"Prime Candidates for Iraq"

[SWJED]

Have not done this for quite a while - but if you think this SWJ post is worth it - cast a vote at Real Clear Politics Reader's Articles. Again, only if you think worthy - much appreciated.

Dave

[SWJED]

... from Abu Muqawama.

... At the operational level, Killebrew argues that the "inter-agency" will never be solved in Washington. Instead we should let local commanders and ambassadors work out issues on the ground as part of a action-oriented country team. (Some see the Khalilzad-Barno days in Afghanistan as one model to emulate.) As one who allegedly teaches about the inter-agency, Charlie has deep sympathy with Killebrew on this front.

All of this begs the question as to what State's role is in COIN campaigns? Charlie has heard military officers refer all too often to "civilian capacity" with the idea that the Foreign Service is chock full of experts on agriculture, water and electrical systems, tribal cultures, and more. This blogger is pretty sure that if those people existed, they'd volunteer to be on the first flights overseas (and to the extent that those skills do exist, those folks are true first responders). But the Foreign Service exists to represent US interests in foreign capitols. If we want an expeditionary State Department, we're going to have to (re)create one in much the same way we have to (re)create those capabilities in the Army and Marine Corps as well.

[Rob Thornton]

Charlie has heard military officers refer all too often to "civilian capacity" with the idea that the Foreign Service is chock full of experts on agriculture, water and electrical systems, tribal cultures, and more.

It does raise the question - where should these capabilities reside? How do you build them, retain them, best employ them? How do they interact with other capabilities?

One way to refine these questions and get to some answers might be to set up something at DoS (if that is where the capacity is going to reside) along the lines of CALL (Center for Army Lessons Learned) to go out and collect on PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) across the board, and PRT like organizations operating elsewhere under similar conditions to document the challenges they face so that skill sets can be prioritized, recruited, trained, etc. Perhaps this could be an Inter-Agency venture between DoS and DoD? While there is already some good collection and analysis done on PRTs - I'm not sure its been analyzed in terms of providing the basis for an Inter-Agency understanding - nor if it is linked and justified to strategic documents as part of greater political objectives.

Whoever takes on this challenge is going to have to grow capacity, or trade capacity in other areas. They may also be taking on new roles for foreign commitments that reduce the ability to respond to domestic commitment.

Even if you are talking about double billing professionals by "affording" an Inter-Agency experience such as the opportunity to work else where in the government, get ACS (Advanced Civil Schooling) or attend military PME such as CGSC/ILE or the War College - it means a desk or task goes absent unless those agencies have a surplus personnel account that affords those opportunities.

Good people can make a difference, even if their skill sets/professions don't exactly match up - a language skill, or a cultural experience that at least allows them to empathize helps allot - relationships such as the types built at embassies that allow people to reach back and ask questions, or shed light on a problem are also valuable - but that should be seen as a temporary solution.

If the problem is only temporary, then a temporary solution is probably acceptable. If the problem is persistent and matches to our view of the next decade or two - then we probably need to allocate the resources toward a solution that matches the problem. Otherwise we just grind down our existing resources and you get into an attrition of the willing where you just place more and more burden on those who stick around. Lots of good folks in State and the Inter-Agency, but the system does not seem to be set up to allow them as much flexibility as the situation appears to require.

Best, Rob

[Rex Brynen]

It does raise the question - where should these capabilities reside? How do you build them, retain them, best employ them? How do they interact with other capabilities?

Many of them reside at USAID. However, in an era where so much of the specialist support in these areas is itself subcontracted from outside government, in-house technical capacity (regards development and institution-building) can be surprisingly thin in virtually all donor agencies.

It does exist to a greater degree in some (certainly not all) of the UN and Bretton Woods agencies--UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank, IMF, etc. I think a key question for US policy is to what extent it wants to reproduce those skill sets internally within USG agencies, or to what extent it wants to think about accessing external expertise more effectively (or, most likely, both).

On a related side note, while the US is still the world's largest provider of ODA, it still provides relatively little development aid as a proportion of GNP, much of this is clustered in a small number of countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt), and is in many other areas is stretched surprisingly thin. In central Africa, for example--location of some of the bloodiest and most regionally destabilizing wars of the post-WWII era, the US is only the 6th largest donor in DR Congo, provides only $57 million a year for Rwanda, etc. Are these the appropriate levels of commitment, given the stakes? It would make for an interesting discussion.


OECD, US aid at a glance.

OECD, Aid recipient data.


Now, back to your regularly-scheduled discussion on the DoS...

[Rob Thornton]

Rex,

Could you go into more detail on this:

It does exist to a greater degree in some (certainly not all) of the UN and Bretton Woods agencies--UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank, IMF, etc. I think a key question for US policy is to what extent it wants to reproduce those skill sets internally within USG agencies, or to what extent it wants to think about accessing external expertise more effectively (or, most likely, both).

in terms of:

-resident skill sets in those organizations & the roles those functions might be able to fill - maybe, what kind of model they might provide & maybe costs of doing so
-how we might access them more effectively (and if there are any problems in doing so)


I knew a guy in Ethiopia back in the 80s who worked for UNICEF - he was looking at soil samples to determine how the absence of key minerals effected pregnancy, infant and child development. Guys and gals like that would seem key to helping produce long term solutions. With all of our fears about pandemics, etc associated with globalization - I have become very curious about how the WHO is laid out and their importance.

I really think this is an important piece of the discussion - although the piece focused on DoS - I think what we're really talking about is more along the lines of capability as you describe.

Thanks, Rob

[MattC86]

In regards to DoS, it's helpful to remember Kilcullen's comment on Charlie Rose - DoS is absolutely minute in comparison to DoD. This raises a difficult question about unity of command and purpose - so insisted upon by COIN theorists (actually all military theorists) from Galula on forward, when many of the resources needed are outside the domain of DoD. Using multinational organizations or NGOs for the "civilian" or political side of COIN is risky when these groups do not report to a single commander, whether that's POTUS or SecDef. But the capabilities are not inherent in DoD, nor do I think the Pentagon is going to invest in a lot of agricultural development experts anytime soon (side note: I'm taking a class on the economics of agricultural development; interesting stuff). That means for a unified, consistent effort, those assets will have to come from State, and if we don't have 'em, we need to find 'em.

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

something larger then an "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability" and something more along the lines of a Bureau of Reconstruction and Stability that would provide more of a say at the table, offer continuity, incentivize, etc.?

Or would it be better suited to the culture of AID - the one that existed back in the 80s in Africa and S. America - I met some guys and gals in that line of work while in Addis as well who were smart and did not mind getting dirty?

Maybe the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability should be moved under AID and used to provide structure to those capabilities?

If you want

a unified, consistent effort, those assets will have to come from State, and if we don't have 'em, we need to find 'em.

as Matt says, then that means something along the lines of what the military reflects as DOTLMPF type impacts and that requires willingness to change and resources ($$$) to do so.

As for the watering holes - there is going to be a good one down at Sines on the 30th and I hear Rex has shifted his "free beer" commitment to some reporter

[Ken White]

multi-national agencies are prone to ask the US to do more while excoriating the US on many counts leads to a strong disinclination to support the use of those agencies in pursuit of US policy. Thus, I suspect we'll see little movement in that direction. Restoring USAID to its pre-Clinton size and mission would perhaps be a better plan.

There is little support for increased Government provided foreign aid from the US to developing nations due to beliefs that the money is often diverted to pockets of leaders, thoughts regarding the essential inefficiency of government programs (as witnessed by the flaws of many internal to the US) and the perception cited above -- that they'll take the money but don't appreciate it enough to avoid sometimes harsh criticism and actions that seem to be no more than "thumb your nose at the big guy." Pretty hard to get Joe Sixpack interested in supporting nations that routinely vote against you at the UN...

The counterpoint to that is that US private giving tops most everyone else; thus it is not stinginess nor a perceived lack of need; it is in the 'how to do it' pocket as opposed to what to do.

That is, of course my sensing of the national mood and I'm sure it bears little relationship to the consensus in the better watering holes. My sensing is also that mood encompasses, population wise, about 75%+ and the better watering holes account for <25%.