Agility, Adaptability and Innovation: the Art of the Counter-Punch

[wm]

While in OBC, a wise old Colonel and an equally wise old SGM each told me that I would be issued an E7 who would teach me how to become a good leader of soldiers, if I was willing to watch, listen, and ask questions. I was also lucky enough to have had enlisted experience prior to going to ROTC; usually I could tell when I was being trained and when I was being snookered by my PSG as well as the three other E7 section chiefs and 5 SSGs in my Platoon (no, it was not a rifle platoon). I suspect that my 18-odd years of non-rated time as a "brat" helped some, too. I watched two other 2LTs (one from USMA, one from ROTC) struggle with their platoons. If they had gotten the same guidance as I did, they certainly failed to heed it.

LTs need to remember to use their mouths and ears in the same proportion that they were issued. I think that's actually pretty good advice for any leader or staffer, regardless of grade.

[Ken White]

A lot of people miss this point. Certainly good NCO's can run a platoon as well or better than the 2LT nominally in charge. But as an NCO pointed out to me, the PL job allows that officer to learn his trade in a "catastrophe-free" enviornment. Although it does happen, a normal PL has at least 8-10 NCO's of varying grades in his unit, and can keep the unit from major failure. So he winds up with a big saftey net.

All true for the way we do business today and I pointed out that the old mixed bag Armored Cavalry Platoon is the best such combat arms training vehicle around. The question is, IMO, is the way we do business today the most effective way? And that is a question...

The alternative is PL's starting as company commanders and XO's, where they don't get the NCO mentorship received as a PL.

Again, if you presume that we must organize and operate as we do today. I'd also note that I suggested the French model of half and half may have some merit.

Of course, I've also for over forty years suggested that true combined arms battalions should be the norm and thus have never accepted the "can't mix vehicles" argument as valid.

And that the bulk of US parachute forces should be Cavalry Squadrons or Brigades; we had the technical capability but elected not to use it because that wasn't the way we were organized...

An aside question -- do the Marines still use Marine Gunners as Tank PL?

Regarding direct comissions, prior service officers tend to be either some of the best or worst officers I meet, and rarely in-between. The difference often is those who wanted to become exceptional leaders and apply their NCO/enlisted experience and those who saw being an officer as an easier, higher paid life with no latrine detail. The other trend is that many seem to reach max potential as a CO CDR (where they excel), because they are unable to adapt to "big thinking" on staff. Subjective and shotgun blast opinions, and you don't have to look far for exceptions.

I agree on every count and that mirrors my experience and observation over a long time and four wars. I have seen a few who deservedly made it past the Co Cdr mark. I've also known a couple who should have and did not as well as several who should never have been entrusted with a Company.

Yet another question. Is there anything wrong with having a good extremely competent Co Cdr who is going to run one Company sized unit or another for ten to fifteen years? Progressing say from line to hindquarters to a garrison or some such as he aged (Yeah, I know, that'd drive HRC bananas -- and that's a good thing... ).

Every commissioning source has its good and bad points.

Again agree. There are trends from each source but the one thing that works is that the majority are good and the promotion selection process we now employ essentially works if it is a little prone to be overly generous for progression, retention and end strength purposes -- not combat effectiveness purposes. I realize the importance of all those things and know that balance is required. I also believe that we do not now have that balance and merely acceptable combat effectiveness is the result (with full acknowledgment that many units transcend that -- but suggest that is due to the people and hard work overcoming a significant systemic imbalance).

The question here is do various sources lend themselves to better performance at certain levels and / or in certain positions and are there ways to improve staffs and commanders, thus the Army, related to that?

I will second that we need battlefield promotions, the USMC does it in Iraq but the Army hasn't. It used to be to replace leaders who were casualties, but it is a powerful reward tool as well.

I suggest not only battlefield but it merits consideration in the bulk of time that Armies spend not at war.

What I'm doing, of course and among other things is challenging the validity and value of the current highly competitive system to the individuals, the Army and the Nation.

Not to mention and far more importantly the viability of it for the future...