"Prime Candidates for Iraq"

[TROUFION]

mATTc86-- I dont disagree with you that professional area expert FSO's should be filling these jobs, but the point is most are unwilling. Those that have volunteered have done well in most cases. But they are too few. The idea of 'seconding' military folks (along with sending them to schools like the Naval Postgrad, Civilian University or the FS Institute for training) would be a cover our behinds right now move. Bottom line there are not enough FSO ready to roll. There are military professionals willing to take their place and they are ready to learn as well as execute.

BTW on a monetary front 'seconding' would require the paying of base military pay augmented by the equivalent GS pay and bonuses, with the cap still hitting 200k.

-T

[skiguy]

TROUFION, I agree with what you are saying on one hand, but disagree that it should only be military or prior military personnel. There are civilians out there who are going to school for one reason and that's to do this type of work. It pisses me off, not only that they went public with their crying, but that there are so many working for DoS now who are unwilling to do their job. It would piss me off more if they wouldn't hire me or let me go because I "only" have a BA and no experience whatsoever in foreign service. Train me! I want to go. I want to serve my country. It's the reason I am going to school.
If I ever get a job at State or somewhere else, I'll volunteer the first time they ask.

I regret 2 things in my life: that I started school so late (but I'm doing it now) and that I didn't reenlist when I had the chance. Of the many reasons I regret the latter, one is because I could have gotten foreign service experience and would have a better chance of getting a job. I guess I'll just have to work that much harder.

[Rob Thornton]

this sounds so, so subversive...of the way things are handled at State: I like it. Radically transform the Department from the inside, by infiltrating military professionals into its ranks.

I have learned a few things over the last few years that seem to apply on and off field:

1) The shortest distance between 2 points is not always a straight line
2) A direct head-on approach often gets bogged down or turned and results in allot of flash/bang, but no real change
3) Subversion from the inside is often a more subtle, economy of force way of doing things

The changes we need to occur are are across the broad spectrum of our Inter-Agency - the world changed some for us, and if we don't figure out and reflect how it changed we're putting ourselves at a disadvantage (you an also get it wrong - just changing is not enough - we've got to get it more right then wrong). When I see the arguments that were made public at the AFSA meeting, it seems to me they also have a culture that resists change - we had that long thread on adaptability where we discussed how change occurs in the military - DoS is having the same issues. I've know some incredible talented and sacrificing folks at DoS, but I've also known some duds who had the highest sense of over self importance I've ever seen. They'd probably say something similar about us. It'll be interesting to see how their adaptation to the things proceeds. We can only hope they get it more right then wrong.

Best, Rob

[Jedburgh]

An opinion piece by a retired FSO and CORDS vet in the Nov 07 FSJ:

Caution: Iraq is Not Vietnam

....Civilian Foreign Service personnel should never be used as “totems” — symbols of a decision by our government’s most senior political officials that every element of the U.S. government must be represented on the battlefield in order to signal our determination to do whatever it takes to win.

Foreign Service officers are not combat professionals, and no amount of training in combat skills, weaponry and self-protection will ever enable them to be more than hostages to luck in a combat environment. As such, they will also never be more than a burden on those military and security forces who have to protect them, and they are unlikely to be able to significantly assist in postwar reconstruction and the transition to democratic institutions in the countries where they serve.

Assigning Foreign Service professionals to such environments does not demonstrate commitment on the part of our government so much as a lack of sound judgment. Nor does it send a signal that this administration intends to win in Iraq and Afghanistan. It merely endangers lives — and not only those of Foreign Service personnel, but also those of the military and security forces who have to protect them.

[Brian Hanley]

I guess the argument could be made that with one of Blackwater's primary tasks being protection of foriegn service personnel that they are quite the diplomatic liability. Hmmm. Hadn't thought of it that way, but it certainly makes sense.

I did a quick stat that suggests life in Iraq is pretty close to as survivable as life in the USA for foriegn service.

3/2000 (approximately 2000) foriegn service workers over 5.5 years of war have died. That's about 28 per 100,000 per year.

According to CDC http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr55/nvsr55_19.pdf (scroll down to death rates by age and sex) the 35-44 year old age group has a 400 deaths per 100,000 rate from all causes. If you look at table 18, you see that 56 deaths per 100,000 are to be expected from all causes of injury. (Using the lower age adjusted figure rounded down to be conservative.)

That indicates that foriegn service personnel are probably significantly safer in Iraq than at home.

[goesh]

yeh - I thought mortaring the green zone had become less a fad than previously. I think they should have to sleep wearing those goofy looking, bare helments, painted OD

[Surferbeetle]

The FSO Team that I worked with in Iraq was outside the wire everyday, spoke the language, had practical suggestions, and were able to implement some solid ideas. My assessment was a thumbs up.