Nit Pickin Stuff
This is nit pickin,but the 101 is now 101 Air Assault they are rahter proud of that distinction. The 11th was reactivated as the 11th Air Assault Division (Test), then abosorbed into the 1st Cav(Airmoble) Division. One of my 1st Squad leaders SSGT Dickey Flett was from the Air Cav which had one Brigade Airborne when they were first created.
All these large airborne formations are of no use in a real war.
How do you deploy them? Parachuting into a SAM infested red zone? Got some airlifters too many?
Once they jumped they are just light infantry, since no U.S. airborne unit has BMD style vehicles to make the final dash to the objective.
And I don't even start talking about supplying a brigade from the air ...
Air-transportable yes (as much as possible).
Airborne only up to battalion level (mechanized airborne = cavalry, if possible).
Airmobile - fancy word. Every light infantry unit should be capable of that. Own dedicated formations? No. And why? Airbornes don't have C-17 attached to them, either.
@ all this "Special" forces thing: What about getting regular infantry units into shape, instead of creating the fifth or six service branch?
But isn't it, that everybody tries to get away from dirty and dangerous and into more technicalized units, and those who can't make it end up in infantry? Negative selection. And then if you need infantry units that really do the job you have to start anew (and pin SOCOM on them)?
SOCOM should be really limited to politically/diplomatically/militarily "toxic" missions.
Oh? you basis for this is?
That would be sort of dumb. Why would one do that? Why not go where the SAMs are not?Originally Posted by Distiller
One presumes you've never fought good light infantry. They can really ruin your day and contrary to many myths, they do not end up being speed bumps for tanks. As for BMDs, a really poor little vehicle that offers great mobility and little else. I suppose what and where the objective was might determine ones need to dash...Once they jumped they are just light infantry, since no U.S. airborne unit has BMD style vehicles to make the final dash to the objective.[
Why not; with air superiority, it can be done easily today and has been done with difficulty in the past with smaller birds. Though I don't think anyone really contemplates that at this time.And I don't even start talking about supplying a brigade from the air ...
Bad idea -- then you have the minuses of 'light infantry' and none of the pluses of Armor nor the flexibility of parachutes. Plus, how are you going to initially seize that airfield for your air trans troops to land?Air-transportable yes (as much as possible).
That's the doctrine; higher formations exist for training control, a godfather role (to protect little battalions from those in the system who would hurt them -- or don't know what they can do...Airborne only up to battalion level (mechanized airborne = cavalry, if possible).) and limited tactical employment when feasible.
Agreed.Airmobile - fancy word. Every light infantry unit should be capable of that...
I have no idea what you meant there.Own dedicated formations? No. And why? Airbornes don't have C-17 attached to them, either.
That's happening here; how about yours?@ all this "Special" forces thing: What about getting regular infantry units into shape, instead of creating the fifth or six service branch?
Once upon a time; pretty much passe now. We finally realized that Infantry takes as much skill as most; more than many. Your info seems dated in this as well as the foregoing.But isn't it, that everybody tries to get away from dirty and dangerous and into more technicalized units, and those who can't make it end up in infantry? Negative selection...
That effectively is the case with only slight exceptions. Most of those exceptions are due to interservice / intraservice turf and political battles more than operational concerns or TODAYS infantry capability. I don't know any Armed forces that escape that foolishness......And then if you need infantry units that really do the job you have to start anew (and pin SOCOM on them)?
SOCOM should be really limited to politically/diplomatically/militarily "toxic" missions.
Ken,
For what its worth.... Early Entry slash Dynamic Entry slash Forced Entry was a theoretical doctrine possibly/probably implemented by the 173rd during OIF-I.
The genesis of this type of op was the concept behind the EMPRS (Enroute Mission Planning Rehearsal System) being tested/developed by Army PEO C3T in conjuction with the 82nd (MG Vines) and possibly the 18th Abn Corps just prior to Millenium Challenge 02 and OIF in 2003. It was a follow-on to the AWE of the Y2K timerame.
EMPRS as an experimental program/system of the vision of Force XXI was nixed just prior to MC-02, but I do believe the overall concept did have life after "death" and was executed by the 173rd in OIF-I.
Err... Patrol based Infantry
So called Elite formations are usually based on a fitness test. Not military skills tests.
I submit if you can run 3,200m in 16 mins carrying a 22kg ruck sack, and then climb a 7m rope, with the 22kg ruck, you are fit enough for purpose.
Testing determination/guts/staying power is a different thing and need to be tested separately.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I think I posted this a bit over a year ago somewhere on the board, but I figure it also fits here as a bit of a reference piece in this discussion:
General Orders No. 10
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 25 September 2006
UNITS CREDITED WITH ASSAULT LANDINGS
II—LIST. The following units were designated by the Senior Army Commander in the theater of operations as having participated in a parachute (to include freefall), amphibious, or helicopter assault landing.
......
b. Helmand Desert, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1845Z-0014Z hours, 19 October 2001 to 20 October 2001.
75th Ranger Regiment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company A, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company C, Detachment
c. In the vicinity of Alimarden Kan-E-Bagat, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1800Z-2334Z hours, inclusive, 13 November 2001.
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company B, Detachment
d. Near Chahar Borjak, Nimruz Province, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1345Z-1445Z hours, inclusive, 25 February 2003.
75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Company A, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Company C, Detachment
504th Infantry, 3d Battalion, Company B, Detachment
.......
w. Bashur Drop Zone in Northern Iraq (Parachute), 1700Z to 1737Z hours, inclusive, 26 March 2003.
1st Special Forces, 10th Special Forces Group, 2d Special Forces Battalion, Detachment
74th Infantry, Detachment
173d Airborne Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Company
173d Support Company
250th Medical Detachment
319th Field Artillery, Battery D
501st Support Company
503d Infantry, 2d Battalion
508th Infantry, 1st Battalion
4th Air Support Operations Squadron (United States Air Force)
86th Contingency Response Group (United States Air Force)
x. Northwestern Desert region of Iraq, in the vicinity of the town of Al Qaim, near the Syrian boarder (Parachute), 1830Z to 2230Z hours, inclusive, 24 March 2003.
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company C
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
24th Special Tactics Squadron, Detachment (United States Air Force)
y. At H1 airfield in western Iraq, west of the Haditha Dam and the town of Haditha (Parachute), 1835Z to 1200Z hours, 28 and 29 March 2003.
27th Engineer Battalion, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company A
24th Special Tactics Squadron, Detachment (United States Air Force)
z. Southeastern region of Afghanistan (Free Fall), 1735Z to 1800Z hours, inclusive, 3 July 2004.
75th Ranger Regiment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Regimental Reconnaissance Detachment, Team 3
Heh, you screwed up my ambush
S'okay, I forgive you.
You're right on all that. To add to it, airfield seizure used to be a Ranger Regiment primary mission long time ago, they've moved on to other things and the 82d and the two forward deployed airborne brigades have the mission -- and the training to go with it. They always had it as a METL task before there was a Ranger Regiment.
The 173d (a plain old airplane infantry battalion, no SOF outfit) did indeed do that and the single battalion of theirs that had the airfield mission was followed quickly by a dozen C17s with an M1 tank apiece. The other Battalion (-) did other things. Nothing really new, the Oil Slick concept included that and dates from the fifties.
The death of parachute troops has been predicted by many since 1940. Every time a non-airborne CoS Army gets in, destruction on the "Airborne Mafia" is wrought. Fred Weyand, when he took over as Chief of Staff at the death of Abrams called in almost all the Airborne Major Generals and fired 'em. Six years later there were just as many as there had been earlier.
Airborne troopies are sort of like aircraft Carriers; nobody likes the Airborne due to cost and arrogance -- until they need it. That will remain true until we find a better way to transport a large body of troops 5,000 or so miles and put it on the ground ready --and willing -- to fight anything. We will do that someday but not just yet...
I respectfully disagree
Distiller,
Take this with a grain of salt, since I readily confess to being branch biased. I think most people are biased though. Sometimes it comes down to which bias is the best bias to be biased with.
Moving on.....
I fail to see how air assault and airlanding operations are any safer than a parachute assault if a SAM threat is present. Either way you've got troops in an aircraft flying through a SAM threat.
Sure, transport aircraft are vulnerable to SAMs; and ships are vulnerable to anti-ship missiles; and tanks are vulnerable to anti-tank missiles; and convoys are vulnerable to IEDs and RPGs; and troops are vulnerable to small arms fire.....
Even if SAMs are not present airlanding operations are not without problems: bottleneck comes to mind, and aircraft make a big targets for guerrillas with RPGs while unloading on the ground. Also, I think the Germans lost a lost of Ju52s at Maleme airfield on Crete due to beginning airlanding operations too soon.
All things considered, if the operation requires moving large numbers of troops long distances by fixed wing aircraft I think it makes sense to drop at least a brigade combat team before beginning airlanding operations.
Consider this: Point Salinas airstrip in Grenada was a cluster; Panama, while not without mistakes, generally went a lot smoother. In Panama the Army parachuted a reinforced brigade combat team from the 82nd and three Ranger Battalions; six infantry battalions, plus support. It made for a rapid build up of combat power.
I don't know about the logistics of supplying a brigade from the air but people more experienced than me don't see it as a problem if the aircraft are available. Does the Berlin Airlift not provide any lessons?
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
There are actually some pretty good numbers on this. The really efficient and effective method is to have a strip that wide body cargo jets (747 or similar) can operate off and the cargo handling kit to unload them.
see here
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2005-02.pdf
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Army and Joint Doctrine on Airborne ops has addressed that issue clearly since the period of the Berlin Airlift. And we've long had the capability. Simply put, the preferred method to supply the troops that have taken the airfield being landing of supplies by aircraft, with airdropping supplies being the alternative.
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