Counterinsurgency For U.S. Government Policymakers

[Rob Thornton]

Ken - I really appreciate that post - it shows the value of a military leader who recognizes the need to adapt while preserving most of a full range of options against an enemy who thinks, has options himself, and if possible will take advantage of opportunities presented him; or because he may want it more then you do - might do something we just could not or would not expect (or chose to ignore). I believe our current MNF-I leadership has also done that - while the story would seem to be in the various lines of effort (political, etc.) and that is OK, but there is an awful lot of combat power that has been preserved there for more offensive and defensive operations, and that is at least occasionally needed against an aggressive enemy.

Long story short; we tried to fight a European style war in the rice paddies from 1962 until late 1968 because of two Euro-centric Generals. When Abrams took over and CORDS got going, the war turned around and was effectively won by 1973. It is very important to note that the final tactical solution was a mix of COIN doctrine plus Armor * and infantry tactical battles suited to the terrain and the enemy both relying on good intel. Unfortunately or fortunately (viewpoint dependent) US domestic politics -- which started the war in the first place -- ended it

.

If we find ourselves in similar situations in the future, its probable that it will also go down in a locale where the neighbors have a surly disposition and have their own objectives in mind - a situation where for whatever reason the unlikely happens. Here we will be best served with agile, adaptive leadership that have the full range of tools (with respect to proportion to the mission at hand) to do something about it.

Here is to balance and consistency combined with the very best leadership we can field!

Best, Rob

Best Regards, Rob

[Gian P Gentile]

Because counterinsurgency may look like war at the tactical level but it is not at the strategic level. To the extent we elect to treat it like a variant of war, we fail.

Sorry Steve but i dont buy your answer. I have a much more cynical view as to why the manual left out St Carl from its classic reading list and this was confirmed to me by an individual who was involved in the writing. That the writers (not the busy-body writers but the rock-star types) wanted to bludgeon the conventionally minded, big-battle focussed hard-wired officers (i guess like me) out of the darkness of our cold-war mindset and into the light of Galula-like coin operations. That is why St Carl was removed. In my mind, absurd and inexecusable. How does our army forsake the brilliance and immediate relevance of Clausewitz, in any kind of war, for the pop-theories of the armed social scientists?

Also Steve do you really mean that Coin is not war "at the strategic level?" I wonder if General Patreaus would agree with that statement since he is our strategic general in command in Iraq? I imagine from time to time on Victory Base in Baghdad he has attended memorial ceremonies for dead american service men and women killed in action in Iraq. Hard to believe that he would think that he is not at war.

good luck at your conference.

gian

[SteveMetz]

Sorry Steve but i dont buy your answer. I have a much more cynical view as to why the manual left out St Carl from its classic reading list and this was confirmed to me by an individual who was involved in the writing. That the writers (not the busy-body writers but the rock-star types) wanted to bludgeon the conventionally minded, big-battle focussed hard-wired officers (i guess like me) out of the darkness of our cold-war mindset and into the light of Galula-like coin operations. That is why St Carl was removed. In my mind, absurd and inexecusable. How does our army forsake the brilliance and immediate relevance of Clausewitz, in any kind of war, for the pop-theories of the armed social scientists?

Also Steve do you really mean that Coin is not war "at the strategic level?" I wonder if General Patreaus would agree with that statement since he is our strategic general in command in Iraq? I imagine from time to time on Victory Base in Baghdad he has attended memorial ceremonies for dead american service men and women killed in action in Iraq. Hard to believe that he would think that he is not at war.

good luck at your conference.

gian

Well, I was kind of involved in the writing myself and I'm co-authoring a book with the main scribe, Con Crane. The idea that subversives were able to pull a fast one generals Petraeus and Mattis and all of the other flag officers who signed off on the manual is a bit far fetched.

And your second paragraph illustrates the point I just made: that troops are killed does not make something war (although there is similarity at the tactical level). But, the fact that a general rather than a civilian is seen as the primary architect of the counterinsurgency effort shows that the United States cannot fully transcend the idea that counterinsurgency is just a small war. That may be the reason that over the past fifty years, we've brought one out of the four counterinsurgency efforts we were involved in to a successful resolution.

[slapout9]

Steve Metz, almost forgot if you have not left yet. Check with Colonel Rod Zastrow Air Force rep at the Army War College. He has a bunch of things from the SMART wars workshop that he was very impressed with that are not being taught anywhere. He has read a lot about Killcullen. You might find some usefull information for discussion at your workshop. Good Luck Slap...from that other Universe.

[SteveMetz]

Steve Metz, almost forgot if you have not left yet. Check with Colonel Rod Zastrow Air Force rep at the Army War College. He has a bunch of things from the SMART wars workshop that he was very impressed with that are not being taught anywhere. He has read a lot about Killcullen. You might find some usefull information for discussion at your workshop. Good Luck Slap...from that other Universe.

I once lived in Millbrook so I've actually BEEN to Slapout. Not something that I put on my resume, though! Isn't the town slogan "Slapout--Gateway to Wetumpka"?

[Rob Thornton]

If armed insurgency is a form of warfare adopted by a group(s) who cannot openly take on either the ruling government under which it currently exists (perhaps they lack the means), and/or is adopted by an outside state which seeks to foment a change in the balance of its neighbor - then wouldn't "insurgency" still be a considered a manner to wage war to a political end?

I'll agree that inurgency and counter-insurgency require greater political effort - because the means at the disposal of the insurgents are employed toward the de-legitimization of the of the political body to afford an opportunity to emplace its own politics, however - I think it could transition sharply at some point given a change in the means at the disposal of any one side - as such if we are glued to any one view we may miss the transition and the opportunities.

Kilcullen mentioned counter-insurgency to counter war - an interesting point I thought as you are trying to diminish the chances of the insurgents from gaining the politcal power and the means to move from one form of warfare to another.

However - I think we must consider it war, if we are employing warfare to political purpose. This is also another place where I think Clausewitz would fit well because he does discuss this - however I suppose interpretation matters . During this phase - politics may have more weight then armed force in regards to countering the efforts of the insurgents, but it must be backed up with security, and it must be prepared for new variables to be introduced which might change the weighting of the efforts - at the tactical, operational, theater strategic and strategic - there are a number of complex relationships operating in this environment that make it a combination of regional Jenga and Twister.

I'm not quibbling, but I think its a mistake to try and box this in one camp or the other. Consequently we must be prepared to consider the nature of the war from multiple perspectives at every level.

I don't think we can say this is not "war" at the strategic level - if for no other reason because the domestic and iternational audience consider it so for a number of reasons - and that has consequences. Clausewitz was not the first or last to put forward these ideas - as long as people have contemplated politics, people and the use of force they have considered it - but Clausewitz does provide a broad theoretical framework for considering the spectrum of war, its possibilities, causes and the objective and subjective nature of war - as such I read what I want and ignore most lists - I also pick and choose out of doctrine because I believe that while it provides good content - it is still an attempt (however well it is done) to distill art into science so we can all benefit from it in varying degrees.

Best, Rob

[slapout9]

Yeah i remember you saying you lived in Millbrook. You are not going to believe this but for the last 2 or 3 years Millbrook has been the fastest growing city in Alabama you probably would not recongnize it. As for Slapout we are coming right along we now have our own Subway, 2 gas stations, and there is talk of changing the caution light to a real stoplight because of traffic congestion. Wetumpka is going to have one of the largest casinos in the state on an (Indian reservation).....and then SlapVegas!!!

[SteveMetz]

Yeah i remember you saying you lived in Millbrook. You are not going to believe this but for the last 2 or 3 years Millbrook has been the fastest growing city in Alabama you probably would not recongnize it. As for Slapout we are coming right along we now have our own Subway, 2 gas stations, and there is talk of changing the caution light to a real stoplight because of traffic congestion. Wetumpka is going to have one of the largest casinos in the state on an (Indian reservation).....and then SlapVegas!!!

I lived on South Cobb Loop. If you exit the Interstate on Cobb Road, take the first left then the first right.

I had to go to Wetumpka to get a driver's license. I felt like Joseph making the trip to Bethlehem to pay his taxes.

[kehenry1]

In regards to Gian's comment about taking Clausewitz off the reading list for this counterinsurgency manual...

Am I wrong, or isn't Clausewitz on the general reading list for officers in the officers manual? And, isn't he still taught at military academies? And on the reading lists given to officers through OCS?

I am not sure that his lack of inclusion is necessarily a lack of endorsement of his general theories. However, I might agree that he was not included on this list because the focus was on counterinsurgency and that it was meant to shape the ideas and tactics used by officers in that regard. Is that "browbeating" combat officers into changing their minds about the role of combat and politics in a counterinsurgency? I suppose you could call it that, but I am unsure why the attempt to reshape strategy and tactics for a given type of war is incorrect or reviled.

On Steve Metz, that is exactly what I was referring to. The question of whether politics or combat takes over all precedence in a counterinsurgency seems out of place when the entire process is to facilitate flexibility in responses to get a resolution.

It is a balancing of appropriate force to achieve the ends. Even Clausewitz makes reference to that as you point out.

So, I guess my question is: "why is it hard for the military to do both?"

Is this about inflexible meets flexible? And why doesn't the need to be flexible in conventional war and adjust to the circumstances translate to flexibility in application of force and politics in a counterinsurgency?

[marct]

Some good points all around. I particular, I am really pleased to see so much discussion of semantics .

Gian, as you know I disagree with your conclusion that COIN is "war" and, therefore, can be treated as semantically equivalent to all other wars. I do tend to agree with SteveM that it may be "war" at the tactical level, but not at the level of Grand Strategy (Steve, I think Gian does have about about the Strategic level...).

I'll admit that a lot of my disagreement with Gian comes from our differing backgrounds. Personally, I don't see "war" as a first order concept but, rather, as a second order concept. I see "conflict" as a first order concept, with "war" being only a single sub-set of conflict (I also use fuzzy sets for definitions, not crisp sets). Other sub-sets of conflict, to my mind, include economic competition, party politics, symbolic competition (with or without overt "religious" tones), sports, intra-social group conflict (e.g. class, race, ethnicity, religious, etc.), etc.

I tend to view the semantic "hardening" of taxonomies as both a core feature of "culture" and, also, a neurobiological process and both are susceptible to change over time dependent on environment. So. let's take this back to "war" and "politics"....

How do we define politics? I think this is a crucial question that is not being asked here. Rather, the term "politics" is being tossed around as if we all agree on exactly what it is. I don't think that there is agreement and, furthermore, I think the range of assumed meaning is quite broad which is causing a large amount of semantic confusion. To start the ball rolling, I'll give you my own definition of politics as "the ecology of human interaction".

[Norfolk]

I tend to view the semantic "hardening" of taxonomies as both a core feature of "culture" and, also, a neurobiological process and both are susceptible to change over time dependent on environment. So. let's take this back to "war" and "politics"....

How do we define politics? I think this is a crucial question that is not being asked here. Rather, the term "politics" is being tossed around as if we all agree on exactly what it is. I don't think that there is agreement and, furthermore, I think the range of assumed meaning is quite broad which is causing a large amount of semantic confusion. To start the ball rolling, I'll give you my own definition of politics as "the ecology of human interaction".

I'll simplify that same definition by quoting something Arnold Scharzenegger wrote about 25 years ago: "Politics is simply the way that people relate to each other." Given that he's been able to remain as Governor of one of the most politically eccentric States in the Union, I rather suspect that his definition - if it is still one that he uses in his present capacities - is eminently practical.

[marct]

I'll simplify that same definition by quoting something Arnold Scharzenegger wrote about 25 years ago: "Politics is simply the way that people relate to each other." Given that he's been able to remain as Governor of one of the most politically eccentric States in the Union, I rather suspect that his definition - if it is still one that he uses in his present capacities - is eminently practical.

That works for me, although unpacking it gets into all sorts of interesting areas .

[Norfolk]

That works for me, although unpacking it gets into all sorts of interesting areas .

Oh yes...and may all the ways remain uncounted.

[Rank amateur]

A couple of points. Overall, I think that Gian's message is starting to get through. I have seen a subtle change in Kilcullen's choice of words. He talks more about kinetic operations, killing etc. There is now more emphasis on tactical elements like denying sanctuary, controlling op tempo etc.

I think, however, that the overall COIN message is clear enough that an amateur can understand it. Killing is not strategic, because the insurgents can control their lost rates by running. (As opposed to the first Gulf War where retreat did nothing except change where the Iraqis died.) Insurgents are able to control their loss rate by hiding in the population. The strategy, therefore, is pretty simple.

The strategic objective is to separate insurgents from the population. The strategy is population control. Once the insurgents are separated from the population, you can kill them. (Good luck. Have fun. Don't take any pictures.)

Put more simply, kill them while they hide in the population: lose. Separate them from the population first and then kill them: win.

But again, I have seen a change in emphasis in COIN doctrine. The objective is population control. Social workers don't control populations. Neither do democratic politicians. As long as you follow the ROE, I don't think any one cares how you control the population. Carrots, sticks, a combination, whatever works.

[kehenry1]

"Politics is simply the way that people relate to each other."

I think that is a pretty good general statement. If we did unpack it further I believe that "politics" encompasses the entire efforts that are not "combat" (ie, shooting, killing, arresting or disrupting the enemy; but would include intelligence gathering and other activities directly linked to carrying out "combat" operations). That would include building government infrastructure, negotiating power sharing, developing economy, reconstructing physical infrastructure and all the other variants of that which do not directly relate to actual "combat".

[kehenry1]

But again, I have seen a change in emphasis in COIN doctrine. The objective is population control. Social workers don't control populations. Neither do democratic politicians. As long as you follow the ROE, I don't think any one cares how you control the population. Carrots, sticks, a combination, whatever works.

I'll repeat the title there: separating the insurgents IS political in nature. Carrots and sticks are political. Negotiating power sharing, whether democratic or other, is political.

Further, I think there is a reason that we separate the "indigent insurgents" from the "global insurgents" and how we deal with them. We don't have to kill all or even a significant portion of the indigent insurgents in order to win the "war". That can still be handled through a mix of political and combat that may reduce casualties on all sides. In a previous thread, we discussed that "local" insurgents have their own agenda and is tied to their local goals and gains. The risk of losing that may result in more political resolutions.

"Global Insurgents", like Al Qaida and their recruits, are working towards a global construct that little cares about the local populations conditions beyond serving their global agenda. they are less likely to negotiate or accept "political" resolutions and are more likely to be or need to be killed off in great numbers in order to result in a secession of combat. Equally, the way we separate them from the "population" may have a different variation than what we do with the "locals".

[wm]

I'll simplify that same definition by quoting something Arnold Scharzenegger wrote about 25 years ago: "Politics is simply the way that people relate to each other." Given that he's been able to remain as Governor of one of the most politically eccentric States in the Union, I rather suspect that his definition - if it is still one that he uses in his present capacities - is eminently practical.

I was impressed that MarcT finally suggested shifting the discussion to the definition of politics. I also am impressed that the Guvernator has almost the same definition for politics that Aristotle has. (Maybe I'm just easily impressed ) I think a good summary of Aristotle's definition is "a practical body of knowledge that tries to explain how people get along in groups (anything from a family to a polis)." (BTW, I'm not quoting anyone here, just using the quotation marks as a stylistic device to set off my proposed summation of Aristotle's definition.)

[marct]

Hmmm, I can see why you would cut out combat operations but, on the whole, I would tend to include them. For example, sometimes shooting and killing people is not "war" it is "law enforcement", and sometimes it's just cultural expectation (e.g. blood feuds, honour killings, gang initiations, etc.).

Personally, I tend to draw distinctions between the "formal" institution and the "real" institution - I've found it a very useful distinction that, I believe, has been clouded quite badly in the case of "war" (consider the war on drugs, the war on poverty, etc.). As I mentioned in my earlier post, I tend to use fuzzy sets rather than crisp sets, so I really have no problems with the idea that a singular observed action / event can be part of more than one "term". I would suggest that some level of violence has always been part of politics, even if that violence is only implied.

[selil]

.....As I mentioned in my earlier post, I tend to use fuzzy sets rather than crisp sets, so I really have no problems with the idea that a singular observed action / event can be part of more than one "term"....

So you aren't really talking about "sets" you're talking about confidence intervals. In general these "terms" fall within this area but not always.

[kehenry1]

marct...I know what you're getting at and yes "combat" or "violence" is part of social interaction and thus, can be construed as "political". and, yes, Clausewitz at once makes combat and politics the same while simultaneously making them separate. Probably what confuses people.

however, I think the issue here is separating "violence" from other tactics in order to re-enforce the idea among the "combat oriented" forces that the "other tactics", ie "politics" or "non-violent", are available and should be used equally or more often to defeat an insurgency.