Revisiting DR Kilcullen's piece on New Paradigms and the OSS

[Rifleman]

Well, we could do this: recreate the OSS using most of the existing CIA as the special intelligence branch and most of the existing SOCOM as the special operations branch. And have it under a civilian director. Leave the services a tactical special operations capability.

Of course, this is an idea from someone who doesn't have a good understanding of strategic matters. I'm sure someone here can tell me why it's not a good option.

[John T. Fishel]

Rob--

As usual, a thoughtful and intriguing post. I have a concern about the OSS model in that I beleive that Donovan erred when he combined the capabilities of MI6 and SOE in one organization. This resulted in the operators having a vested interest in the intelligence product. the problem was carried over into CIA and came out "loud and clear" in the Bay of Pigs that President Kennedy reportedly called a "perfect failure."

I am also concernd that SOF is viewed as primarily direct action when FID, PSYOP, and Civil Affairs may be its most important components.

If one were to thin seriously about creating a new organization then the first step would be, I think, to address the capabilities one would want to have. The second step would be to ask what kind of organizational structure would be needed to optimize those capabilities. Then, compare those capabilities with those in existing organizations; see if they could be adapted, or if one or more new organizations were needed.

Cheers

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

I'm just not sure those ( I guess the OSS model) are the capabilities we're after (I'm not saying their not either) - that was one of the reasons its stuck with me for 6 months - it bothers me - like I'm missing something. I've known a few CIA folks, I always thought highly of them - as an organization it seems to fulfill its role (and probably then some) - I would not tamper with it. SOCOM is an organization that also seems to have come into its own and offered policy makers a suite of capabilities under one roof that we've not really been able to put our fingers before - my gut tells me that SOCOM is a good thing.

Since I read DR K's piece, I've thought he was alluding to something different. To be sure he had/has allot going on, and may not have had the opportunity to think more about it - but I think its something that would fill a niche that is absent, or one that something else is covering poorly because its a square peg in a round hole. Partly why I decided to put it up - so we could think about it some more - burn up some brain cells.

If interested, folks might peruse the Barnett Sys-Admin piece (just Google it). Kilcullen mentioned it, and at first I thought he was referencing it as a model - but after looking at it a couple of times - I think he just meant we required something that reflected the challenges we see now and believe are ahead. While I don't think Sys-Admin is what we need - I do think it has attempted to frame the challenges (in this case Barnett's "Gap" theory) and develop a solution. Same with LTC Nagl's Advisory Corps -in this case a way of looking at the problem of future security challenges differently within an existing organization (the Army). I think what is important is the way we think about the problem - using the analysis of the problem and its conditions to shape the solution vs. trying to use existing solutions against a problem for which they were not designed to anticipate. It sounds subtle - but I think its significant, and I think that was the value of the examples - not necessarily that the proposed solution(s) were the ones to go with - just the process in which the solutions were derived should be used here.
Best, Rob

[selil]

As we move forward the needs for advancing Intelligence that is tactical rather than strategic is going to require a change in CIA/NSA/DOD efforts. In the past each of the intelligence services has sliced up and duplicated efforts and no amount of substantial political wrangling has changed that. I'm currently reading a few good books that look at information sharing and operational versus intelligence analysis.

Treverton, G. F. (2001). Reshaping national intelligence for an age of information. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Shulsky, A. N., & Schmitt, G. J. (2002). Silent warfare: Understanding the world of intelligence. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc.

Clark, R. M. (2004). Intelligence analysis a target-centric approach. Washington D.C: CQ Press.

The changing role of information in warfare. (1999). Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

[slapout9]

From my point of view he (Dr. K) was suggesting something a like a world wide Phoenix program. Just my opinion.

[Rob Thornton]

Slap,

From my point of view he (Dr. K) was suggesting something a like a world wide Phoenix program. Just my opinion.

I think there is something to what you are saying. One of the problems we have though is that our ability to describe something (or problem solve) usually begins with our experiences and knowledge. This is generally a good problem to have since it accounts for the context in which the description /solution took place and that helps us determine how relevant and how applicable something is.

This is one of the reasons I think why its easier to discuss what happened in the past as opposed to what will happen in the future - we're able to sort of walk around the problem and start to consider it from the "what happened before it", "what happened during it" and "what happened after it" to provide context. Often we infer the wrong lessons because of whatever bias we've applied from the angle of view - which might skew the applicability/relativity of the description/solution/model.

However, you have to start somewhere and the nice thing about history is that if you consider enough similar problem sets and how they were approached you stand a better chance of identifying your own bias and mitigating it.

The Wikipedia has a reasonable definition of the Phoenix Program (not always the case with a wiki) - what would be interesting is the debate that led to the creation of the Phoenix Program, and its original intent - then finding out how it evolved/morphed over time - what influenced creation and change.

I'm still wrestling with defining the problem that was put forward in DR K's essay to a level where I can think about the solution. The other part is wondering if it is a problem with a solution at all, or just a change in the conditions in which our problems are occurring. The two things are different enough to require different approaches. Then there is allot of background noise going on in the environment that complicates it - ex. I read a piece this morning discussing the est. of an private intelligence company out of the Prince Group (of Blackwater fame) that has guys like former career CIA officers in it. While former intel officers have marketed their talents before, this seems of growing importance in the larger COE (Contemporary Operational Environment) because of IT and reach of not only those who offer services, but those who contract them. How does that affect our goals? How does it change the environment? The rise of importance and availability of professional services with resources comparable to many states is just one aspect of how to consider contemporary and future challenges.

Wanted to add that I'm not trying to single out any one changing variable within the COE (this was just the one I read this morning and was thinking about), but just that its difficult to describe all the variables which have led us to understanding we have problems which need answers, but which also leaves us scratching our head a bit when it comes to understanding the relationships between parts of problems and problem sets, and problem sets withing problem sets. This is why I think it has to be "people" oriented solution that while it might be capable of acting on a problem (or resourcing action), its culture would not be such as though it approached problems with the desire to find a "fire and forget" solution - then service the next target. Does that make sense?

Best, Rob

[slapout9]

Hi Rob, a big portion of the first part of your post is almost straight out of Col. Warden's concept of the 'Future Picture' of the Situation. You don't start with the past you start with the ideal future you want to see and then work backwards to the present

The second part is important because of all the misconceptions of what Phoenix was. It was conceived and executed as a Constabulary (Police) Operation. Intell was collected...a warrant for arrest was issued....you were put on trial and had a chance to defend yourself....and if convicted you could go to jail or convert to the side of the Vietnam Government. The arrest process is where most of the killings happend relative to Phoenix proper, not as some kind of formal policy.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Slap - spent about 5 hours hanging out with TT (AKA SWC member Terry Terriff) and we were discussing similar processes - I got to thinking about David Hume (1711-1776) and remembered a remark attributed to him ref. his thoughts on probability while considering the physics of billiards.

Then I got to thinking what we're really talking about is the ability to better set up the shot. How do you arrange the pool balls on the table in such a way that the probability of the shot you need is better then before?

Best, Rob

[Rex Brynen]

I think what is important is the way we think about the problem - using the analysis of the problem and its conditions to shape the solution vs. trying to use existing solutions against a problem for which they were not designed to anticipate.

The danger here is that we presume that there is a broad, possibly new but nonetheless enduring, problem--whether its CT or stability/PKO ops, or COIN.

I'm not so sure that there is. Not that there aren't new challenges--obviously there are, as 9/11 highlighted--but different parts of the CT (or PKO or whatever) puzzle require very different approaches, approaches that vary over time and space and political context. Quite apart from the dangers of going through major organizational bureaucratic change, there's the risk of designing new structures for problem sets that are themselves constantly evolving and mutating.

All of which leads me to want to look at this very much from the bottom up: what is being done now, or is needed now, that current doctrine, capabilities, or structures don't address? (Related to that--do we really agree what what's lacking now, against current or foreseeable future challenges?)

[Ken White]

parenthetical comment, I'm not at all comfortable we have much of a clue as to future challenges and our impatience to reorganize today to meet yesterdays challenge sort of concerns me...

[Rob Thornton]

by considering the so what. That is what got me thinking about Killcullen's blog post - how do we see (collectively) the 21st Century unfolding - how do you get it more right then wrong?

From Ken:

I'm not at all comfortable we have much of a clue as to future challenges and our impatience to reorganize today to meet yesterdays challenge sort of concerns me...

From Rex:

All of which leads me to want to look at this very much from the bottom up: what is being done now, or is needed now, that current doctrine, capabilities, or structures don't address? (Related to that--do we really agree what what's lacking now, against current or foreseeable future challenges?)

I agree - I'm not sure we've had our feet under us very well when it comes to understanding how/if the world is different, how our friends see us/if that matters/what could we do to make it better/why should we do it. I'm not sure we understand the enemy -even from the point of agreeing on who the real enemy is from a global perspective that allows some focused thinking - what is that enemy (insert menu depending on your view) trying to accomplish with regards to himself and with regard to us and with regard to others?

My sense is we're having a hard time deciding who we want or need to be - did we change, or are we the same, but just forgot for awhile? Until we decide that one - our friends are going to look at us a little funny, and our enemies might misinterpret our actions/inactions on matters or slide one past us.

I think we are starting to come out of though. That we're asking questions about ourselves, and are tired of using the words - gray, ambiguous, nebulous, unclear and other words that followed 9/11 when the emphasis swung to passion's corner seems to me that we might be getting a sense of self and the world.

Until we get some consensus built on how know yourself (our government,the domestic population, the Inter-Agency,etc.), know the enemy (from state to non-state; pandemics to the effects of global warming), know the terrain (friends, trading partners, allies, neutrals, peers, everyone not currently the enemy) it will be hard.

I'll be off the net most of the day - got to play catch up on all the things I'm supposed to be doing, but didn't yesterday Best, Rob

[goesh]

I tossed the bones and it shows alotta' small wars and petty dictatorships - scarce resources fueling the former and lots of take-offs on established religions jusifying the latter - a real bump on the bell curve - extra smart missles and fast-moving, very autonomous, almost independent small units are seen in the bone pattern - they show an External Affairs Cabinet aka the Dirty Works Dept. with State pretty much muzzled from trying to foist notions of democracy on primitive people

[Ken White]

Where's Matt Helm when we need him...

Now, to train and unleash the Rambos.