"Prime Candidates for Iraq"

[Rob Thornton]

I have it on good authority by a buddy who was on a PRT that the $$s to be made are:

Over base pay for the FSO:

25% hazzardous duty
25% locality
Deployment bonus incentive ranging from 12-80K

I hear their cap is at 200K

We need to start pitching this to guys making the decision to leave the military - employing them by DoS will help shape the DoS culture to something that works within the policies proscribed by the elected officials vs. believeing that the elected folks should shape their policies around the views held by folks who don't want to deploy.

The suggestion that only those FSOs in agreement with policies in Iraq should have to go is bordering on treasonous IMHO - certainly its insubordiantion. We take the King's schilling - we often do things we may not agree with on a personal level - that is just the way it is.
Best, Rob

[goesh]

- if duty and committment is good enough for the troops in tents, it's good enough for State weenies in the green zone and I may well be speaking for a large segment of the tax paying Public here

[Norfolk]

I have it on good authority by a buddy who was on a PRT that the $$s to be made are:

Over base pay for the FSO:

25% hazzardous duty
25% locality
Deployment bonus incentive ranging from 12-80K

I hear their cap is at 200K

We need to start pitching this to guys making the decision to leave the military - employing them by DoS will help shape the DoS culture to something that works within the policies proscribed by the elected officials vs. believeing that the elected folks should shape their policies around the views held by folks who don't want to deploy.

The suggestion that only those FSOs in agreement with policies in Iraq should have to go is bordering on treasonous IMHO - certainly its insubordiantion. We take the King's schilling - we often do things we may not agree with on a personal level - that is just the way it is.
Best, Rob

Rob, this sounds so, so subversive...of the way things are handled at State: I like it. Radically transform the Department from the inside, by infiltrating military professionals into its ranks.

Wouldn't that come as a shock to sensibilities in certain quarters. The conduct of US Foreign Policy would certainly undergo some changes in due time.

Although competition for the Paris postings (at the wives' behest) might lead to the employment of a little more aggression towards such an end than some Foreign Service types are accustomed to.

[John T. Fishel]

The Foreign Service is on a different pay scale than the Civil Service although pay is roughly comparable (as it is with military pay - key word is "roughly"). GS 15 is roughly equivalent to FSO 1 to O6. Big differentials in locality pay, overseas pay, hazardous duty pay, etc. as Rob pointed out.

The Foreign Service, like military officers, is commissioned service with the USG, unlike the Civil Service. As a result, the SECSTATE as always had the authority to direct assignments just like the military. It has been a long time since any Secretary exercised that authority until now.

That said, there are many members of the Foreign Service who are willing to go anywhere their country needs them. Witness the high success rate in getting volunteers for both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as for PRTs. Clearly, there are plenty of wimps as well but we shouldn't tar the whole bunch with that brush.

Regarding USAID: My experience with them has generally been positive in spite of rules that in previous times appeared to preclude cooperating with the military. Still, we in Southcom, were able to work with reluctant AID guys in many places - in El Salvador we had an SF CPT assigned to the AID mission in 87 and 88 with a lot of success. But Matt, as far as SAP goes, the problem is not in AID but rather in USG policy which AID, like State, is charged with executing. BTW, structural adjustment is/was not all bad. It worked well in some countries and badly in others. I should say I am not a fan and haven't been one for over 40 years but the real question is why it works or doesn't work. Where it works, as in Chile, what made it successful? Why doesn't it work elsewhere? Subject for much research that needs to be undertaken without ideological bias IMHO.

Cheers

JohnT

[TROUFION]

mATTc86-- I dont disagree with you that professional area expert FSO's should be filling these jobs, but the point is most are unwilling. Those that have volunteered have done well in most cases. But they are too few. The idea of 'seconding' military folks (along with sending them to schools like the Naval Postgrad, Civilian University or the FS Institute for training) would be a cover our behinds right now move. Bottom line there are not enough FSO ready to roll. There are military professionals willing to take their place and they are ready to learn as well as execute.

BTW on a monetary front 'seconding' would require the paying of base military pay augmented by the equivalent GS pay and bonuses, with the cap still hitting 200k.

-T

[skiguy]

TROUFION, I agree with what you are saying on one hand, but disagree that it should only be military or prior military personnel. There are civilians out there who are going to school for one reason and that's to do this type of work. It pisses me off, not only that they went public with their crying, but that there are so many working for DoS now who are unwilling to do their job. It would piss me off more if they wouldn't hire me or let me go because I "only" have a BA and no experience whatsoever in foreign service. Train me! I want to go. I want to serve my country. It's the reason I am going to school.
If I ever get a job at State or somewhere else, I'll volunteer the first time they ask.

I regret 2 things in my life: that I started school so late (but I'm doing it now) and that I didn't reenlist when I had the chance. Of the many reasons I regret the latter, one is because I could have gotten foreign service experience and would have a better chance of getting a job. I guess I'll just have to work that much harder.

[Rob Thornton]

this sounds so, so subversive...of the way things are handled at State: I like it. Radically transform the Department from the inside, by infiltrating military professionals into its ranks.

I have learned a few things over the last few years that seem to apply on and off field:

1) The shortest distance between 2 points is not always a straight line
2) A direct head-on approach often gets bogged down or turned and results in allot of flash/bang, but no real change
3) Subversion from the inside is often a more subtle, economy of force way of doing things

The changes we need to occur are are across the broad spectrum of our Inter-Agency - the world changed some for us, and if we don't figure out and reflect how it changed we're putting ourselves at a disadvantage (you an also get it wrong - just changing is not enough - we've got to get it more right then wrong). When I see the arguments that were made public at the AFSA meeting, it seems to me they also have a culture that resists change - we had that long thread on adaptability where we discussed how change occurs in the military - DoS is having the same issues. I've know some incredible talented and sacrificing folks at DoS, but I've also known some duds who had the highest sense of over self importance I've ever seen. They'd probably say something similar about us. It'll be interesting to see how their adaptation to the things proceeds. We can only hope they get it more right then wrong.

Best, Rob

[Jedburgh]

An opinion piece by a retired FSO and CORDS vet in the Nov 07 FSJ:

Caution: Iraq is Not Vietnam

....Civilian Foreign Service personnel should never be used as “totems” — symbols of a decision by our government’s most senior political officials that every element of the U.S. government must be represented on the battlefield in order to signal our determination to do whatever it takes to win.

Foreign Service officers are not combat professionals, and no amount of training in combat skills, weaponry and self-protection will ever enable them to be more than hostages to luck in a combat environment. As such, they will also never be more than a burden on those military and security forces who have to protect them, and they are unlikely to be able to significantly assist in postwar reconstruction and the transition to democratic institutions in the countries where they serve.

Assigning Foreign Service professionals to such environments does not demonstrate commitment on the part of our government so much as a lack of sound judgment. Nor does it send a signal that this administration intends to win in Iraq and Afghanistan. It merely endangers lives — and not only those of Foreign Service personnel, but also those of the military and security forces who have to protect them.