Hizbullah / Hezbollah (just the group)

[William F. Owen]

A few points.

@ The Israeli claim of 600-1,000 dead Hizbullah is an exagerration. The figure is closer to 200-300. Mind you, there were others fighting in south Lebanon - Amal, SSNP, Communists etc -

@ The IDF was unable to seize any border villages or towns until the final stages of the war when it entered Lebanon in force.

@ The IDF evenually abandoned attempting to seize the villages and simply skirted them. At the end of the war, it was possible to drive behind the IDF's front line (almost matching the configuration of the old Security Zone from the 1990s) going from village to village without seeing a single IDF soldier.

@ The reason the IDF fared so badly in my view was down to unrealistic political expectations

@. It still amazes me that the IDF had no idea of the extent of the bunker network constructed by Hizbullah in those six years, despite near daily overflights with jets, UAVs and whatever assets they may have had on the ground), and hubris on behalf of the IDF General Staff.

@ How can you defeat Hizbullah? You can't militarily in my view. You can temporarily weaken but you cannot destroy.

@ However, first, the IDF would have taken much larger casualties, second, what about Hizbullah positions north of the Litani and in the Bekaa?
.

Welcome to the dust, my brother

@ Clearly that figure is an exaggeration. I have yet to see a serious source try and support it. The best estimate I know of is a little higher than 300, but comparing piles of bodies are meaningless in this matter.

@ During the early days the IDF was mainly concerned with raiding, and dismounted infiltration to clear out OPs and ATGM posts, almost always situated in civilian houses, and thus in villages.

@ So the IDF by-passed villages of no tactical importance. - and why would you expect to see IDF soldiers once they are exploiting northwards?

@ Correct.

@ If you have knowledge of basic engineering, then spanning out a bunker complex from the basement of a house is not that difficult, and I would not assume that the IDF IBP was a woeful as some like to believe. The amount of captured equipment would indicate otherwise.

@ Of course they can be destroyed. If Syria wanted to destroy Hezbollah, they would, and Hezbollah would never recover, and no one, who was left alive south of the Litani would ever speak the word Hezbollah again. Maybe Bashir isn't the man Hafas was, but I am sure you get my point.

@ Well that implies you believe conflict is determinable, which I do not.

[Abujnoub]

1 During the early days the IDF was mainly concerned with raiding, and dismounted infiltration to clear out OPs and ATGM posts, almost always situated in civilian houses, and thus in villages.

2 So the IDF by-passed villages of no tactical importance. - and why would you expect to see IDF soldiers once they are exploiting northwards?

3 Of course they can be destroyed. If Syria wanted to destroy Hezbollah, they would, and Hezbollah would never recover, and no one, who was left alive south of the Litani would ever speak the word Hezbollah again. Maybe Bashir isn't the man Hafas was, but I am sure you get my point.

1. Actually most of the OPs, bunker complexes, underground rocket firing positions etc were located in the wadis outside villages. Hizbullah had some underground storage facilities and OPs in the villages and towns, but these were more logistical in nature than intended for war fighting. I have explored some of Hizbullah's bunkers in the wadis in the past year and they are quite impressive, far more elaborate than anyone imagined prior to the 06 war, passages lined with welded steel plates, equipped with hot and cold water, ventilation, latrines, kitchens, electric lighting etc. They were located in sealed-off military zones, and everyone (IDF, UNIFIL, local residents, nosy journos) knew the locations of these zones, but no one really knew what Hizb was up to inside them. How they built them without anyone seeing, I have no idea. Even the hundreds of tons of quarried rock from one the larger bunkers I visited had been carried away, so leaving no trace to observers in the skies above.
I don't know if SWC has facilities for posting pics, but I'd be happy to send along a couple of bunker interiors if interested, or kml (or is it kmz) attachments so you can view the locations on google earth.

2. The villages by-passed by the IDF were the villages they were unable to capture in the opening days of the war.

3. Syria cannot destroy Hizbullah because they are no longer in Lebanon. If for whatever reason they attempted to do so now, I suspect they would fare even worse than the IDF. Hizbullah is not a military entity separate from its environment so that it can be isolated and crushed, it is part of the fabric of Lebanese Shiite society. Maximalist solutions (genocide against Lebanese Shiites/blitzing Lebanon with nuclear weapons) aside, a more realistic means of tackling Hizbullah is to neutralize its ability to use its weapons. That means depriving it of its casus belli. This is a process that has been underway since 2000 when the IDF withdrew from south Lebanon. How can you resist occupation where there is no occupation left to resist? Yes, Hizbullah claims the Shebaa Farms, Lebanese detainees in Israeli jails and the nebulous "deterrence against future Israeli aggression" as its justification for continuing to bear arms. But to many Lebanese, these excuses sound hollow and as they are chipped away, Hizbullah's ability to use its arsenal becomes increasingly difficult.

[MattC86]

A few points.

How can you defeat Hizbullah? You can't militarily in my view. You can temporarily weaken but you cannot destroy. A senior IDF general told me recently that the IDF should have staged a full-scale invasion from the get go, punching up to the Litani in a couple of days before fanning back and wiping out Hizbullah pockets. However, first, the IDF would have taken much larger casualties, second, what about Hizbullah positions north of the Litani and in the Bekaa? The speculation is that come round 2, the IDF will move into the Bekaa and take out Hizbullah's logistical centers there. But then what? As has already been stated, Hizbullah will simply rebuild once the IDF has gone home.

BTW, Being Arabic, the word Hizbullah can be spelt in numerous different ways. There is no correct or incorrect spelling in English.

Oh, I'm quite aware of the pitfalls of writing out Arabic words in English - our professor always railed against us when we did that. So, in short, I can't do it. I just laugh when I see about 50 different versions of Hezbollah.

I completely agree about the IDF's inability to defeat Hezbollah in Lebanese territory, but I think Rex made an excellent point (though you, given your background and occupation, would speak to it better than I); namely, that the kidnapping and initial Israeli response detracted from Hezbollah's popularity and legitimacy in Lebanon. A more carefully planned initial response might have been effective without further bolstering Hezbollah in the eyes of the Lebanese people.

But you're right, there is no real way for Hezbollah to be defeated and destroyed by the IDF.

Matt

[William F. Owen]

To suggest that Hezbollah somehow out fought the IDF is akin to suggesting the Taliban out fought the US during OP Anaconda or that the Somalis out fought the US during Gothic Serpent.

I am going to abstain from further comment. I consider Hezbollah one of the worst terrorist groups on the planet, and one that directly threatens my family on a daily basis, thus I have to take a side and cannot afford the leisure of purely intellectual comment.

[William F. Owen]

Excellent example, Tequila--Hizbullah's tactical performance was often outstanding, as was their ability to operate in very small manoeuver units (which also exhibited innovation and leadership by NCOs). There was very little "spray and pray," and a great deal of coordinated ambushing involving multiple weapons systems, interlocking fields of fire, etc (for example, simultaneous ATGM, RPG, and deep-dug IED attacks, followed by LMG and mortar cover fire while AT units relocated or went to ground).

I strongly disagree. I have now interviewed 7 IDF front line infantryman, and am talking to more. None of them rated Hezbollah's combat performance, other than to place IEDs, and conduct ATGM shoots from villages that prevented counter-fire. Hezbollahs defensive mindset in fixed in hiding amongst civilians.

I know of two occasions where Hezbollah's surround IDF platoons and where unable to over run or destroy them, despite outnumbering them, maybe 4:1.I also know of IDF infantry companies continuously involved in combat operations, that took no combat casualties across 30 days. There were losses due to exhaustion and combat fatigue, so these guys were fighting.

There a various sources on the web and in the media, spreading the idea of Hezbollah tactical competence, with the aim of supporting a Hezbollah IO campaign, and thus supporting Hezbollah.

There is a vast difference between operational failure founded on very poor campaign planning resulting in poorly defined missions and actually being defeated at the the tactical level by forces with superior training and ability.

Sorry to say, but I am not yet at liberty to share precise detail, and yes, I am not objective. Hezbollah have as much credence with me as the KKK have with most educated and civilised people.

[Rex Brynen]

No one here is arguing that Hizbullah's tactical performance was superior to (or even approached) that of the IDF. The issue, rather, was Hizballah's tactical performance compared to that of other militias in Lebanon (Amal, the PLO in 1982).

I also don't think the discussion has either been influenced by, or serves, Hizballah IO.

[William F. Owen]

No one here is arguing that Hizbullah's tactical performance was superior to (or even approached) that of the IDF. The issue, rather, was Hizballah's tactical performance compared to that of other militias in Lebanon (Amal, the PLO in 1982).

I also don't think the discussion has either been influenced by, or serves, Hizballah IO.

Sorry Rex. Didn't get that, but hey ho. I think we are all on the same side.

REF: The USA Today peice,

"It's not just counterinsurgency," said Rickey Smith, of the Army Capabilities Integration Center-Forward Office. "This was a wake-up call to all of us as analysts."

The study by the Center for Army Analysis, which provided an unclassified version to USA TODAY, stresses that guerrillas armed with high-tech equipment can fight a modern military force to a standstill.

Well some analysts must have been sleeping very soundly. The only thing I found surprising was the use of C-802 SSM.

The idea that a bunch guerillas with some nice kit, can fight a competent modern military force to a stand still is ludicrously simplistic, inaccurate and misunderstands the nature of tactical operations.

[SWJED]

From the Vital Perspective Blog - Background Briefing: Iran's Historic and Present Ties with Lebanon, Hezbollah.

The origins of Iranian involvement in Lebanon:

Iran first became involved militarily in Lebanon when a 2500-strong Iranian expeditionary force drawn from the Revolutionary Guard land army was sent to Syria in 1982 to assist in confronting Israel during the Peace in Galilee campaign.

Although the Syrians prevented actual Iranian participation in fighting, with many of the troops being returned to Iran, the remainder (1000-1500 men) stayed on to camp in the Bekaa Valley in the midst of the Shiite population. The force established a permanent military and logistic infrastructure at Camp Sheikh Abdallah in Baalbek, (which it had captured from the Lebanese Army) and at the Zabadani Camp in Syria, northeast of Damascus. In addition, command posts, field intelligence and operations units were established at Baalbek, Beirut, Zahleh and Mashgara (south Bekaa).

However the most distinctive accomplishment of the Iranians in Lebanon was their ability to cause disparate Shiite groups (which had been operating as local clan militias) to unite under one organizational umbrella called Hezbollah ("the party of Allah"), to indoctrinate their leaders with the extremist concepts of the Islamic revolution, and to train them in the military techniques and methods of the Revolutionary Guards.

Assistance by the Revolutionary Guards to Hezbollah prior to and during the present confrontation:

Iran did all it could during the present confrontation to stress its moral support for Hezbollah, as being part of "the historic struggle against the Zionist cancer and the USA". At the same time Iran strenuously denied any military involvement in the crisis. In fact, Iran was totally involved in these events.

This involvement was led by the Quds (Jerusalem) Force, an elite unit of the Revolutionary Guards. The Quds Force commanded by Qasem Suleimani is in charge of Iranian military operations and terrorist activities world-wide, and Lebanon is one of its main theaters of operations.

The Revolutionary Guard force in Lebanon is the spearhead of Iran in its campaign against Israel. It expresses an Iranian strategy that sees Lebanon as a beach-head, and so cultivates Hezbollah and its strategic abilities as a means of reacting to Israel, to wear Israel down with the ultimate aim of destroying that country, and meanwhile maintaining a balanced deterrent against it.

Over the years the Revolutionary Guards strengthened Hezbollah's military capabilities, granting it over $100 million annually. Iran also supplied the organization with varied weaponry, some of which was used by Hezbollah in the recent conflict. Some of these weapons were used independently and others required Iranian consent before use, such as the C-802 missiles...

Further Iranian assistance to Hezbollah in the recent fighting:

Iran supplied Hezbollah with intelligence about Israel.

Technical assistance in operating weapons: This assistance complemented routine basic training held in Iran at Revolutionary Guards camps and facilities. The two main camps of the Quds Force where non-Iranians are trained are the Imam Ali base in Teheran and Bahunar camp at Kharj north of Teheran. Two Hezbollah terrorists captured by the IDF related that they had been trained by the Revolutionary Guards at the Kharj base. One of them named the commander of an anti-aircraft course in 1999 as Hassan Irelo, a senior Iranian officer in charge of training.

Courses and joint exercises held in Iran for Hezbollah included anti-tank weapons (firing Sagger and Tow missiles), and anti-aircraft missiles. Special efforts were made to train in the use of strategic missiles with ranges of over 75 and 100 km, as well as drones. Revolutionary Guards officers assisted Hezbollah in launching an Iranian drone in November 2004 against Israel.

During recent years the Iranians stepped up supply of weapons to Hezbollah by air. When humanitarian supplies were flown into Iran following the earthquakes in Bam in southeast Iran (Dec 2003-Jan 2004) at least 9 return flights were used to ferry weapons to Hezbollah.

It is estimated that some recent attempts to resupply from Iran were prevented by IDF action. But the huge arsenal amassed over the years gave Hezbollah its "second wind". Iranian leaders have recently admitted publicly to supplying Hezbollah with weapons including long range rockets that threaten Israel...

[SWJED]

1 September Washington Times - Palestinians Aim to Learn from Hezbollah by Joshua Mitnick.

Gunmen from the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a militant Palestinian group known for its suicide attacks on Israel, say they envy Hezbollah even as they despair of their own inability to defeat Israeli forces.

"Even though we feel our capabilities are depleted, any chance at striking back we'll take. We have men that will eat stones," said Abu Ameed, who used a nickname for fear of arrest by the Israeli military.

"And if our generation feels a little demoralized, the next generations will not stop."

Mr. Ameed was part of a group of gunmen who spoke with a reporter in a grungy courtyard parking lot in Ramallah. Their disappointment was obvious. The Israeli military can reach them at will, and leaders of their own Fatah party want them to lay down their weapons.

But after Hezbollah held firm against an Israeli invasion for 34 days until an Aug. 14 cease-fire, the Palestinian gunmen say they have hope.

Israeli officials and analysts have expressed concern that Palestinian militants will try to replicate Hezbollah's tactics and "Lebanonize" areas such as the Gaza Strip by smuggling advanced weapons and building bunkers.

The militants, who wore black shirts, said they are trying to learn the lessons of Hezbollah's success, which they attributed partly to the militia's cohesion and discipline...

[jonSlack]

Jerusalem Post - Exclusive: Hizbullah paying terrorists for Kassam attacks

According to the officials, while Islamic Jihad was behind most recent rocket attacks - including the one on Tuesday night that critically wounded 14-year-old Adir Basad in Sderot - several splinter terrorists groups are also involved and have received direct funding from Hizbullah.
According to security officials, Islamic Jihad gets the money via its headquarters in Damascus while Fatah's Tanzim terror group and the Popular Resistance Committees receive payment from Hizbullah in Lebanon.

All of the money originated in Iran, the officials said.

Government officials said Hamas was not currently involved in firing missiles, but was doing nothing to stop those who were.

[Strickland]

I am not sure why this is either shocking or seen as being somehow under-handed or nefarious? Didnt we pay the Contras to attack the legitimate government of Nicaragua? Didnt we pay the Hmong to act as a counterinsurgent force? Didnt we pay the ISI / Afghan Mujahideen to fight the Soviets? Wasnt the IRA primarily funded by misguided souls in Boston and New York City?

[Bowman]

What I find interesting is that apparently Hezbollah has to pay someone to do their deed ! How much of this mercenary business is going on when we are told that ideology drives the attacks ? Very interesting and worth looking further .

[Bill Moore]

The Hezbollah have proven they understand how to implement 4GW strategy effectively. These are guesses, but they are attempting to garner more political power in Lebanon, so they are probably holding their military arm in reserve, and keeping a clean overt appearance, yet covertly they are keeping the pressure on Israel by channeling money to various individuals and groups to conduct harassment attacks against Israel. To what purpose? This creates a wide array of targets for Israel, which means there are few if any identifiable targets that can be "effectively" neutralized. They may be able to find and kill the shooter, but there are hundreds of shooters waiting to step up to the plate. The Israeli government obviously feels compelled to take action, so this could be an attempt to lure Israel into conducting an attack, which will be seen by many as unprovoked, so again Hezbollah wins on the IO stage. Speculation, but don't underestimate them.

[SWJED]

14 September USA Today - Israeli Military Studies Hezbollah's Resilience by Yaakov Katz.

Israel's military has ordered a series of investigations to examine why its armed forces were unable to crush Hezbollah militants during a month of fighting in Lebanon.

Hezbollah guerrillas proved a resilient foe for Israel's vaunted military, inflicting casualties and firing missiles into Israel despite a punishing air campaign. Even after Israel sent thousands of troops into Lebanon, Israeli military commanders were still surprised by Hezbollah's capabilities.

“This is by far the greatest guerrilla group in the world,” said Brig. Gen. Guy Zur, commander of Division 162. His division lost 12 soldiers during an effort by Israel to gain ground days before a United Nations-brokered cease-fire went into effect Aug. 14...

Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 after an 18-year occupation in the south. Hezbollah used the past six years to build a complex network of tunnels and other fortifications in southern Lebanon. Some of these bunkers were found a couple hundred yards from the border with Israel.

Israeli troops, Saguy said, walked into traps Hezbollah had been preparing for six years.

Hezbollah is rearming after Israel lifted the sea and air blockade of Lebanon, allowing the group to get smuggled weapons, some experts say.

“Hezbollah is working to recover its arsenal and will be in several months where it was before the war,” Ganor said.

[Bill Moore]

1. Hezbollah lost several foot soldiers in the conflict. Are they effectively able to recruit replacements? There is a big difference between supporters waving Hezbollah flags and volunteering to fight. If their recruiting trend is improving that would be an area of concern.

2. What is the trend of public support for Hezbollah? Understandably there was mass support for Hezbollah during the recent spat between Israel and Lebanon, since Hezbollah was the only effective force countering "perceived" Israeli aggression; however, now that the dust has settled is the Lebonese public reconsidering their position on the Hezbollah?

If anyone can provide answers to these questions it would be most appreciated.

[Tom Odom]

Bill,

I can provide experienced-based SWAGs:

a. Recruitment will not be a problem among the young Shia in Lebanon. Hiszballah's "victory" may be perceptions-based but that constitutes reality in this matter.

b. Larger support for Hizballah will be greater at least for the near term. Hizballah damage payments to locals and earlier civic minded efforts all work in the organization's favor.

The central questiuon will be how Hizballah, the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Army, and the Israelis react to the expanded UNIFIL, one with a much more aggressive mandate and larger troop list.

Frankly, Zur's comments are somewhat obfuscatory; Hizballah's record against the IDF was not a state secret hidden from IDF leaders. And the open press--especially Poole's book on their tactics--had very accurate portrayals of what could be expected, especially the use of caves and caches.

Best

Tom

[CPT Holzbach]

Hezbollah laid ambushes throughout southern Lebanon's hilly terrain, hitting Israel's tanks with some of the world's most advanced anti-tank missiles...Israel's military has asked the government for $2.5 billion to purchase a system capable of detecting and tracking anti-tank missiles and countering them with a launched projectile.

OF COURSE that's what they want to do. They would get better results faster if they just practice their defile drills. Accept the idea that tanks must have significant infantry support in broken, complex terrain (hills, mountains, cities). The tanks by themselves won't be enough. The IDF loves it's flashy, 3rd gen, manuever warfare, but in complex terrain, it's slow going; no faster than the slowest fat ass in the accompanying infantry. The IDF should send units to train with the US forces in Korea. Defile drills are the name of the game in the mech forces there. And it would cost less than $2.5 billion.

[selil]

Hezbollah cracked the code
http://www.newsday.com/news/nationwo...orldnews-print

Hezbollah guerrillas were able to hack into Israeli radio communications during last month's battles in south Lebanon, an intelligence breakthrough that helped them thwart Israeli tank assaults, according to Hezbollah and Lebanese officials.

Using technology most likely supplied by Iran, special Hezbollah teams monitored the constantly changing radio frequencies of Israeli troops on the ground. That gave guerrillas a picture of Israeli movements, casualty reports and supply routes. It also allowed Hezbollah anti-tank units to more effectively target advancing Israeli armor, according to the officials.

"We were able to monitor Israeli communications, and we used this information to adjust our planning," said a Hezbollah commander involved in the battles, speaking on the condition of anonymity. The official refused to detail how Hezbollah was able to intercept and decipher Israeli transmissions. He acknowledged that guerrillas were not able to hack into Israeli communications around the clock.

The Israeli military refused to comment on whether its radio communications were compromised, citing security concerns. But a former Israeli general, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said Hezbollah's ability to secretly hack into military transmissions had "disastrous" consequences for the Israeli offensive.

[kaur]

Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/p...icyFocus60.pdf

[kaur]

After reading this report I'm wondering how would Hezbollah perform if they could use SAM's as close protection agains Israeli air force. What is your oppinion?

I didn't find any mention of mortarts used by Hezbollah. Couldn't be mortars effective counter measure against infantry that covered Israeli tanks. Report says that Israelis couldn't intercept short range Katyushas. Can we make parallel and say that Israelis are not able to spot possible Hezbollah's mortar batterys. Does anyone know if mortars in that kind of conflict are vulnerable to Israeli counter-battery radars? Is this kind mortar tactics already passed phase on Hezbollah's learning curve?