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Thread: 101st Abn, 3/2 & 1/25 Stryker Bdes in N. Iraq

  1. #1
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    Default 101st Abn, 3/2 & 1/25 Stryker Bdes in N. Iraq

    RAND, 31 Oct 07: Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st Airborne Division, 3/2 and 1/25 Stryker Brigades in Northern Iraq
    The Stryker brigade, one of the Army’s newest units, has advanced command, control, and intelligence capabilities and uses a network-centric concept of operations. These capabilities include the full complement of Army digital communications and battle command systems. Its networked capabilities enabled it to employ network-centric operations (NCO) capabilities down to a lower echelon than other Army units. An important issue for the Department of Defense and the Army is whether these improved capabilities translate into an information advantage and, if so, whether that advantage results in greater mission effectiveness in stability operations.

    This study attempts to answer those two questions by focusing on the Stryker brigade’s performance in stability operations. It employs the case-study methodology to examine three units that operated in the same area in Iraq between 2003 and 2005: the 101st Airborne Division (ABD), the 3/2 Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), and the 1/25 SBCT. All served in Iraq’s northern provinces. The study compares the performance of the units along a number of dimensions. The comparisons between the 101st ABD and the Stryker brigades are especially important because, although the 101st ABD had some advanced battle command systems, it was largely an “analog” unit, i.e., one that communicated using analog radios and generally used voice-only, line-of-sight communications at the tactical level.....

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default

    Will give it a read - for those interested in reading - its good to keep in mind their are variables which provide context that would be hard to use in causal effect type comparrisons. When ever you look at something historical - its a bit frozen and the context present in a living environement is hard to account for.

    I appreciate you posting it as I have both strong interests in the specific AOR and the 2 SBCTs - I expect Shek will see this and comment too.
    BEst, Rob

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    Hopefully the Public appreciates the fact that the development and fine tuning of new systems often entails extreme sacrifices in the process.

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    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default Comparing apples and fungo bats

    Why is it that everything that looks interesting to read is 222 pgs long. As the title of this entry implies, it appears that the study already has a serious flaw. The size of the forces being compared are significantly different. If my memory serves me correctly, the 101st had over 5 BDEs in the Mosul area alone during the early stages of operations following MCO. It can also easily be reasoned that the nature of the environment was significantly different (e.g. you could not characterize the environment as anything close to an insurgency). Add in different training preparation, body of corporate knowledge (doctrine, shared TTP, etc) and there are just too mand different variable to really form a viable comparison between network-centric and not.

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