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Thread: Counterinsurgency For U.S. Government Policymakers

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    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Default Counterinsurgency For U.S. Government Policymakers

    Anyone have any opinions on the Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policymakers manual? I'm heading down tomorrow for the workshop on it that Kilcullen is running.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Looks reasonable for a starter. Only thing

    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Anyone have any opinions on the Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policymakers manual? I'm heading down tomorrow for the workshop on it that Kilcullen is running.
    I'd suggest is removing the words "defeat" and "victory" -- even though their usage in this pub is basically benign -- totally. Those two words in a modern insurgency can lead to false expectations on the part of politcians and the international public as well as those engaged in the operation and, IMO, their use should be actively discouraged.

    Thanks for linking it. Give 'em fits at the workshop.

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    Default Armchair Quarterback!

    As a whole, I thought the document was fairly good. However, I am not sure why they tried to separate terrorists and insurgents:

    "This objective differentiates insurgents from terrorists, whose objectives do not necessarily include the creation of an alternative governing authority capable of controlling a given area or country."

    It seems to me that all terrorists are insurgents but not all insurgents are terrorists. In other words, terrorists fit the mold of an insurgency because they are trying overthrow a government or force it to change specific policies. We all know the debate surrounding the term "terrorism". If I were writing this document, I would not have tried to throw the sentence in their separating terrorists from insurgents. I suspect it is in there for political reasons; it is advantageous to label an entity a terrorist organization or a state sponsor of terrorism.

    Also, the whole government approach to COIN planning is very good, but where is the part of the USG that deals with information? According to this document and FM 3-24, information is the glue that holds all the pillars together. Unfortunately, we only give strategic communications partial support through the State Department! If information is really so important, the USG needs to reestablish the USIA or something like it.

    Overall, the document is very good. Organizations such as USAID may have more of an impact than a full military division, which is why we should increase their funding. Also, working with IGOs and NGOs is a great way to increase legitimacy for COIN operations!

    Very respectfully,

    Invictus

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    Council Member kehenry1's Avatar
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    Default By Any Other Name

    It seems to me that all terrorists are insurgents but not all insurgents are terrorists. In other words, terrorists fit the mold of an insurgency because they are trying overthrow a government or force it to change specific policies. We all know the debate surrounding the term "terrorism". If I were writing this document, I would not have tried to throw the sentence in their separating terrorists from insurgents. I suspect it is in there for political reasons; it is advantageous to label an entity a terrorist organization or a state sponsor of terrorism.
    Not just that, but our inability to name the enemy. I don't just mean the question of its Islamic nature, but most enemies name their organization and it is one organization. When you are fighting a decentralized enemy whose forces set up separate "armies" under the flag umbrella and call their organization something different, yet the ideology, though the same, is not given a name (like Nazis), it's a little difficult to be specific.

    At the same time, it is important to separate "terrorists" from "insurgents" when you are performing COIN. "Insurgents" are indigenous to the location, have local grievances and can be negotiated with to eventually resolve the situation. "Terrorists" or whatever we want to call the Islamic Fanatics usually have a whole other agenda, don't have anything personal at risk in the location and are, by nature, implacable and impossible to negotiate with.

    I assume that is the reason he separated them. He just didn't know what PC name he was supposed to give it or didn't want to for "political reasons".
    Kat-Missouri

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    Default Global Islamic Jihad?

    Hi Kehenry!

    Great point on not being able to define the enemy!

    Borrowing from Michael Schuerer, I prefer to use the term "Global Islamic Insurgency". I think this best describes the specific threat we face today, though the document Steve posted was meant to deal with insurgencies in general.

    Later!

    Invictus

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    There are limits some times to what a military force can accomplish in a counterinsurgency operation; even one armed with the best counterinsurgency doctrine available and a trained counterinsurgency force winning—in all of its domestic political, international, and operational context--may be beyond its means and that should be acknowledged up front in a manual to policy makers on this subject. I imagine that the atmosphere of this conference will be drunk with success from the Surge and the idea that these things are doable if we just get the right doctrine and force on board.

    Coin is not “armed politics.” If it were then we would have politicians doing Coin with guns. We don’t. Instead they are conducted by soldiers and marines with guns. A big and important difference that unfortunately clever little cliché’s like “armed politics” helps to cloud and make unclear. In fact the term “armed politics” conceals the reality of Coin which fundamentally is one of death, destruction, and fighting.

    Finally, I disagree with the straw-man approach under the theory section that poses two theories for Coin: enemy centric and population centric. Coin is more complicated than this binary conception. By rendering counterinsurgency into a population-centric construct the manual removes the enemy from the equation and therefore turns Coin into something it is not. In fact by removing the enemy as the center of focus the manual actually removes the element of friction from war too. So for policy makers who read this manual a series of scientific processes, coordinated through the interagency process, can be applied to secure the population and improve their lives thereby winning their hearts and minds. Coin for policy makers now becomes a relatively simple matter of inter-agency coordination, applied scientific processes across a set of lines of operations.

    Beware; we are in the grips of armed social scientists.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Generally agree, couple of minor points...

    Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
    There are limits some times to what a military force can accomplish in a counterinsurgency operation; even one armed with the best counterinsurgency doctrine available and a trained counterinsurgency force winning—in all of its domestic political, international, and operational context--may be beyond its means and that should be acknowledged up front in a manual to policy makers on this subject. I imagine that the atmosphere of this conference will be drunk with success from the Surge and the idea that these things are doable if we just get the right doctrine and force on board.
    Totally agree with the thrust. In regard to the last sentence, I'd hope not on the drunk with success part and surely they won't succumb to believe that's all it takes for success -- and, conversely will acknowledge that these things are doable. Difficult, eminently dislikeable, to be avoided if at all possible but if not, doable.

    Coin is not “armed politics.” If it were then we would have politicians doing Coin with guns. We don’t. Instead they are conducted by soldiers and marines with guns. A big and important difference that unfortunately clever little cliché’s like “armed politics” helps to cloud and make unclear. In fact the term “armed politics” conceals the reality of Coin which fundamentally is one of death, destruction, and fighting.
    Also true -- though I'd suggest the reality is even more than just killing and dying. Still your point is valid, that death, destruction and fighting are usually going to be required and the policy makers and deciders need to know and acknowledge that up front. They also need to worst case those effects else they'll make a dumb decision.

    Finally, I disagree with the straw-man approach under the theory section that poses two theories for Coin: enemy centric and population centric. Coin is more complicated than this binary conception. By rendering counterinsurgency into a population-centric construct the manual removes the enemy from the equation and therefore turns Coin into something it is not. In fact by removing the enemy as the center of focus the manual actually removes the element of friction from war too. So for policy makers who read this manual a series of scientific processes, coordinated through the interagency process, can be applied to secure the population and improve their lives thereby winning their hearts and minds. Coin for policy makers now becomes a relatively simple matter of inter-agency coordination, applied scientific processes across a set of lines of operations.
    Agreed. It ain't that easy...

    Beware; we are in the grips of armed social scientists.
    Heh, true -- and in my observation, have been since the early 60s...

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    Default War and Politics

    Gentlemen,

    Your underlying assumption is that war and politics are two different entities, but they are one and the same. . .always have been. War and politics are inseperable! According to Dr. Colin Gray, "2. The United States has a persisting strategy deficit. Americans are very competent at fighting, but they are muchless successful in fighting in such a way that they secure thestrategic and, hence, political, rewards they seek. The United
    States continues to have difficulty regarding war and politics as a unity, with war needing to be permeated by politicalconsiderations." LTC Nagl further makes this point in his book when he says that one of the biggest mistakes we made in Vietnam was not realizing earlier that it was a political endeavor. This is contrary to many who say, "The only reason we lost in 'Nam is because the politicians got involved!" This is what my dad alway says. Anyway, I agree with Dr. Gray and LTC Nagl. It is impossible to separate the two.

    Although I do not recomment it to military leaders with thin skin, I have inserted a link to the article:

    http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB650.pdf

    Very respectfully,

    Invictus

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Invictus, just re-read the thread

    and nowhere did I see anything that led me to believe anyone who'd commented questioned the consanguinity of politics and war. Where did you get the idea that anyone did question it?

    Gray's comment is true, Nagl's less so. The WH knew it was political (on several counts) from the start; DoD and the JCS not so much; ComUSMACV initially did not but finally woke up, knew it was political but still refused to adapt and tried to fight a land war in Europe in the rice paddies of SE Asia (until Abrams took over). The point being that 'knowing' and doing are two different things --as Gray points out...

    FYI, the Gray monograph has been linked here a couple of times and many have read it, I suspect.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post

    Coin is not “armed politics.” If it were then we would have politicians doing Coin with guns. We don’t. Instead they are conducted by soldiers and marines with guns. A big and important difference that unfortunately clever little cliché’s like “armed politics” helps to cloud and make unclear. In fact the term “armed politics” conceals the reality of Coin which fundamentally is one of death, destruction, and fighting.
    Hi Ken!

    You are correct! The post did not explicitly say that war and politics are separate entities. This is why I said the assumption of the post was that war and politics are separate. My assertion was based on the quote above. Of course I could be misunderstanding Gian P Gentile's point.

    Please elaborate on your comment concerning Vietnam War strategy; I'd love to read your thoughts!

    Very respectfully,

    Invictus
    Last edited by marct; 11-14-2007 at 03:34 PM. Reason: fixed quote

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    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by invictus0972 View Post
    Gentlemen,

    Your underlying assumption is that war and politics are two different entities, but they are one and the same. . .always have been. War and politics are inseperable! According to Dr. Colin Gray, "2. The United States has a persisting strategy deficit. Americans are very competent at fighting, but they are muchless successful in fighting in such a way that they secure thestrategic and, hence, political, rewards they seek. The United
    States continues to have difficulty regarding war and politics as a unity, with war needing to be permeated by politicalconsiderations." LTC Nagl further makes this point in his book when he says that one of the biggest mistakes we made in Vietnam was not realizing earlier that it was a political endeavor. This is contrary to many who say, "The only reason we lost in 'Nam is because the politicians got involved!" This is what my dad alway says. Anyway, I agree with Dr. Gray and LTC Nagl. It is impossible to separate the two.

    Although I do not recomment it to military leaders with thin skin, I have inserted a link to the article:

    http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB650.pdf

    Very respectfully,

    Invictus
    I'm trying to get Colin to write the foreword to my book.

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    Default Concur with the Subtitle

    A Work in Progress

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    Default Gray Article

    I have only read this article; I am sure he has several other great writings. I was telling Ken that I should have known, considering the audience, that this article had be referenced many times.

    By the way, have a great trip tomorrow!!

    V/r

    Invictus

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    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by invictus0972 View Post
    I have only read this article; I am sure he has several other great writings. I was telling Ken that I should have known, considering the audience, that this article had be referenced many times.

    By the way, have a great trip tomorrow!!

    V/r

    Invictus
    Colin is always a difficult read, but worth the effort. He makes kind of an interesting counterpoint to Martin van Creveld--both are towering intellects but Colin is very much the strategic traditionalist who believes that traditional state war will again rear its hideous head in the future, while Martin contends that the world has reached the point where conflicts pitting states against nonstate actors will be the dominant if not the only form.

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Hi Steve, don't know if this will help but at the Smart Wars workshop our metrics/country assessment were done this way.

    1-Assets

    2-Attitude(population)

    3-Technology

    4-Scope

    5-Obstacles

    6-Momentum

    We prepared one for each system we dealt with and they were prepared from the stand point of what we wanted these metrics to look like in the future. In my case it was 8 months out from the start of the Operation. We prepared one for Turkey, The PPK and The International system all designed to look a certain way in the future. By the categories you see that you can make these as brief or as detailed as you want or the situation demands.

    Go Army

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    [QUOTE=invictus0972;31329]
    Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post

    This is why I said the assumption of the post was that war and politics are separate. My assertion was based on the quote above. Of course I could be misunderstanding Gian P Gentile's point.
    Of course i do not believe that war and politics are separate. i am a disciple of the great one, St Carl von Clausewitz. The two are so inexorably mixed that they can not be seperated in whatever kind of war one is fighting.

    My point is that clever cliches like "armed politics" make counterinsurgency war, which is still war and at its most basic level is death, violence and fighting, into something that it is not. This is a term that the armed social scientists have thrust upon us and i feel it actually reduces the complexity of Coin to the point where it appears to the uniformed to be a simple process of applying lines of operations and other pop-anthropolgical theories to achieve "victory." To quote Ken White in an earlier posting on this threat, "It ain't that easy."

    Too bad our new Coin manual chose to omit St Carl off of its classics reading list. Can anyone explain that???

    gian

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default You really want the gospel according to KW?

    Please elaborate on your comment concerning Vietnam War strategy; I'd love to read your thoughts!
    Very respectfully,
    Invictus
    Sounds like masochism to me...

    It's all in the books, idealistic WH looks for a way to boost the economy, get the nation out of the doldrums and spread democracy, seizes on Viet Nam as a likely candidate -- and has Eisnehower's treaty as a fall guy for the decision -- and away we go. (Moral: Idealism is dangerous)

    Joint Chiefs aren't pleased with the idea so changes are made there and the buildup begins. Paul Harkins was ComUSMACV and tried to get the VC to stand up and fight like men -- and tried to get the south Viet Namese to do the same thing. Little success either way. (Moral: Can't change the culture)

    Kennedy is shot, Johnson took over. Johnson was breathtakingly shrewd; he was also a great and crooked politician -- but knew zilch about geo politics (as was true of MacNamara and Rusk wasn't much better off) -- and he decided to cement his reelection by upping the war several notches.

    Westmoreland replaced Harkins and used US troops to try to get the VC (who were being chewed up pretty bad by several things and were increasingly replaced by the PAVN, later NVA) to stand and fight. They generally didn't elect to do that, when they did they got whipped (which was why they normally tried to avoid it, d'oh...). The South Viet Namese reaction to that was to hang back to husband strength because they knew we'd leave. (Morals: [1] "Corrupt" does not mean stupid; [2] One can win battles and lose the war)

    Long story short; we tried to fight a European style war in the rice paddies from 1962 until late 1968 because of two Euro-centric Generals. When Abrams took over and CORDS got going, the war turned around and was effectively won by 1973. It is very important to note that the final tactical solution was a mix of COIN doctrine plus Armor * and infantry tactical battles suited to the terrain and the enemy both relying on good intel. Unfortunately or fortunately (viewpoint dependent) US domestic politics -- which started the war in the first place -- ended it.

    ERRATA: Apologies to RTK, CavGuy, Ironhorse, Gian and all the other Treadh... er, Tankers and Cavalrymen for omitting Armor above (*). I plead old age; last time I ran the TCPC was in an M41A1C...

    NOTE: That is not to say that the politicians 'lost' the war, they did not. Nor did the Media 'lose' it for us; they didn't help but they don't have nearly as much power as they like to think. First there is no lose or win, no 'victory' or 'defeat' in any modern insurgency. Second, a satisfactory outcome was not reached because the Army fought the wrong war; took to long to get its act together though it eventually did but by the time they did, the American people and their elected pols had tired of it. It's far more complicated than that but that's the gist.

    I can remember standing on the beach at Tuy Hoa in 1966 and saying "We'll be here another 10 years, spend fifty billion and get 100K KIA all to give Uncle Ho 15 airfields." That doesn't mean I was particulalry prescient, a number of Officers and senior NCOs believed along those lines. I was off on the time and the numbers but fortunately, I was too high on everything, particularly the KIA, except the dollars. However, it's the thought that counts...

    Two lessons out of Viet Nam appropriate today are; one does not always get to fight the war one wishes to fight, own politicians and the enemy have votes in that. That and be very careful to do your homework BEFORE you decide to commit troops and be very aware that Americans do not care that much about casualties, they expect them in a war and will give you a couple of years but then they want progress or cessation.

    On that first point, I'd note that every single war or major operation outside CONUS in which we have engaged since 1945; from the Greek Civil War forward has been one picked by the Politicians we elected and was decidedly not one with which the Armed Forces really wanted to be involved or one for which they were really prepared (we would've flat been prepared for a land war in Europe, though...) Note further that only a few have had satisfactory conclusions.

    I think there's a message in there somewhere...
    Last edited by Ken White; 11-14-2007 at 04:38 AM. Reason: Dropped phrase + Errata sheet

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    Council Member kehenry1's Avatar
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    Default Clausewitz Theory of War and Politics

    Quote:
    Coin is not “armed politics.” If it were then we would have politicians doing Coin with guns. We don’t. Instead they are conducted by soldiers and marines with guns. A big and important difference that unfortunately clever little cliché’s like “armed politics” helps to cloud and make unclear. In fact the term “armed politics” conceals the reality of Coin which fundamentally is one of death, destruction, and fighting.
    Also true -- though I'd suggest the reality is even more than just killing and dying. Still your point is valid, that death, destruction and fighting are usually going to be required and the policy makers and deciders need to know and acknowledge that up front. They also need to worst case those effects else they'll make a dumb decision.
    Actually, I always thought that Clausewitz's theory on the interaction of war and politics was applicable to COIN. Not just that war is an extension of politics, though that may be true. But when he wrote:

    On War - Book I, Chpt 1: What is War

    11.—The political object now reappears.

    Here, now, forces itself again into consideration a question which we had laid aside (see No. 2), that is, the political object of the war. The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary, to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object. Just as this law loses its force, the political object must again come forward.
    In relation to counterinsurgency, I believe that this applies, not just at a strategic national level, but in a very localized micro-level. In each area of operations, war and politics are at a continuous ebb and flow, each taking precedent over the other, each shaping the other as the circumstances warrant. Until, as Clausewitz notes, the political objective diminishes (or is satisfied) for one side or the other or even both together. The need to act or fight is diminished in relationship to the rise of the political solution.

    I often think that the argument about which is predominant in counterinsurgency or war is a fallacy that is projected by either proponents' history and occupation. It seems, by nature, fighting men want to fight and believe that is the the decisive factor. Politicians want to politic or negotiate and believe that this is the decisive factor. Neither is apt to see the other as a partner to achieving the ends. Each sees the objective differently. One sees it as "defeating the enemy in combat" (or, as Clausewitz indicates, disarming or destroying the enemy physically) and the other sees it as reaching a political agreement that will satisfy political objectives and end combat. Each sees the other as a hindrance to obtaining their determined objective. Neither sees the other as complimentary.

    Clausewitz also noted that war is about conjecture and probabilities, not absolutes. We can apply this to the question of whether combat (fighting) is the appropriate means or politics. There are no set points that determines which is appropriate. It's something we have to determine by weighing the situation. To decide war or combat without weighing the cost, whether in blood, treasure or political fallout, is foolish. To rely solely on politics, without having the means or will to enforce the decision (military) is bound for failure.

    With one exception, that Clausewitz also points out: if the enemy is set on combat and attacks us, then the enemy has made his decision and necessarily changes our plans, sometimes against our will. If we are working on political solutions in a localized area and the enemy attacks us, then we are forced to respond with violence. Thus, war or combat coming to the fore. As his actions are countered and diminishes, then the political aspect returns to the fore.

    Ebb and flow.

    26.—They may all be regarded as political acts.

    Returning now to the main subject, although it is true that in one kind of war the political element seems almost to disappear, whilst in another kind it occupies a very prominent place, we may still affirm that the one is as political as the other; for if we regard the state policy as the intelligence of the personified state, then amongst all the constellations in the political sky which it has to compute, those must be included which arise when the nature of its relations imposes the necessity of a great war. It is only if we understand by policy not a true appreciation of affairs in general, but the conventional conception of a cautious, subtle, also dishonest craftiness, averse from violence, that the latter kind of war may belong more to policy than the first.

    ON War - Book I, Chpt 2: Ends and Means of War

    The second way is to select for the object of our enterprises those points at which we can do the enemy most harm. Nothing is easier to conceive than two different directions in which our force may be employed, the first of which is to be preferred if our object is to defeat the enemy's army, while the other is more advantageous if the defeat of the enemy is out of the question. According to the usual mode of speaking we should say that the first is more military, the other more political. But if we take our view from the highest point, both are equally military, and neither the one nor the other can be eligible unless it suits the circumstances of the case.[snip]

    These are the circumstances in general connected with the aim which we have to pursue in war; let us now turn to the means.

    There is only one single means, it is the Fight. However diversified this may be in form, however widely it may differ from a rough vent of hatred and animosity in a hand-to-hand encounter, whatever number of things may introduce themselves which are not actual fighting, still it is always implied in the conception of war, that all the effects manifested have their roots in the combat. [snip]

    Thus, the destruction of the enemy's armed force appears, therefore, always as the superior and more effectual means, to which all others must give way.

    But certainly it is only when there is a supposed equality in all other conditions that we can ascribe to the destruction of the enemy's armed force a greater efficacy.
    It would, therefore, be a great mistake to draw from it the conclusion that a blind dash must always gain the victory over skill and caution. An unskilful attack would lead to the destruction of our own and not of the enemy's force, and therefore is not what is here meant. The superior efficacy belongs not to the means but to the end, and we are only comparing the effect of one realised aim with the other
    Now, I don't claim to have read the COIN manual front to back, so I can't say for certain that it places politics above combat. But, it would seem, by the reporting on the current implementation of the strategy, that it is both and neither can be considered successful without the other.
    Last edited by kehenry1; 11-14-2007 at 08:45 AM.
    Kat-Missouri

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    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    [QUOTE=Gian P Gentile;31355]
    Quote Originally Posted by invictus0972 View Post

    Too bad our new Coin manual chose to omit St Carl off of its classics reading list. Can anyone explain that???

    gian
    Because counterinsurgency may look like war at the tactical level but it is not at the strategic level. To the extent we elect to treat it like a variant of war, we fail.

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    Council Member kehenry1's Avatar
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    Default Clausewitz and Counterinsurgency

    Because counterinsurgency may look like war at the tactical level but it is not at the strategic level. To the extent we elect to treat it like a variant of war, we fail.
    I think I would agree with you. The phrase "to the extent we elect to treat it like a variant of war, we fail" is apt. The "extent" is the issue. Obviously, counterinsurgency will contain elements of combat. The problem seems to be whether adherents of Clausewitz choose to jettison his commentary on political objectives and how much effect politics have on war. Or, in this case, counterinsurgency.

    Of course, Clausewitz spent limited time on this part of his "theory" because he was ultimately a soldier whose theater was war. It didn't make his commentary on the political aspects less astute or applicable. It does mean that the emphasis should be on this extract of his thesis and supplemented with Mao and others who focus on the balance of the political with combat.

    Not because the political aspect is the only "means" to the end of an insurgency. Particularly when that insurgency is extensive and very violent. However, politics are the cause of insurgencies, thus, politics are the final solution. In between combat and politics ebb and flow.

    Soldiers are generally and by nature warriors focused on combat as was Clausewitz. They are conditioned for traditional war, to confronting the enemy with violence. Thus, the extent to which politics are emphasized in the education of military leaders and the common soldier is simply an attempt to balance out natural inclinations and previous training in order effectively conduct a counterinsurgency.

    Because it is a counterinsurgency against violent insurgents and these counterinsurgencies, for the US, are expeditionary counterinsurgencies in other nations, it requires combat capable forces that can also act as political arbitrators. They must be able make war and negotiate peace at the same time.

    Counterinsurgency is the balance of politics and war; the application of law and directed violence. It's yin and yang, feng shui, whatever term of balancing we want to use. It's just that the last weight that is dropped on the scale is always political.
    Kat-Missouri

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