Revisiting DR Kilcullen's piece on New Paradigms and the OSS

[selil]

As we move forward the needs for advancing Intelligence that is tactical rather than strategic is going to require a change in CIA/NSA/DOD efforts. In the past each of the intelligence services has sliced up and duplicated efforts and no amount of substantial political wrangling has changed that. I'm currently reading a few good books that look at information sharing and operational versus intelligence analysis.

Treverton, G. F. (2001). Reshaping national intelligence for an age of information. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Shulsky, A. N., & Schmitt, G. J. (2002). Silent warfare: Understanding the world of intelligence. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc.

Clark, R. M. (2004). Intelligence analysis a target-centric approach. Washington D.C: CQ Press.

The changing role of information in warfare. (1999). Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

[slapout9]

From my point of view he (Dr. K) was suggesting something a like a world wide Phoenix program. Just my opinion.

[Rob Thornton]

Slap,

From my point of view he (Dr. K) was suggesting something a like a world wide Phoenix program. Just my opinion.

I think there is something to what you are saying. One of the problems we have though is that our ability to describe something (or problem solve) usually begins with our experiences and knowledge. This is generally a good problem to have since it accounts for the context in which the description /solution took place and that helps us determine how relevant and how applicable something is.

This is one of the reasons I think why its easier to discuss what happened in the past as opposed to what will happen in the future - we're able to sort of walk around the problem and start to consider it from the "what happened before it", "what happened during it" and "what happened after it" to provide context. Often we infer the wrong lessons because of whatever bias we've applied from the angle of view - which might skew the applicability/relativity of the description/solution/model.

However, you have to start somewhere and the nice thing about history is that if you consider enough similar problem sets and how they were approached you stand a better chance of identifying your own bias and mitigating it.

The Wikipedia has a reasonable definition of the Phoenix Program (not always the case with a wiki) - what would be interesting is the debate that led to the creation of the Phoenix Program, and its original intent - then finding out how it evolved/morphed over time - what influenced creation and change.

I'm still wrestling with defining the problem that was put forward in DR K's essay to a level where I can think about the solution. The other part is wondering if it is a problem with a solution at all, or just a change in the conditions in which our problems are occurring. The two things are different enough to require different approaches. Then there is allot of background noise going on in the environment that complicates it - ex. I read a piece this morning discussing the est. of an private intelligence company out of the Prince Group (of Blackwater fame) that has guys like former career CIA officers in it. While former intel officers have marketed their talents before, this seems of growing importance in the larger COE (Contemporary Operational Environment) because of IT and reach of not only those who offer services, but those who contract them. How does that affect our goals? How does it change the environment? The rise of importance and availability of professional services with resources comparable to many states is just one aspect of how to consider contemporary and future challenges.

Wanted to add that I'm not trying to single out any one changing variable within the COE (this was just the one I read this morning and was thinking about), but just that its difficult to describe all the variables which have led us to understanding we have problems which need answers, but which also leaves us scratching our head a bit when it comes to understanding the relationships between parts of problems and problem sets, and problem sets withing problem sets. This is why I think it has to be "people" oriented solution that while it might be capable of acting on a problem (or resourcing action), its culture would not be such as though it approached problems with the desire to find a "fire and forget" solution - then service the next target. Does that make sense?

Best, Rob

[slapout9]

Hi Rob, a big portion of the first part of your post is almost straight out of Col. Warden's concept of the 'Future Picture' of the Situation. You don't start with the past you start with the ideal future you want to see and then work backwards to the present

The second part is important because of all the misconceptions of what Phoenix was. It was conceived and executed as a Constabulary (Police) Operation. Intell was collected...a warrant for arrest was issued....you were put on trial and had a chance to defend yourself....and if convicted you could go to jail or convert to the side of the Vietnam Government. The arrest process is where most of the killings happend relative to Phoenix proper, not as some kind of formal policy.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Slap - spent about 5 hours hanging out with TT (AKA SWC member Terry Terriff) and we were discussing similar processes - I got to thinking about David Hume (1711-1776) and remembered a remark attributed to him ref. his thoughts on probability while considering the physics of billiards.

Then I got to thinking what we're really talking about is the ability to better set up the shot. How do you arrange the pool balls on the table in such a way that the probability of the shot you need is better then before?

Best, Rob

[slapout9]

Hi Rob, the article talks about a dye (rolling dice) not billiards is this the right link? Anyway I loved the article I went to. Ayn Rand liked Hume quite a bit which is something not generally known about her.

This article is a good example of systems theory (that I learned anyway) a higher or larger system always controls the smaller or system below it. So cause and effect can come out differently, but the truth of what really happened can be difficult to see or understand.

Which sums up my personal philosophy and I forget who said this, "I can only believe in a God that laughs"

[Rob Thornton]

I had to go with the dice because I couldn't find the anecdote piece I was after - it may have come from a second source - basically it said that Hume was contemplating the billiard balls and decided he needed a "pint" of ale to continue I've always suspected beer and thinking go together.