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Thread: Chaotic Dynamics: A Novel Approach to Intelligence Analysis in Asymmetric Warfare

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  1. #16
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    Quote Originally Posted by Jedburgh View Post


    As stated, mirror imaging, along with falling into logical fallacies and permitting various biases to determine judgments, are a common failing among new and poorly trained analysts. However, "common" does not equate to "pervasive".
    If what you're saying is correct, then that means that the CIA is filled with incompetent senior people. What other explanation can there be for not implementing proper training for new analysts year after year?

    For the record, I don't believe that to be the case. I just don't have another explanation for how this problem can properly be attributed to habitual poor training.



    There are also significant differences in quality and type of analysis produced by the different agencies and services. There is perhaps an agency or two out there that hires far too many people who don't really deserve the title of "intelligence analyst"; but there are others that are lucky enough to have several consummate professionals on the payroll. Throughout the community we have many outstanding analysts who are very much in touch with reality as it exists on the ground and in the heads of the threat.
    I think so as well.


    Reads the literature? Well, I've spent a couple of years as a collector and worked a bit of analysis here and there, and, as limited as my academic qualifications may be, I stand solidly by my opinions.
    That's understandable.

    The disparagement of seemingly simple solutions is in itself an analytic failing. Despite the apparent simplicity, they are still dependent upon the human vagaries of the people implementing them. The existing problems with selection, training and professional development of career analysts may have a simple solution - but the primary obstacle is not so simple, as it tends to lie with bureaucrats outside the field of intelligence analysis. If you were able to conduct such a study in-depth, you would find that the degree of severity of these quality problems ebb and flow as much with changes in senior management as it does with hiring and training of analysts.

    I don't deny that it's a complex problem, nor that there can be a multitude of possible solutions. Mine is simply one of many. As long as solutions are being offered, implemented, and evaluated, I think that's all that anyone can expect, particularly in very large organizations.


    Along the lines of my last statement, I recommend giving a read of Knowing One’s Enemies – Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars. The book is a collection of essays that amply illustrate the point that, even when a nation is in possession of sufficient intelligence of a quality to make effective policy decisions, it can all come to disaster due to the inherent biases, proclivities and abilities of key policy makers. The harmful effects of internal disputes within intelligence agencies, and turf battles between competing agencies, are also laid out in careful detail.
    Thanks for the recommendation. I'll add it to my reading list.



    This is where you complexity in reaching an effective solution. Hell, its been over six years since the wake-up call and we're still not ready for work yet. Hiring, training and developing good analyst is the easy part.
    Don't get me started.
    Last edited by JeffC; 11-06-2007 at 04:40 AM.

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