Agility, Adaptability and Innovation: the Art of the Counter-Punch

[davidbfpo]

In the law enforcement (LE) arena innovation does happen at all levels, but bureaucracy intervenes to slow the process down and the gains made. Here the need to have an audit trail for all actions taken, even the background i.e. intelligence processes, acts as a barrier.

Innovation in LE is invariably IT related, all too often with great promise and very mixed results. The old adage "round up the usual suspects" takes on a new life and can mean limited vision.

The best innovations are those not communicated upwards quickly and allowing for any real successes to be too valuable to discard.

Bureaucracy -v- Innovation a thread in it's own right.

I'd reverse Slapout's theme and put senior commanders back on the ground floor, maybe not the frontline. Evene a few days should suffice.

davidbfpo

[TT]

On pint #2 the discussion was really going Terry described “Innovation” as the steps taken to create and sustain the broader climate or atmosphere in which “Adaptation” takes place – this affords us greater mental “Agility” in identifying changes in the operational environment so that we shorten the adaptation loop, and seize the initiative on a broader scale.

I believe my 2nd beer did indeed say something along the lines you say. Let’s see what my coffee says.

There is, or should be, a distinction between adaption and agility. Adaption – minor change - can be seen as an entire range of small changes that you undertake to increase effectiveness and/or efficiency, from substituting one piece of equipment for another (or using bailing wire and bubblegum to fix something) through to adjusting tactical and even operational methods. It is the later which is of prime interest with respect to agility, this being a mindset (or intellectual outlook) that allows, as Rob says, to better and more quickly identify changes in the environment and exploit the opportunities that occur as a result or at least adjust to minimize the adverse consequences. An example that Rob and I discussed was the mental agility to recognize and seize appropriately the opportunity afforded by some Sunni insurgent groups turning against al Qaeda in Iraq (Cavguy – I think it was he - and Kilcullen have both discussed this on SWB) and then adaptation was to be able to transfer the basic model to other areas while adjusting the model appropriately to fit the local situation and circumstances (and yes, recognizing different circumstances and adjusting the model falls under agility as well). So, another, and perhaps better, way to think about the difference between adaptability and agility is that adaptation is the ability to react to obvious change and/or problem, while agility is the capacity to discern change and, more important, its implications, so that you are able to anticipate and act in an anticipatory manner (preferably appropriately). Rob’s boxer analogy captures this.

Turning to innovation, methinks my beers’ explanation was only partial. So allow me to elaborate. Innovation, as I as an academic define it, is major change in aims, strategies (ways of warfare), and/or structure. As an example, institutionalizing maneuver warfare is a major change (operational way of warfare), and as such has implications for the other two main aspects noted earlier as well as throughout an organization and for resources. (So, I would guess that davidfpo's obervation about change in LE would in my definition be 'adaptation')

Where my beer probably mis-explained was in the context of what Rob and I were talking about – institutionalizing IW or Complex IW (or hybrid warfare, if you will – a mix of conventional and unconventional [ie, Hezbollah, summer 2006]) as a core competency of the US military (or specific services, if you prefer). A key element of developing a CIW competency, for the US military (and I concur with this) is agility and adaptability. So, in the context of this, Rob’s observation ‘“Innovation” as the steps taken to create and sustain the broader climate or atmosphere in which “Adaptation” takes place’ is correct, as ‘part’ of institutionalizing CIW. The effort to implement and institutionalize CIW will, in part, involve creating and sustaining a broader climate or atmosphere (or to be academic, organizational culture) through persuasion (narratives), education and training (behavior), in which mental agility can be fostered, and to the degree that it is fostered this will improve adaptability. Fostering improved mental agility and/or agility in and of itself would not constitute major change or innovation, even though it would be organizationally very useful, rather in the context of Rob’s and my conversation it is an important component of implementing CIW which would be a major change or innovation.

Of course, fostering agility is not easy (agility takes experience, education, training, and so on and so forth), and nor should we expect that every enlisted, NCO and/or officer will be agile, for human nature is such that some people tend to be more mentally agile than others. It seems to me that to develop agility you need to start right in enlisted and officer ‘boot camp’, whereas my limited, ‘book based’, understanding of ‘boot camp’ is that part of the training /socialization process is to inculcate ‘obedience to command’ (among a host of other attributes), which I suspect works to rigidify thinking (but I am guessing on this observation). How one balances a desire for mental agility with the necessity of ‘obedience to command’ is beyond my competence and I leave this to the psychologists and sociologists (and anthropologists? and ?) to mull over.

So there is the Agility - Adaptation/Counter Punch and combination hook/uppercut/block/strong cross follow up which arguably we can do at the “double time” at the tactical level, “quick time” at the operational level, and maybe “half time/mark time” at the strategic level.

Agree. At the tactical level you are looking pretty much at individual and/or small unit (up to brigade?) agility; at the operational level pretty much at mid size to large unit and/or organizational agility, and at the strategic level pretty much at organizational and political (civilian government) agility. To return to CIW, an agile organization discerns a pattern of evolving warfare that is moving to a mix of conventional and unconventional (or irregular or asymetrical), a mix of kinetic and non kinetic approaches (again, Hezbollah last summer seemed to reflect this form of warfare) and so it innovates (institutionalizes) a CIW competency to meet this emerging problem.

And just as fostering agility in individuals is not easy, fostering agility in an organization such as the military with its fairly rigid hierarchical structure and operating procedure (and not just on the ‘battlefield’) will not be easy. Bureaucracy (as davidfpo ably notes) as well as org culture (or self identity) are serious obstacles to innovation

And just thinking about fosering agility at the civil/political level makes my head start to hurt……

Cheers, TT

[TT]

1-Let Sergeants go to the Army War college.

2-Let Sergeants experiment with small unit tactics and give them funds to do it with, then let them write the manual.

3-Let veteran combat Sergeants go directly to OCS and be comissioned as officers without all the college degree bull####.

4- Instead of just giving troops a booklist to read...buy them the books.

Developing agility is a profession long process. So speaking as a non-military person, these are the sorts of ideas (adaptations) that that strike me as possibly contributing to fostering ‘agility’, with the first two relevant to the development of ‘strategic corporals’.

3) I think this is a good idea but the actual details I think are a little complex.

In principle, this should be manageable. After all, I believe I am correct in saying that there are ‘mustangs’ currently in the ranks of the US military, and past officers, such as Gen. Alfred Grey, who started their military careers as an enlisted personnel did very well as officers. So I would think it would be case of developing processes for identifying likely candidates and then providing them with the opportunities. Whether this would require them to obtain an undergraduate degree before being commissioned as an officer, however, is an interesting issue. Some form of additional education ‘may’ be required (though this may be dependent on the individual in question and precisely what is looked for in a officer candidate) or perhaps some form of additional training.

[Adam L]

In principle, this should be manageable. After all, I believe I am correct in saying that there are ‘mustangs’ currently in the ranks of the US military, and past officers, such as Gen. Alfred Grey, who started their military careers as an enlisted personnel did very well as officers. So I would think it would be case of developing processes for identifying likely candidates and then providing them with the opportunities. Whether this would require them to obtain an undergraduate degree before being commissioned as an officer, however, is an interesting issue. Some form of additional education ‘may’ be required (though this may be dependent on the individual in question and precisely what is looked for in a officer candidate) or perhaps some form of additional training.

I should have been more clear in what I mean by difficult and complex. I am more commenting at the politics both in and out of the military. I don't know how a lot of elites would feel about this. I am more worried that we are going to to get a "study group" that comes up with some idiotic selection method. I am always paranoid about this stuff. I have seen first hand how poor management + bad testes = scary results. I am really saying the success of such a change would depend on how it would be instituted.

Adam

[TT]

I should have been more clear in what I mean by difficult and complex. I am more commenting at the politics both in and out of the military. I don't know how a lot of elites would feel about this. I am more worried that we are going to to get a "study group" that comes up with some idiotic selection method. I am always paranoid about this stuff. I have seen first hand how poor management + bad testes = scary results. I am really saying the success of such a change would depend on how it would be instituted.

I figured that the problem of the politics of it (mostly in, not outside, of the military) was somewhere there in your concerns, and I certainly agree that it could well be (or maybe even very likely would) a significant issue. And yes, I fully agree that how such selection would be implemented is very important (hence, my use of ‘In principle’).

I wonder if anyone has ever looked at ‘mustang’ officers and how they fared (obviously some well but others, who knows) once they became officers (ie socially, professionally, etc). I suspect that ‘mustangs’ simply applied for officer school (or maybe left the military, got a degree and then applied), so the relevant issue would be is what were the acceptance criteria and what was required of these potential officer candidates? This would provide a starting point for thinking about this issue, if only to indicate that perhaps the best way may be to simply informing enlisted personnel that they can apply and then having relevant criteria that they need to meet (and all this may already exist for all I know). If this is case, the additive would be what would the military offer extra to help such enlisted candidates prepare to succeed in officer school.

[Ken White]

I believe my 2nd beer did indeed say something along the lines you say. Let’s see what my coffee says.

Do not trust Coffee...

Where my beer probably mis-explained was in the context of what Rob and I were talking about – institutionalizing IW or Complex IW (or hybrid warfare, if you will – a mix of conventional and unconventional [ie, Hezbollah, summer 2006]) as a core competency of the US military (or specific services, if you prefer). A key element of developing a CIW competency, for the US military (and I concur with this) is agility and adaptability. So, in the context of this, Rob’s observation ‘“Innovation” as the steps taken to create and sustain the broader climate or atmosphere in which “Adaptation” takes place’ is correct, as ‘part’ of institutionalizing CIW. The effort to implement and institutionalize CIW will, in part, involve creating and sustaining a broader climate or atmosphere (or to be academic, organizational culture) through persuasion (narratives), education and training (behavior), in which mental agility can be fostered, and to the degree that it is fostered this will improve adaptability. Fostering improved mental agility and/or agility in and of itself would not constitute major change or innovation, even though it would be organizationally very useful, rather in the context of Rob’s and my conversation it is an important component of implementing CIW which would be a major change or innovation.

A few thoughts.

I'm unsure of the comment that innovation fosters the climate that produces adaption and agility. What I do know is that innovation can encompass or lead to both abilities and can also stand on its own. I also know that none of those things is a tenet of US Army doctrine in the fully stated sense and that, sometimes purposefully and sometimes inadvertantly, the Army stifles all three characteristics all too often. My observation generally has been that the stifling is precipitated by commanders, staff officers and senior NCOs who either lack self confidence or are personally averse to those traits as being risky.

Fortunately, there are plenty of senior people around who do have self confidence and are not risk averse -- the so-called Thunder runs in Baghdad in 2003 come to mind as an examples of three echelons worth of risk acceptance (without involving a fourth echelon ) -- so all is not lost.

The desirability of adaption and agility in IW or CIW are mentioned. They are desirable traits -- I'd say necessary -- in all levels of warfare and while we may well have to soon engage in another IW effort; we may just as well not need to do so. We should be careful not to plan for the next war based on the last (we have evidence that this is not wise), we must be full spectrum.

Of course, fostering agility is not easy (agility takes experience, education, training, and so on and so forth), and nor should we expect that every enlisted, NCO and/or officer will be agile, for human nature is such that some people tend to be more mentally agile than others. It seems to me that to develop agility you need to start right in enlisted and officer ‘boot camp’, whereas my limited, ‘book based’, understanding of ‘boot camp’ is that part of the training /socialization process is to inculcate ‘obedience to command’ (among a host of other attributes), which I suspect works to rigidify thinking (but I am guessing on this observation). How one balances a desire for mental agility with the necessity of ‘obedience to command’ is beyond my competence and I leave this to the psychologists and sociologists (and anthropologists? and ?) to mull over.

Very well said. I suggest that some are indeed more mentally agile than others -- and that agility is subject or object related. Wayne Gretzky famously said "Most players skate to where the puck is, I skate to where the puck is going to be." I can think of several people I know who wouldn't know a puck if they tripped over it much less 'where it was going to be' but they could recognize a tactical (and in one case, an operational or strategic) opening very rapidly.

What's required is realizing that our one size fits all, every person of like rank and specialty can do every job adequately is totally true.

The question is, without the large forces that provided multiple backstops that archaic system was designed to serve and with todays small professional armed force when lives, resources and national will are at stake -- is 'adequate' acceptable?

I think not. We need to foster adaptation, agility and innovation and we need to select intuitive commanders and leaders at ALL levels. Unfortunately, we have a large bureaucracy to whom those things are potential harbingers of embarrassment

And just as fostering agility in individuals is not easy, fostering agility in an organization such as the military with its fairly rigid hierarchical structure and operating procedure (and not just on the ‘battlefield’) will not be easy. Bureaucracy (as davidfpo ably notes) as well as org culture (or self identity) are serious obstacles to innovation.

Too true. The Institution will curl up to fend off any such effort and will trot out numerous politically and even realistically correct reasons to avoid change. After watching the monster for many years, I'm convinced that attempts to change from the top down will fail.

A flanking action is probably required.

And just thinking about fosering agility at the civil/political level makes my head start to hurt……

Cheers, TT

Shudderrrr... That. Is scary.