]

Welcome to the discussion, Abujnoub. Should we read anything into you being being an Abujnoub and not an Ibnjnoub?

I would agree with your assessment, although I think Hizballah's casualties were higher than they have claimed (although not as high as IDF claims). Amal's casualties might have been significant, but the SSNP and LCP were at best very marginal contributors to both the fighting and the battle deaths.

Actually, I think there were (and are) very few in the IDF who thought or think that it possible to defeat Hizballah militarily. This in many ways makes the design of the 2006 campaign even more puzzling--and especially the almost complete absence of any plan on how best (from a political point-of-view) to terminate the fighting. The flip-flop on UNIFIL+ was a perfect example of this.

I think Hizbullah claimed around 220 fatalities. I agree, the figure is probably higher. There were a few SSNP and Communists killed in the last days of the war during the fighting in Wadi Salouqi and Ghandourieh village. Several villages just to the west, including Srifa, still maintain sizeable Communist support. But the numbers would not have been that significant compared to Hizb and Amal fatalities.

I'm not sure there was a design to the 2006 campaign. It initially concentrated on air power and when that was failing to halt the Katyusha rockets, it became an ad hoc endeavor with ground forces at first making probing attacks, and only in the last 60 hours (after a ceasefire deal had been reached) did the IDF move into Lebanon in strength, advancing west toward the Litani in an utterly futile gesture that cost the lives of some 30 soldiers.

Abu Jnoub is a nickname conferred upon me by some buddies in UNIFIL.