Chaotic Dynamics: A Novel Approach to Intelligence Analysis in Asymmetric Warfare

[JeffC]

As stated, mirror imaging, along with falling into logical fallacies and permitting various biases to determine judgments, are a common failing among new and poorly trained analysts. However, "common" does not equate to "pervasive".

If what you're saying is correct, then that means that the CIA is filled with incompetent senior people. What other explanation can there be for not implementing proper training for new analysts year after year?

For the record, I don't believe that to be the case. I just don't have another explanation for how this problem can properly be attributed to habitual poor training.

There are also significant differences in quality and type of analysis produced by the different agencies and services. There is perhaps an agency or two out there that hires far too many people who don't really deserve the title of "intelligence analyst"; but there are others that are lucky enough to have several consummate professionals on the payroll. Throughout the community we have many outstanding analysts who are very much in touch with reality as it exists on the ground and in the heads of the threat.

I think so as well.

Reads the literature? Well, I've spent a couple of years as a collector and worked a bit of analysis here and there, and, as limited as my academic qualifications may be, I stand solidly by my opinions.

That's understandable.

The disparagement of seemingly simple solutions is in itself an analytic failing. Despite the apparent simplicity, they are still dependent upon the human vagaries of the people implementing them. The existing problems with selection, training and professional development of career analysts may have a simple solution - but the primary obstacle is not so simple, as it tends to lie with bureaucrats outside the field of intelligence analysis. If you were able to conduct such a study in-depth, you would find that the degree of severity of these quality problems ebb and flow as much with changes in senior management as it does with hiring and training of analysts.

I don't deny that it's a complex problem, nor that there can be a multitude of possible solutions. Mine is simply one of many. As long as solutions are being offered, implemented, and evaluated, I think that's all that anyone can expect, particularly in very large organizations.

Along the lines of my last statement, I recommend giving a read of Knowing One’s Enemies – Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars. The book is a collection of essays that amply illustrate the point that, even when a nation is in possession of sufficient intelligence of a quality to make effective policy decisions, it can all come to disaster due to the inherent biases, proclivities and abilities of key policy makers. The harmful effects of internal disputes within intelligence agencies, and turf battles between competing agencies, are also laid out in careful detail.

Thanks for the recommendation. I'll add it to my reading list.

This is where you complexity in reaching an effective solution. Hell, its been over six years since the wake-up call and we're still not ready for work yet. Hiring, training and developing good analyst is the easy part.

Don't get me started.

[Ken White]

I think he is correct.

However, I do not think your analysis of his statement is necessarily correct:

"If what you're saying is correct, then that means that the CIA is filled with incompetent senior people. What other explanation can there be for not implementing proper training for new analysts year after year?"

It is entirely possible that said senior people are competent but either bureaucratically constrained and more concerned with protecting their institution or simply are strongly inclined to not stick their necks out to demand competence and release those who are not capable.

Those alternatives are similar but not synonymous though the result is the same. There is, of course the possibility that pure incompetence is part of the problem and there are other alternatives but experience with our government leads me to believe my provided alternatives are more probable; as they say, "indications lead me to believe" the bureaucracy and it's natural ally, risk avoidance, are your culprits.

For the record, I don't believe that to be the case. I just don't have another explanation for how this problem can properly be attributed to habitual poor training.

Having briefly been an analyst -- and not a good one, I'm too impatient and arbitrary; realized that and went on to other things -- I have to agree with others who point out that we can produce a large number of fair analysts but that good one are naturals and hard to find. I'm not at all sure they can be created without that talent. Lot of good basketball players out there, very few Michael Jordans.

I have been immersed in another culture fairly thoroughly for over a year -- I think maybe the Jesuits have it right; get 'em before they're seven -- after that, the culture in which they got to that age is pretty thoroughly embedded and is unlikely to be shed.

There are always exceptions but I'm unsure how you'd determine who would be receptive and who not.

You also have the factor that thorough cultural attunement with one grouping does not provide better analysis capability for a multinational and multi ethnic grouping...

Just some thoughts for your consideration.

Regards,
Ken

[Brian Hanley]

He's to the point, and most of it rings true to me, although I have not seen the inner bureau side enough to be able to say one way or another. It fits the analysis of Soviet deficiencies well. I will say that from what I've seen the "boots on the ground" of our CIA are quite weak even now. Shot through with political correctness and using simplistic methodologies "out of the book". But basically, I think he's right and it goes wider than that to the public at large and the weird conversation that sometimes goes on there.

I honestly think that this discussion, JeffC, is a symptom of the problems. Why go to all that trouble simulating what you don't know instead of go out and see the real thing? Some journalists do it, even get to Quetta from time to time. (Though none I know of personally recently.) Is the reluctance because it's dangerous? I'm trying to wrap my mind around where you're coming from.