Rifleman, I think that creating new Ranger Battalions was probably unnecessary; with Ranger-type training and adequate resources, any regular infantry battalion can do the same thing.
We'll have to wait and see how Ken clarifies this when he posts, but I think that Ken seems to mean something more along German/Commonwealth lines rather than U.S. lines in this regard. What I mean is what Lord Slim said about any special operation requiring units larger than 5-man parties, that any properly-trained regular infantry unit should and can perform such operations. Slim was in favour of Special Forces like the SAS/SBS; he consciously rejected Commando Forces like the Army and Royal Marine Commandos, the Rangers, and their kind, considering them to be both unnecessary and a drain on the regular infantry battalions. He even believed that Parachute Operations should be a routine task for regular infantry battalions.
In short, I think what Ken is saying is that all regular infantry battalions should maintain Ranger Battalion-level standards, not just a select few. It must also be said that small Armies are often compelled by their small size to ensure that their regular units are capable of many "special operations" that larger armies can afford to have separate units for.
During the Second World War, the Imperial General Staff surveyed the CO's of the British and Commonwealth Infantry Battalions in the ETO about the acceptability of regular infantryman for Airborne Forces. The conclusion of the Infantry CO survey was that 2/3 rds of regular infantrymen would successfully pass Airborne Forces standards. Those standards included a 10-mile battle march within 2 hours with full kit, and a 20 mile forced march within 4 hours with full kit, amongst others. By comparison, the regular infantry were required to perform a 5-mile forced march within 1 hour, and a 20-mile route march within 5 hours, 20 minutes, both with full kit.
By the 1970's, the regular infantry battalions in Commonwealth Armies had taken over most of the tasks that formerly been the preserves of the Airborne and Commando Forces. Since then, the latter have been somewhat "heavied-up" and are used as much as elite shock troops as they are in their original roles. Although the British Airborne Forces have tweaked their standards in recent decades, and are now much closer to the Royal Marines in many ways than they used to be, those standards are hardly inaccessible to regular infantry. In any case, a 6-month basic infantry syllabus would be sufficient to achieve such standards without taking any "shortcuts". A 3- or 4-week Basic Parachute Course could be tacked on at the end. Basic Air Assault and Amphibious Assault training would be part of the aforesaid six months' basic infantry training.
I maintain some doubt that the standards of the Commando Forces would be quite so accessible, but Slim wrote that his own regular troops in India and Burma had been trained to the same high standards. Many Royal Marines instructors are of the view that a 9-month basic infantry and commando syllabus is necessary to bring select recruits up to such standards without either cutting some corners or losing trainees to injuries because they're being pushed too far too fast.
My principle objection to going this far is not that I don't believe regular infantry battalions are capaable of the same tasks and missions as Airborne Forces (or the Marines) with proper leadership and training. My principle objection is that most infantry battalions are (at least in my own experience) seriously under-funded for men and resources. Most units get by with just the minimum, if that. It is more "economical" in the view of planners for a few "elite" units to get the resources and funding that would give most regular infantry battalions (provided that they were on a German-style Divisional System or at least a British-style Regimental System, rather than an "individual"-based system) with proper leadership and training, the same capabilities. Otherwise, if I am reading Ken correctly, I quite agree with him.
At the very least, other than lack of resources, I see no good reason why the Airborne and Air Assault Divisions aren't all RIP-qualified, dispensing with the need for separate Ranger Battalions altogether. Same for the Marine Divisions; other than lack of resources, there seems little good reason for Marine Infantry Battalions to not all be SOC-capable - even the Marine Corps offically agrees on this point, theoretically. So, other than Special Forces, practically all other regular infantry units should be capable of what Marine-MEU-SOC and Ranger Battalions are capable of now.
Originally Posted by Ken White
). slapout has an excellent point -- the Eighty Twice did in fact train for and perform those missions -- as did the 101st when they were still on jump status. Units in Alaska, Panama and Germany or later, Italy, also trained for them. Got pretty good at them, too. The 1st Ranger Bn was activated because training two Divisions and three Bde sized elements to do those missions was deemed too expensive. The other two Bns were activated because one was not enough.
) but I think he makes a sensible argument. He certainly articulates his position well.
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