Counterinsurgency For U.S. Government Policymakers

[marct]

So you aren't really talking about "sets" you're talking about confidence intervals. In general these "terms" fall within this area but not always.

Nope, I am talking about sets, but using Zadeh's fuzzy set theory where different variables defining the boundary conditions of a set have different membership values for each particular instance. The "sets" become ideal types in the Weberian sense (at least depending on how they are defined). Also, it's not the terms that fall into the sets, although that happens with lower order terms being partial members of upper order terms, but, rather, particular instances or events that fall into an area (basically, a topological manifold).

[John T. Fishel]

I agree with you - given your definition of conflict. I would only add that the word that is translated as "politics" is, in German, "politika." That same word in Spanish is "politica" which correctly tranlates to English as BOTH politics and policy. Thus, the classic quote from St. Carl is translated both ways depending on context. Sometimes both words correctly capture the essence at the same time. To wit, language is a slippery devil.

JohnT

[marct]

Hi kehenry1,

marct...I know what you're getting at and yes "combat" or "violence" is part of social interaction and thus, can be construed as "political". and, yes, Clausewitz at once makes combat and politics the same while simultaneously making them separate. Probably what confuses people.

Probably. I suspect that he looked at it as a change in frequency distribution over time given his use of metaphors and analogs from Newtonian physics. If we take a sliding scale, from "Politics" (defined as non-kinetic human interaction) to "War" (defined as kinetic human interaction), that would make sense.

however, I think the issue here is separating "violence" from other tactics in order to re-enforce the idea among the "combat oriented" forces that the "other tactics", ie "politics" or "non-violent", are available and should be used equally or more often to defeat an insurgency.

Agreed - it's one of the reasons why I brought up the issue of defining politics. Hearkening back to that formal-informal distinction, I think we can also look at the range of actions defined as "acceptable" in a formal setting (either through mutual agreement, e.g. the Laws of War or via mutual acceptance without formal agreement, e.g. "collateral damage") vs. those that are not "acceptable" in a formal setting (e.g. non-state actors engaging in "warfare", terrorist tactics, etc.). Again, I would suggest that we are seeing a change over time in the membership function of any given action/event being included in a given term.

One of the reasons why I "pick on" Gian's comments so much (apologies for that - it's not personal at all and I'll be more than happy to buy the first round if/when we can get some f2f time ), is that his stated views are an almost perfect example of someone who believes that certain terms are absolute and unchanging. I really don't think this is a case of someone "getting it" or not - just a great illustration of how the human mind operates. You may be right about the separation of violent from non-violent tactics, although I would argue that this is now into the realm of communicating the concept of appropriate tactics for the given environment.

[invictus0972]

[QUOTE=Gian P Gentile;31355]

Of course i do not believe that war and politics are separate. i am a disciple of the great one, St Carl von Clausewitz. The two are so inexorably mixed that they can not be seperated in whatever kind of war one is fighting.

My point is that clever cliches like "armed politics" make counterinsurgency war, which is still war and at its most basic level is death, violence and fighting, into something that it is not. This is a term that the armed social scientists have thrust upon us and i feel it actually reduces the complexity of Coin to the point where it appears to the uniformed to be a simple process of applying lines of operations and other pop-anthropolgical theories to achieve "victory." To quote Ken White in an earlier posting on this threat, "It ain't that easy."

Too bad our new Coin manual chose to omit St Carl off of its classics reading list. Can anyone explain that???

gian

Hi Gentile,

I get you now. As you and everyone already know, Gray says this very thing in his article. War is war! Thanks for the clarification.

V/r

Invictus

[Ken White]

...
. . .
On Steve Metz, that is exactly what I was referring to. The question of whether politics or combat takes over all precedence in a counterinsurgency seems out of place when the entire process is to facilitate flexibility in responses to get a resolution.

True, however recall that the opponent has a voice in everything and he is generally more agile than will be the COIN force.

It is a balancing of appropriate force to achieve the ends. Even Clausewitz makes reference to that as you point out.

So, I guess my question is: "why is it hard for the military to do both?"

Is this about inflexible meets flexible? And why doesn't the need to be flexible in conventional war and adjust to the circumstances translate to flexibility in application of force and politics in a counterinsurgency?

Because the Armed forces of the US due to many factors tend to tamp down flexibility until it really becomes vital (in the true sense of the word). We are big, heirarchial, bureaucratic and ritualistic. We undertrain people at all levels but particularly at entry, officer or enlisted. We are overly imbued with protecting the institutions and thus almost allergic to any misjudgment that may embarrass the institutions -- all that works to stifle initiative and flexibility.

The fact that a lot of flexibility and initiative are shown is a credit to the people in the units who develop and operate well in spite of the unintentionally oppressive stifling.

The good news is that when initiative and flexibility become imperative and / or the system has rid itself of peace time soldiering oriented folks-- as in the latter stages of WW II -- we can outflex most. We aren't there yet.

From a later post:

"however, I think the issue here is separating "violence" from other tactics in order to re-enforce the idea among the "combat oriented" forces that the "other tactics", ie "politics" or "non-violent", are available and should be used equally or more often to defeat an insurgency."

That statement, while not totally incorrect, implies action that is very much situation and METT-T dependent. There is no one size fits all and in some insurgencies an over emphasis on "non-violence" will have a negative effect. The current situation in Iraq comes to mind. Anyone who thinks that there is not a considerable degree of violence occurring there just isn't paying attention.

For a large percentage of the insurgents, other tactics can and should be used; for others, they will be seen as a weakness and will merely embolden those opponents.

I think that a part Gian's concern -- and I know a large concern of mine -- is that that Army, as it is prone to do, will swing the "we don't do counter insurgency" gate too far in the opposite direction and forget that it has to be full spectrum. We have a record of doing that -- and in each gate swing, a little more initiative and flexibility get stifled.

That occurs because the senior leadership sets the course and the mavericks and nay sayers are ruthlessly purged. Thus each gate swing gets a few more free thinkers to disappear.

I suggest that the last quote from you I included above is indicative of how this occurs. It is very easy to grab the fad of the day and decide it is the holy grail. It almost never is and the flexibility you properly advocate and cite as apparently missing gives the ability to look at the latest fad, accept the good -- and not throw out that which is proven necessary and to work. Every insurgency, every war is different.

Most of all, that flexibility requires, in COIN or conventional combat, the ability to rapidly assess and act and to do so without relying on dogma.

[Ken White]

Agree wtih you and particularly with your last paragraph:

"But again, I have seen a change in emphasis in COIN doctrine. The objective is population control. Social workers don't control populations. Neither do democratic politicians. As long as you follow the ROE, I don't think any one cares how you control the population. Carrots, sticks, a combination, whatever works."

True dat...

Don't think it's a change in emphasis as much as it implementing, where appropriate, a doctrine we learned in the 60s and then parked for a few years.

[invictus0972]

Sounds like masochism to me...


NOTE: That is not to say that the politicians 'lost' the war, they did not. Nor did the Media 'lose' it for us; they didn't help but they don't have nearly as much power as they like to think. First there is no lose or win, no 'victory' or 'defeat' in any modern insurgency. Second, a satisfactory outcome was not reached because the Army fought the wrong war; took to long to get its act together though it eventually did but by the time they did, the American people and their elected pols had tired of it. It's far more complicated than that but that's the gist.

Ken,

Thanks for your thoughts! I love to hear these things from primary sources, those who lived it. I agree with your statements about there not being victory or defeat in insurgency. It seems these terms do not apply. Perhaps success is a better term. EXAMPLE: In Malaysia, the British successfully conducted a counterinsurgency. Maybe this all that can be said on these matters.

In college, I had a seminar on Vietnam, and I came away agreeing with my professor who said that it was an "unwinnable" war. His assertion was that the only path to victory was full mobilization of the military; and, because of our Cold War commitments in Eastern Europe, this was an absolute impossibility. Do you agree?

Very respectfully,

Invictus

[Ken White]

You said:

"...stated views are an almost perfect example of someone who believes that certain terms are absolute and unchanging. I really don't think this is a case of someone "getting it" or not - just a great illustration of how the human mind operates."

While that is certainly a correct statement in regard to much argumenation, I'd also suggest that there are those who have very flexible views on those "certain terms" but in certain fora elect to not reveal that flexibility and instead take an exceptionally strong position for a variety of reasons not least to impress upon others the urgency of what they're saying with respect to a particular aspect -- and concomitantly force those in disagreement to take an exceptionally or even excessively contrary position and thus reveal weaknesses.

Been my observation that the truth usually lies in between...

[kehenry1]

marct...

Probably. I suspect that he looked at it as a change in frequency distribution over time given his use of metaphors and analogs from Newtonian physics.

Clausewitz's writing style was certainly influenced by the overall style of the day. I'm not afraid to admit that the first time I read him, being non-military, non-19th century, I was left scratching my head going "huh?"

Kind of like reading Milton's Paradise Lost in the original language. It has a certain rhythm and language that would do the same unless you've been exposed to shakespearian language.

If we take a sliding scale, from "Politics" (defined as non-kinetic human interaction) to "War" (defined as kinetic human interaction), that would make sense.

Exactly.

I really don't think this is a case of someone "getting it" or not - just a great illustration of how the human mind operates.

I believe that's why I stated in an earlier post that the question of which takes precedence is sometimes related to the person's experience. Combat oriented may focus on the combat while "state" oriented may focus on the non-kinetic, political aspects. Thus, someone has to be able to balance them and figure out when the right time to apply either/or/both is.

You may be right about the separation of violent from non-violent tactics, although I would argue that this is now into the realm of communicating the concept of appropriate tactics for the given environment.

may be true and may also be trying to communicate in the simplest, most recognizable terms. A US infantry man with his "political" experience in the states, probably doesn't associate "politics" with physical violence. Thus, it is meant to translate based on his experiences.

Ken..

That statement, while not totally incorrect, implies action that is very much situation and METT-T dependent. There is no one size fits all and in some insurgencies an over emphasis on "non-violence" will have a negative effect. The current situation in Iraq comes to mind. Anyone who thinks that there is not a considerable degree of violence occurring there just isn't paying attention.

First, the "used more often" was not to imply "more often than combat". But, as in "more often" than it is. Secondly, I had a long post on the very subject of the "enemy's vote" and Clausewitz's point that the enemy deciding to do violence forcibly changes our actions.

The only way to determine which is appropriate is the facts on the ground and evaluated with "probabilities and conjectures". Which, I always though Clausewitz meant "gut instinct" to an extent. You have all the information, now you have to conjure a likely scenario and act on it. there are no "absolutes".

[marct]

Hi Ken,

While that is certainly a correct statement in regard to much argumenation, I'd also suggest that there are those who have very flexible views on those "certain terms" but in certain fora elect to not reveal that flexibility and instead take an exceptionally strong position for a variety of reasons not least to impress upon others the urgency of what they're saying with respect to a particular aspect -- and concomitantly force those in disagreement to take an exceptionally or even excessively contrary position and thus reveal weaknesses.

Been my observation that the truth usually lies in between...

I would certainly agree with that observation! Honestly, that's why I was trying to focus my commentary on the "stated" views. Possibly due to my classical education, I'm a great believer in in vino veritas - I would really like to sit down over some beers with Gian, and a whole host of other people here () and just talk.

[Rob Thornton]

remembered - from which parts will we draw lessons available?

What was John Ford trying to tell us when Jimmy Stewart admits to not having killed Lee Marvin in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance?

I have some concern that when OIF is reviewed we will pick and choose what we want to learn out of it. If we were doing a review right now what would we lay out as the top 5 or so takeaways and how would that effect change? I'm a bit concerned that as a military we might go for the low hanging fruit instead of really being introspective and looking forward with regards not only to our own war, but the other wars going on around us, and how potential adversaries might be eyeballing us and their neighbors.

Do we simplify things through aggregation of events to get our arms around it -a kind of historical compression - where important bits get crushed in order to make the larger event fit the place we assign it? Do we linearize historical events to a point where they are seen only in relation to previous and subsequent events and as such lose important context, or are discarded as irrelevant? We have to be real careful not to do this.

At certain points in OIF you'll find some serious fights where the nature of war became reasonably unbridled and pure for the combatants, even if outside of that it was more tethered to its political context. This not only happened during the invasion, but in Ramadi, Fallujah, Baghdad, Mosul and several other places between the invasion and up to 2007. We still consider there is a possibility of large scale fights that might happen as a result of JAM, folks lying low until we start to withdraw BCTs or if events exterior to OIF should occur - we have to in order to lessen the chance of being surprised. We should not write those fights off as anomalies - nor should we cite them as the norm. Maybe its just the way chance and probability are going to play out to scale given the stakes of interested parties. What appears of tactical consequence to us, might be perceived as strategic to somebody else - and their reaction might be as well.

Consider what it takes to deploy and sustain a large military force of air, sea and ground components capable of doing what we did in the initial phase of OIF - too many times I think policy folks (and even ourselves) don't understand or forget the mechanisms involved in that task until we actually have to do it. As such we often lack an appreciation for the overhead required to adjust to the friction of doing these big muscle movements with all the supporting ones that make it possible.

I don't think we can operate on a business model that espouses efficiency over effectiveness and operate in the type of high risk environments we do in the spectrum of war while maintaining the potential for success that we like to go to war with. The ability to operate successfully in those away games does not develop overnight, and once you start pulling the plug on it or converting it, its hard to get back (you might never get it back) - which I think is one reason the Marines are concerned that they have a growing generation gap of leaders who have never done amphibious operations.

Its also not just about if you will ever use it or not - having it and showing the resolve to use it is in fact a deterrent that might limit or even prevent its use, or create other strategic, operational and tactical opportunities. FDOs (Flexible Deterrent Options) in themselves have probably swayed many a decision by some foreign leader who would rather not wait for a more peaceful and less fulfilling settlement. Both of those require that the force be more then just an off the shelf concept - these capabilities require training and exercise to get over the friction that occurs in war and to a lesser degree realistic training where things break, bad weather occurs, people get tired, and #### happens to force leaders to recognize the impact and adapt in order to accomplish the mission. Sims not so much - but are easier to resource to scale.

Training requires resources - the one that is hardest for us to generate is time - time to get good enough at all the tasks we must do. So we have to make tough choices about balancing those that are most likely with those those that are more catastrophic if we fail. The more I think about it the more I think that range of possibilities and the cost of failing in the deep end are going to require we accept a learning curve in the more shallow end - even if 4/5ths of the pool is shallow - meaning we may not be able to afford to be optimized for anything, but must remain a GPF force capable of doing it all. Trust me, as someone who loves the Army, this is a choice that sucks - we want to win all the time, everywhere we go, and we want to be the best at everything we are tasked with - its who we are.

This is where investing in leaders (even more then we have so far) from team leader to GO may be the only mitigation strategy we can pull off. We have to have guys and gals who can take a concept out of doctrine (science) and implement it within the context of the operational conditions (art) to accomplish the mission - whatever it may be. Its a tall order, and why we require the best people be placed where they can be best used.

Regards, Rob

[Ken White]

...
. . .
Ken.
First, the "used more often" was not to imply "more often than combat". But, as in "more often" than it is...

Realized that and am simply unsure you're correct. My sensing is that the first 18 months were overly violent on our part, the next 18 were, effectively a learning phase where a balance was sought and the last 18 have seen a pretty good amalgam. IOW, I do not think that last "more often" is now true.

It should be noted there were examples of units that did the balance bit very well early on and others that do not do it well today. All units have never and will never perform the same way in a given situation. Both the Army and the Marines are far from monolithic or standard in their tactical methodology. That's okay. It better be because it's highly unlikely to change.

...Secondly, I had a long post on the very subject of the "enemy's vote" and Clausewitz's point that the enemy deciding to do violence forcibly changes our actions.

Read and generally agreed with that.

The only way to determine which is appropriate is the facts on the ground and evaluated with "probabilities and conjectures". Which, I always though Clausewitz meant "gut instinct" to an extent. You have all the information, now you have to conjure a likely scenario and act on it. there are no "absolutes".

The "gut instinct" is, practically, the action of an intuitive commander. Fortunately, there are some of them about. The unfortunate counterpoint is that Steve Metz hit a nail with his comment about interchangeable Colonels (substitute any rank); it is anathema to the personnel 'managers' to say that any one of a given grade and specialty cannot do any job requiring that specialty. It is a fact of life that perhaps anyone may be able to do the job but the most capable should probably be employed to do a specific job. Unfortunately, that is not the American way...

True, there never are any absolutes. In war, any variety, there are not even too many probables...

[Rob Thornton]

I would certainly agree with that observation! Honestly, that's why I was trying to focus my commentary on the "stated" views. Possibly due to my classical education, I'm a great believer in in vino veritas - I would really like to sit down over some beers with Gian, and a whole host of other people here () and just talk.

You know - somehow we need to make this happen while getting somebodyelse to pay for it. Hmmm - my vote is JFCOM pays for it and hosts it - we have a broad Joint, Inter-Agency and even multi-national cast - we could allow them to get their agenda out as well - without falling victim to "The Man" and losing our independence / credibility - they benefit in a one time shot that hosts a cross cutting / inter-discipline divers bunch that provides the community a chance to discuss and work through small wars issues and thoughts - which in turn generates greater long term returns because there is no substitute for face to face discussion to strengthen the online type.

What say JFCOM - got a few grand laying around - you could even have the SWC do a sim - of course after we drink your beer, we're back to being ourselves.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

Hi Ken,
I would certainly agree with that observation! Honestly, that's why I was trying to focus my commentary on the "stated" views. Possibly due to my classical education, I'm a great believer in in vino veritas - I would really like to sit down over some beers with Gian, and a whole host of other people here () and just talk.

I did glide over the "stated views" didn't I? Sorry about that. I can only attribute it to a lack of vino impacting my veritas, a condition i will rectify shortly -- the sun surely being over the yardarm in Bermuda by now...

[Ken White]

for "opener of cans of worms" ???

"In college, I had a seminar on Vietnam, and I came away agreeing with my professor who said that it was an "unwinnable" war. His assertion was that the only path to victory was full mobilization of the military; and, because of our Cold War commitments in Eastern Europe, this was an absolute impossibility. Do you agree?"

How many pages did Karnow have to do this stuff???

My opinions...

With my aforementioned there is no 'win,' well, yeah it was 'unwinnable.' I do think it could have been brought to a more satisfactory conclusion but I have to caveat that by saying had it been, the 30% probability is that we'd have had a North and South Korea like situation and an altered relationship with both China and Russia today. The greater probability, the 50% solution, is that we and they would be about where we are now due to our inability to stem the North's -- and many in the South's -- strong sense of nationalism and dedication. Not to mention the fact that there was really no overarching national interest at stake in Viet Nam and people here were more aware of that than they were at the time of Korea and thus there would have been little support for a continued troop presence -- and the North would have known that. (The other 20% is all over the place,dozens of possibilities)

I disagree with him that full mobilization would have been required; there were adequate forces in country, they just weren't properly employed for a too lengthy period. Once they were, the combat was reduced to very minor efforts on the part of the North and the South effectively countered most of them.

The commitments in Europe were actually hollowed out significantly to support the war in Viet Nam; Seventh Army was a veritable shell and the USSR knew that so I disagree on using Europe as an excuse. Full mobilization was not called for due to US domestic political constraints and for no other reason. Most were not convinced that Viet Nam was a necessary war.

I think it was marginally necessary but very poorly planned and fought initially. One can argue about the rationale for Eisenhower signing and the Senate ratifying the mutual support treaty but both actions were taken. We did have a Treaty obligation . One can also argue about the wisdom of the Kennedy Admin in convincing the South to invoke that treaty and then argue more about the Admin's actions early on -- not to mention Johnson's stupidity. Then there was Nixon's campaign promise to get us out. All in all, domestic politics intruded into that war in a major way to the extent that a more satisfactory outcome was denied.

Long way of saying that we probably agreed to a treaty that we should not have, went in as obligated by that treaty which was the right thing to do; went in wrong and stayed wrong for too long, finally got it half right and then left. We would not have 'won' but the capability for a much better end result was squandered. Europe and Cold War considerations there were not an impediment, US domestic politics were the arbiter.

FWIW, to me the military lessons are: (1) Our egos are way too big. (2) Our politicians are way too dumb.

(1a) We knew how to fight insurgencies, we'd done it a number of places but our ego centric leadership refuses to learn from the past and want to do it their way, we are masters at reinventing wheels. The Troops early on had trained for COIN, the Generals had not (1b) We are cultural illiterates, we consistently ignore the rest of the world, partly due to incompetent media but again egos strike -- we have FAOs and ignore what they say. Thus we wander into other nations like clueless boobs. (1c) We refuse to be Bismarkian and learn from the mistakes of others; bad as a bunch of teenagers. (1d) We're too arrogant, a military fallibility that causes continuing underestimation of opponents.

(2) That's obvious and needs no explanation.

[Rank amateur]

Agree wtih you and particularly with your last paragraph:



True dat...

Don't think it's a change in emphasis as much as it implementing, where appropriate, a doctrine we learned in the 60s and then parked for a few years.

Thanks. I've watched all the Kilcullen links posted here carefully. His "talking points" have shifted. (But remember, I'm an ad guy/spin doctor. ) It's probably both going on at once: more aggressive tactics and trying to communicate in a way that elicits more "oo-rahs"/ prepares the public to expect more explosions on their TV.) Paetreus et al. are providing much better spin than anything coming out of our politicians. Kudos to them. Shame on the civilian leadership.

Further, I think there is a reason that we separate the "indigent insurgents" from the "global insurgents" and how we deal with them.

My main objection to their current strategy - assuming that there is one, and that I more or less understand it - is that there isn't enough strategic differentiation. We need to fight the global insurgents. The Shiites and the Kurds aren't going to provide them sanctuary. The Sunnis are pretty good at killing whomever they want to kill. They seem pretty motivated to go after AQI. A small presence in the triangle should be all we need to help the Sunnis kick their butt. And it would be a global PR victory for us.

But we seem to have defined success as getting a political agreement between all the diverse local militias, without a full fledged civil war or partition. Much harder, much more expensive and much more likely that the world will eventually conclude that we were defeated.

I have some concern that when OIF is reviewed we will pick and choose what we want to learn out of it. If we were doing a review right now what would we lay out as the top 5 or so takeaways and how would that effect change?

Start a thread on that. I'd like to peel that onion.

[Ken White]

Thanks. I've watched all the Kilcullen links posted here carefully. His "talking points" have shifted. (But remember, I'm an ad guy/spin doctor. ) It's probably both going on at once: more aggressive tactics and trying to communicate in a way that elicits more "oo-rahs"/ prepares the public to expect more explosions on their TV.) Paetreus et al. are providing much better spin than anything coming out of our politicians. Kudos to them. Shame on the civilian leadership.

in my overlong life at getting their message out...

I don't pay much attention to any of the spokes types; the tendency to spin is too great. I just cull a dozen or so sites a day and try to keep up with what's actually happening; not easy but one can get a fair idea. If you know what to look for it's out there.

Of course, it helps to not have a day job...

And, if I may:

My main objection to their current strategy - assuming that there is one, and that I more or less understand it - is that there isn't enough strategic differentiation. We need to fight the global insurgents...

We are. We just don't talk about it and thus all eyes are on I-rak and that's good.

[selil]

You know - somehow we need to make this happen while getting somebodyelse to pay for it. Hmmm - my vote is JFCOM pays for it and hosts it - we have a broad Joint, Inter-Agency and even multi-national cast - we could allow them to get their agenda out as well - without falling victim to "The Man" and losing our independence / credibility - they benefit in a one time shot that hosts a cross cutting / inter-discipline divers bunch that provides the community a chance to discuss and work through small wars issues and thoughts - which in turn generates greater long term returns because there is no substitute for face to face discussion to strengthen the online type.

What say JFCOM - got a few grand laying around - you could even have the SWC do a sim - of course after we drink your beer, we're back to being ourselves.

Best, Rob

Make it a conference with blind peer reviewed papers and I can get my bosses to spring for my travel... Let's see right now I'm working on a paper titled "Public risks associated with widespread dependence upon computers" i could change that around to "Military risk......"

[Ken White]

"I don't think we can operate on a business model that espouses efficiency over effectiveness and operate in the type of high risk environments we do in the spectrum of war while maintaining the potential for success that we like to go to war with."

That seems to me to summarize a great many synergistic things that put us where we are. I'm going to work on a post on that after Turkey Day, pretty crammed up between now and then -- be outa town from Fri until the Tue after the day.

"This is where investing in leaders (even more then we have so far) from team leader to GO may be the only mitigation strategy we can pull off. We have to have guys and gals who can take a concept out of doctrine (science) and implement it within the context of the operational conditions (art) to accomplish the mission - whatever it may be. Its a tall order, and why we require the best people be placed where they can be best used."

That, too is a critical point. Very critical.

Rank amatuer is right, you oughta start a thread on that five items idea...

[Rank amateur]

I don't pay much attention to any of the spokes types; the tendency to spin is too great.

Spin is what I do for a living. By deciphering spin I get a pretty good idea of where Rob will be spending his next 15 month deployment. Maybe there are more valuable skills, but I don't have any of them.

We are. We just don't talk about it and thus all eyes are on I-rak and that's good.

I agree. Except for the last word. Our eyes should be on the most important fight. It's the only way to make sure we don't get sucker punched by a cheap shot we don't see coming.

One of the reasons why I "pick on" Gian's comments so much (apologies for that - it's not personal at all and I'll be more than happy to buy the first round if/when we can get some f2f time ), is that his stated views are an almost perfect example of someone who believes that certain terms are absolute and unchanging.

He tends to come across that way, but I think what he means is "I know which tactics work, and defining the new strategy in a touchy feely way will lead to ineffective tactics, which will get people killed."

Of course, if he's smart enough to teach at West Point, he's smart enough to speak for himself.

Rank amatuer is right, you oughta start a thread on that five items idea...

I think this is the first time I've been right twice in one thread.

This administration is the worst, is in my overlong life at getting their message out...

Two points. One: It's not over long. Hang around. We need you.

Two: Purely as a spin doctor: no idealogical underpinnings. I think that with every administration spin has become more important and reality less important. But the gap between the two can't become too large. "I did not have sex with that woman" and four years of "Stay the course. We're making progress." are moments when the spin doctors lost all credibility and therefore the presidents they work for lost all credibility.

On a personal note, however, it's nice to be reminded that spin can effect the real world. It makes me realize that maybe my skills have some value after all.