"Prime Candidates for Iraq"

[MattC86]

In regards to DoS, it's helpful to remember Kilcullen's comment on Charlie Rose - DoS is absolutely minute in comparison to DoD. This raises a difficult question about unity of command and purpose - so insisted upon by COIN theorists (actually all military theorists) from Galula on forward, when many of the resources needed are outside the domain of DoD. Using multinational organizations or NGOs for the "civilian" or political side of COIN is risky when these groups do not report to a single commander, whether that's POTUS or SecDef. But the capabilities are not inherent in DoD, nor do I think the Pentagon is going to invest in a lot of agricultural development experts anytime soon (side note: I'm taking a class on the economics of agricultural development; interesting stuff). That means for a unified, consistent effort, those assets will have to come from State, and if we don't have 'em, we need to find 'em.

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

something larger then an "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability" and something more along the lines of a Bureau of Reconstruction and Stability that would provide more of a say at the table, offer continuity, incentivize, etc.?

Or would it be better suited to the culture of AID - the one that existed back in the 80s in Africa and S. America - I met some guys and gals in that line of work while in Addis as well who were smart and did not mind getting dirty?

Maybe the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability should be moved under AID and used to provide structure to those capabilities?

If you want

a unified, consistent effort, those assets will have to come from State, and if we don't have 'em, we need to find 'em.

as Matt says, then that means something along the lines of what the military reflects as DOTLMPF type impacts and that requires willingness to change and resources ($$$) to do so.

As for the watering holes - there is going to be a good one down at Sines on the 30th and I hear Rex has shifted his "free beer" commitment to some reporter

[skiguy]

If I'm wrong, someone please tell me. It seems the problem is not only the agency's (State) operations, it's the people who are employed by State. Do they have the experience but aren't volunteering for foreign service? That's kind of what I'm getting from reading much of this.

if an insufficient number volunteers

Not to be snarky, but if you got hired as a FSO, where do you expect to work? From home?
It just appears half, or perhaps more, of the problem is that the people who are needed most just aren't volunterring to go.

Like I said, if I'm wrong or completely misunderstanding this, tell me.

[Ken White]

problem is that we're just a kinder and gentler America. A lot of the PRT guys in Viet Nam were not volunteers and most had been through a three or four month course on the job that included some language training.

I imagine that in the intervening years, the culture got to the point where we expected folks to volunteer --or get paid mega bucks -- to go to unhealthy places. Far as I know the SecState has always had the authority to order any FSO to any station. I do not know what training they're given now but given the standard US ploy of skimping on training (at great cost in the long run), I bet they aren't getting three or four months.

None of which answers the obvious question; why wasn't this done three or four years ago...

[John T. Fishel]

FSOs, neither does AID, and we lost more than another bureaucratic HQ when we amalgamated USIA with State. In addition, State and AID have gone to outsourcing at least as much as DOD with the same kinds of problems.

It is interesting to note that Civil Affairs was cionceived by General Marshall in WWII as an organism that should be transferred, lock, stock, and barrel, to State after the shooting stopped. didn't happen and maybe it could not have but it would have given State the capability that many are calling for now.

[skiguy]

Some questions:
Why does DoS and AID have a shortage?
Why are the standards so high (PhD)for HTTs, and I believe as far as civilians go, PRTs as well? IMHO, someone with a lowly BA in Middle Eastern Studies, who already knows at least intermediate Arabic is not going to be in the way and would likely be quite helpful.
How many universities are on board with this? My UG degree program at AMU is intensive as far as Middle Eastern culture/history/etc courses go, but I don't see much in the way of actual training/education that prepares me to work for a government agency like State.
And what does the training consist of? One can learn all he wants about Iraq or what it will be like working in a conflict zone, but the individual doesn't really know until he actually goes there.

[John T. Fishel]

Skiguy--

I can only take on the first question at this point. It has to do with downsizing and doing more with less. We went from 800,000 people in the Army to around 400,000 in the last 20 years. We cut State's FSOs from avout 16,000 +/- to 6000 and 2000 in AID. That 6000 includes the folk who were in USIA before 1999. As far as AID is concerned, we outsource much more than we did before. In the mind of the government (Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II) the private sector can do the job cheaper and better. In this, we followed the lead of Maggie Thatcher's UK but she didn't automaticly assume that the private sector would be more efficient - the Brits made govt and private agencies compete for govt contracts (and some went ot govt entities). So, it's a combination of ideology, pragmatism, and simply being cheap! IMHO

Cheers

JohnT

[John T. Fishel]

having been involved with police training in Panama (we had to call it advising to stay legal) and police training (peripherally in El Salvador - there we had to call it training to stay legal), we are not well organized to do that job. Since we have no National Police we make do with cobbled togther contractors from local police or MPs or the FBI (active and retired)and wish we had the capability of the RCMP or the Italian Carabinieri. Part of the problem with providing police from the outside - whether to do policing or as trainers - is that few police units in the world have the redundancy of the military. Police tend to train on the job and surge by going to 2 shifts from 3. if they really need a surge, the call in the military - in the US the order is police from other jurisdictions, National Guard, regular military (see the LA riots of 1992 for example). So, the problem is a tough one even if we were better equipped to do it than we are but we keep relying on others even when it is obvious that we need that sort of capbility ourselves.

One interesting story from Panama: We had an offer from the Georgia State Police to provide the training for the Panama National Police - an organization that was much mor capable than the FBI because its mission was more like that of the PNP. ICITAP (then part of both DOJ [FBI] and State) rejected the offer and it took them a full 6 months to get a decent training program functioning...

Fun, ain't it?

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

FSOs, neither does AID, and we lost more than another bureaucratic HQ when we amalgamated USIA with State. In addition, State and AID have gone to outsourcing at least as much as DOD with the same kinds of problems.

It is interesting to note that Civil Affairs was cionceived by General Marshall in WWII as an organism that should be transferred, lock, stock, and barrel, to State after the shooting stopped. didn't happen and maybe it could not have but it would have given State the capability that many are calling for now.

dumb shortfall for a lot of folks to share. Between Jesse Helms, the Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton admins (and I won't even go into the emasculation of the CIA and DIA by every one from Nixon forward, a related batch of stupidity) at a time when the future need should have been obvious, the US elected to do its usual "post war dividend" act and slice needed capabilities at the behest of a number of Congresses so that said squirrels could buy votes with more "entitlements." Yes, I know that's simplistic and to an extent unfair -- but not by much.

Almost as bad as "We fight the nation's big wars..."

Iraq and Afghanistan both are in dire need of police trainers. Germany was supposed to pick that up. They have not, so we cobble something together three years after we knew that Police trainers were an urgent need, that the Germans were not going to do it and that failure to act was simply because of fears in several quarters that the ideal folks to do this, the MPs, should not be so used due to (fill in the blank based on parochial concern).

Aargh!!! You not only hit my last nerve, John, you stood on it....

No bets on, say, five to seven years from now.

[sandbag]

I have some experience with State in this regard. The ones I've met either:

1) are strictly academics, who want to work only in diplomacy-related, office-type stuff, or

2) want desperately to be Agency guys, but filled out the wrong application. There truly is no greater Hell than having a 23-year-old Georgetown grad with a goatee and earring teach a senior NCO or officer a soldier's trade.

That said, there are exceptional State guys, and I've found most of their senior field people to be great problem solvers and quite competent. It's the younger ones that scare me. I can only assume they have the same problems we have with our younger folks. It still doesn't explain the "what-do-you-mean-I-might-actually-have-to-go-overseas?" mentality I sometimes bump into on the Beltway. I see it in my own Army, so it does not surprise me to encounter it in other Government agencies, I guess.

If I'm wrong, someone please tell me. It seems the problem is not only the agency's (State) operations, it's the people who are employed by State. Do they have the experience but aren't volunteering for foreign service? That's kind of what I'm getting from reading much of this.


Not to be snarky, but if you got hired as a FSO, where do you expect to work? From home?
It just appears half, or perhaps more, of the problem is that the people who are needed most just aren't volunterring to go.

Like I said, if I'm wrong or completely misunderstanding this, tell me.

[Jedburgh]

Foreign Service Journal, Jun 08: Who is the Total Candidate? FSO Hiring Today

....To gain a comprehensive picture of the changes being implemented, the Journal spoke with officials in the Bureau of Human Resources, the Office of Recruitment, Examination and Employment, and the Board of Examiners. We also followed online discussions among the two exam Yahoo Groups, corresponding directly with more than a dozen FSO candidates — nine of whom have taken both the old and the new tests....

....In part because the new hiring process is being initiated during a time when the demand for people to serve in Iraq is putting a strain on the whole personnel system, some FSOs have assumed that the changes were being made to fill Iraq jobs. But there does not appear to be a direct connection: all incoming FS personnel agree to worldwide availability, which is nothing new. That said, staffing demands for Iraq, and to some extent Afghanistan, do dictate that many officers joining today will need to serve there.

More generally, the number of unaccompanied postings has risen dramatically, from about 200 a few years ago to over 900 positions today (generalist and specialist positions combined). Incoming FSOs should probably expect to serve in an unaccompanied post at some point in their careers, and directed assignments to war zone posts are not out of the question. State may now need many more so-called “expeditionary” diplomats, but HR tells the Journal that the examiners do not select on that basis.....