An Airborne Expeditionary Unit?

[Ken White]

The possibility of 'Heavy - Light parochiality' is an interesting observation, and one that I will have to keep a keen eye out for (it speaks to intra-service 'tribal culture').

If that's an issue, also be aware there are Band disputes within the Tribes... . For example, the airborne unit the Tanks joined via C-17 in northern Iraq in 2003 was not the 82d, it was the 173d Airborne Brigade out of SETAF in Vicenza; folks from the 82d will tell you the 173d really aren't paratroopers (until a guy from the 82d gets assigned to the 173d, then he switches and announces the 82d are a bunch of showboats). Seems minor and of no consequence but that rivalry can have real impact on decisions as to who does what or where they do it. Former Commanders now Generals have been known to 'take care' of their former commands -- even if it's dumb.

... I have no doubt that you are right that it was more a political than military decision. So far, in what is still early days in my research (I am still writing up my work on the USMC - sigh), I have only run across across a brief mention of the idea of inserting the 82nd. So there is lots in what you note for me to look for. Thank you.

Regrettably, too many of our seeming military decisions are political -- and I do not mean national or international political (though that obviously is an important factor) -- I mean internal military politics.

...which based on my research I do not agree with - the attendant public 'embarassment' re TF Hawk was the final straw...

Or the cited final straw, it certainly contributed though I suggest that the hassle of getting the M1 Tanks from Germany to 'protect' the Aircraft had more to do with than did the Aviation shortfall and 'embarassment.'

...there seems to be a lot of concern about combat effectiveness of the FCS as a medium weight force (even though the Brits and French are going down this road too). ..

It needs to be pursued but not seen as the holy grail.

[TT]

Correct as always. Mea culpa. I had the 82nd on my brain when I was typing.....

I do know that 'commander's' etc do lobby for particular forces to be used for parochial reasons, just not all the many examples. Not sure yet how much of an issue service/tribal/Band parochialism is through the 1990s for the views and decisions that led over time to the Future Force concept, but org culture often shapes decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions, and so I think it is worth paying attention to as I get deeper into the weeds of my research.

Ken posted: I suggest that the hassle of getting the M1 Tanks from Germany to 'protect' the Aircraft

I remember this particular issue, but so far I have not seen or heard it referred to as playing into the decision to move forward on the Future Force. Again, thanks, for I had forgotten about the 'tanks, and I will keep my eye out for this issue in future readings and interviews.

[Ken White]

may be the rather interesting saga of how we got the Bradley and what ever happened to the M8 Mobile Protected Gun system. And why...

You can also move up a notch and see why we selected the YUH-60 rather than the YUH 61. Or the M1 Tank from then Chrysler instead of the GM prototype...

Never underestimate the effect of politics at many levels on 'military' decisions. Add to that the minor phemonena that III Corps staffers will tell you that contrary to many rumors, the 1st Cavalry Division does not command III Corps -- the fact that the Corps Staff absorbs so many 1st Cav alumnae who will give the Cav pretty much what it wants just make it seem that way. Same thing happens vis a vis XVII Abn Corps and the 82d -- much to the chagrin of the poor 10th Mountain (but the 3d ID doesn't care, since they're Heavy, the Corps at Bragg pays them little attention). Politics and relationships are very much more important than most realize.

[TT]

Ken, thank you for your useful observations. I am familiar with the Bradley story, and am aware of the influence of politics and relationship on procurement decisions (indeed, I think it safe to say all procurement decisions). The studies on this aspect of the US military are fairly extensive.

I have heard somewhere about the story you relate with respect to the command relationships re the 1st Cav and III Corps, but not the other relationship.

Studying military organizations as I do I have learned, as you say, that politics and relationships are, or can be, very influential, and are always on my list of factors to look for and consider. My chore as a researcher is to discover the particular politics and relationships involved in what I am studying, to see what influence, good or ill, these had. Never easy, as these factors are often neither officially reported (or at least very obscure) nor to be found in public reports or in archival documents (at least that I can view) (but sometimes they can be found, for one of those hallelujah moments). But for the most part these two factors, particularly at the mid and lower levels, exist in the experiences and recollections of those involved.

Tom and you have made several points/observations I was not aware of so far and I do appreciate your help. I am profoundly aware that what I do not know exceeds very greatly what I do know, and this will always be th case, so I am always willing to listen and learn.

My apologies to all, for my first interjection in this thread has led the discussion astray (however much I found the digression interesting and helpful). Sorry!