Abolish the Air Force

[Adam L]

What do you mean by this? They can't fly in rain? I am not trying to be a smart-aleck, I just never heard of this problem.

No, the skin coating gets dinged. All they will officially say is they will suffer damage in the rain (it is not easy to strip and replace this stuff.) I thousands of small dings would most likely result in aerodynamic problems, but I am not sure to what extent (if its minor the computers will take care of the instability.) Thousands of little dings would also decrease its stealth capabilities. I am unable to guess to what extent, but it would depend on the amount of damage. Moisture can also develop inside the airframe. This may cause mechanical and electrical problems whether or not it freezes. If it freezes it may take up to 24 hours to thaw. I also would speculate that its low heat signature design prevents it from de-icing itself effectively. Most jets simply use the heat of their engines in order to prevent and/or remove ice from the airframe. Certain planes (normally non-jets) utilize boots or electric heating systems. If it developed ice on its surface, it would greatly if not completley diminish its stealth capabilities. Also, the layer of ice changes the aerodynamics. Many planes (not certified and sometimes even those certified for icing conditions) literally lose all lift while flying in icing conditions due to even thin ice formations greatly effecting the planes aerodynamics.

Beyond this it must be kept in a climate controlled hangar in order to prevent the build up of moisture in side the plane which can lead to mechanical and electrical problems. It would be unfeasable to station them at foreign airbases for this reason.

These are some strong reasons why we stopped at 31. We needed them to deter and/or threaten the Russians (and everybody else), but they are not practical for general use given their limitations.



Adam

[Adam L]

For anyone who may not have noticed or remember, we discussed this a bit in Air Powers Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare.

Adam

[carl]

Adam L:

I will read up on the B-2's problems. I don't think airframe and wing icing at cruise speed would be much of a problem though. Jets normally cruise fast enough that aerodynamic heating (or something like that) keeps ice from from forming.

[Adam L]

Adam L:

I will read up on the B-2's problems. I don't think airframe and wing icing at cruise speed would be much of a problem though. Jets normally cruise fast enough that aerodynamic heating (or something like that) keeps ice from from forming.

Yes, normal jets do one hell of a job of keeping ice off of them due to both thier engine heat and at higher speeds the heat generated. The B2 is not a highspeed jet. Also, with the airflow so even across such a large surface, I doubt it heats up as much as a normal airframe. My concern about the potential for icing on the B2 is due to its abilty to reflect and not absorb heat. If the airframe is able to stay cool as to not be detected by infared at altitude (which is quite an accomplishemnt) it either is staying very cool or somehow is that effective at absorbing infared.

Adam

[MattC86]

. . .is the study of the competition for scarce resources. And this is fundamentally a question of economics. The United States, as a hegemonic power (and I mean that in a value-neutral way), has the unfortunate responsibility of having to be prepared to deal with all threats to itself or the supporting international system. I think the services fear that politicians or the public wont swallow the enormous costs of maintaining what amounts to dual forces - unchallengeable conventional forces and forces capable of all sorts of irregular warfare. As a result, there's intense pressure to prove their viability in both arenas (the Air Force in COIN, e.g.). Personally, I think Iraq has/is showing there's enough dual capability (like Army heavy or mechanized brigades have shown) to keep these costs from being prohibitive, but the services feel the budget cuts are coming once Iraq winds down and a new administration (particularly a Democratic one - and I say that as a liberal) comes into office, and thus feel the need to prove their worth.

Ken made the point on the first page that we go through these cycles where everyone gets all hot and bothered over the issue of the moment, and can lose long-term strategic foresight and perspective. I'd take it a step farther, with respect. I see this as the heir to the old American war tradition of being woefully unready, then kicking into enormous overdrive once war finally came. Not that the focus on COIN is unnecessarily overcompensating for our pathetic ignorance of it beforehand, but it is the hot "fad" of the moment, regardless of whether it becomes the mainstay of US operations in the future or not.

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

Friday we were working a tactical problem where a theoretical BCT (Brigade Combat Team) found itself 72 hours in front of the follow on BCT and had a limited opportunity to seize a bridge head and an enemy center of government. The situation quickly turned bad as we suddenly found out that this BCT had several enemy mechanized divisions between 12 and 24 hours out and the BCT only had 48 hours of ammo and fuel - OK staff make your tactical decisions. BTW the weather is bad and the enemy has relative air parity and their are no TLAMs (Tomahawk Cruise missiles) - you got what you got for 72 hours.

What is wrong with this picture? Well for starters since when did we go to war without our Air Force recently? Where are the all weather strike capabilities that would certainly be there under the conditions (be they from any of our war fighting services)? Who can claim even relative air superiority against us - anywhere? How about the satellites and J-Star type ISR assets that would have told us that a corps sized element was on the move further then 24 hours out - and the JFACC piece that would have ensured that these divisions were at least fixed (as in unable to move or reposition)

Now - I give you the point of the exercise was to stress the influence of logistics during tactical operations - but this is not the first time as a ground guy I've seen us assume away the advantages we know we will have because we have built the world's best air force (and I'd argue- the second and third best as well) for unknown reasons. Why do we do that? Is it because we don't own them and never want to rely or depend on the USAF? Because we believe that such conditions as those stated could happen? I don't know.

However, the USAF provides us (and our allies) an advantage across the spectrum of war that no one else enjoys. It often provides deterrence options just by being on the ground somewhere where the enemy cannot strike. In the past I have not agreed with everything USAF MG Dunlap has written, but I believe it is true that in the aggregate of our capabilities - the USAF as it exists offers us an asymmetric advantage that offers a wide range of possibilities throughout the spectrum of conflict.

One of the hard questions to answer these days for ground force construct/organizational planners is how much of what will we need in the future? One thing worth considering is that during a conventional phase of a war large, amounts of PGMS delivered by air, rocket artillery, cannon and missile fires combined with the means to target enemy C2, armor, artillery, mobility & CSS assets and clusters of ground forces are a sweet advantage that offers up options to ground commanders. While we've proved you need lots of ground forces to help secure a population beyond those required to terminate a regime, we also proved that ground combat power is exponentially enhanced when you combine it with the threat of air superiority. Is it reasonable to assume we will always go to war with our Air Forces and other advantages available? What does this say about the types of ground forces we can develop if we make that assumption?

I think acknowledging that the Air Force as it exists provides us incredible advantages during the high intensity - major combat operations phase of a war, and may offer us flexibility as we look forward in considering how much of what we require by type to meet our ground service commitments in other phases of a war - be it Phase 0 thru Phase 5. These advantages might allow us some flexibility in force design across the DOTLMPF (Doctrine, Organizational, Training, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities) spectrum that allow us to focus limited resources and better achieve our ends.

From a ground perspective - I never want to be without air superiority, and if the USAF can provide options that allow us to consider the future battlefield differently - then I'm all for those options too. We have to be careful about inferring the wrong lessons from the current conflict and applying them to the future - we also need to look at where are real shortfalls were, and how we can address those. Ken had mentioned we don't often consider things like balance and consistency of equal value with other attributes - more wisdom from a guy whose heard this tune a time or two (or 4)

Best, Rob

[slapout9]

General Gavin said it best I think "never send a soldier where you can send a missile."

My personal view is also Gavin's in that in the future the concept of Air Power, Land Power and Sea Power are obsolete. Everybody should be designed to work together as a "System" kinda like the Marine Corps figured out a while back be prepared to fight on the land,sea and air.

Which means let the Air Force keep their planes and give the Army back it's missiles!!!!

[slapout9]

Missiles in a COIN environment


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iyP-Ub2st6s

[Steve Blair]

As he was about to step down as AF CoS, McPeak was proposing to hand CAS back to the Army and basically focus both the AF and Naval air on deep strike and air supremacy missions while the Army and Marines did their own CAS. His logic was that the Marines (who do their own CAS) were a "satisfied customer" while the Army (who had to depend on the AF) was not. McPeak came from a CAS background, and I think he understood that it was something the mainline AF didn't really want to do or couldn't necessarily do in the most effective way.

I don't think it's a matter of getting rid of the AF as it is looking at what it does (and perhaps more importantly what it really wants to do) and optimizing it for that mission. They'd have to resign themselves to losing some budget to bring both the Army and USMC up to full capability for CAS, but then they could go 'do' their bomber and fighter thing without worrying about CAS. They may also have to surrender some overall control of the air package in the bargain (which might cause some pain to one of the most centralized, over-controlling of the services), but it could be pitched so that the gains outweighed the losses.

Once again, as in so many discussions, I think we're seeing the "either/or" syndrome. You either have an AF or you don't. We've seen this a time or two (or four), but the constant thread going all the way back to Korea has been CAS and (to a lesser degree) tactical airlift. Maybe it's time we actually DID something about it instead of hiding behind either/or positions on it.

Just my $.02.