Chaotic Dynamics: A Novel Approach to Intelligence Analysis in Asymmetric Warfare

[Jedburgh]

....while military regulations may restrict fraternization, enforcing those for intel gathering is just plain silliness. Those are the networks that get you places.

For instance, staying out of the drug transport/payment networks means you are kept away from Osama's support system. Get into it in Afghanistan, you'll have a shot at finding him. Staying out of gun running networks means you can't keep tabs on who is selling what to whom without a scorecard.

There is a lot of opinion based on assumption in this thread; much of that assumption itself based on poorly informed and/or dated sources.

While the nuts and bolts of source ops and building networks is not something that is up for discussion in this forum, I will just throw a thought out there for y'all:

To infil Afghan, Albanian, Indonesian, Nigerian or Russian organized crime networks - let alone getting into the core of al-Qa'ida, Chechen or JI terror structures - ain't as simple as just getting someone to approve mixing in with the bad guys - or of the operator being up to speed on language and cultural nuances. These groups operate on tight-knit trust networks, and are generally composed of individuals linked by kinship and friendship ties that are very difficult to compose and live cover to enough of a degree to get inside. It is also not exactly easy to spot and recruit someone inside one of those targets from the outside. So its a helluva difficult and dangerous job that should never be underestimated or taken for granted - but don't assume that nothing is going on in that regard.

[Shivan]

Thank all for the comments.

. . .We aren't to far from being able to create the above scenario.

This stuff is amazing. Thank you for posting the links, esp. to Silverman's work at U/Penn. I had no idea how close simulation was to the real deal. I'm still reading through material to educate myself.

To infil Afghan, Albanian, Indonesian, Nigerian or Russian organized crime networks - let alone getting into the core of al-Qa'ida, Chechen or JI terror structures - ain't as simple as just getting someone to approve mixing in with the bad guys - or of the operator being up to speed on language and cultural nuances. These groups operate on tight-knit trust networks, and are generally composed of individuals linked by kinship and friendship ties that are very difficult to compose and live cover to enough of a degree to get inside. It is also not exactly easy to spot and recruit someone inside one of those targets from the outside. So its a helluva difficult and dangerous job that should never be underestimated or taken for granted - but don't assume that nothing is going on in that regard.

Agree wholeheartedly, which is what I was thinking of vis-a-vis simulation and immersion for intel collectors. Useful, but hard to break into the kinship networks. The old Italian mob started getting infiltrated as the old generations moved on, and the American born crowd allowed people in who did not have ties to the old country; this is happening a little with the Russian mob in the U.S. Long story short - hard to do with AQ etc, but not impossible, as Jedburgh notes.

For intel analysts, simulation & immersion will improve their skills exponentially.

Salaam y'all