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Thread: Hizbullah / Hezbollah (just the group)

  1. #61
    Council Member bismark17's Avatar
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    Default Hizballah: An Iranian Proxy?

    At the Domestic L.E. level, I would be worried about their Force Projection via Hezbollah cells throughout the world. People forget they attacked a Jewish Center in Argentina back in 1994 and don't forget the cell that was rolled up in North Carolina thanks in part to the vigilance of an off duty officer working in a convienance store in the mid 90s. http://www.rd.com/content/a-hezbolla...-charlotte-nc/

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    Quote Originally Posted by bismark17
    At the Domestic L.E. level, I would be worried about their Force Projection via Hezbollah cells throughout the world. People forget they attacked a Jewish Center in Argentina back in 1994 and don't forget the cell that was rolled up in North Carolina thanks in part to the vigilance of an off duty officer working in a convienance store in the mid 90s.
    The degree to which Iran is able to use Hezbollah as a proxy is greatly exaggerated. They are definitely not a terror "force projection" force to be used at the whim of the Iranian government. Each has its own core interests and objectives, separate from the other, although they definitely share others.

    When Hezbollah collaborated with Iran in carrying out the attacks in South America, they also had their own interests at heart - revenge (even if indirect) for the Israeli abduction of Mustafa Dirrani, one of their senior leaders.

    And the NC cell, which is definitely over-used as a domestic operational example, was a fund-raising support cell with no other operational mission. No intel collection, no direct action, nada. Pure support, in an attempt to protect the lucrative fund-raising activity. Even then they ended up compromised.

    Yes, Iran and Hezbollah are both threats, each potentially serious in their own context. But lets assess them in realistic manner.

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    Council Member bismark17's Avatar
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    My understanding is that Hezbollah is just a proxy of the Revolutionary Guards. Even if not, they share many of the same goals and objectives. Its not in their interest to see Iran's government destroyed. I don't think Hezbollah would sit on the fence during a large scale engagement between the U.S. and Iran.

    As for the cells it doesn't take much to change direction from simple fund raising to a more active posture. At least several of the members had combat training in Lebanon. It makes sense to think if they had the foresight to infiltrate fund raising cells that they would also have other sleeper cells acting more covertly.

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    Default Hizbullah

    Quote Originally Posted by bismark17 View Post
    My understanding is that Hezbollah is just a proxy of the Revolutionary Guards. Even if not, they share many of the same goals and objectives. Its not in their interest to see Iran's government destroyed. I don't think Hezbollah would sit on the fence during a large scale engagement between the U.S. and Iran.
    Hizbullah has a close and intimate ideological and material relationship with the IRGC and the Iranian regime. However, it is not a "proxy," and its electoral success and political influence in Lebanon requires that it also keep touch with its Lebanese Shi'ite base there (most of whom have no such attachment to Iran).

    Incidentally, there no chance that any US strike will "destroy the Iranian government," and Hizbullah knows that. While it would degrade Tehran's military and economic capabilities, it might actually enhance the regime's hold on power.

    I do think that, in the event of a prolonged US assault on Iran, there would be intense pressure on Hizbullah to "do something," and that there is a non-zero chance it might do so. However, in general I'm with Ted when he says that Hizb's ability to mount major, short-notice external operations has likely been exaggerated.

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    I've been wondering about Iranian ability to retaliate against the US navy. The Gulf is narrow and from Fox News July 16, 2006.

    "the army's investigation into the attack, which left four Israeli sailors missing, showed that Hezbollah had fired an Iranian-made missile at the vessel from the shores of Lebanon, said Brig. Gen. Ido Nehushtan."

    Also, I've seen reports - here and in the media - that Syria and Hezbollah are both preparing for an Israeli attack. I don't think that's a coincidence.

    I doubt there was a commando attack. If Hezbollah can shoot down helicopters with laser guided Iranian missiles, Syria would undoubtedly have some asymmetric surprises around a top secret facility. Finally, I'm going to see if I can interest any of the pros here in an outlandish conspiracy theory. I wonder if the attack was carried out by stealth aircraft and the reason everyone is so close lipped is because Israel doesn't have any stealth aircraft.

    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    I'm with Ted when he says that Hizb's ability to mount major, short-notice external operations has likely been exaggerated.
    According to another thread here, Hezbollah has been frantically building in the mountains east of Beriut, north of where the fighting took place last year. Whatever they are planning to do, it won't be on short notice. If they are hiding missiles capable of hitting Tel Aviv, the missiles would've come from Iran, via Syria and could've been the target.
    Last edited by Rank amateur; 09-25-2007 at 02:26 AM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by bismark17
    ...As for the cells it doesn't take much to change direction from simple fund raising to a more active posture. At least several of the members had combat training in Lebanon. It makes sense to think if they had the foresight to infiltrate fund raising cells that they would also have other sleeper cells acting more covertly.
    First off, the fund raising was an active support op - it was not conducted by a "sleeper" cell. And foresight had nothing to do with it. It was simply opportunism.

    Just to be clear - A sleeper cell is composed of individuals who do absolutely nothing to compromise their identity until they are activated. They are part of the community. Once a cell "acts" it is no longer a sleeper.

    Now, active cell members also need to blend into the community; the key difference is that active cell members attempt to conduct their ops in such a manner as to prevent compromise - compartmentation, clandestine communications, etc. Sleeper cell members do absolutely nothing even covertly or tangentially related to the organization until they are activated.

    The "sleeper cell" threat is definitely overblown. The problem with true sleepers is that it is very difficult to maintain loyalty, let alone operational control - unless its a situation like in Telefon. In my opinion, every cell that actually exists in this country is active, to one degree or another. The problem is in identification. Professionally compartmented support cells, using relatively sophisticated clandestine comms, may conduct discreet fund-raising or low-level intel collection with little danger of being rolled up - or of creating enough evidence to enable successful prosecution.

    When fund raising is linked with overt criminal activity - as with the cigarette smuggling example - it creates a significant risk of operational compromise. That brings us to the next point. It is not as easy as you think for a cell to transition effectively from financial support to intel collection or offensive action. As stated, the members engaged in the criminal activity are constantly at risk of compromise. Effective compartmentation means that they better have no knowledge or links with any important element of the organization - the money gets passed on through a cut-out, or even better, a series of cut-outs. The cigarette smugglers know nothing, other than they are helping the cause. Much like most of those who raised money for the IRA in the US.

    Cells engaged in intel collection require training, tight compartmentation and a detailed understanding of clandestine comms in order to even remotely be effective - they ain't gonna waste those guys by getting them engaged in a high risk action.

    As regards offensive action, one of the methods the guys smuggling cigs may get involved is if they look exploitable for a suicide op. If the dumbass will risk going to jail for smuggling cigs to send a few thousand home to Lebanon, he may be malleable and dedicated enough to get him to blow himself up. However, I see that as an unlikely course of action for Hezbollah in the US. Even if we do attack Iran. But for al-Qa'ida, an affiliate or a wannabe, that is a very scary possibility that keeps LE - Fed, state and local - on edge across the country. Yet that has nothing to do with the Iran issue. In any case, a handler is necessary for the wannabe martyr - and the handler, in most instances, is going to be a smart guy and well trained along the lines of what I mentioned for the intel cell. If he's done his job right, he won't be directly connected to the suicide bomber by anything that is readily picked up post-blast.

    The other side of the offensive action coin is the threat of a sophisticated attack - non-suicide IED, VBIED, WMD, high-profile hostage incident, etc. ad nauseum. This ain't gonna be carried out by a bunch of cigarette smugglers who have fired off a few rounds in the Bekaa. Similar to the example of the intel cell, this type of op will be executed by guys who have been trained, not only in the skills necessary to carry out the attack, but in organizing and conducting themselves in a clandestine manner that mitigates against operational compromise until the moment of attack.

    Now, for a high-payoff offensive op, there is the possibility of the organization dropping the compartmentation at the last moment, and bringing in the dumbasses to be gun-cover for the real actors in the drama. They'll be expendable, and they'll be given only what they need prior to the op. Of course, in this worst-case scenario, if everyone is called in for a terror TF of this nature, the assumption is that the final denouement will be so ugly that it just won't matter who is compromised afterwards. No state-supported terror organization would go to this extreme in an attack on the US. The non-state bad guys would if they could.

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    Default Hizbullah Tactical Competence

    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    How about Hizbullah in 2006
    Excellent example, Tequila--Hizbullah's tactical performance was often outstanding, as was their ability to operate in very small manoeuver units (which also exhibited innovation and leadership by NCOs). There was very little "spray and pray," and a great deal of coordinated ambushing involving multiple weapons systems, interlocking fields of fire, etc (for example, simultaneous ATGM, RPG, and deep-dug IED attacks, followed by LMG and mortar cover fire while AT units relocated or went to ground).

    Moreover, Hizbullah regular force combatants typically show levels of OPSEC well beyond what your average NATO infantry are ever asked to manage--far from "prideful" boasting, their own immediate families are often unaware of their status, training, etc.

    By contrast, Amal--a militia made up of the same "cultural" group, Lebanese Shi'ites—displayed very poor tactics and discipline in the war in 2006.

    This isn't to say that culture doesn't matter--it clearly does. It is to suggest that whatever the original cultural "cloth," however, the right combinations of training, doctrine, and ideological motivation can clear still produce effective military forces.

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    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    By contrast, Amal--a militia made up of the same "cultural" group, Lebanese Shi'ites—displayed very poor tactics and discipline in the war in 2006.
    Rex, I thought much of the first line of village militia which slowed the IDF was Amal?

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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    Zarqawi was a convict and former street thug whose formal weapons handling training approximated zero. The better comparison would be between Zarqawi and your average mid-level Crip leader rather than Zarqawi and an American soldier.

    Compare vs. Arab forces which are actually motivated and trained as Western forces are --- i.e. Hizbullah and Amal, both trained by Iranians. Even their village militias showed excellent fire discipline in 2006.

    If you want to believe that Omar Bradley made a perfectly reasonable decision based totally on his own military judgment in 1944, I suppose I won't be convincing you otherwise. Corlett himself thought that Bradley was snubbing him out of prideful disdain rather than reasonable disagreement, however. According to Corlett:

    "I was pretty well squelched for my question [regarding why Army troops would attack using LCVPs and LCAs instead of LVTs]. I soon got the feeling that American generals in England considered anything that had happened in the Pacific strictly 'Bush League stuff' which didn't merit any consideration.'"
    If you read one of the articles posted, you would have seen that the same remark was made about the performance of some Iraqi troops being trained by the US.

    I do not believe that Bradley had a completely objective military basis for the judgement he made, but he did have one, however flawed that was, given the resources at his disposal and his professional appreciation of what he was facing. That personal feelings affected this does not change the fact that he still had a military basis upon which to render the judgement he did, however faulty that judgement was (and it most certainly was flawed) and the role of emotions in colouring that judgement. The Saudi general in his own admission, did not, and consciously and deliberately rejected any and all outside help even as he knew that his own troops had neither training nor equipent at hand for the breech. Bradley may have deceived himself, believing that all the firepower and engineer resources he had at hand would certainly be sufficient to do the job; the Saudi was not deceived, and went ahead anyway.

    Hezbollah is in no way representative of the armies of the Arab world in general, and even the latter suffered tactical defeat by the end of last year's Israeli invasion (a pyrrhic victory to be sure). As you observed, intensive Iranian training has had its effect - but unlike many other Arab armed forces, these two have been engage in more-or less constant wars for survival, which may have softened their resistance to outside training - even to help from the "Persians" - albeit fellow Shi'a. Amal has not been a major factor for some years, and its fighting prowess dubious.

    And Hezbollah, for all the striking political success it scored, has suffered the loss of the majority of its best fighting men. It is now a shell of what it used to be, and has kept fairly quiet, militarily, ever since. Not to mention thst the Israelis, by their own admission, were even maintaining their own fighting standards, having not only let them slip in order to concentrate on intrnal security operations, but in fact had cancelled the annual training of Reservists - which has since ben restored.

    There are points in the two articles that I posted the links to that have not been addressed. Here is a more direct handling of the matter by a USMC trainer of the Iraqi Army posted on our own site: "partnering with the Iraqi Security Forces" by Lt.Col. P.C. Skuta, CO 2/7th Marines:


    http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/skuta.htm


    About a quarter of the way down the page he makes the observation that US trainers should:

    Start off slow. Lawrence says, “Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for, and the Arabs form their judgments on externals that we ignore.” How true. It was beneficial for the battalion to take a ‘crawl, walk, run” approach to training and operating with the ISF. Especially if there is a lack of trust, and underdeveloped personal relationships, the Iraqis would be hesitant to adopt U.S. processes. This was not because the Iraqis had a negative view of U.S. military techniques, quiet the contrary; it was because they maintained Arab and Iraqi pride. (boldface added)

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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    Rex, I thought much of the first line of village militia which slowed the IDF was Amal?
    Most of it was Hizb, which also has local militia reserves--and, frankly, much more local support. Amal was active, but judging from the relative casualties they only played a minor role (and their forces are known for poor discipline and training).

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    Quote Originally Posted by Norfolk View Post
    And Hezbollah, for all the striking political success it scored, has suffered the loss of the majority of its best fighting men. It is now a shell of what it used to be, and has kept fairly quiet, militarily, ever since.
    I don't think Hizbullah lost the majority of its best fighting men, and its losses were compensated by both stepped-up recruitment and greater combat experience. In my view it is at least as powerful now as it was in 2006.

    Hizbullah's relative quiet in the south derives from a combination of its desire to have time to continue its rearmament, fortification and training programme; its current primary focus on Lebanese domestic politics; and the domestic costs of being seen to spark another confrontation with Israel at this time.

    Perhaps the most interesting contrast, btw, is between Hizb performance in 2006, and PLO performance in 1982. The PLO was, by the standards of the day, at least as well as equipped as Hizbullah. It had larger field forces, deployed in battalion and larger formations. It was fighting for its political life, and consisted of personnel (largely Palestinian refugees) who had strong ideological motivations to fight Israel.

    Its battlefield performance, however, was much worse. In fairness, it faced a much larger IDF force. However, the variation had much more to do (I think) with differences in leadership, command and control, training, and political-organizational (rather than religious-ethnic) cultures.

    (Actually, we have a PhD student doing a thesis on this very comparison.. wait a few years and you may be able to buy the book!)

    Again, I'm not suggesting that culture is irrelevant--I think its quite important. I do think that the right mix of other factors, however, can have dramatic effects on combat effectiveness.

    Umm, what was the original thread? *lol*

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    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    I don't think Hizbullah lost the majority of its best fighting men, and its losses were compensated by both stepped-up recruitment and greater combat experience. In my view it is at least as powerful now as it was in 2006.

    Hizbullah's relative quiet in the south derives from a combination of its desire to have time to continue its rearmament, fortification and training programme; its current primary focus on Lebanese domestic politics; and the domestic costs of being seen to spark another confrontation with Israel at this time.

    Perhaps the most interesting contrast, btw, is between Hizb performance in 2006, and PLO performance in 1982. The PLO was, by the standards of the day, at least as well as equipped as Hizbullah. It had larger field forces, deployed in battalion and larger formations. It was fighting for its political life, and consisted of personnel (largely Palestinian refugees) who had strong ideological motivations to fight Israel.

    Its battlefield performance, however, was much worse. In fairness, it faced a much larger IDF force. However, the variation had much more to do (I think) with differences in leadership, command and control, training, and political-organizational (rather than religious-ethnic) cultures.

    (Actually, we have a PhD student doing a thesis on this very comparison.. wait a few years and you may be able to buy the book!)

    Again, I'm not suggesting that culture is irrelevant--I think its quite important. I do think that the right mix of other factors, however, can have dramatic effects on combat effectiveness.

    Umm, what was the original thread? *lol*
    Yes, I largely agree with you, Rex. The Hezbollah performance was certainly in stark contrast to that of the PLO in 1982. Indeed, the IDF managed to snatch (military) victory from the jaws of defeat last year in large part to sheer weight of men, machines, and firepower. And reported Hezbollah tactics are being studied, re-studied, and studied some more to extract their lessons.

    I was under the impression from an Israeli paper (so far as I know, it was not one of the rabid right-wing ones either, so I was inclined to believe it, or at least not to seripously doubt it), that Hezbollah had suffered heavy losses in its best men, especially from a particular elite battalion. I may well be wrong in that regard, then.

    I'm intrigued by the mention of your student's work, Rex (my inner political philosopher is naturally attracted to these sorts of things).

    Yes, it would appear that we have deviated just a little from this thread's focus.

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    A few points.

    Hizbullah's field units fought well against the IDF during the July war. The Israeli claim of 600-1,000 dead Hizbullah is an exagerration. The figure is closer to 200-300. Mind you, there were others fighting in south Lebanon - Amal, SSNP, Communists etc - who could have made up the numbers. For eg. only nine Hizbullah died in Aitta Shaab village which saw some of the fiercest and most prolonged fighting of the war. The IDF was unable to seize any border villages or towns until the final stages of the war when it entered Lebanon in force. Aitta Shaab, located less than 1km from the border and also close to the scene of the July 12 kidnapping which triggered the war, remained in the hands of Hizbullah until the end. The fighters defending the village for the most part were not even full-time regulars, but part-timers, albeit with extensive battlefield experience from the 1980s and 1990s. The IDF evenually abandoned attempting to seize the villages and simply skirted them. At the end of the war, it was possible to drive behind the IDF's front line (almost matching the configuration of the old Security Zone from the 1990s) going from village to village without seeing a single IDF soldier. In general, the villages were defended by village guard units with the regulars deployed in the bunker networks in surrounding wadis. Hizbullah employed small unit hit-and-run tactics. Hizb SecGen Nasrallah said during the war “We are fighting a guerrilla war... Our policy is not to hang onto geography ... It is beneficial for us to allow them to advance to the entrances of villages. This is our goal. Our goal is to inflict maximum casualties and damage to the capabilities of the enemy, and we are succeeding.”

    The reason the IDF fared so badly in my view was down to unrealistic political expectations (the Israelis should have learned by 2006 that bombing Lebanese infrastructure does not turn the population against Hizbullah, it turns them against Israel. The Israelis tried this tactic in 1993, 1996 and 1999. It didn't work then and it won't work if they try it again in the future), woeful intelligence shortcomings on what they were dealing with (Hizbullah of 2006 was not the Hizbullah of 2000. It still amazes me that the IDF had no idea of the extent of the bunker network constructed by Hizbullah in those six years, despite near daily overflights with jets, UAVs and whatever assets they may have had on the ground), and hubris on behalf of the IDF General Staff. Hizbullah didn't win the war, Israel lost it.

    How can you defeat Hizbullah? You can't militarily in my view. You can temporarily weaken but you cannot destroy. A senior IDF general told me recently that the IDF should have staged a full-scale invasion from the get go, punching up to the Litani in a couple of days before fanning back and wiping out Hizbullah pockets. However, first, the IDF would have taken much larger casualties, second, what about Hizbullah positions north of the Litani and in the Bekaa? The speculation is that come round 2, the IDF will move into the Bekaa and take out Hizbullah's logistical centers there. But then what? As has already been stated, Hizbullah will simply rebuild once the IDF has gone home.

    BTW, Being Arabic, the word Hizbullah can be spelt in numerous different ways. There is no correct or incorrect spelling in English.

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    Default marhaba!

    Welcome to the discussion, Abujnoub. Should we read anything into you being being an Abujnoub and not an Ibnjnoub?

    I would agree with your assessment, although I think Hizballah's casualties were higher than they have claimed (although not as high as IDF claims). Amal's casualties might have been significant, but the SSNP and LCP were at best very marginal contributors to both the fighting and the battle deaths.

    Actually, I think there were (and are) very few in the IDF who thought or think that it possible to defeat Hizballah militarily. This in many ways makes the design of the 2006 campaign even more puzzling--and especially the almost complete absence of any plan on how best (from a political point-of-view) to terminate the fighting. The flip-flop on UNIFIL+ was a perfect example of this.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Abujnoub View Post
    A few points.

    @ The Israeli claim of 600-1,000 dead Hizbullah is an exagerration. The figure is closer to 200-300. Mind you, there were others fighting in south Lebanon - Amal, SSNP, Communists etc -

    @ The IDF was unable to seize any border villages or towns until the final stages of the war when it entered Lebanon in force.

    @ The IDF evenually abandoned attempting to seize the villages and simply skirted them. At the end of the war, it was possible to drive behind the IDF's front line (almost matching the configuration of the old Security Zone from the 1990s) going from village to village without seeing a single IDF soldier.

    @ The reason the IDF fared so badly in my view was down to unrealistic political expectations

    @. It still amazes me that the IDF had no idea of the extent of the bunker network constructed by Hizbullah in those six years, despite near daily overflights with jets, UAVs and whatever assets they may have had on the ground), and hubris on behalf of the IDF General Staff.

    @ How can you defeat Hizbullah? You can't militarily in my view. You can temporarily weaken but you cannot destroy.

    @ However, first, the IDF would have taken much larger casualties, second, what about Hizbullah positions north of the Litani and in the Bekaa?
    .
    Welcome to the dust, my brother

    @ Clearly that figure is an exaggeration. I have yet to see a serious source try and support it. The best estimate I know of is a little higher than 300, but comparing piles of bodies are meaningless in this matter.

    @ During the early days the IDF was mainly concerned with raiding, and dismounted infiltration to clear out OPs and ATGM posts, almost always situated in civilian houses, and thus in villages.

    @ So the IDF by-passed villages of no tactical importance. - and why would you expect to see IDF soldiers once they are exploiting northwards?

    @ Correct.

    @ If you have knowledge of basic engineering, then spanning out a bunker complex from the basement of a house is not that difficult, and I would not assume that the IDF IBP was a woeful as some like to believe. The amount of captured equipment would indicate otherwise.

    @ Of course they can be destroyed. If Syria wanted to destroy Hezbollah, they would, and Hezbollah would never recover, and no one, who was left alive south of the Litani would ever speak the word Hezbollah again. Maybe Bashir isn't the man Hafas was, but I am sure you get my point.

    @ Well that implies you believe conflict is determinable, which I do not.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    Welcome to the discussion, Abujnoub. Should we read anything into you being being an Abujnoub and not an Ibnjnoub?

    I would agree with your assessment, although I think Hizballah's casualties were higher than they have claimed (although not as high as IDF claims). Amal's casualties might have been significant, but the SSNP and LCP were at best very marginal contributors to both the fighting and the battle deaths.

    Actually, I think there were (and are) very few in the IDF who thought or think that it possible to defeat Hizballah militarily. This in many ways makes the design of the 2006 campaign even more puzzling--and especially the almost complete absence of any plan on how best (from a political point-of-view) to terminate the fighting. The flip-flop on UNIFIL+ was a perfect example of this.

    I think Hizbullah claimed around 220 fatalities. I agree, the figure is probably higher. There were a few SSNP and Communists killed in the last days of the war during the fighting in Wadi Salouqi and Ghandourieh village. Several villages just to the west, including Srifa, still maintain sizeable Communist support. But the numbers would not have been that significant compared to Hizb and Amal fatalities.

    I'm not sure there was a design to the 2006 campaign. It initially concentrated on air power and when that was failing to halt the Katyusha rockets, it became an ad hoc endeavor with ground forces at first making probing attacks, and only in the last 60 hours (after a ceasefire deal had been reached) did the IDF move into Lebanon in strength, advancing west toward the Litani in an utterly futile gesture that cost the lives of some 30 soldiers.

    Abu Jnoub is a nickname conferred upon me by some buddies in UNIFIL.

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post

    1 During the early days the IDF was mainly concerned with raiding, and dismounted infiltration to clear out OPs and ATGM posts, almost always situated in civilian houses, and thus in villages.

    2 So the IDF by-passed villages of no tactical importance. - and why would you expect to see IDF soldiers once they are exploiting northwards?

    3 Of course they can be destroyed. If Syria wanted to destroy Hezbollah, they would, and Hezbollah would never recover, and no one, who was left alive south of the Litani would ever speak the word Hezbollah again. Maybe Bashir isn't the man Hafas was, but I am sure you get my point.
    1. Actually most of the OPs, bunker complexes, underground rocket firing positions etc were located in the wadis outside villages. Hizbullah had some underground storage facilities and OPs in the villages and towns, but these were more logistical in nature than intended for war fighting. I have explored some of Hizbullah's bunkers in the wadis in the past year and they are quite impressive, far more elaborate than anyone imagined prior to the 06 war, passages lined with welded steel plates, equipped with hot and cold water, ventilation, latrines, kitchens, electric lighting etc. They were located in sealed-off military zones, and everyone (IDF, UNIFIL, local residents, nosy journos) knew the locations of these zones, but no one really knew what Hizb was up to inside them. How they built them without anyone seeing, I have no idea. Even the hundreds of tons of quarried rock from one the larger bunkers I visited had been carried away, so leaving no trace to observers in the skies above.
    I don't know if SWC has facilities for posting pics, but I'd be happy to send along a couple of bunker interiors if interested, or kml (or is it kmz) attachments so you can view the locations on google earth.

    2. The villages by-passed by the IDF were the villages they were unable to capture in the opening days of the war.

    3. Syria cannot destroy Hizbullah because they are no longer in Lebanon. If for whatever reason they attempted to do so now, I suspect they would fare even worse than the IDF. Hizbullah is not a military entity separate from its environment so that it can be isolated and crushed, it is part of the fabric of Lebanese Shiite society. Maximalist solutions (genocide against Lebanese Shiites/blitzing Lebanon with nuclear weapons) aside, a more realistic means of tackling Hizbullah is to neutralize its ability to use its weapons. That means depriving it of its casus belli. This is a process that has been underway since 2000 when the IDF withdrew from south Lebanon. How can you resist occupation where there is no occupation left to resist? Yes, Hizbullah claims the Shebaa Farms, Lebanese detainees in Israeli jails and the nebulous "deterrence against future Israeli aggression" as its justification for continuing to bear arms. But to many Lebanese, these excuses sound hollow and as they are chipped away, Hizbullah's ability to use its arsenal becomes increasingly difficult.

  18. #78
    Council Member MattC86's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Abujnoub View Post
    A few points.

    How can you defeat Hizbullah? You can't militarily in my view. You can temporarily weaken but you cannot destroy. A senior IDF general told me recently that the IDF should have staged a full-scale invasion from the get go, punching up to the Litani in a couple of days before fanning back and wiping out Hizbullah pockets. However, first, the IDF would have taken much larger casualties, second, what about Hizbullah positions north of the Litani and in the Bekaa? The speculation is that come round 2, the IDF will move into the Bekaa and take out Hizbullah's logistical centers there. But then what? As has already been stated, Hizbullah will simply rebuild once the IDF has gone home.

    BTW, Being Arabic, the word Hizbullah can be spelt in numerous different ways. There is no correct or incorrect spelling in English.
    Oh, I'm quite aware of the pitfalls of writing out Arabic words in English - our professor always railed against us when we did that. So, in short, I can't do it. I just laugh when I see about 50 different versions of Hezbollah.

    I completely agree about the IDF's inability to defeat Hezbollah in Lebanese territory, but I think Rex made an excellent point (though you, given your background and occupation, would speak to it better than I); namely, that the kidnapping and initial Israeli response detracted from Hezbollah's popularity and legitimacy in Lebanon. A more carefully planned initial response might have been effective without further bolstering Hezbollah in the eyes of the Lebanese people.

    But you're right, there is no real way for Hezbollah to be defeated and destroyed by the IDF.

    Matt
    "Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall

  19. #79
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    To suggest that Hezbollah somehow out fought the IDF is akin to suggesting the Taliban out fought the US during OP Anaconda or that the Somalis out fought the US during Gothic Serpent.

    I am going to abstain from further comment. I consider Hezbollah one of the worst terrorist groups on the planet, and one that directly threatens my family on a daily basis, thus I have to take a side and cannot afford the leisure of purely intellectual comment.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    Council Member MattC86's Avatar
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    Sir, I hardly consider Hezbollah a "good" group. There's no question they are terrorists. I have no particularly sympathy for their cause, goals, or methods.

    Nor would I claim they "outfought" the IDF, which is a remarkably subjective term anyway. No one has admitted they get "outfought" since Stilwell marched out of Burma and announced we got our teeth kicked in - it's an issue of ego and pride, not usually of fact. Doesn't matter to me.

    What I would say, based on the reports and analysis I've read - much of it provided by Jedburgh and others here, that Hezbollah fought very effectively for an irregular force taking on a professional army; that it held villages with decentralized defenses, and had more success against Israeli armor than many believed possible (thanks in part to the effectiveness of the RPG-29).

    The criticism of the Israelis was (1) in their planning and operational concepts and (2) from Naveh, anyway, that they had been doing Gaza policing for so long, that when they took a few casualties and lost a few vehicles to Hezbollah, they were unprepared and prone to overcautiousness.

    My larger question is less about what the IDF should have done (in part because almost everyone at least agrees it was something other than what they did) and more about what can be done against an entity like Hezbollah. They cannot be militarily destroyed, and the Lebanese government is in no position to co-opt them into the government.

    Matt
    "Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall

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