Hizbullah / Hezbollah (just the group)

[Ken White]

the Constabulary in Germany post WW II. It was more dog and pony show than effective -- but it did work well enough to deter any resurgence, no doubt about that.

There were some minor successes other than Greece but IMO you got this 110% correct:

"If it was new territory, then the mistakes we made would be understandable and pardoned, but the mistakes we're making now could have been avoided if we didn't officers who blindly adhere to the war is war mindset. The American people should speak out strongly against incompetence in the Army. Losing our young people in pursuit of national security is a terrible necessity, but losing them to incompetence is not acceptable."

Stay alert and keep your head down.

[tulanealum]

The success in Greece had more to do with the Greeks than with us...and the idiocy of the Communists there...

[Ken White]

of the KKE and its armed factions but we helped a great deal, not least in getting Papagos in position and training said Greeks. An even bigger contributor was really the USSR / Yugoslavia break up. There would have been no success at the time without all those elements.

[Rank amateur]

R.A.,

This quote from the Krepinevich article I referenced above sticks in my head....and I believe we can substitute Hezbollah/Hizbollah for Iraqi.

"The assumption behind these market metrics is that the higher the insurgents' price, the fewer people there are who are willing to support them. "

Steve

The problem with price is that it's a function of supply and demand. High price could indicate few people willing to plant them (low supply) or that AQI has a lot of money and a lot of IEDs. (high demand.)

All war is immoral; period, end of sentence.

I tend to agree with that - with a few exceptions - but we do seem to spend a lot of time talking about the superior way we fight. It would be more sense - IMO - if we talked about the superior reasons why we fight.

[That's why I asked if anyone could identify any western nation who had done that sort of thing -- so your attempt at diversion or obfuscation sorta falls flat...

I did say "it depends on how you define "we.""

I can show you a western nation that sells cluster bombs to an ally who drops them on civilian areas, which I think has some moral similarity to the use of civilian shields, but if you consider those two things apples and oranges there is no sense discussing it further.

Good try, though

Thanks. It's always nice when someone notices that you're trying.

[Ken White]

...I tend to agree with that - with a few exceptions - but we do seem to spend a lot of time talking about the superior way we fight. It would be more sense - IMO - if we talked about the superior reasons why we fight.

I don't make any exceptions; just note that, immoral or not, some are necessary. I do strongly agree with your last sentence there...

I did say "it depends on how you define "we.""

That was your response to Wilf's 'we.' Since he's a Brit, one could assume he was referring to only the UK, I took it as a western or Eurocentric generic. I think stretching it beyond that would be counter to the thrust of the discussion he was engaged in. YMMV.

I can show you a western nation that sells cluster bombs to an ally who drops them on civilian areas, which I think has some moral similarity to the use of civilian shields, but if you consider those two things apples and oranges there is no sense discussing it further.

Apples and Tractor-trailers more like...

Thanks. It's always nice when someone notices that you're trying.

De Nada.

[Rank amateur]

I don't make any exceptions; just note that, immoral or not, some are necessary. I do strongly agree with your last sentence there...

I knew we could agree on some things. I also agree that a soldier's best moral defense is, "someone has got to do it." Thank God that some people are willing to do it. (Cowards like me really appreciate it.)

I'm sure we agree on the first sentence too. I don't think genocide, or ethnic cleansing, are ever justified. You probably don't consider them military tactics. My only comment is that if you don't clearly state they're never justified, some nut will attempt to justify them as military tactics. (Sadly, some nuts already have.) But at least once we had to go nuclear. Hopefully, we won't need to again, but we might.

[Ken White]

...I'm sure we agree on the first sentence too. I don't think genocide, or ethnic cleansing, are ever justified. You probably don't consider them military tactics. My only comment is that if you don't clearly state they're never justified, some nut will attempt to justify them as military tactics. (Sadly, some nuts already have.) But at least once we had to go nuclear. Hopefully, we won't need to again, but we might.

but you're correct, genocide or ethnic cleansing are not military tactics in any sense, though such tactics may be used in the process of committing the crime. To my mind it is a crime -- but a difficult one to curtail. We can say they're never justified and most of the world does and has for some time said just that. Unfortunately, saying so doesn't seem to stop it from occurring even today.

As to whether it's a justification for war, my sensing is that it is not. If it were wars would be started to stop it at each occurrence yet they rarely are. The few occasions like Kosovo where that was invoked generally end up causing more problems than they solve.

United external pressure from the rest of the world is more effective -- IF one can develop a united front. That seems to be almost impossible; nations tend to be far from altruistic and to be pretty selfish. Bad problem with no easy solutions.

[Surferbeetle]

The problem with price is that it's a function of supply and demand. High price could indicate few people willing to plant them (low supply) or that AQI has a lot of money and a lot of IEDs. (high demand.)

R.A.,

Price can in fact serve as a measure of the capability and desire to engage in the insurgency.

You have half of it when you state that high price indicates low supply. Assuming that AQI has a fair amount/'excess amount' of money (a reasonable assumption since we are targeting the money supply of AQI) does not mean however that the supply of people willing to do this type of work (the issue that we are measuring) is limited.

http://counterterrorismblog.org/ please see 'Extremism's Deep Pockets' by Michael Jacobson as just one open source example of the tactic of targeting funding)

The demand function can be described mathematically as:

Qd=a +bP+cM+dPr+eT+fPe+gN

Where
Qd = Quantity Demanded
P= Price of the Good or Service
M=Consumer Income
Pr=Price of Related Goods or Services
T=Taste Patterns of Consumers
Pe=Expected Price of the Good in Some Future Period
N=Number of Consumers in the Market
a = Intercept Parameter (when P,M,Pr,T,Pe, and N all equal zero)
b,c,d,e,&f are slope parameters.

So let's check our equations prediction (low supply = high demand) against an in-country observation.

Given a state of ~XX% unemployment in your country (which includes you 'Joe-Iraqi') your family asks you (the patriarch) when water, food, and shelter will be purchased (electricity is out again, your food spoiled in yesterdays 125F heat, the cities pumps have not delivered water to your home, the markets are closed due to security concerns, and you and your family can't stay in your house due to security issues). You know that you will need to pay XX dollars to get your family through Y time.

What do you do? Your choices include:

a) Food/Water/Shelter is available so you do not have to participate (you obviously live in America - Lucky You!). b) Sell your possessions. c) Ask your tribe or militia to help you out yet again. d) Join the local CLC/Iraqi Army and hope the American funding continues and retribution does not come to you or your family. e) leave the country f) Participate in smuggling, crime, etc. g) Take X dollars to shoot at the infidels. h) Take XX dollars to plant an IED. i) Take XXX dollars to act as lookout for an IED attack. j) Take XXX dollars to push the IED trigger.

Supply and Demand are metrics which can be used to measure the insurgency. The 60,000 dollar question is how accurate are the estimates for the variables used in the model.

Steve

[Rank amateur]

R.A.,
The 60,000 dollar question is how accurate are the estimates for the variables used in the model.

Steve

There's also the issue of whether or not it's an efficient market. It appeared to be surprisingly efficient at one time. As our COIN efforts get better, it should become more inefficient.

It would be interesting to see if the price changes when we think we've killed/arrested " a major distributors of IEDs." It would also be interesting to see how long the price was disrupted. That would indicate the flexibility/resilience of the supply chain. It would also be interesting to see if there were different prices for different types of IEDs, or placing them in different locations. That would give some indication of the tactical importance placed on the different IEDs/location: though again you can't necessarily assume a constant supply of "labor" across Iraq.

Given all the variables, however, I would think that the operational value of the data is somewhat limited. How many IEDs, where and placed by who is probably the most important data.

[Jedburgh]

JFQ, 2nd Qtr 08: Hizballah Rising: Iran’s Proxy Warriors

....Because it furthers its foreign policy aims without any meaningful penalty from the international community, it is safe to assume that Iran will continue to provide significant financial and military support. Hizballah provides Iran a means of changing U.S. behavior, as it did in Lebanon by blowing up the Marine barracks in 1983, facilitating an American withdrawal.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force will continue to use Hizballah as a proxy in Iraq. If it has not already done so, Hizballah may expand operations into Afghanistan and other regions in support of Iranian foreign policy objectives. In 2006, a senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization official likened tactics of Taliban insurgents to those of Hizballah. While no direct evidence currently exists that the organization is involved in Afghanistan, it would not be surprising to find it in some kind of training or advisory role to insurgent forces there, much as it is doing in Iraq.

Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, provides this assessment: “Lebanese Hizballah, which has conducted anti-U.S. attacks outside the United States in the past, may be more likely to consider attacking the homeland over the next three years if it perceives the United States as posing a direct threat to the group or Iran.” U.S. policymakers must focus efforts on Hizballah inroads into the Western Hemisphere to prevent potential attacks in the United States by Hizballah operatives.....

[BR]

Of course Hezbollah is an iranian proxy. In fact the organization was founded by dispatched units of the Pasdara(Irani Revolutionary Guard) in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon in the beginning of the eighties.

[Rex Brynen]

I suppose it depends on what one means by "proxy."

Hizbullah is an extremely close ally of Iran, and heavily funded and equipped by it. It is, at the same time, a very Lebanese organization, whose core constituency supports it because of its Lebanese goals (resistance to Israeli occupation, defending the political interests of the Shi'ite community) and not because of its Iranian connection.

Does Hizbullah slavishly follow orders from Tehran? No. Does it usually agree with Tehran? Yes--and, equally, Tehran usually defers to it on issues of Lebanese policy (although some differences seem to have been apparent during the recent presidential crisis).

[Jedburgh]

Infantry Mar-Apr 08 (AKO Log-In Required): The Arab Perspective of the 2006 Israeli War with Hezbollah - The Egyptian Strategic Research Central Al-Ahram Annual Strategic Report

....The Arab report states that 1,500 Hezbollah fighters shattered and eroded the invincibility and deterrence factors of the IDF. Israeli forces could not advance at will towards Beirut as they did in 1982, and this is already being touted as Hezbollah offering a major deterrence factor to Israeli military movement towards the Lebanese capital. Arab articles and books on the war refer to this conflict as the Sixth Arab-Israeli conflict, which is indicative of the timeline by which the mass media in the region view its long-term wearing down of Israel....

[kaur]

Russian Anti-Armour Weapons and Israeli Tanks in Lebanon

Mikhail Barabanov

According to various Israeli and Western sources, during the course of battle in Lebanon, between 46 and 50 Merkava main battle tanks (of the 400 deployed) and 14 APCs were hit by anti-tank weapons, including 22 incidents where tank armour and 5 cases where APC armour was penetrated. Another six tanks and at least one APC were blown up by mines and IDEs.

Of those tanks hit by anti-tank weapons, 18 were the newest Merkava Mk 4 version (from the 401st armoured brigade), and six of these had their armour penetrated. Twenty-three tank and five APC crew members were killed. A large number of anti-tank guide-missiles and RPG grenades hit the tanks, but in most cases these did little damage. It was reported that one of the Merkava Mk 4 tanks survived 23 hits from anti-tank guided—missiles before it was finally disabled and its armour penetrated. All penetrations of Merkava armour, according to Israeli statements, were achieved by the Konkurs, Metis-M and Kornet-E anti-tank guided—missiles, and the RPG-29 rocket-propelled grenades. If one considers that 22 of 50 tanks had their armour penetrated, that gives a penetration rate of 44% (and only 33% for the Merkava Mk 4). According to Israeli Army statistics, the penetration rate for tanks during the 1982 Lebanon War was 47%, and 60% during the 1973 War. The crew casualties rate was also much higher in 2006 at 0.5 crew member for each damaged tank, while the rate per disabled tank in 1973 War is one full crew member.

The number of irrecoverable tank losses among those damaged, according to recent Israeli publications, was five altogether, of which two (a Merkava Mk 2 and Mk 4) were destroyed by IDEs and three tanks were completely burned out after hits by guided anti-tank guided—missiles. This attests to the high degree of protection afforded by the most modern Merkava Mk 4 tanks, which could be damaged only by the most modern anti-tank weapons with powerful tandem HEAT warheads hitting, it would seem, weakened armoured zones.

http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2007/item2/item1/

[Fuchs]

Actually, all but "the most modern" AT weapons predate the Merkava, so it should not come as a surprise that the old tools are blunt.

[William F. Owen]

Here is a breakdown of actual IDF casualties from the Lebanon, that I have cobbled together from Israeli sources.

Of the 23 members of the armoured corps killed in action, 15 were killed by ATGMs, and 7 by mines.

The cause of death for the other 1 is not recorded specifically. Most probably gunfire from commanding "heads out".

Over 50% of the armour casualties are attributable to just 3 incidents.
The ATGM deaths are all accounted for by just 6 hits.

For APCs 14 were hit by ATGM killing 7 embarked troops in 2 incidents. 3 APCs hit mines killing 5 infantrymen in two incidents (4 and 1). 90% of these casualties all occurred in one night.

In comparison, 14 infantrymen were killed by ATGMs fired at buildings.

The vast majority of casualties were still incurred by the infantry, in gun battles.

[William F. Owen]

So extrapolating on from this, and using the most reliable sets of open source figures.

Let us assume Hezbollah fired only 100 ATGM and RPG. They hit 50 tanks, of which 22 hits perforated the armour. Of those 22 hits, only 6-7 caused deaths. That's a 6-7 percent "success" rate per 100 rounds fired. Only 3 MBTs were total losses to ATGM fire. The reality is more likely a >2% success rate.

APCs got perforated 11 times, causing 7 casualties across 2 hits.

Essentially there are only 8-9 recorded incidents where Hezbollah AT fire was able to cause deaths inside armoured vehicles, and 4 times where AT fire killed troops in buildings.

[RedTEamGuru]

Hizbullah Spying Through 'Facebook'
5 Elul 5768, 05 September 08 10:16
by Gil Ronen

(IsraelNN.com) According to the intelligence community in Israel, Hizbullah terrorists are becoming increasingly computer savvy, using Facebook to learn more about IDF soldiers, potential targets for kidnappings.

Yeshiva World News reported that IDF intelligence officials are concerned that soldiers may unwittingly give the enemy information through social networking sites or even arrange to meet an internet companion who is in fact a terrorist.

[Jedburgh]

Old news - even older than the more-than-three-month old article linked. I first saw it begin to recycle through the e-mail lists a couple of days ago. If anyone is surprised that any threat organization uses open social-networking sites to gather information on their enemies, then shame on them. The only thing that is really newsworthy is the number of people who honestly find this to be an eye-opener and are shocked by the revelation.

[Rex Brynen]

Retired IDF general: Deterrence is our best option against Hezbollah

Giora Eiland says another war between Israel and Hezbollah 'will be a war between Israel and the State of Lebanon and will wreak destruction on the State of Lebanon.'

Haaretz 16 December 2010 /Reuters

Mass devastation in Lebanon is Israel's best deterrence against the powerful Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, former Israel Defense Forces general and national security adviser Giora Eiland said Thursday, warning that Israel's home front would suffer greatly in any confrontation between the two sides.

"Our only way of preventing the next war, and of winning if it happens anyway, is for it to be clear to everyone ... that another war between us and Hezbollah will be a war between Israel and the State of Lebanon and will wreak destruction on the State of Lebanon," Eiland told Israel Radio. "And as no one - including Hezbollah, the Syrians or the Iranians - is interested in this, this is the best way of creating effective deterrence."


Eiland also cautioned that guerrilla group, which has an arsenal of thousands of rockets, would inflict heavy damage on the Israeli home front if war broke out.

Israel last sent its troops into southern Lebanon in 2006, after Hezbollah abducted and killed two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border attack. Tensions between Israel and Hezbollah's Iranian and Syrian backers have stoked expectations of renewed violence in Lebanon.

"Israel does not know how to beat Hezbollah," said Eiland, who served as national security adviser to former prime ministers Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert.

"Therefore a war waged only as Israel-versus-Hezbollah might yield better damage on Hezbollah, but Hezbollah would inflict far worse damage on the Israeli home-front than it did 4-1/2 years ago," he said.

...