An Airborne Expeditionary Unit?

[TT]

Reed posted: If you look at the win-loss ratio of airborne ops, and consider the amount of pyric victories, large scale airborne operations rarely make much sense. I am a paratrooper, and I still feel that actual airborne ops should really be limited to reconn, raids and airfield siezures. I feel it is more important to be capable when you arrive, then to arrive quickly. Want expiditionary warfare? Buy sealift, not planes. Intelligent unit sizing and rotational readyness would do more for our ability to quickly project force globaly then light airborne armor would.

I have been following this thread with some interest.

Your post, Reed, captures the issue that the Army seeming has been grappling with since 1991/2 very well (and it touches on an important issue related to my research on mil change in the US Army). It does relate at least obliquely to the thread, but if this is well off topic, my apologies.

The issue is/was that the US Army found itself in the 1990s, to use my irreverent colloquialism, ‘too light to fight, too fat to fly’, and this has been a driving concern – if not always obvious - since the first Gulf War behind the movement towards the Objective/Future force concept and, to a lesser extent, Modularization.

As everyone remembers, the US' initial 'rapid response' to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait was to deploy the 82nd Airborne to Saudi and there was concern at the time that should the 3 Iraqi divisions on the Kuwait/Saudi border drive south that the 82nd Airborne would be little more than a ‘speed bump’. (As an ignorant outsider this seemed a bit of an overstatement to me - think airpower support but then I am easily ). By contrast, to deploy armour divisions took many months, until Oct 91 for a ‘defensive’ force and Feb/March for an offensive force. Gen Sullivan (and others ) recognized that the US was moving into an era of expeditionary ops and was concerned about the future role of the Army due to this problem. So he instigated a process of thinking through how deal with it (and other issues) through the New Louisiana Maneuvers Experiments and then the Army After Next concept studies (and the Force XXI plays at the margins vice C2 for smaller sized units that the AAN was playing with conceptually).

The same problem emerges in Kosovo. Reportedly, the US considered inserting the 82nd Airborne into Kosovo very early but decided against doing so out of concern that the Serb military would go after them with deadly consequences for the 82nd (too light…) In contrast – again – was Task Force Hawk which demonstrated again the logistics/deployability problem (too fat...). TF Hawk was embarrassing for the Army and of course spurred Gen. Shinseki to take the bull by the horns and start the process of developing the Objective/Future force with its very tight deadlines for deployment into theatre and for combat readiness once on the ground (essentially arrive combat ready and capable). In other words, to be irreverent again, the FCS is supposed to be ‘fat enough to fight, light enough to fly’.

So Reed's observations - as well as others - seems to me be quite relevant given the current development problems with the FCS system (or ‘system of systems’, if you will ) and underscores the problem the US Army still faces in becoming an 'expeditionary force' capable of a rapid response with combat capable forces (and I acknowledge that 'combat capable' may or even likely depend on the 'enemy' to be faced). Clearly finding a solution to the problem - if one thinks it is a problem - is very difficult.

Anyway, thank you all for your comments on the thread, for they all have helped me make more sense of the issue/problem, thereby lifting a little bit of my fog of ignorance.

[Tom Odom]

As everyone remembers, the US' initial 'rapid response' to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait was to deploy the 82nd Airborne to Saudi and there was concern at the time that should the 3 Iraqi divisions on the Kuwait/Saudi border drive south that the 82nd Airborne would be little more than a ‘speed bump’. (As an ignorant outsider this seemed a bit of an overstatement to me - think airpower support but then I am easily ).

true but not all of it. Remember the 101st went quickly after the 82d. The real sweaty palms issue for the first 90 days or so was a shortage of AT munitions for the platforms (fixed and rotary) in theater. Plus by the time the second month rolled around the 3 Iraqi divisions were well reinforced:

In transitioning to the defense, Iraqi dispositions reflected Saddam's emerging strategy of deterrence. His forces soon established an echeloned defense of Kuwait and a strategic defense of Iraq, both designed to make an attacker pay dearly. By late September, the Iraqi defenses in the KTO had 22 divisions—13 light and 9 heavy. Fourteen were in the forward defenses. Ten infantry divisions defended the Saudi border and the coastline, backed by four heavy divisions immediately available as corps reserve. In addition, the Iraqis retained six Guard and two regular army divisions in the theater reserve, of which five were heavy divisions. Evidence of mobilization and training throughout Iraq suggested that more military forces would be dispatched to the KTO as soon as they were nominally ready.

From Certain Victory written by yours truly

Where the 82d speed bump thing really made me sweat was when I learned that the AF planners had a gleem in their eye to "take down" Iraq without putting airpower against those divisions.

The too light to fight too fat to fly also came into play for Restore Hope. We went light when those of us who had been in Somalia said send an ACR.

Best

Tom

[TT]

Tom posted: Remember the 101st went quickly after the 82d.

You are of course correct (when are you not?). My memory is not what it used to be and I forgot about this 'reinforcement'. Thank you for your point about the AT munitions shortage.

Tom Posted From Certain Victory written by yours truly

I hope you get royalties, for I bought a copy to read in late May (unfortunately, I have not had time to read it yet, due to moving continents and other work commitments).

Tom Posted: Where the 82d speed bump thing really made me sweat was when I learned that the AF planners had a gleem in their eye to "take down" Iraq without putting airpower against those divisions.

I have not run across this (yet), so thank you for this insight.

Tom posted: The too light to fight too fat to fly also came into play for Restore Hope. We went light when those of us who had been in Somalia said send an ACR.

Very interesting, for I was not aware that this 'problem' was an issue in Restore Hope (but then I was not looking for it). So, again, my sincere thanks (in spite of it meaning more research! ). May I ask if you know whether this issue appeared in any of the post-op 'lessons learned' for the operation?

Thanks!

[Tom Odom]

Quote:
Tom Posted: Where the 82d speed bump thing really made me sweat was when I learned that the AF planners had a gleem in their eye to "take down" Iraq without putting airpower against those divisions.

I have not run across this (yet), so thank you for this insight.

Take a look at Certain Victory--it is on line at CSI Press by the way. I recounted in there an episode of getting briefed on this plan in late August in Checkmate. no royalties for active duty writers

On the AT weapons, I work here with retired SMA Bill Gates; we talk from time to time about this period and the AT munitions shortages always comes up.

My take on the light versus heavy issue on restore hope was there was very much a "put us in, Coach," mentality for those concerned with validating light forces after being left out in Gulf War 1, matched by a sense we did not want to start reloading tanks on ships when we had just completed the Desert Shield/Storm retrograde. The idea of loading an ACR was snuffed pretty quickly--and then resurfaced when the request for tanks came in the next spring, only to be snuffed by Les Aspin as were requests for AC130s. You won't find mention of the ACR idea; you will find much on the issue of armor and AC 130s. Remember Aspin resigned taking responsibility for saying no to the armor. What a concept!

Tom

[Ken White]

Lots of fog. Agree with the bulk of your first four paragraphs, though...

...The same problem emerges in Kosovo. Reportedly, the US considered inserting the 82nd Airborne into Kosovo very early but decided against doing so out of concern that the Serb military would go after them with deadly consequences for the 82nd (too light…).

True -- but that decision was made by the Mech (Heavy) centric USAREUR. The 82d and its troops were not nearly as concerned. Was the USAREUR concern actually for Force Protection reasons or due to Heavy - Light parochiality? We'll never know but that factor cannot be summarily dismissed. In any event, I submit that was far, far more a political then a military decision. It is noteworthy that then BG R. Sanchez was the first USArEur Commander in Kosovo, that he took over a week to ford a river (to the amusement of the British and French and the chagrin of the Engineers who he forced to wait until it was 'safe') and when he finally arrived late in Kosovo discovered the 82d had LTs and SSGs out in the Villages playing Mayor and Police Chief -- and doing it well. All was quiet. His response to that? Pull them all back in and ALL patrols will henceforth have a field Grade Officer. May not have been the most stupid edict ever but it had to be in the top five. Sanchez' force (self?) protection glands apparently worked overtime.

... In contrast – again – was Task Force Hawk which demonstrated again the logistics/deployability problem (too fat...). TF Hawk was embarrassing for the Army...

Not really, the Army just took one in the shorts for the good of the cause. In this case, it was a DoD / CJCS objection to Wes Clark dictating more than they wanted Wes to dictate; TF Hawk was deliberately stalled to avoid a commitment that many did not agree with.

...and of course spurred Gen. Shinseki to take the bull by the horns and start the process of developing the Objective/Future force with its very tight deadlines for deployment into theatre and for combat readiness once on the ground (essentially arrive combat ready and capable). In other words, to be irreverent again, the FCS is supposed to be ‘fat enough to fight, light enough to fly’.

That was and is the dream, it won't happen but that's another story and thread...

So Reed's observations - as well as others - seems to me be quite relevant given the current development problems with the FCS system (or ‘system of systems’, if you will ) and underscores the problem the US Army still faces in becoming an 'expeditionary force' capable of a rapid response with combat capable forces (and I acknowledge that 'combat capable' may or even likely depend on the 'enemy' to be faced). Clearly finding a solution to the problem - if one thinks it is a problem - is very difficult.

In order; Reed may be partly correct but at this time the only way one can transport and deliver several thousand troops several thousand miles to an inland location in order to do anything, including airfield seizure (IF one is lucky enough to have such handy, might not always be one where you need to go...), is with Parachute troops. They have their uses and halfway decently trained they aren't nearly the pushover many think. Having been a Tanker, A CavGuy and an airplane Infantry type, if I were Tanking today, I worry a whole lot more about a bunch of nut case paratroopers than I would about other Tanks. You can see other Tanks at about the same time they see you -- and if you have a reach advantage on them...

OTOH, LGOP have ruined the day of a lot of Armor over the years -- for real and not least at the NTC where an 82d rotation is the bane of the OCs existence because the Troops are all over the place in small packets and they -- and the OpFor -- cannot keep up with them...

The development of FCS is and will remain problematic -- and, if completed, is not likely IMO to offer the panacea that some might wish. As you point out, the determinant is, as always, METT-TC. Something we forget all too often -- and that applies to when and where one uses parachute elements...

[TT]

Ken posted: but that decision was made by the Mech (Heavy) centric USAREUR. The 82d and its troops were not nearly as concerned. Was the USAREUR concern actually for Force Protection reasons or due to Heavy - Light parochiality? We'll never know but that factor cannot be summarily dismissed. In any event, I submit that was far, far more a political then a military decision.

The possibility of 'Heavy - Light parochiality' is an interesting observation, and one that I will have to keep a keen eye out for (it speaks to intra-service 'tribal culture'). I have no doubt that you are right that it was more a political than military decision. So far, in what is still early days in my research (I am still writing up my work on the USMC - sigh), I have only run across across a brief mention of the idea of inserting the 82nd. So there is lots in what you note for me to look for. Thank you.

the Army just took one in the shorts for the good of the cause

True. I realize that there was stalling going on, but I was thinking of the 'perception' of the problems that attended the deployment and the perception of many that this was the sole reason for the development of FCS (which based on my research I do not agree with - the attendant public 'embarassment' re TF Hawk was the final straw) .

That was and is the dream, it won't happen...The development of FCS is and will remain problematic -- and, if completed, is not likely IMO to offer the panacea that some might wish.

Agree. While I have read (can't remember where, it is somewhere in a file in a sealed box at the moment) that deployment of the armour bolstered 82nd into northern Iraq indicated that the deployment timelines and the on-the-ground quick combat readiness attached to the Future Force concept were achievable, these days the FCS as 'a dream' seems apt. There have already been a lot of compromises in the design of the platforms (so two aircraft instead of one to move) and, while it is beyond my competence to judge, there seems to be a lot of concern about combat effectiveness of the FCS as a medium weight force (even though the Brits and French are going down this road too). But as you say, that is another thread.

transport and deliver several thousand troops several thousand miles to an inland location in order to do anything

This is a dilemma, for sure. I take your point, though, that airborne forces may not be the push over some think (not least as it conforms with my initial ill-informed default assumption ).

Thanks.

[TT]

Tom posted: it is on line at CSI Press by the way.

Rats! I would not mind paying for a copy if you at least got a drink out of it. Nonetheless, thank you for letting me know it is available on-line (don't know how I missed it) I will get round reading it in the sort-of near future and will definitely look for your account of the briefing you mention. Interesting, though, is that this points to the Army's long standing wariness about getting CAS from the USAF.

On the lack of AT munitions, my view that the airborne would not be simply a 'speed bump' stemmed in no small part from my assumption that the 82nd would have had at least adequate AT capability munitions (and air support). Once again I was obviously wrong.

My take on the light versus heavy issue on restore hope was there was very much a "put us in, Coach," mentality

Thank you very much for this. I am aware of the issue later in the operation that resulted in Aspin resigning but not at the start. There is a hint of parochial intra-service tribal rivalry in your observation which potentially converges with Ken's observation (do I detect an emerging theme in this?). So I will at some point poke around the literature on Restore Hope to see what I can find, if anything, on this.

[Ken White]

The possibility of 'Heavy - Light parochiality' is an interesting observation, and one that I will have to keep a keen eye out for (it speaks to intra-service 'tribal culture').

If that's an issue, also be aware there are Band disputes within the Tribes... . For example, the airborne unit the Tanks joined via C-17 in northern Iraq in 2003 was not the 82d, it was the 173d Airborne Brigade out of SETAF in Vicenza; folks from the 82d will tell you the 173d really aren't paratroopers (until a guy from the 82d gets assigned to the 173d, then he switches and announces the 82d are a bunch of showboats). Seems minor and of no consequence but that rivalry can have real impact on decisions as to who does what or where they do it. Former Commanders now Generals have been known to 'take care' of their former commands -- even if it's dumb.

... I have no doubt that you are right that it was more a political than military decision. So far, in what is still early days in my research (I am still writing up my work on the USMC - sigh), I have only run across across a brief mention of the idea of inserting the 82nd. So there is lots in what you note for me to look for. Thank you.

Regrettably, too many of our seeming military decisions are political -- and I do not mean national or international political (though that obviously is an important factor) -- I mean internal military politics.

...which based on my research I do not agree with - the attendant public 'embarassment' re TF Hawk was the final straw...

Or the cited final straw, it certainly contributed though I suggest that the hassle of getting the M1 Tanks from Germany to 'protect' the Aircraft had more to do with than did the Aviation shortfall and 'embarassment.'

...there seems to be a lot of concern about combat effectiveness of the FCS as a medium weight force (even though the Brits and French are going down this road too). ..

It needs to be pursued but not seen as the holy grail.

[TT]

Correct as always. Mea culpa. I had the 82nd on my brain when I was typing.....

I do know that 'commander's' etc do lobby for particular forces to be used for parochial reasons, just not all the many examples. Not sure yet how much of an issue service/tribal/Band parochialism is through the 1990s for the views and decisions that led over time to the Future Force concept, but org culture often shapes decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions, and so I think it is worth paying attention to as I get deeper into the weeds of my research.

Ken posted: I suggest that the hassle of getting the M1 Tanks from Germany to 'protect' the Aircraft

I remember this particular issue, but so far I have not seen or heard it referred to as playing into the decision to move forward on the Future Force. Again, thanks, for I had forgotten about the 'tanks, and I will keep my eye out for this issue in future readings and interviews.

[Ken White]

may be the rather interesting saga of how we got the Bradley and what ever happened to the M8 Mobile Protected Gun system. And why...

You can also move up a notch and see why we selected the YUH-60 rather than the YUH 61. Or the M1 Tank from then Chrysler instead of the GM prototype...

Never underestimate the effect of politics at many levels on 'military' decisions. Add to that the minor phemonena that III Corps staffers will tell you that contrary to many rumors, the 1st Cavalry Division does not command III Corps -- the fact that the Corps Staff absorbs so many 1st Cav alumnae who will give the Cav pretty much what it wants just make it seem that way. Same thing happens vis a vis XVII Abn Corps and the 82d -- much to the chagrin of the poor 10th Mountain (but the 3d ID doesn't care, since they're Heavy, the Corps at Bragg pays them little attention). Politics and relationships are very much more important than most realize.

[TT]

Ken, thank you for your useful observations. I am familiar with the Bradley story, and am aware of the influence of politics and relationship on procurement decisions (indeed, I think it safe to say all procurement decisions). The studies on this aspect of the US military are fairly extensive.

I have heard somewhere about the story you relate with respect to the command relationships re the 1st Cav and III Corps, but not the other relationship.

Studying military organizations as I do I have learned, as you say, that politics and relationships are, or can be, very influential, and are always on my list of factors to look for and consider. My chore as a researcher is to discover the particular politics and relationships involved in what I am studying, to see what influence, good or ill, these had. Never easy, as these factors are often neither officially reported (or at least very obscure) nor to be found in public reports or in archival documents (at least that I can view) (but sometimes they can be found, for one of those hallelujah moments). But for the most part these two factors, particularly at the mid and lower levels, exist in the experiences and recollections of those involved.

Tom and you have made several points/observations I was not aware of so far and I do appreciate your help. I am profoundly aware that what I do not know exceeds very greatly what I do know, and this will always be th case, so I am always willing to listen and learn.

My apologies to all, for my first interjection in this thread has led the discussion astray (however much I found the digression interesting and helpful). Sorry!

[reed11b]

Reed may be partly correct but at this time the only way one can transport and deliver several thousand troops several thousand miles to an inland location in order to do anything, including airfield seizure (IF one is lucky enough to have such handy, might not always be one where you need to go...), is with Parachute troops. ...

Or air assualt or driving. Namely driving. I have a hard time inventing a scenario where not only is the region out of driving range from a friendly county and without a shoreline and lacking in capablilty eneough that an airborne division is needed. If we had big long range VTOL transports, then the idea might have more merit, maybe. Again I like our airborne units and I think that they are under-rated in capability, but they can fly in and land to the vast majority of any missions the future may hold for them. Haite could have been done from the sea, Grenada and Panama as well. Rowanda could have been air-landed, Iran is not paratrooper friendly terain nor is china. Anything I miss?
Reed

[Ken White]

Or air assualt or driving. Namely driving. I have a hard time inventing a scenario where not only is the region out of driving range from a friendly county and without a shoreline and lacking in capablilty eneough that an airborne division is needed. If we had big long range VTOL transports, then the idea might have more merit, maybe. Again I like our airborne units and I think that they are under-rated in capability, but they can fly in and land to the vast majority of any missions the future may hold for them. Haite could have been done from the sea, Grenada and Panama as well. Rowanda could have been air-landed, Iran is not paratrooper friendly terain nor is china. Anything I miss?

Perhaps you missed these facts:

(1) We didn't drive to Afghanistan... Sometimes you want to go places that other people don't want you to go and the driving then becomes sort of a problem but if you can overfly them and get behind them their advantage disappears and a long drive isn't necessary.

(2) Air assault will be great if you're doing it locally and the opposition has no ADA (or small arms, for that matter). Be nice if we had those big VTOL transports for longer range stuff but they aren't here yet. You lose fewer aircraft in overflying hot spots and dropping loads than you do trying to land on a hot LZ.

(3) We can indeed fly in and seize an airfield for many missions; just not for all -- probably not for most -- of them. Haiti, Grenada and Panama all had a seaborne operation; Grenada's parachute op was totally unnecessary; Panama's wasn't imperative but it did help because the seaborne capability was limited for several reasons and the drive-in capability from the Canal Zone for several of the same reasons, not least a really poor road net, was also limited. One DZ was for an airfield seizure, the other was to cut off reinforcements. Haiti was an airland and an air assault, even, off a Carrier -- not a jump. Air Assaults from the sea work, the Marines are good at them and the first big batch of troops on the ground in Afghanistan were Marines because the times and location of troops supported that -- and southern Afghanistan was barely in range and that only with the assistance of Pakistan (who might not be helpful another time).The first troops into Saudi for DS/DS, OTOH were parachute infantry flown from CONUS -- due to time requirements and, again troop locations. As I keep saying, METT-TC rules.

(4) No place is Paratrooper friendly, they take all the girls and the local guys get hacked off. China and Iran, OTOH as really large nations aren't susceptible to seizure by any airborne elements; those are indeed driving operations (which is why we're in Korea and Iraq) -- however, once one is in those two countries and in combat, the possibility of several types of parachute operations not only exists but could be desirable.

(5) You did notice that, as I mentioned above, Afghanistan was not a drive in operation? Neither would an operation in a lot of places be -- take Bolivia for example. Ah-ah, don't say never...

(6) In 1949, the then Chief of Staff of the Army, a Five Star General announced there would never be another large amphibious operation. About a year later, I crossed the mud flats in Inchon Harbor on D+1. Several Chiefs of Staff have tried to gut or remove the parachute infantry battalions because they are 'unnecessary in modern war.' Right...

(7) Tanks are expensive. Parachute units are expensive. A lot of folks would like to get rid of both and spend the money elsewhere. The demise of the Tank has been long predicted. Many armchair strategists will tell you that there is no need for Parachute Infantry Battalions. Note the Tanks are still here -- and so are parachute infantry battalions. That is true in both cases in spite of their expense because they offer a capability that cannot otherwise be had.

Nah, you didn't miss much.

[reed11b]

..but I get the feeling that most of those "airborne" operations you sited, had larger then needed troop drops out of politics more then anything else. Afghan was an air-land, not an air-drop, big differance. Deffinetly need some airborne capability, but I think that discusions focused around airborne DIVISIONS (<<--- channeling a little sparky there) are a little silly.

(4) No place is Paratrooper friendly, they take all the girls and the local guys get hacked off.

OK now that was funny, even if i disagree with you on the validity of LARGE airborne ops, I am still very proud to be a paratrooper.
Reed

[Ken White]

..but I get the feeling that most of those "airborne" operations you sited, had larger then needed troop drops out of politics more then anything else.

I didn't cite them, you did. I agreed with you that Grenada was purely political and unnecessary; I disagreed with you on Panama, there was an element of politics but the drops did serve valid purposes and were successful. I pointed out that Haiti was solely air land , there was no drop -- and yes, Haiti was pure political theater but the Army just did what it was told.

Afghan was an air-land, not an air-drop, big differance.

As I also said -- and I pointed out that it was Marine Air land at that -- and that it could not have happened without Pakistani cooperation.

Deffinetly need some airborne capability, but I think that discusions focused around airborne DIVISIONS (<<--- channeling a little sparky there) are a little silly.

Your prerogative. Who mentioned division sized operations? I didn't.

even if i disagree with you on the validity of LARGE airborne ops, I am still very proud to be a paratrooper.

Depends on what large is doesn't it? Are five BCTs dropping in to grab five airfields nearly simultaneously a large operation or five small ones?

Yet again, METT-TC is the driver. Always...

[reed11b]

Your prerogative. Who mentioned division sized operations? I didn't.

I inferred it from this statement...

In order; Reed may be partly correct but at this time the only way one can transport and deliver several thousand troops several thousand miles to an inland location in order to do anything, including airfield seizure (IF one is lucky enough to have such handy, might not always be one where you need to go...), is with Parachute troops.

Sounds like we just had an argument over...nothing. I feel that ops bigger then reinforced batalion size for a paradrop mission are unwise, but battalion to Brigade is not an argument I care to try and justify. Perhaps we could just go with rock-paper-scissors?
Reed

[jkm_101_fso]

We didn't drive to Afghanistan... Sometimes you want to go places that other people don't want you to go and the driving then becomes sort of a problem but if you can overfly them and get behind them their advantage disappears and a long drive isn't necessary.

Ken, just out of curiosity, do you think the 173rd's Drop was necessary?

Do you even consider it a real "combat jump"?

[Uboat509]

On my last ODA, the Team Sergeant had been on the drop zone with 10th Group when the 173rd jumped in. The Junior Engineer was in the 173rd at the time and made the jump. Needless to say there was a lot of smack talk but eventually the Engineer did admit that the hardest thing about the jump was that the hot coffee was gone by the time that he got to his link-up point. I would submit that the 173rd jump was unnecessary.

SFC W

[jkm_101_fso]

On my last ODA, the Team Sergeant had been on the drop zone with 10th Group when the 173rd jumped in. The Junior Engineer was in the 173rd at the time and made the jump. Needless to say there was a lot of smack talk but eventually the Engineer did admit that the hardest thing about the jump was that the hot coffee was gone by the time that he got to his link-up point. I would submit that the 173rd jump was unnecessary.

I concur. It was Kurdistan, for God sakes!

[Rifleman]

I would submit that the 173rd jump was unnecessary.

SFC W

Of course! So was Suart's ride around McClellan.

But a good time was had by all.....both times!