"Prime Candidates for Iraq"

[SWJED]

SWJ Blog - "Prime Candidates for Iraq".

Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, reports on a new US State Department intitiative; nay, order; that will see additional diplomats taking posts in Iraq next year because of expected shortfalls in filling openings, the first such large-scale forced assignment since the Vietnam War. As far as we are concerned this is a long overdue move by State to fulfill its end of the 80% political, 20% military counterinsurgency (COIN) fight in Iraq.

... On Monday, 200 to 300 employees will be notified of their selection as "prime candidates" for 50 open positions in Iraq, said Harry K. Thomas, director general of the Foreign Service. Some are expected to respond by volunteering, he said. However, if an insufficient number volunteers by Nov. 12, a department panel will determine which ones will be ordered to report to the Baghdad embassy next summer...

While we applaud (what we call “long overdue”) this move, we do acknowledge that State and other non-military departments and agencies lack the resources to fulfill its COIN obligations. It is time for Congress to get serious and ensure that our Nation has the capacity to deploy fully-trained and mission-capable personnel that truly represent all elements of national power.

Much more at the link...

[SWJED]

Have not done this for quite a while - but if you think this SWJ post is worth it - cast a vote at Real Clear Politics Reader's Articles. Again, only if you think worthy - much appreciated.

Dave

[SWJED]

... from Abu Muqawama.

... At the operational level, Killebrew argues that the "inter-agency" will never be solved in Washington. Instead we should let local commanders and ambassadors work out issues on the ground as part of a action-oriented country team. (Some see the Khalilzad-Barno days in Afghanistan as one model to emulate.) As one who allegedly teaches about the inter-agency, Charlie has deep sympathy with Killebrew on this front.

All of this begs the question as to what State's role is in COIN campaigns? Charlie has heard military officers refer all too often to "civilian capacity" with the idea that the Foreign Service is chock full of experts on agriculture, water and electrical systems, tribal cultures, and more. This blogger is pretty sure that if those people existed, they'd volunteer to be on the first flights overseas (and to the extent that those skills do exist, those folks are true first responders). But the Foreign Service exists to represent US interests in foreign capitols. If we want an expeditionary State Department, we're going to have to (re)create one in much the same way we have to (re)create those capabilities in the Army and Marine Corps as well.

[Rob Thornton]

Charlie has heard military officers refer all too often to "civilian capacity" with the idea that the Foreign Service is chock full of experts on agriculture, water and electrical systems, tribal cultures, and more.

It does raise the question - where should these capabilities reside? How do you build them, retain them, best employ them? How do they interact with other capabilities?

One way to refine these questions and get to some answers might be to set up something at DoS (if that is where the capacity is going to reside) along the lines of CALL (Center for Army Lessons Learned) to go out and collect on PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) across the board, and PRT like organizations operating elsewhere under similar conditions to document the challenges they face so that skill sets can be prioritized, recruited, trained, etc. Perhaps this could be an Inter-Agency venture between DoS and DoD? While there is already some good collection and analysis done on PRTs - I'm not sure its been analyzed in terms of providing the basis for an Inter-Agency understanding - nor if it is linked and justified to strategic documents as part of greater political objectives.

Whoever takes on this challenge is going to have to grow capacity, or trade capacity in other areas. They may also be taking on new roles for foreign commitments that reduce the ability to respond to domestic commitment.

Even if you are talking about double billing professionals by "affording" an Inter-Agency experience such as the opportunity to work else where in the government, get ACS (Advanced Civil Schooling) or attend military PME such as CGSC/ILE or the War College - it means a desk or task goes absent unless those agencies have a surplus personnel account that affords those opportunities.

Good people can make a difference, even if their skill sets/professions don't exactly match up - a language skill, or a cultural experience that at least allows them to empathize helps allot - relationships such as the types built at embassies that allow people to reach back and ask questions, or shed light on a problem are also valuable - but that should be seen as a temporary solution.

If the problem is only temporary, then a temporary solution is probably acceptable. If the problem is persistent and matches to our view of the next decade or two - then we probably need to allocate the resources toward a solution that matches the problem. Otherwise we just grind down our existing resources and you get into an attrition of the willing where you just place more and more burden on those who stick around. Lots of good folks in State and the Inter-Agency, but the system does not seem to be set up to allow them as much flexibility as the situation appears to require.

Best, Rob

[Rex Brynen]

It does raise the question - where should these capabilities reside? How do you build them, retain them, best employ them? How do they interact with other capabilities?

Many of them reside at USAID. However, in an era where so much of the specialist support in these areas is itself subcontracted from outside government, in-house technical capacity (regards development and institution-building) can be surprisingly thin in virtually all donor agencies.

It does exist to a greater degree in some (certainly not all) of the UN and Bretton Woods agencies--UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank, IMF, etc. I think a key question for US policy is to what extent it wants to reproduce those skill sets internally within USG agencies, or to what extent it wants to think about accessing external expertise more effectively (or, most likely, both).

On a related side note, while the US is still the world's largest provider of ODA, it still provides relatively little development aid as a proportion of GNP, much of this is clustered in a small number of countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt), and is in many other areas is stretched surprisingly thin. In central Africa, for example--location of some of the bloodiest and most regionally destabilizing wars of the post-WWII era, the US is only the 6th largest donor in DR Congo, provides only $57 million a year for Rwanda, etc. Are these the appropriate levels of commitment, given the stakes? It would make for an interesting discussion.


OECD, US aid at a glance.

OECD, Aid recipient data.


Now, back to your regularly-scheduled discussion on the DoS...

[Rob Thornton]

Rex,

Could you go into more detail on this:

It does exist to a greater degree in some (certainly not all) of the UN and Bretton Woods agencies--UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank, IMF, etc. I think a key question for US policy is to what extent it wants to reproduce those skill sets internally within USG agencies, or to what extent it wants to think about accessing external expertise more effectively (or, most likely, both).

in terms of:

-resident skill sets in those organizations & the roles those functions might be able to fill - maybe, what kind of model they might provide & maybe costs of doing so
-how we might access them more effectively (and if there are any problems in doing so)


I knew a guy in Ethiopia back in the 80s who worked for UNICEF - he was looking at soil samples to determine how the absence of key minerals effected pregnancy, infant and child development. Guys and gals like that would seem key to helping produce long term solutions. With all of our fears about pandemics, etc associated with globalization - I have become very curious about how the WHO is laid out and their importance.

I really think this is an important piece of the discussion - although the piece focused on DoS - I think what we're really talking about is more along the lines of capability as you describe.

Thanks, Rob

[Ken White]

multi-national agencies are prone to ask the US to do more while excoriating the US on many counts leads to a strong disinclination to support the use of those agencies in pursuit of US policy. Thus, I suspect we'll see little movement in that direction. Restoring USAID to its pre-Clinton size and mission would perhaps be a better plan.

There is little support for increased Government provided foreign aid from the US to developing nations due to beliefs that the money is often diverted to pockets of leaders, thoughts regarding the essential inefficiency of government programs (as witnessed by the flaws of many internal to the US) and the perception cited above -- that they'll take the money but don't appreciate it enough to avoid sometimes harsh criticism and actions that seem to be no more than "thumb your nose at the big guy." Pretty hard to get Joe Sixpack interested in supporting nations that routinely vote against you at the UN...

The counterpoint to that is that US private giving tops most everyone else; thus it is not stinginess nor a perceived lack of need; it is in the 'how to do it' pocket as opposed to what to do.

That is, of course my sensing of the national mood and I'm sure it bears little relationship to the consensus in the better watering holes. My sensing is also that mood encompasses, population wise, about 75%+ and the better watering holes account for <25%.

[TROUFION]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071031/...s_iraq_embassy

"WASHINGTON - Several hundred U.S. diplomats vented anger and frustration Wednesday about the State Department's decision to force foreign service officers to take jobs in Iraq, with some likening it to a "potential death sentence."

I see an argument to allow and call for more Military Officers and Enlisted to take many of these jobs AND it should be done on a 'seconding' format. A military officer or enlisted should be able to volunteer to fill one of these unfilled billets and be seconded to the DOS, meaning DOS pays the salary of the military personnel at the GS rate. This would no doubt be a substantial pay raise. This would not be a drain on the services since the target audience would be middle level officers and more senior enlisted which are not the critically short ranks. This could be scene as a b-billet as in the Marine Corps. IMHO. --T

[Rob Thornton]

You got to love that image of somebody "venting" anger and frustration - it sounds so diplomatic

I read Monday that we'd scaled back our diplomatic mission in Azerbaijan because of unrest and it made me think. Given what these FSOs would likely be doing in Iraq - working at the Green Zone, or on a large FOB possibly going out to do some PRT work if they are of the caliber I've known a few to be (vs. trying to do it from inside the FOB - few of those out there too), they would probably be safer with service in Iraq or Afghanistan then in some of the other places we're at. It may just be my mindset, but if you are in a place where you are conscious of the danger, and have the tools around you to mitigate it, then you are better of then being in a place that offers a permissive environment to terrorists, narco-traffickers, kidnappers, organized crime, health risks, etc., but one in which you are ignorant of the dangers and blind to reality.

The world is a dangerous place, and I'm not sure its getting any better. So if you are an FSO and your objection is that DoS is handing out death sentences because its sending you to do your job in Iraq, I'd recommend you reconsider your line of work - maybe take a job with a beltway think tank, work from your house, start up an Internet business or something along those lines with lots of insulation from the dangers of the real world.

Also - these guys are not just getting their GS pay - they are getting that and then some. I'd recommend State start heavily recruiting at the military job fairs, and offering training and good $$$s for those who have served abroad to come in serve abroad again - we're pretty understanding types so we acknowledge that the word "foreign" in the job description means we'll serve where needed, not just where we'd like.

Best, Rob

[skiguy]

I'd recommend State start heavily recruiting at the military job fairs

and at AMU.

[MattC86]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071031/...s_iraq_embassy

"WASHINGTON - Several hundred U.S. diplomats vented anger and frustration Wednesday about the State Department's decision to force foreign service officers to take jobs in Iraq, with some likening it to a "potential death sentence."

I see an argument to allow and call for more Military Officers and Enlisted to take many of these jobs AND it should be done on a 'seconding' format. A military officer or enlisted should be able to volunteer to fill one of these unfilled billets and be seconded to the DOS, meaning DOS pays the salary of the military personnel at the GS rate. This would no doubt be a substantial pay raise. This would not be a drain on the services since the target audience would be middle level officers and more senior enlisted which are not the critically short ranks. This could be scene as a b-billet as in the Marine Corps. IMHO. --T

Depending on what exactly what jobs you're suggesting military personnel take over, I strongly disagree, and here's why.

The problem with USAID in particular, and State political, economic, and agricultural experts in general, at least in terms of their track records in Africa and elsewhere, is that they are painfully inflexible. While NGOs have been quick to adapt to local conditions and modify their aid or assistance programs, USAID (again, in the past - not sure how they've been the last few years, but I've heard bad things) has a well-earned reputation from the days of Structural Adjustment Policies for being ideologically rigid and stubborn. The SAPs essentially said to recipient nations, "our way or we're hitting the highway with our money."

In order to be successful, economic development programs, particularly with respect to agriculture, must be tailor-made for local conditions; thus a combination of local cultural expertise and economic experience. While military personnel with experience in Iraq may be adaptable, flexible, and skilled, I doubt they will have the prerequisite skills that State really needs right now.

That said, after extolling the adaptability and flexibility of NGO aid or development organizations, I still don't think they're the answer unless we can subordinate them somehow to a unified command.

Matt

[Old Eagle]

at the temper tantrum at the FS town hall. It validates what many of the foreign service's detractors have claimed for decades -- that the FS is a group of effete snobs. While I don't hold that view myself, it's probably time for a purge in the FS, so only motivated foreign policy experts remain.

While I am still officially working on the precept that the FS needs to be expanded and made more robust, there may indeed be a place for culling the herd. Cut the FS back to about 10% of its current strength, let those volunteer for posts in places like Paris, London and Tokyo, under the supervision of politically appointed ambassadors. They could go to all the parties and write mindless reports on exchange rates and the number of remaining endangered animals. Then open up all of the remaining difficult posts (Oh! I might get a hangnail!) to "seconded" military folk. Might also help the officer retention challenge on the other thread. I would make a dandy ambassador in a small to medium-sized country (think Estonia).

The fact of the matter is that the FS is filled with tough, dedicated and talented professionals. They need to be singled out for advancement, while the wusses need to be eliminated. They must not be rewarded with cush jobs while the pros embrace the suck.

[Rob Thornton]

I have it on good authority by a buddy who was on a PRT that the $$s to be made are:

Over base pay for the FSO:

25% hazzardous duty
25% locality
Deployment bonus incentive ranging from 12-80K

I hear their cap is at 200K

We need to start pitching this to guys making the decision to leave the military - employing them by DoS will help shape the DoS culture to something that works within the policies proscribed by the elected officials vs. believeing that the elected folks should shape their policies around the views held by folks who don't want to deploy.

The suggestion that only those FSOs in agreement with policies in Iraq should have to go is bordering on treasonous IMHO - certainly its insubordiantion. We take the King's schilling - we often do things we may not agree with on a personal level - that is just the way it is.
Best, Rob

[goesh]

- if duty and committment is good enough for the troops in tents, it's good enough for State weenies in the green zone and I may well be speaking for a large segment of the tax paying Public here

[Norfolk]

I have it on good authority by a buddy who was on a PRT that the $$s to be made are:

Over base pay for the FSO:

25% hazzardous duty
25% locality
Deployment bonus incentive ranging from 12-80K

I hear their cap is at 200K

We need to start pitching this to guys making the decision to leave the military - employing them by DoS will help shape the DoS culture to something that works within the policies proscribed by the elected officials vs. believeing that the elected folks should shape their policies around the views held by folks who don't want to deploy.

The suggestion that only those FSOs in agreement with policies in Iraq should have to go is bordering on treasonous IMHO - certainly its insubordiantion. We take the King's schilling - we often do things we may not agree with on a personal level - that is just the way it is.
Best, Rob

Rob, this sounds so, so subversive...of the way things are handled at State: I like it. Radically transform the Department from the inside, by infiltrating military professionals into its ranks.

Wouldn't that come as a shock to sensibilities in certain quarters. The conduct of US Foreign Policy would certainly undergo some changes in due time.

Although competition for the Paris postings (at the wives' behest) might lead to the employment of a little more aggression towards such an end than some Foreign Service types are accustomed to.